CourtListener 10661772•People v. Salmon CA5
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Filed 8/27/25 P. v. Salmon CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F087996
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. DF017274A)
v.
MURL GARDNER SALMON, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Michael Caves,
Judge.
Picone & DeFilippis and Steve M. DeFilippis for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill, Erin
Doering, and Viktoriya Chebotarev, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Murl Gardner Salmon (appellant) pled no contest to reckless evasion
(Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)) in Santa Clara County Superior Court and admitted two
prior strike convictions. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life
pursuant to the “Three Strikes” law. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd.
(c)(2)(A).) 1 In 2023, while serving the above sentence, appellant pled no contest to
possession of drugs or alcohol in prison (§ 4573.8) in Kern County Superior Court and
admitted a prior strike conviction. Pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, appellant
was sentenced to a consecutive determinate term of 32 months.
On appeal, appellant claims that in imposing sentence in the Kern County case, the
trial court was also required to resentence him in the Santa Clara County case. He
contends this rendered the Santa Clara County judgment nonfinal, entitling him to the
ameliorative benefit of the new law pursuant to In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740.
Specifically, he argues the court should have applied section 1170.126, the resentencing
provision of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Reform Act) (Prop. 36, as approved
by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)), which allows a person presently serving a third
strike sentence to petition for resentencing if their committing offense was neither serious
nor violent. (§ 1170.126, subd. (a).)
We conclude Estrada is inapplicable because the imposition of sentence in the
Kern County case did not affect the finality of the Santa Clara County judgment. We
also agree with the trial court that it was not the proper venue for resentencing
proceedings under section 1170.126. We affirm.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2.
BACKGROUND
In 2009, in Santa Clara County Superior Court, appellant pled no contest to
reckless evasion (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)).2 He also admitted he suffered two
prior strike convictions for second degree robbery (§§ 212, 212.5, subd. (c)) in Santa
Clara County in 2001. (§§ 667, subd. (d)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b)(1)).) Pursuant to the
former Three Strikes law, appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to
life. (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A).)
In 2023, while appellant was serving the Santa Clara County sentence in North
Kern State Prison, the Kern County District Attorney’s Office filed a complaint charging
appellant with possession of a controlled substance in state prison. (§ 4573.6.) The
People also alleged appellant suffered two prior strike convictions for second degree
robbery in Santa Clara County. (§§ 667, subd. (d)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b)(1).)
Appellant pled no contest to an amended charge of unauthorized possession of
drugs or alcohol in state prison (§ 4573.8) and admitted one prior strike conviction
allegation. In exchange, appellant agreed he would be sentenced to 32 months in state
prison (the low term of 16 months, doubled for the prior strike), consecutive to the
indeterminate term imposed for the 2009 conviction in Santa Clara County. (§§ 667,
subd. (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).)
Appellant filed a sentencing memorandum claiming that under section 1170.1,
subdivision (a) (hereinafter section 1170.1(a)), the trial court must also resentence him on
the Santa Clara County case and “pronounce a new judgment providing just one
aggregate term.” He argued that because of this resentencing, judgment in the Santa
2 Appellant also pled guilty to misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol
(Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) and misdemeanor driving with a blood-alcohol content of
0.08 percent or greater (id., § 23152, subd. (b)).
3.
Clara County case would become nonfinal for purposes of Estrada, entitling him to the
ameliorative benefits of the Reform Act. Thus, he contended the court must apply the
resentencing provision established by the Reform Act (§ 1170.126) and impose a second
strike sentence. The People did not dispute the Santa Clara County sentence was subject
to the Reform Act, but urged the court to find resentencing appellant would “pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).)
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court concluded section 1170.1(a) was
inapplicable to appellant’s sentences because he was sentenced to an indeterminate term
in the Santa Clara County case. Turning to section 1170.126, the court explained that to
be eligible for resentencing, a defendant must file a resentencing petition “within two
years after the effective date of [the Reform Act] or at a later date upon a showing of
good cause,” and the petition must be heard by “the trial court that entered the judgment
of conviction in his or her case.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (b).) After observing appellant had
not made a showing of good cause for filing a late petition, the court reasoned it did not
“need to get there” because the petition was not before the trial court that imposed
sentence on the Santa Clara County case. Consequently, the court ruled it lacked
“jurisdiction” to conduct resentencing proceedings under section 1170.126, and declined
to make “any substantive findings” on whether resentencing would pose an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety.
The court then sentenced appellant on the 2023 case to 32 months in state prison,
to be served consecutively to the 2009 case, in accordance with the negotiated plea
agreement.
4.
DISCUSSION
I. Sentencing in the Instant Matter Did Not Affect the Finality of the Judgment
in the Santa Clara County Case. Accordingly, Estrada is Inapplicable, and
the Trial Court Was Not Obligated to Resentence Appellant in Accordance
with the Reform Act.
Appellant was sentenced to a third strike sentence of 25 years to life in the Santa
Clara County case in 2009, well before the Reform Act became effective in 2012. Under
the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act, many defendants with two or more
prior strike convictions whose current offense is not a serious or violent felony are
excepted from the 25-year-to-life sentence for third strike defendants. (See People v.
Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 652–653 (Conley).) For those defendants who are
“presently serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment” under the previous version of
the Three Strikes law, the Reform Act established a resentencing procedure that allows
such defendants to petition for resentencing “before the trial court that entered the
judgment of conviction in his or her case.” (§ 1170.126, subds. (a) & (b).)
Appellant claims that under section 1170.1(a), when the trial court imposed
sentence in the Kern County case, it also had to resentence him on the Santa Clara case
and impose a single, “aggregate term of imprisonment for [both] convictions.” He
contends this purported resentencing rendered judgment in the Santa Clara County case
nonfinal, triggering the retrospective application of section 1170.126 under Estrada.
Thus, in appellant’s view, the court was required to automatically apply section 1170.126
to the Santa Clara County judgment by virtue of his sentencing in the Kern County case.3
3 There is no indication in the record on appeal that appellant previously filed a
petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.126. However, our review of People v.
Salmon (Oct. 24, 2016, H042341) [nonpub. opn.] reveals appellant filed such a petition in
Santa Clara County in 2013. On this court’s own motion, we take judicial notice of this
unpublished opinion. (See Evid. Code §§ 452, subd. (d), 459; People v. Hill (1998)
17 Cal.4th 800, 847, fn. 9.) The opinion states the trial court held an evidentiary hearing
5.
Appellant’s claim fails for two reasons. First, section 1170.1(a), only applies to
the imposition of multiple consecutive determinate terms. Because appellant received an
indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life in the Santa Clara County case, the judgment is
not subject to section 1170.1(a). Second, to the extent the imposition of sentence in the
Kern County case had any effect on the Santa Clara County case, there is no basis to
conclude the latter judgment was rendered nonfinal for Estrada purposes.4
II. Legal Background.
A. The Three Strikes Reform Act.
“Under the Three Strikes law as originally enacted … a defendant who had been
convicted of … two or more prior serious or violent felonies (a third strike defendant)
was to be sentenced to ‘an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term
of’ at least 25 years.” (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 652.) Effective in 2012, “[t]he
Reform Act changed the sentence prescribed for a third strike defendant whose current
offense is not a serious or violent felony.” (Ibid.) Now, such defendants are generally
sentenced as second strike defendants and instead receive “twice the term otherwise
provided as punishment for the current felony conviction.” (§§ 667, subd. (e)(1),
1170.12, subd. (c)(1); see Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 653.)
to address whether resentencing appellant “would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).) After considering the testimony of several
witnesses, including appellant, the trial court denied the resentencing petition on this
ground. The denial was affirmed on appeal.
4 Because we conclude appellant’s claim must be rejected on these grounds, we
need not determine whether the Estrada retroactivity exception applies to the amended
penalty provisions of the Reform Act or its resentencing provision. (See Conley, supra,
63 Cal.4th at pp. 661–662 [defendants with nonfinal judgments must seek resentencing
pursuant to section 1170.126 and are not entitled to automatic resentencing under
Estrada].)
6.
The Reform Act also established a resentencing procedure for those “persons
presently serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment” under the previous version of
the Three Strikes law but could not have received such a sentence under the Reform
Act’s revised sentencing provisions. (§ 1170.126, subd. (a).) “[W]ithin two years after
the effective date of the [Reform Act] or at a later date upon a showing of good cause,”
such persons may file a petition for recall of sentence “before the trial court that entered
the judgment of conviction in his or her case.” (Id., subd. (b).) “If the petitioner would
have qualified for a shorter sentence under the Reform Act … section 1170.126 provides
that he ‘shall be resentenced pursuant to [the Reform Act] unless the court, in its
discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety’ (id., subd. (f)). In exercising this discretion, the court may
consider the defendant’s criminal conviction history, the defendant’s disciplinary record
and record of rehabilitation while incarcerated, and ‘[a]ny other evidence the court ...
determines to be relevant.’ (Id., subd. (g).)” (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 653.)
B. Sentencing under section 1170.1(a).
“Section 1170.1, which was enacted as part of the [Determinate Sentencing Law
(§ 1170 et seq.)], ‘generally governs the calculation and imposition of a determinate
sentence when a defendant has been convicted of more than one felony offense.’ ”
(People v. Sasser (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1, 8–9.) Section 1170.1(a) sets forth the
methodology for imposing “multiple consecutive determinate terms,” irrespective of
whether the terms arose from the same or different proceedings. (In re Reeves (2005)
35 Cal.4th 765, 773 (Reeves); see People v. Sasser, supra, at p. 8; People v. Felix (2000)
22 Cal.4th 651, 655 (Felix).) “[T]he aggregate term of imprisonment … shall be the sum
of the principal term, the subordinate term, and any additional term imposed for
applicable enhancements.” (§ 1170.1, subd. (a).) “[T]he term with the longest sentence
7.
is the ‘principal term’; any term consecutive to the principal term is a ‘subordinate term.’
(§ 1170.1, subd. (a).) The court imposes the full term, either lower, middle, or upper, for
the principal term. However, … the court imposes only ‘one-third of the middle term’
for subordinate terms.’ (Ibid.)” (Felix, at p. 655.)
If a determinate term is imposed consecutive to a determinate term imposed
previously in a different proceeding, the second sentencing court “must designate the
longest single term as the principal term, which may displace a previously designated
principal term.” (In re Rodriguez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 952, 961 (Rodriguez); see Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.452(a).) Thus, in this circumstance, “the second court is
empowered to modify a sentence previously imposed by a different court and make it
subordinate to the later-imposed term.” (People v. Baker (2002) 144 Cal.App.4th 1320,
1329.) However, the second court cannot disturb the discretionary sentencing choices of
the first sentencing court, such as “the decision to impose [the lower, middle, or upper
term], making counts in prior cases concurrent with or consecutive to each other, or …
striking the punishment for an enhancement.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.452(c); see
Reeves, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 773; Rodriguez, at p. 960.) “This limitation reflects, in
part, the common law rule that a court loses jurisdiction to resentence a defendant once
execution of the sentence has begun.” (Rodriguez, at p. 960.)
III. Section 1170.1(a) Is Inapplicable Because Appellant Was Sentenced to an
Indeterminate Term of 25 Years to Life in the Santa Clara County Case.
By its plain language, section 1170.1(a), “specifically limits its application to
consecutive terms imposed under ‘Sections 669 and 1170,’ ” i.e., to consecutive
determinate terms. (People v. McGahuey (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 524, 531–532; see
Felix, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 656.) Consecutive indeterminate terms are imposed under
sections 669 and 1168, subdivision (b), and thus, are not subject to section 1170.1(a).
8.
(Felix, at p. 656; McGahuey, at pp. 531–532.) Rather, indeterminate sentences and
determinate sentences must be “considered and calculated independently of one another”
because they are subject to different sentencing schemes. (People v. Reyes (1989)
212 Cal.App.3d 852, 856; see People v. Neely (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 787, 797.) “Once
the court determines what sentence is to be imposed for the indeterminate term offenses
and the determinate term offenses, it combines the two to reach an aggregate total
sentence.” (Neely, supra, at p. 798.)
Here, appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term in the Santa Clara County
case, and a consecutive determinate term in the Kern County case. Accordingly,
section 1170.1(a) is inapplicable. The trial court was only permitted to impose the
determinate sentence in the Kern County case, then combine it with the indeterminate
sentence in the Santa Clara County case to reach the aggregate term of imprisonment.
There was no need for the court to select principal or subordinate terms, nor any legal
basis to otherwise modify the previously imposed third strike sentence in the Santa Clara
County case.
IV. Sentencing in the Kern County Case Did Not Affect the Finality of the Santa
Clara County Judgment.
Having determined section 1170.1(a), is inapplicable to appellant’s sentences, we
now consider what impact, if any, sentencing in the Kern County case had on the finality
of the judgment in the Santa Clara County case for purposes of Estrada.
A. Estrada only applies to nonfinal judgments.
Under Estrada, we assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that an amendatory
statute “mitigat[ing] the possible punishment for a class of persons” is “presumptively
retroactive and applie[s] to all persons whose judgments [are] not yet final at the time the
statute [takes] effect.” (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 624.) In short, Estrada,
9.
“stand[s] for the proposition that (i) in the absence of a contrary indication of legislative
intent, (ii) legislation that ameliorates punishment (iii) applies to all cases that are not yet
final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671,
675.)
“The Estrada finality ‘inquiry focuse[s] on whether the criminal prosecution or
proceeding as a whole is complete.’ ” (People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 395.)
“[A] judgment becomes final ‘ “where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the
availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari ha[s] elapsed.” ’ ”
(People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 162.) However, a final criminal judgment
becomes nonfinal for Estrada purposes if sentence is subsequently vacated on collateral
review, such as habeas corpus proceedings. (Padilla, at pp. 162–163.) When a sentence
is vacated, the trial court regains the “jurisdiction and duty to consider” the appropriate
punishment at resentencing, and the defendant regains the right to appeal the new
sentence. (Id. at p. 162.)
V. Sentencing in the Kern County Case Did Not Render the Santa Clara County
Judgment Nonfinal.
Appellant contends that when the trial court announced the aggregate sentence, it
necessarily modified the previously imposed sentence in Santa Clara County case and
“creat[ed] a[n] entirely new sentence altogether.” He relies on People v. Phoenix, where
the defendant claimed that a trial court that imposes a consolidated sentence under
section 1170.1(a) must calculate and award custody credits related to a previously
imposed sentence in another county. (People v. Phoenix (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1119,
1124 (Phoenix).) Phoenix agreed, concluding that the second trial court became the
“sentencing court” for both cases, and the sentence from the other county was “replaced
by the consecutive sentence imposed” by the second trial court. (Id. at p. 1126.) Because
10.
section 2900.5, subdivision (d) requires the “sentencing court” to award custody credits,
it was the “trial court’s duty as the new sentencing court to calculate and award” such
credits. (Phoenix, at p. 1126.)
Phoenix is inapplicable here because, as we have explained, appellant’s sentence
is not subject to section 1170.1(a). Moreover, Phoenix only considered which court
constitutes the “sentencing court” for purposes of awarding custody credits under the
applicable statute. (Phoenix, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 1124.) It had no occasion to
address the crux of appellant’s claim – whether the announcement of an aggregate
sentence renders a previously imposed judgment nonfinal for purposes of Estrada.
The Rodriguez court concluded it does not. There, in the first proceeding, the
defendant was convicted of several felonies and sentenced to a determinate term, which
included a one-year prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). (Rodriguez,
supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 958.) In the second proceeding, which occurred after
judgment in the first proceeding became final, the defendant was convicted of several
additional determinate term felonies. (Ibid.) The trial court imposed a determinate term
of imprisonment to run consecutively with the sentence imposed in the first proceeding.
(Ibid.) In accordance with section 1170.1(a), the court announced a single aggregate term
encompassing both proceedings. (Rodriguez, at p. 958.)
While appeal from the second proceeding was pending, the Legislature amended
section 667.5, subdivision (b), to limit its application to certain sexually violent offenses.
(Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1); Rodriguez,
supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 958.) On habeas, the defendant argued the amendment
applied retroactively to the first proceeding under Estrada, alleging his “aggregate
sentence” was not final when the amendment went into effect. (Rodriguez, at p. 957.)
11.
Rodriguez disagreed, explaining that, “[c]rucially, the court announcing the
aggregate term of imprisonment does not resentence the defendant in the generally
understood manner, with authority to modify every aspect of the sentence.” (Rodriguez,
supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 960.) Instead, it is limited by the discretionary sentencing
choices of the first court and may only modify the prior judgment if necessary. (Ibid.)
The lone exception to this rule is the designation of a new principal term, which may
supplant a previously imposed principal term. (Id. at p. 961; see People v. Bozeman
(1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 504, 507.) “Given these limitations, the announcement of an
aggregate sentence does not reopen a prior judgment or render it nonfinal for purposes of
the Estrada rule. The announcement of an aggregate sentence is not a mere continuation
of a prior criminal proceeding. It is, instead, the result of a new proceeding, occasioned
by the commission of an additional offense, which builds on the now-final determinations
of a previous court.” (Rodriguez, at p. 961, fn. omitted.)
Although Rodriguez involved the application of section 1170.1(a), its reasoning is
applicable here. Rodriguez highlighted that under section 1170.1(a), the imposition of a
consecutive determinate sentence has limited impact on a previously imposed
determinate sentence. Here, the imposition of the determinate sentence in the Kern
County case had even less effect on the previously imposed indeterminate sentence in the
Santa Clara County case. As we have explained, an indeterminate sentence and a
determinate sentence are subject to different sentencing schemes. There is no principal
term and no subordinate terms, and thus, the term in one case does not affect the length of
the term in the other case. Rather, the sentences must be considered and calculated
separately, and do not interact until the sentencing court adds them together to form the
aggregate term. Accordingly, the imposition of sentence in the Kern County case, and
announcement of an aggregate term of imprisonment, did not result in vacatur of the
12.
Santa Clara County sentence, necessitate resentencing, or otherwise affect he finality of
that judgment for Estrada purposes.
Appellant also relies on People v Kimble, which held that the trial court was not
required to apply the ameliorative sentencing changes of the Reform Act to a defendant
resentenced under section 1172.75.5 (People v. Kimble (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 746, 750–
751, review granted Apr. 24, 2024, S284259.) But contrary to appellant’s claim, Kimble
did not hold that the trial court was required to determine at the section 1172.75
resentencing hearing whether the defendant was eligible for resentencing under section
1170.126. (Kimble, pp. 750–751.) Kimble merely concluded that section 1172.75 does
not authorize the trial court to bypass the resentencing procedures set forth in section
1170.126. (Kimble, at pp. 750–751.) Regardless of its holding, Kimble is inapplicable
here because appellant was not resentenced on the Santa Clara County case, let alone
resentenced pursuant to section 1172.75.6
To conclude, appellant fails to show that the finality of the Santa Clara County
judgment was affected by the sentencing proceedings in the Kern County case or the
announcement of an aggregate term of imprisonment. Accordingly, insofar as the
resentencing provisions of 1170.126 constitute an ameliorative benefit under Estrada,
5 Section 1172.75 sets forth a procedure by which defendants who are serving a
sentence with a now invalid prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) are
identified and recalled for resentencing.
6 In support of this argument, appellant cites to section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2),
which provides that when a defendant is resentenced pursuant to this section, “[t]he court
shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in
law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” This subdivision has no relevance
here because, as noted, appellant was not resentenced under section 1172.75.
13.
appellant was not entitled to their retrospective application by virtue of his sentencing in
the Kern County case, and we reject this claim.
VI. The Kern County Superior Court Was Not the Proper Venue for
Resentencing Proceedings under Section 1170.126.
After rejecting appellant’s claim that he was entitled to automatic resentencing
under the Reform Act, the trial court appears to have construed appellant’s sentencing
memorandum to be a resentencing petition under section 1170.126. Assuming it did
constitute such a resentencing petition, we agree with the trial court it was not filed in the
correct court.
Section 1170.126, subdivision (b) specifies that resentencing proceedings must
occur “ ‘before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case.’ ”
In other words, the resentencing petition must be heard by the “initial sentencing judge.”
(People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1300, 1301
(Kaulick).) Nothing in the language of section 1170.126 authorizes a defendant to file a
resentencing petition in the superior court of a different county. Because the third strike
sentence was imposed by a judge in the Santa Clara County Superior Court, the Kern
County Superior Court was not the proper venue for the resentencing petition.
Appellant contends he is not limited to petitioning for resentencing in Santa Clara
County because the right to be heard by a particular judge can be waived. (See Kaulick
supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1301.) Our Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in
People v. Adelmann, which addressed the proper venue for filing a Proposition 47
resentencing petition (§ 1170.18). (People v. Adelmann (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1071
(Adelmann).) There, the defendant filed such a petition in a different county than he was
originally sentenced. (Id. at p. 1074.) Section 1170.18 contains an identical venue
provision to section 1170.126, providing that resentencing proceedings shall occur
14.
“before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction.” (§ 1170.18, subd. (a).)
Nonetheless, the appellate court concluded the defendant had “waive[d] his right to be
sentenced by a particular judge in a particular county” by filing the petition in another
court. (Adelmann, supra, p. 1081.)
Adelmann reversed, concluding that section 1170.18, subdivision (a) “mean[s]
what it says, that the original sentencing court, or an assigned judge in that county, rule
on a resentencing petition.” (Adelmann, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1080.) Rejecting the
appellate court’s waiver theory, Adelmann explained: “Section 1170.18 gives a
defendant the right to petition for resentencing under Proposition 47. It does not grant a
concurrent right to choose the venue for such a petition. Taken to its logical extreme,
such a waiver theory would seem to allow a defendant to petition for resentencing in any
California court, however untethered to the original county of conviction.” (Id. at
p. 1081.)
Adelmann’s reasoning is applicable here. Like section 1170.18, subdivision (a),
section 1170.126, subdivision (b) plainly states that a resentencing petition must be heard
by the initial sentencing judge.7 Appellant cannot bypass this requirement by asserting
waiver.8 Thus, under Adelmann, appellant did not have the right to file a petition for
resentencing in Kern County Superior Court.
7 Where the initial sentencing judge is unavailable, section 1170.126, subdivision (j)
provides that “the presiding judge shall designate another judge to rule on the defendant’s
petition.”
“The presiding judge of the superior court has authority to ‘distribute the business
of the court among the judges.’ (Gov. Code, § 69508; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule
10.603(b)(1)(B).) The presiding judge of one county does not customarily assign cases to
judges in other jurisdictions.” (Adelmann, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1078.)
8 We do not dispute that under certain circumstances, a defendant may properly
waive the right to have a section 1170.126 resentencing petition heard by a specific
judge. (See Kaulick, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1301.) We only conclude that the
15.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
LEVY, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SNAUFFER, J.
FAIN, J.
ability to enter such a waiver does not permit a defendant to bypass section 1170.126,
subdivision (b), and select the venue for resentencing proceedings.
16.
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