People v. Young CA2/2

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Filed 8/26/25 P. v. Young CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B338064

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. No. NA103854)

MOSES JEROME YOUNG,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura L. Laesecke, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.

John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________
Defendant and appellant Moses Jerome Young appeals
from the trial court’s order denying his motion for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1170.91.1 Because the court did not
follow the required procedures for adjudicating the motion, we
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts2
Appellant entered a fast food restaurant, jumped over the
counter, pointed a gun at the cashier, and took money. In a
“separate incident[,]” appellant “had narcotics and a
357 revolver.”
II. Conviction and Sentencing
On June 29, 2017, appellant pled no contest to second
degree robbery (§ 212.5, subd. (c)) and admitted that he
personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). In a separate
case, he pled no contest to possession of a controlled substance
while armed. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a).) The
trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate prison term of
14 years for both cases.
III. Section 1170.91 Motion for Resentencing
On March 11, 2024, appellant filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus requesting to be resentenced pursuant to
section 1170.91, which allows individuals convicted of some

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2 The record on appeal contains minimal information about
the facts underlying appellant’s convictions. We draw this
summary from the trial court’s comments during appellant’s plea
and sentencing hearing in 2017.

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felonies to seek recall and resentencing so that certain mitigating
factors related to military service can be considered. Appellant
alleged that he had “honorably served in the United States
Military” and suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD). Among other exhibits, appellant attached a letter dated
April 28, 2022, from the Department of Veterans Affairs
indicating that defendant (1) is a veteran; (2) served in the Navy
“[u]nder [h]onorable [c]onditions” from 1997 to 2007; and
(3) suffered from “[s]ervice [c]onnected” noncombat PTSD.
Appellant also attached mental health treatment records from
2022, as well as the transcript from his June 29, 2017, sentencing
hearing.
IV. Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court construed appellant’s petition as a motion
for resentencing under section 1170.91. On April 2, 2024, with no
parties present, the court denied the motion. In a written order,
the court explained:
“Penal Code section 1170.91 took effect in 2015, prior to the
filing of both cases. Since the law was in effect at the time of the
plea, it is presumed that counsel was aware of it and would have
taken action had [appellant] been eligible to benefit from it.
“At the time of the plea negotiations, defense counsel
informed the court and prosecuting attorney that [appellant] was
a veteran of the military and had some ‘difficulties related to
that’ . . . . However, simply being a veteran does not entitle a
person charged with a crime to a lesser sentence. The code
requires that the person have ‘a condition or trauma’ related to
their service which was a factor in the crime charged. [Appellant]
has provided proof that he was discharged from the Navy in
2007, that he was diagnosed with noncombat PTSD and that he

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suffers from anxiety. However, he has failed to provide any proof
that PTSD or anxiety played a role in his armed robbery of a
Jack-in-the Box or his possession of narcotics for sale while in
possession of a gun.”
V. Appeal
Appellant’s timely appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We interpret the requirements of section 1170.91 de novo.
(See People v. Bonilla-Bray (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 234, 237
(Bonilla-Bray).)
II. Relevant Law
If a trial “court concludes that a defendant convicted of a
felony offense is, or was, a member of the United States military
who may be suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic brain
injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, or
mental health problems as a result of the defendant’s military
service,” the court is required to “consider the circumstance as a
factor in mitigation when imposing a sentence.” (§ 1170.91,
subd. (a); see also People v. Sherman (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 325,
329.)3
Section 1170.91, subdivision (b) provides a procedural
mechanism for a defendant “currently serving a sentence for a
felony conviction, whether by trial or plea,” to petition for

3 Section 1170.91 “does not apply to a person convicted of, or
having one or more prior convictions for, an offense specified in
[section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv)] or an offense requiring
registration pursuant to [section 290, subdivision (c)].”
(§ 1170.91, subd. (c).) These exclusions are not relevant to this
appeal.

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resentencing “if the circumstance of suffering from sexual
trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder,
substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of the
person’s military service was not considered as a factor in
mitigation at the time of sentencing.” (§ 1170.91, subd. (b)(1).)
Upon receiving a section 1170.91 petition for resentencing,
the trial court must hold “a public hearing” to determine whether
the defendant satisfies the statutory criteria for relief.
(§ 1170.91, subd. (b)(3).) The prosecution, the defense, and any
victim must be given at least 15 days’ notice of the hearing.
(Ibid.) “At that hearing, the prosecution shall have an
opportunity to be heard on the [defendant]’s eligibility and
suitability for resentencing.” (Ibid.)
If the trial court finds that the defendant satisfies the
criteria for relief, “the court may, in the interest of justice,”
reduce the sentence or “[v]acate the conviction and impose
judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense or lesser
related offense, whether or not that offense was charged in the
original pleading, and then resentence the defendant to a reduced
term of imprisonment with the concurrence of both the defendant
and the” prosecutor. (§ 1170.91, subd. (b)(3)(A)-(B).)
III. Analysis
We agree with appellant that the trial court erred by
denying his motion for resentencing without holding a properly
noticed “public hearing” as required by section 1170.91,
subdivision (b)(3).
Appellant filed a facially sufficient motion under
section 1170.91, subdivision (b)(1) indicating that he served in
the military and suffers from service-connected PTSD and mental
health problems. Appellant attached as an exhibit the transcript

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from his original sentencing hearing, which does not reflect that
these circumstances were actually considered by the trial court as
a mitigating factor.
Under section 1170.91, subdivision (b)(3), the trial court
was thus obligated to hold “a public hearing” with at least 15
days’ notice given to the prosecution, the defense, and any victim
of appellant’s crimes, where it could determine if he satisfied the
statutory requirements for relief and, if so, whether resentencing
was warranted. The court’s denial of appellant’s motion without
holding such a hearing was improper.
Bonilla-Bray, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th 234 is instructive and
supports reversal here. In that case, the defendant filed a
petition alleging that he met the statutory requirements under
section 1170.91, subdivision (b). (Bonilla-Bray, supra, at p. 239.)
“Nevertheless, soon after receiving [the] defendant’s petition, the
[trial] court—with no parties present and no apparent notice to
[the] defendant or the prosecution—summarily denied [the]
defendant’s petition.” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal found the
summary denial to be improper and reversed and remanded with
directions for the lower court to hold a hearing. (Id. at pp. 236,
239.)
The People do not cite Bonilla-Bray, let alone attempt to
distinguish it. Rather, the People contend that appellant’s claim
is forfeited on appeal because he knew about his service-
connected PTSD at the time of his original 2017 sentencing but
failed to raise it. We disagree. The evidence submitted by
appellant in connection with his section 1170.91 motion
regarding his PTSD and mental health problems did not exist in
2017, as it is dated from 2022. Even if other similar evidence was
available in 2017, we decline to find forfeiture because appellant

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claims that any failure to present such evidence constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel. (See People v. Welch (1999)
20 Cal.4th 701, 759–760 [“Because defendant also claims that the
failure to object . . . amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel,
we will consider the merits”].)
The People also argue that the trial court did consider the
impact of defendant’s military service at the 2017 sentencing
hearing, pointing to appellant’s trial counsel’s statement at the
original sentencing that appellant “is a veteran, and has had
some difficulties related to that.” But mere consideration of
military service and related “difficulties” is not at issue here.
Defendant is entitled to petition for resentencing under
section 1170.91, subdivision (b)(1) if, as relevant here, “the
circumstance of suffering from . . . post-traumatic stress
disorder . . . or mental health problems as a result of [his]
military service was not considered as a factor in mitigation at
the time of sentencing.” Nothing in the appellate record indicates
that the sentencing court in 2017 was aware of or actually
considered defendant’s service-related PTSD or mental health
problems as a mitigating factor, nor did the court in 2024 deny
the motion on that basis.
Finally, the People argue that, in denying appellant’s
section 1170.91 motion, the trial court “considered the fact of
appellant’s military service upon the instant crime” and found no
proof that his PTSD or anxiety was a factor in the commission of
the crimes. This is not a ground to deny a section 1170.91
petition without holding a hearing. “The statute does not require
the petitioner to allege that the qualifying condition actually
contributed to the commission of the crime.” (People v. Coleman
(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 817, 824.)

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DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1170.91 motion is
reversed. The case is remanded for the trial court to conduct a
noticed public hearing in accordance with section 1170.91,
subdivision (b)(3).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, P. J.
LUI

________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

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