People v. Romero CA2/1

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Filed 8/27/25 P. v. Romero CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B337005

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A800121)
v.

STEVEN MICHAEL ROMERO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Alan K. Schneider, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert H. Derham, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H. Chung,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
We affirm the resentencing court’s order, brought by
appellant Steven Michael Romero pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.6, denying his petition for resentencing.1 As a
matter of law, he is ineligible for resentencing on his convictions
for the murder of Daniel H. and the attempted murder of Kim M.
Relying on the instructions given to the jury at Romero’s trial
and the jury’s verdict, we conclude the jury found all elements of
murder and attempted murder as those crimes are currently
defined.

BACKGROUND
In 1983, Romero, Michael James Dominick, and Clifton
Joseph Shedelbower were “convicted of the first degree murder of
Daniel H. with special circumstances (witness killing and killing
while engaged in flight from commission of rape and other felony
crimes) (count I).[2] They were also each convicted of kidnapping
[of Daniel H. and Kim M.] (count II), rape [of Kim M.] (count IV),
and oral copulation in concert [of Kim M.] (count VI). In addition,
Dominick was convicted of sodomy [of Kim M.] (count V) and
Romero and Shedelbower were convicted of the attempted
murder of Kim M. (count VII), who was the sex crimes victim.

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
We refer to the trial court that considered Romero’s section
1172.6 petition for resentencing as the resentencing court.
2 “After a severance was granted as to defendant
Shedelbower, defendants Dominick and Romero were tried by
separate juries in a joint trial. Thereafter Shedelbower waived
jury and his case was submitted on various transcripts, including
the transcript of the co-defendants’ trial.” (People v. Dominick
(1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1182 (Dominick).)

2
Great bodily injury allegations were found true as to Romero and
Shedelbower on the kidnapping and as to Romero alone on the
attempted murder. On that latter charge, Romero was also
found to have used a knife.”3 (Dominick, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d
at pp. 1182–1183 [opinion in the appeal from Romero’s
convictions].)
The court sentenced Romero to state prison for life without
the possibility of parole and to a determinate term of 31 years
8 months. (Ibid.) Romero’s indeterminate term was for murder
and his determinate sentence included a nine-year term for the
attempted murder.

1. Facts underlying Romero’s conviction
Romero provides no factual background or citations to the
record. He merely refers to the factual background in our opinion
in Dominick, and represents those are “the facts.” The Attorney
General too quotes excerpts from our factual presentation in
Dominick. Only to give context to the jury instructions and the
jury’s verdict, we rely the pertinent factual summary in
Dominick.
“In the early morning hours of Sunday, November 29, 1981,
Kim M., [then]18 years old, and her 16-year-old friend, Danny H.,
the murder victim, drove in Kim’s Datsun station wagon to a
mountain-top location overlooking both the San Fernando Valley
and the Saugus/Newhall area. In the vicinity were radar testing
facilities operated by ITT Gilfillan Corporation (hereinafter ITT).
These facilities had formerly been part of a Nike missile base and
included a main facility designated as the Upper Loop Canyon

3 Romero was the only defendant alleged to have used a
knife in connection with the attempted murder of Kim M.

3
site and another facility containing missile silos at a nearby site
called Lower Loop Canyon. ITT employed 24-hour uniformed
security guards who made rounds of the facilities in a white van.
They operated from a guard house at the main ITT facility.”
(Dominick, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 1183.)
“Kim and Danny parked near the main facility at about
3 a.m. and within a few minutes a white van pulled diagonally in
front of the station wagon. A man wearing a dark jacket with a
fur collar and a badge whom Kim later identified as Romero
approached the station wagon and told the couple they were
trespassing. After Romero obtained identification from the two, a
second man came toward them with a flashlight and asked if they
had any weapons. This man wore a green jacket with green
pants and spoke with a southern accent. Although Kim testified
that Dominick was this man in green, other evidence at the trials
showed that he was in fact Shedelbower.” (Dominick, supra,
182 Cal.App.3d at p. 1183.)
“Romero told Kim and Danny to follow him so that he could
check them out on ‘the main computer’ to insure they were not
spies. The couple then followed the white van down to the lower
facility with the missile silos where one of the defendants
unlocked a gate so the vehicles could be parked inside the fenced
compound. A third man, Dominick, whom Kim had not noticed
until then, led Danny inside a nearby building. Dominick was
dressed in a dark fur-collared security jacket similar to Romero’s
but displayed no badge.” (Dominick, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 1183–1184.)
“Shedelbower and Romero, using a flashlight, then led Kim
down into what was later determined to be an empty missile silo.
As she was being led down some cement stairs, Kim hesitated,

4
and Romero swung a three-foot long white pole or pipe at her. In
fear she descended the remaining stairs, arriving in a large room
with a cement floor. Her glasses were removed and she was
made to undress. Shedelbower then fondled the victim [Kim] and
forced her to orally copulate him, after which he raped her.”
(Dominick, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 1184.) Romero then
forced her to orally copulate him and raped her. (Ibid.) “At about
this time, Dominick appeared in the silo and he too forced Kim to
orally copulate him. Then he raped her and, following that,
turned Kim on her stomach and sodomized her.” (Ibid.)
“Shedelbower told Kim she had 30 seconds to get dressed.
She was taken outside and placed in the rear of the white van. A
few minutes later Shedelbower removed her and placed her in
her station wagon. At this time Kim noticed Danny with his
head and arms stuck through a ladder leaning against the
building he had entered earlier. She could not tell if Danny was
tied to the ladder. Romero was standing near him. [¶] Danny
was then brought to the station wagon. He was bleeding from
the nose and slumped over the steering wheel. Moments later he
was made to sit on Kim’s lap in the front passenger seat while
Shedelbower drove the station wagon down the mountainside
with the van leading the way. After approximately 10 or
15 minutes, Shedelbower honked the horn and the van and
station wagon stopped. Shedelbower led Danny to the front of
the van and Kim heard Romero tell him to ‘lie down on the
ground.’ Kim saw Romero make striking motions with what
appeared to be the white pole she had seen earlier and heard the
noise of Danny being struck. Shedelbower, in the meanwhile,
was standing beside Kim as she stood near the Datsun on the
roadway. She turned her head away from Danny and

5
Shedelbower asked her what she was thinking about. She
replied that it was really cold out and they were going to kill her.”
(Dominick, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 1184.)
“Shortly Romero came toward her holding the white pole
and stated, ‘Now [it’s] your turn.’ Shedelbower got behind her
and after taking hold of her by her arms, pulled her head back by
her hair. As Romero swung the white pole at her in an apparent
attempt to ‘hit [her] throat,’ she turned her head and screamed
and a blow was struck to the right side of her face. At that
moment, Kim somehow managed to break free and fell off the
roadway partway down the mountainside.
“She heard a voice say, ‘What did you let her go for?’ and
another voice replied, ‘She broke free.’ She heard someone say
that they had to find her and then heard someone yell the name
‘Mike.’ Testimony at trial indicated that Romero used the first
name of Steve, that Shedelbower used the first name of Cliff, and
that Dominick used the first name of Michael or Mike. Kim lay
on the hillside until one of the three men approached her and felt
her arm, apparently for a pulse. She feigned lifelessness and the
individual who had found her yelled up the hillside that she was
dead and then departed. Moments later she heard voices saying
that they would not drag her back up but would push the car off
the cliff close to her to make it look as if she had fallen out. She
also heard a voice say that Danny was not dead yet and someone
else replied that ‘they were going to kick the son-of-a-bitch to
death.” She then heard the men say to put Danny in the car and
lock the doors.” (Dominick, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 1185.)
“Kim lay . . . quiet for approximately 15 minutes and
assumed that it was close to 5 a.m. The victim then struggled up
the side of the mountain arriving on the roadway just as the sun

6
was coming up. She was unable to spot the Datsun station
wagon and so started down the roadway half walking and half
running. [¶] After about ten minutes, she heard the sound of an
engine and turned to see a white pickup truck coming up from
behind. She went over the side of the hill and slipped partway
down to hide. She heard one of two men ask if she needed help
and then she saw a hand extended over the edge of the roadway
to her. Too late Kim, who was still without her glasses, realized
to her horror that the two men were Romero and the man in the
green clothing (i.e., defendant Shedelbower). Romero had a
sharp shiny object with which he stabbed her in the chest three
times. She fell backwards partially down the hillside once more.
She heard someone yell, ‘Make sure she’s dead this time.’ She
then arose and began running and screaming down the hill
further. Near the bottom of that hill she stopped as Romero
closed in on her and she asked him, ‘to let me alone, let me die in
peace.’ Romero put his arm down and said, ‘I’d like to but I can’t.’
Kim then became angry and started hitting him. She related
that she ‘reached for his balls’ and was ‘trying to kick him.’ In
this attempt, she fell forward and landed on her stomach. At this
point, Romero fell upon her and stabbed her 17 times in the back.
Romero left her there bleeding on the ground and she heard the
pickup leave.” (Dominick, supra, 182 CalApp.3d at pp. 1185–
1186.)
On Tuesday night, Kim “managed to climb back up to the
roadway and had begun walking down the mountain. On her
own, she arrived on the outskirts of Sylmar and went to a house
where assistance was summoned. She was taken by ambulance
to Holy Cross Hospital where she remained for approximately
two weeks. There she was treated for the 20 stab wounds and for

7
a broken shoulder which she had sustained in falling down the
mountainside. Her face was swollen. She suffered from
numerous cuts and bruises and one of her lungs had partially
collapsed. Dr. Howard Detwiler testified at trial that her stab
wounds were life threatening. Dr. Celso Rodriguez further
testified that Kim had suffered laceration and rupture of her
hymen.” (Dominick, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 1186.)
“In the meanwhile when Danny failed to return home by
Sunday morning, his father reported him missing to the police.
When the police were unable to provide any assistance, he
chartered an airplane from which he spotted the wreckage of the
Datsun station wagon down a ravine on the mountainside. Fire
department personnel and police arrived at the wreckage site at
approximately 5 p.m. on Sunday to find only Danny’s dead body
in the rear cargo area of the Datsun station wagon. The site of
the wreckage was approximately two and a half miles from the
Lower Loop Canyon ITT facility.” (Dominick, supra,
182 Cal.App.3d at p. 1186.) “A deputy medical examiner
performed an autopsy on the body of Danny and ascribed the
cause of death to traumatic asphyxiation due to blunt force
trauma injuries to the neck. He observed multiple abrasions and
lacerations over the head and fractures of the cartilage in the
neck. He also noted abrasions and bruises on the victim’s hands.”
(Id. at p. 1187.)

2. Jury instructions
The trial court instructed Romero’s jury that principals
include: “1. Those who directly and actively commit [or attempt
to commit] the act constituting the crime, or [¶] 2. Those who,
with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the person who
directly and actively commits [or attempts to commit] the crime,

8
aid and abet in its commission [or attempted commission] and
shares in the perpetrator’s intent, or [¶] 3. Those who, whether
present or not at the commission [or attempted commission] of
the crime, advise and encourage its commission [or attempted
commission], and share in the perpetrator’s intent. [¶] One who
aids and abets is not only guilty of the particular crime that to
his knowledge his confederates are contemplating committing,
but he is also liable for the natural and reasonable or probable
consequences of any act that he knowingly aided or encouraged,
and shared in the perpetrator’s intent.”
The jury instruction on natural and probable consequences
was similar but not identical to the 1976 pattern instruction on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The 1976
pattern instruction added to the definition of principals: “ ‘One
who aids and abets is not only guilty of the particular crime that
to his knowledge his confederates are contemplating committing,
but he is also liable for the natural and reasonable or probable
consequences of any act that he knowingly aided or encouraged.’ ”
(People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 263 [quoting the 1976
CALJIC No. 300].) Significantly, here, the trial court added to
the pattern instruction the requirement that the aider and
abettor knowingly aid and share in the perpetrator’s intent.
The court also instructed the jury on aiding and abetting:
“A person aids and abets the commission of a crime if, with
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator of the
crime, he aids, promotes, encourages or instigates by act or
advice the commission of such crime, and shares in the
perpetrators intent.”
The court instructed the jury on the elements of murder,
including that murder requires malice aforethought. The court

9
did not give an implied malice instruction. The court defined
first degree murder as a “willful, deliberate and premeditated
killing with express malice aforethought . . . .”
Regarding the special circumstance of the murder of a
witness, the court instructed the jury that it had to find that if
Romero was “not the actual killer,” he “intentionally aided,
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested or
assisted, as previously defined, the actual killer in the
commission of the murder in the first degree . . . .” The court
instructed the jury that the special circumstance of murder of a
witness to a crime required the jury to find that “the witness was
intentionally killed for the purpose of preventing his testimony in
a criminal proceeding.”
With respect to attempted murder of Kim M., the court
instructed the jury that one element was that “the attempt[ed]
killing was done with malice aforethought.” The court further
instructed the jury: “An attempt to commit a crime of murder
consists of two elements, namely, a specific intent to commit the
crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its
commission.” The first degree attempted murder instruction
provided: “All attempt[ed] murder which is perpetrated by any
kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated attempt[ed] killing
with express malice aforethought is attempt[ed] murder of the
first degree.”
As for great bodily injury in connection with the attempted
murder, the court first informed the jury the prosecution alleged
Romero “with the specific intent to inflict such injury personally
inflicted great bodily injury” on Kim M. The court then
instructed the jury that it had to find whether Romero “with the
specific intent to inflict such injury, did personally inflict great

10
bodily injury . . . .” With respect to the attempted murder count,
the court further instructed on the personal use of a deadly
weapon, “mean[ing] to display such a weapon in a[n
intentionally] menacing manner or intentionally to strike or hit a
human being with it.”

3. Appeal from judgment of conviction
On appeal from the judgment of conviction Romero argued,
among other things, that the jury instructions failed to define
aiding and abetting properly. (Dominick, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d
at p. 1203.) Romero contended that under the then recent case,
People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, a defendant could be
convicted as an aider and abettor only if the defendant shared the
specific intent of the perpetrator and aided the crime knowing the
full extent of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose. (Dominick, at
p. 1203.)
In rejecting Romero’s argument that the trial court failed
adequately to instruct the jury on intent, Dominick held to
convict Romero of first degree murder, “jurors necessarily found
that the murder was intentional and that each defendant
‘manifested an intent unlawfully to kill’ the victim.” (Dominick,
supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 1206.) Further, even if the jury
found Romero was an aider and abettor, under the aiding and
abetting instructions the jury necessarily concluded that he
“shared in the actual perpetrator’s intent.” (Ibid.) Additionally,
to convict Romero of the special circumstance of murder of a
witness to a crime “[t]he jury had to find that ‘the witness was
intentionally killed’ (CALJIC [No.] 8.81.10 (4th ed.)).” (Dominick,
at p. 1206.) Dominick affirmed Romero’s convictions. (Dominick,
at p. 1211.)

11
4. Petition for resentencing, opposition, and reply
In April 2019, Romero filed a resentencing petition
pursuant to former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6. He
alleged a complaint, information, or indictment was filed against
him that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. He also alleged he was convicted of
murder based on the felony murder rule or the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. Romero did not allege he could
not now be convicted of murder because of changes to sections
188 and 189 effective January 1, 2019. Nevertheless, for
purposes of this appeal, we deem him to have made such an
allegation.4
The People opposed the petition, initially arguing the
statute was unconstitutional. The People also argued Romero
intended to kill and was a major participant who acted with
reckless indifference to human life. The People filed a second
opposition arguing Romero was ineligible for resentencing as a
matter of law because the jury found he acted with intent to kill.
In reply, Romero argued he was not “barred from relief
under section 1172.6 solely because his jury found true that he
had the intent to kill.” Romero asserted the jury also had to find
he aided and abetted the murder. Finally, Romero asserted his
jury was given “some instruction on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.”

4 On appeal, the parties appear to assume Romero alleged
he could not now be convicted of murder or attempted murder
because of changes to sections 188 and 189.

12
5. Resentencing court order
Although the petition concerned only the murder count, the
resentencing court considered Romero’s convictions for both
murder and attempted murder. The court found Romero did not
establish a prima facie case for resentencing relief. The court
explained there was no instruction on felony murder or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. The court found the
aiding and abetting instruction required Romero to have the
mens rea and actus reus for murder and attempted murder.

DISCUSSION
On appeal, appellant focuses on the instruction regarding
the special circumstance for victim murder and argues the jury’s
true finding does not “conclusively” establish appellant had
intent to kill. That instruction was relevant to the murder count;
appellant makes no argument on appeal specifically directed to
his attempted murder conviction.
To support his argument, appellant contends that at the
time of Romero’s conviction, the law was “unclear” until the
Supreme Court decided Carlos v. Superior Court (Carlos)5 as to
whether the special circumstance instruction “at issue” required
the jury to find intent to kill. He further contends, contrary to
the resentencing court’s finding, the trial court did instruct on
the natural probable consequences and in combination with the

5 Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, overruled
by People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1138–1139 [holding
that intent to kill is not an element of the felony murder special
circumstance but if the defendant is an aider and abettor and not
the actual killer, intent must be proven in order to find the
special circumstance true].)

13
unsettled state of the law, the jury could have convicted appellant
based on imputed malice. We review de novo the denial of a
resentencing petition at the prima facie stage. (People v.
Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251.) We conclude that
the special circumstance instruction, which incorporates the
aiding and abetting instruction, demonstrates the jury found all
elements of murder as currently defined. We also conclude that
Romero is ineligible for resentencing on his attempted murder
conviction because the jury found he was the principal—the
person who stabbed Kim M. causing her great bodily injury.

A. Background on Section 1172.6
“[T]he Legislature, in Senate Bill 1437, ‘eliminated natural
and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to
aiding and abetting, and limited the scope of the felony-murder
rule.’ [Citation.] Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1170.95,
now section 1172.6, to provide ‘a procedure for convicted
murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended
to retroactively seek relief.’ [Citation.] Thereafter, Senate Bill
775 amended section 1172.6 to, inter alia, expand eligibility for
resentencing to persons convicted of murder pursuant to a ‘theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 723–724 (Antonelli).) Senate Bill
No. 1437 did not affect the direct theory of aiding and abetting.
Accordingly, “[o]ne who directly aids and abets another who
commits murder is . . . liable for murder under the new law just
as he or she was liable under the old law.” (People v. Offley
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 596.)
“[T]he section 1172.6 petitioning ‘process begins with the
filing of a petition containing a declaration that all requirements

14
for eligibility are met ([§ 1172.6], subd. (b)(1)(A)), including that
“[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to . . . Section 188 or
189 . . . .” ’ [Citations.]” (Antonelli, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 724.)
“ ‘If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that
the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss
the petition.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
In People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433 (Curiel), our high
court held a defendant who petitions for resentencing under
section 1172.6 is ineligible for resentencing only if the “record
conclusively establishes every element of the offense.” (Id. at
p. 463.) Thus, Curiel instructs that in evaluating whether a
petitioner is eligible for resentencing at the prima facie stage, a
court must view the instructions and verdict to determine
whether the record of conviction shows every element of the
offense.

B. As a Matter of Law, Romero Is Ineligible for
Resentencing as to the Murder of Daniel H.
“ ‘[A] relevant jury finding is generally preclusive in
section 1172.6 proceedings, i.e., it “ordinarily establish[es] a
defendant’s ineligibility for resentencing under Senate Bill 1437
and thus preclude[s] the defendant from making a prima facie
case for relief.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Beaudreaux (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 1227, quoting Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
pp. 453–454.) “ ‘Murder is the unlawful killing of a human
being . . . with malice aforethought.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Richee (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 281, 293 (Richee).)
Either the jury found Romero was the actual perpetrator or
it found he aided and abetted the murder. If the jury found
Romero was the actual perpetrator of the murder, he would be

15
ineligible for resentencing, and Romero does not contend
otherwise. Under the trial court’s instructions, the jury
necessarily found that the perpetrator killed Daniel H. with
express malice, premeditation and deliberation, and with the
intent to stop Daniel H. from testifying.
If, on the other hand, the jury found Romero aided and
abetted the murder of Daniel H., we conclude the jury necessarily
found all elements of aiding and abetting under current law. Our
Supreme Court recently explained: “ ‘[U]nder direct aiding and
abetting principles, an accomplice is guilty of an offense
perpetrated by another [e.g., murder] if the accomplice aids the
commission of that offense with “knowledge of the direct
perpetrator’s unlawful intent and [with] an intent to assist in
achieving those unlawful ends.” ’ [Citation.]” (Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 463.)
The trial court instructed the jury that to find the special
circumstance true, it had to find that appellant “intentionally
aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
requested or assisted, as previously defined, the actual killer in
the commission of the murder in the first degree . . . .” (Italics
added.) Thus, to find the special circumstance true, the jury
necessarily had to have found that the aider and abettor aided
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree,
i.e., willful, premeditated, and deliberate murder, and thus
intended to kill. The special circumstance instruction
incorporated the aiding and abetting instruction. The aiding and
abetting instruction permitted the jury to find Romero aided and
abetted only if it found that “with knowledge of the unlawful
purpose of the perpetrator of the crime, he aids, promotes,
encourages or instigates by act or advice the commission of such

16
crime, and shares in the perpetrators intent.” If the jury found
Romero was not the perpetrator, the jury instructions required
that to convict him as an aider and abettor of the special
circumstance murder, he had to have knowledge of the
perpetrator’s unlawful purpose while sharing the perpetrator’s
intent. Thus, the jury found all elements of direct aiding and
abetting.
The trial court’s natural and probable consequence
instruction does not alter this conclusion. The court instructed
the jury, “One who aids and abets is not only guilty of the
particular crime that to his knowledge his confederates are
contemplating committing, but he is also liable for the natural
and reasonable or probable consequences of any act that he
knowingly aided or encouraged, and shared in the perpetrator’s
intent.” As explained above, however, the jury could not have
convicted Romero as an aider and abettor and found true the
special circumstance regarding killing a witness without finding
that Romero knew of the perpetrator’s intent.
Assuming for purposes of argument only that the law at the
time of Romero’s trial was unclear as to whether an aider and
abettor to a special circumstance murder had to have intent to
kill, the jury instructions required the jury in this case to find
Romero harbored intent to kill. Put simply, the trial court
believed intent was required for aiding and abetting liability and
instructed the jury accordingly. (See Antonelli, supra, 17 Cal.5th
at p. 731 [jury instructions critical to evaluating section 1172.6
petition from defendant convicted by jury]; see also Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 441 [considering jury verdict in light of
instructions to determine whether defendant made prima facie
case for section 1172.6 relief].) As Dominick explained, the jury

17
instructions required the jury to find that Romero harbored
intent to kill regardless of the state of the law at the time of his
trial. (Dominick, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 1206.)
Romero also argues the jury could have imputed malice to
him based on his participation in the kidnaping, rape, and oral
copulation in concert “without also finding that Romero intended
to kill.” No jury instruction permitted the jury to impute malice
to Romero based on his crimes of kidnapping, rape, or oral
copulation.
Finally, none of Romero’s authorities assist him. Romero
relies on Carlos for the proposition that when Romero was tried,
the law was undecided as to whether the special circumstance
law required intent to kill. Carlos is not apt. There, our high
court considered “whether a defendant can be charged or
convicted of murder with the special circumstance of felony
murder under the 1978 death penalty initiative if he did not
intend to kill or to aid in the commission of a killing.” (Carlos,
supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 134.) The court indicated the initiative
“should be construed to require an intent to kill or to aid in a
killing as an element of the felony murder special circumstance.”
(Id. at p. 135.) The court issued a writ barring trial on a special
circumstance where no evidence suggested the defendant
intended to kill the victim. (Id. at p. 136.)
Romero also cites depublished appellate decisions for the
proposition that “the 1978 initiative permitted the jury to impose
death or life without the possibility of parole on an individual
who neither killed nor intended to kill.” As set forth above, we
have assumed arguendo the law was uncertain at the time of
Romero’s trial. Still, under the trial court’s actual jury

18
instructions, Romero’s jury could not have found the special
circumstance true without finding that he intended to kill.
Romero also relies on People v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d
471. There, our high court considered the meaning of the
following felony murder special circumstance instruction: “ ‘To
find that the special circumstance, referred to in these
instructions as murder in the commission of robbery, is true, it
must be proved: [¶] 1a. That the murder was committed while
the defendant was engaged in or was an accomplice in the
commission of a robbery, or [¶] 1b. That the murder was
committed during the immediate flight after the commission of a
robbery, [¶] And it must also be proved: [¶] 2. That the
defendant was either the actual killer or a person who
intentionally aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested or assisted the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree.’ ” (Id. at p. 486.) The
trial court also instructed the jury: “ ‘The unlawful killing of a
human being, whether intentional, unintentional or accidental,
which occurs as a result of the commission of or attempt to
commit the crime of robbery, and where there was in the mind of
the perpetrator the specific intent to commit the crime of robbery,
is murder of the first degree.’ ” (Id. at p. 487.) Warren held that
a reasonable jury would understand the felony murder special
circumstance instruction to mean the aider and abettor intended
to kill. The high court rejected the argument that the aider and
abettor instead could have intended only to commit a robbery.
(Id. at pp. 487–488.) Warren is not apt because Romero’s jury
was not instructed on felony murder, as appellant concedes.

19
C. As a Matter of Law, Romero Is Ineligible for
Resentencing for Attempted Murder
“ ‘Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and
the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward
accomplishing the intended killing.’ [Citation.]” (Richee, supra,
111 Cal.App.5th at p. 293.) When viewed in light of the jury
instructions, the jury verdict shows that the jury found Romero
was the perpetrator because he used a weapon and personally
inflicted great bodily injury on Kim M.6 Romero makes no
separate argument that the jury’s verdict and true finding on the
witness murder special circumstance do not demonstrate the jury
found intent to kill Kim M., and as explained above, the jury
instructions and the jury’s verdict and true finding would render
any such argument unfounded. In sum, as a matter of law,
Romero is ineligible for resentencing on his attempted murder
conviction.

6 Shedelbower was also charged with the attempted
murder of Kim M. He, however, was not charged with personally
using a knife in the commission of the crime. See footnote 3, ante.

20
DISPOSITION
The order denying Steven Michael Romero’s resentencing
petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.

21

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