People v. Butts CA2/1

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Filed 8/25/25 P. v. Butts CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B336561

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA447486)
v.

ASHLEY MELISSA BUTTS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mildred Escobedo, Judge. Affirmed.
Kravis, Graham & Zucker, Thomas Ian Graham and Randy
S. Kravis for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
INTRODUCTION
After a series of personal and housing-related disputes,
defendant Ashley Melissa Butts conspired with her friend Israel
“Stoney” Rios to assault her landlord, a man named Larry D.1
The conspiracy involved Butts paying and otherwise helping the
perpetrators, who discharged a gun and repeatedly hit Larry
with a blunt object during the assault, resulting in him suffering
a concussion and other injuries. A jury found Butts guilty of
felony assault and conspiracy to commit the assault, and the trial
court sentenced her to four years in prison.
Butts asks us to reverse her conviction. She challenges
several of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings (including the
admission of evidence she claims the court should have
suppressed under the exclusionary rule), seeks review of the
court’s ruling on her motion for discovery of peace officer
personnel records, contends the court failed to sua sponte instruct
on the lesser included offense of simple battery, and asks us to
remand for the trial court to reconsider its denial of her motion
for mental health diversion.
Other than one evidentiary ruling on a hearsay-related
impeachment issue, we conclude the trial court did not err. As
for that isolated evidentiary ruling, the court’s error was

1 Larry D.’s proper first name is Lawrence, but he is
referred to as “Larry” throughout the record, so we identify him
by that name. We initially refer to Larry D. by his first name and
last initial pursuant to the guidance of California Rules of Court,
rule 8.90(b)(4), and thereafter by his first name only for ease of
reference. No disrespect is intended.

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harmless because the evidence of Butts’s guilt was overwhelming.
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Although the facts of this case are not particularly complex,
it has generated a record of Brobdingnagian proportions. We
summarize only those portions of the facts and proceedings
necessary to discuss the issues raised on appeal.
A. The People Charge Butts with Assault, Conspiracy,
and Burglary
On June 14, 2016, the People filed a felony complaint
charging Butts and Rios with assaulting Larry by means likely to
cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code,2 § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 1),
conspiracy (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 2) with the underlying crime
identified as the alleged assault, and first degree residential
burglary (§ 459; count 3). In April 2017, after Butts and Rios
were held to answer, the People filed an information charging
them with the same crimes.
On January 11, 2019, the trial court granted Butts’s motion
to sever her case from Rios’s case.
B. Butts Pleads Guilty, Withdraws her Plea, and the
Initial Trial Results in a Mistrial
On September 12, 2019, the court granted Butts’s motion to
dismiss the burglary count, and she pleaded guilty to the assault
and conspiracy counts. On November 13, 2019, Butts filed a
motion to withdraw her guilty plea, which the trial court granted.

2 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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Butts’s case went to trial in February and March 2022,
with Butts representing herself.3 On March 15, 2021, the trial
court declared a mistrial after the jury could not unanimously
agree as to either count.
C. The People Retry Butts
On January 10, 2023, the People filed an amended
information charging Butts with assault by means likely to cause
great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 1) and conspiracy
(§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 2), and alleging an enhancement as to
both counts that a principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022,
subd. (a)(1)).
The case went to trial in July 2023 with Butts represented
by counsel.4 The evidence at trial showed the following. All the
events relevant to the assault and the ensuing investigation
occurred in 2016, so to avoid repetition we refrain from
continuing to repeat the year when dating those events.

3 Butts was initially granted leave to represent herself on
March 29, 2021, after being represented by a series of retained
and appointed counsel. On August 4, 2021, Butts substituted in
private counsel, but three weeks later made another request to
represent herself, which the trial court granted.
4 The trial court revoked Butts’s pro per status on
January 3, 2023. Butts then retained counsel, who were
permitted to withdraw after a little more than two months. Butts
later substituted in a different retained counsel.

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1. Prosecution Case
a. Larry’s Testimony
i. Butts becomes a tenant in Larry’s house
and the two have a series of disputes.
Larry was divorced and lived in a three-bedroom house he
owned. He agreed to rent the back bedroom to his friend Cordell.
Cordell told Larry he was going to share the room and split the
rent with a friend of his, who turned out to be Butts. Larry
agreed.
Larry’s house had two entrances, one in back and one in
front. Both entrances had an interior wooden door and an
exterior screen door. Larry understood that Cordell and Butts
would primarily use the back entrance, which was near the
bedroom they were renting. Larry met Butts at the house on
February 17 or 18 and gave her a key which worked on both
screen doors; Larry assumed that the rear wooden door would
remain unlocked. There was only one key for the front wooden
door, which Larry kept for himself. Larry would keep the front
door locked when he was at home and generally left the key in
the lock. The front wooden door also had a deadbolt operated by
a knob.
When Larry initially met with Butts, he told her the move-
in date would be March 1, and she told him she had one dog. On
February 20, Larry awoke to find Butts already in the house,
sleeping in the wrong bedroom, and that she had brought three
dogs with her. Larry was allowing his friend Nate to keep a dog
in the backyard, and Nate’s dog had already been at the home for
about a week. Larry told Butts that he did not want her dogs in
the backyard with Nate’s dog, so she would have to keep her dogs
in the hallway outside of the back bedroom.

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Soon after Butts moved in, she and Larry had disputes over
several issues, including Butts’s dogs, surveillance cameras Butts
installed without permission, Butts taking Larry’s deceased
mother’s clothes, Butts’s use of the front door, and Butts’s
bicycles.
First, without asking permission, Butts placed a gate in the
backyard so that she could keep her dogs there separated from
Nate’s dog. One of Butts’s dogs got past the gate and was injured
in a fight with Nate’s dog. Butts took her dog to the veterinarian
and later asked both Larry and Nate to pay the substantial
veterinarian bill. Larry refused because he had told Butts to
leave her dogs inside.
Second, Larry noticed that Butts had installed an outdoor
surveillance camera which was connected to a wire that ran
through Larry’s bedroom. Larry told Butts to remove the
camera. When Butts did not comply within about two days,
Larry removed the camera himself. There was also a
surveillance camera installed outside of the back bathroom,
which Larry did not notice until later. Larry asked Butts to
remove that camera, but she did not.
Butts noticed that Larry had some of his deceased mother’s
clothes in the house and expressed interest in them. Larry said
he could sell the clothes to Butts and would come up with a price.
Before the two agreed on a price and without Larry’s permission,
Butts started wearing some of the clothes and took others to be
cleaned. Larry asked Butts to return the clothes. She returned
some a day or so later; she told Larry he could get others from
her car.
Butts sometimes left through the front door and left both
the screen door and the interior wooden door unlocked. Butts

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claimed she forgot to lock the doors. Larry told Butts to use the
back door and started locking the front wooden door whenever he
was in the house. About a week and a half later, at the end of
March, Larry was unable to put his key into the lock on the front
wooden door, and he discovered glue in the lock. He confronted
Butts in a text message, but she denied responsibility. Larry was
able to get the glue out and use the lock again.
In early April, Larry decided to ask Butts to move out. He
did not say anything to Butts or Cordell at that time, but did say
something to Nate, who was close friends with Cordell. Butts
had earlier texted Larry about him evicting her, and Larry
responded that he would evict her if she did not follow the rules.
Larry saw that Butts was storing her bicycles on the side of
the house, in the neighbor’s yard. He asked her to move them to
the backyard because he was concerned they would attract the
attention of thieves. Butts instead moved the bikes to the front
yard, and Larry again told her to move them to the backyard.
After a few days, Butts moved the bikes not to the backyard but
to the other side of the house.
ii. Butts’s bikes are taken, Butts accuses
Larry, and Larry is assaulted.
On April 29, Butts’s bikes went missing and Butts accused
Larry and Nate of being involved in taking them. Larry was not
involved and told Butts that. At 9:46 p.m., Butts texted Larry,
“you were too soft to evict me or whatever so you try to do
something really horrible to me to make sure that [I] would leave
on my own.” After an exchange of texts, Larry texted at 10:14
p.m., “FOR THE LAST FUCKING TIME, [N]ATE NOR I [sic]
HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH YOUR BIKE BEING TAKEN.
POINT BLANK.” Butts responded with two texts reiterating her

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accusation, and Larry then texted, at 10:19 p.m., “You know what
stop texting me. I told you we had nothing to do with it,” and
“End of story.” Larry called Cordell to talk about the situation
with Butts, and the conversation made him feel things with Butts
were going to get “weirder.” He then texted his ex-wife to say
that if anything happened to him she should remember Butts’s
name.
Later, in the early morning hours of April 30, Butts asked
Larry for a massage, something they had both done for one
another in the past.5 Larry agreed, hoping that Butts would
apologize and they could move on from the missing bike
situation. Butts was quiet and texted during the massage, which
was unusual. After two to five minutes, Butts left the room
saying she had to turn off her car lights. Larry saw Butts walk
towards the front door and heard the front door open.
When Butts returned, Larry noticed loud music playing in
Butts’s room. When he asked her about it, she said it was to keep
her dogs calm. Larry resumed the massage, and Butts resumed
texting. Larry then heard the front door open again. When he
asked about the noise Butts responded, “Do you think it’s the
dogs?” Larry thought that was a strange thing to say because the
sound came from the front of the house whereas the dogs were in

5 Larry and Butts were both into fitness and would give
each other massages. The massages were not sexual in nature,
except that during one massage in early April Larry kissed Butts
on her shoulder. He then apologized and told her he would stop if
she wanted him to. Butts grabbed Larry’s hand and placed it on
her breast, and then about three minutes later she abruptly got
up and walked out. Larry texted Butts, apologized, and said it
would never happen again.

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back. Larry got up to go to the front door and noticed Butts move
to the far side of the room, away from the door, which he thought
was weird. As Larry got near the front door, he saw a person
dressed in black, wearing a black skull mask, pointing a gun at
him. Larry said, “What the fuck is going on?” and the person
responded, “You know what fucking time it is.” Larry could tell
from the person’s voice he was a male.
Larry was hit with something hard on his forehead, then
twice on his arm as he tried to shield himself. Larry backed
away, and then he heard the gun go off and saw smoke. Larry
looked to see if he had been struck by the bullet; when he looked
up he heard the front door open, and the man was gone. Larry
came to believe a second person was involved and recalled seeing
a shadow of a second intruder during the assault.
Larry immediately accused Butts of being involved in the
assault. Larry asked Butts to call 911 and started calling family
and friends for help. Paramedics arrived, and Larry saw Butts
showing them gunpowder burn residue on a door sill. Butts was
also trying to wipe off the residue; the paramedics told her to
stop. Larry was taken to the hospital and received six stitches to
close a laceration on his forehead. He also suffered a concussion.
b. Evidence of the Gunshot and the Lack of
Forced Entry
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Officer Matthew
Clark examined Larry’s house about two hours after the assault
and saw what appeared to be a powder burn on a door frame to
the hallway. The powder burn looked smeared and Clark opined
that someone had tried to wipe it off. Clark also recovered a
bullet from the wall next to the door frame. Clark inspected the
front door for signs of forced entry and found none.

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c. Data from Butts’s HTC Cell Phone
Alexander Supall, from the LAPD technical investigation
division, testified that in 2016 a now-retired LAPD employee
performed a logical download of an HTC phone which other
evidence showed belonged to Butts. A logical download produces
a report showing the data on the phone, but not any deleted or
hidden files. Supall recalled that the logical download showed
messages were missing in the latter part of March into April
2016.
Supall’s unit later performed a “chip off” procedure on the
phone, in which the phone’s memory chip is removed. Data is
downloaded directly from the chip, and software then decodes the
data. The report generated from this process recovered texts to
and from someone named “Stoney” from March 17 through 29,
and on April 30 beginning at 10:11 a.m., and showed that all of
these texts had been deleted from the phone. Other evidence
showed that “Stoney” was Rios’s nickname.
Supall testified it was possible that messages from
March 30 through April 30 had been deleted but did not show up
on the report because a chip off procedure will not recover deleted
data which has been overwritten. On cross-examination, Supall
explained that the report did not indicate when any data had
been deleted, only that it had been deleted. He also confirmed he
did not know if the phone was in use during April 2016 prior to
the assault.
d. Butts Arranges for Rios to Go to Larry’s House
by Uber Just Before the Assault
Retired Federal Bureau of Investigation agent Chad
Fitzgerald testified that he reviewed a report from Sprint for a
phone number which other evidence showed belonged to Rios.

10
Fitzgerald analyzed the Sprint records to determine that in the
early morning on April 30 the phone using that number traveled
from Rios’s house in Long Beach to Larry’s house, leaving after
1:16 a.m. and arriving by 1:45 a.m. Fitzgerald also analyzed
records provided by Uber to show that there was an Uber ride on
April 30 which left the area of Rios’s home at 1:21 a.m. and ended
in the area of Larry’s house at 1:52 a.m. The phone returned to
Rios’s home after the time of the assault, leaving at around
2:26 a.m. and arriving at or before 3:31 a.m.
Former Uber driver Raul Muniz testified that at 1:11 a.m.
on April 30 he received a ride request for a pickup at Rios’s
address and a drop-off at Larry’s address. Muniz also received a
message through the Uber app from the Uber accountholder (who
was Butts) indicating there would be three passengers and
providing a phone number for one of the passengers; the number
provided belonged to Rios. Muniz picked up only two men, whom
he described as being Hispanic and bald. One of the men said he
had cancer and one of the two had a cane. Although the original
ride request indicated the destination was Larry’s address, one of
the passengers told Muniz to stop at an intersection near the
address. The passengers got out there, and Muniz saw them
walk towards Larry’s house.
e. Butts’s First Statements to the Police
LAPD Officer Eric Elenes testified about two interviews he
conducted of Butts shortly after Larry was assaulted. In the first
interview, Butts said that at about 2:05 a.m., while she was
getting a massage from Larry inside his bedroom, she and Larry
heard a loud bang coming from the front door area, and Larry
went to investigate. Butts heard Larry say “Wait, wait,” and saw
a male wearing a long-sleeved black shirt with a black and white

11
bandanna concealing his face. She saw the intruder strike Larry
with a three-foot long metallic object, heard a loud pop, and then
saw the intruder flee the house on foot. After speaking with
Larry, Elenes spoke with Butts a second time and asked whether
she had left Larry’s room during the massage. Butts stated that
she had left to take her dog out into the front yard.
f. LAPD Detective Gregory Stearns
LAPD Detective Gregory Stearns and his partner,
Detective Dan Myers, interviewed Butts in the early afternoon on
April 30. During the interview, Stearns became concerned that
Butts was deleting evidence relevant to the investigation because
he saw her manipulating her phone. Stearns and Myers seized
the phone, which was an HTC Desire model, and Stearns later
delivered it to the LAPD technical investigation division to
conduct a forensic examination.
After interviewing Butts, Stearns went to Larry’s house.
At the house, he noticed that the powder burn appeared to have
been smeared.
g. Butts’s Text Messages With Rios
The prosecution introduced reports, provided by Butts’s cell
phone carrier, Verizon Wireless, showing text messages and calls
Butts initiated and received during April 2016. In connection
with analyzing these text messages, Stearns identified several
phone numbers associated with Rios.
The Verizon Wireless records showed that Butts had
engaged in the following exchanges with Rios. On April 11, at
6:38 p.m., Rios asked Butts if she “ha[d] any more surveillance
cameras,” and Butts responded at 8:12 p.m., “Yes but I definitely
need them with these fools.” About 30 minutes later, Rios texted,
“Ya...the homie said he’s down to touch that fool up for a

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HUNNIT $,” “HUNNIT means $100,” and “Ur white, so just in
case u didn’t know.” Butts responded within about a minute,
“Hey” and “Hey yeah.”
On April 29, at 10:57 p.m., about 38 minutes after Larry
had asked Butts to stop texting him about the disappearance of
her bikes, Butts texted Rios, “$200,” and then “$250 cash. Right
now.” Rios responded at 11:07 p.m., “It’s not that easy...hold
[o]n,” and then at 11:18 p.m., “the homie went looking for him,
right now.” At 1:10 a.m. on April 30, Rios texted his address; this
was about a minute before Uber driver Muniz received the
request through Butts’s account for a ride from Rios’s address to
Larry’s address.
At 1:26 a.m., Rios texted Butts, “Park ur Car on 78th pl..
Leave the car keys only, with the $,” and “right now do that
please.” About four minutes later, Butts texted “Kk” and “On it.”
At 1:56 a.m., Rios texted, “Here,” and about four minutes later,
“How We get In,” and Butts responded, “Knock.” At 2:02 a.m.,
Rios texted, “Open it. ..homie will pre[t]en[d] he opened it with a
knife.”6 At 2:03 a.m., Rios texted, “Open it..now We waiting.” At
2:09 a.m., Butts texted, “Open,” and Rios responded at 2:14 a.m.,
“There he goes.” The prosecution later introduced evidence that
Butts called 911 to report the assault on Larry at 2:16 a.m.
Later in the morning on the day of the assault, at 8:10 a.m.,
Butts texted Rios that she would be in Long Beach. Rios
responded at 9:59 a.m., “Sorry just woke up,” and asked if he
could go to the grocery store. Butts texted, “Yes fine I had an

6 Rios’s text stated, “homie will prevent he opened it with a
knife” but in a following text he clarified he meant “pretend”
instead of “prevent.”

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insane night just meet me at [L]ong [B]each in an hour or so,” to
which Rios responded, “Yes..[talk to you later] about it lol.. My
homie said u a down ass bitch.. You are a bad bitch bby. Is a
compliment.” Butts texted, “What does that mean?? . . . I had
such a crazy night I have to tell u, dude someone got in and tried
to rob us and then we’ll [sic] it’s too much to text but I just got
jumped right now, so I don’t feel like it ...I’ll call later,” and Rios
responded, “That means you got me and my homies respect..you
earn - it.” Butts texted, “Oh you mean cuz I let u borrow the car?
It’s no problem I told u when u loan me that 6bills for tigers
surgery” and then “Stop!!” Rios then texted, “Put it this way you
earned your stripes…G-code,” and Butts responded “Stop,” “Stop
please,” and “Hear me.”
h. Items Found at Rios’s Home
LAPD Officer Joel Ruiz testified that he searched Rios’s
house with his partner. They found a 17-inch metal flashlight
and a 15-inch cylindrical metal pipe.
2. Defense Case
a. Butts’s Testimony
Butts testified that she moved into Larry’s house
“sometime around” March 1. She shared a room with Cordell,
and their relationship became romantic. When she moved in,
Butts was working during the days and attending law school
during the evenings.
Nate brought his pit bull Gator to stay at Larry’s house
after Butts started living there. Gator was aggressive and was
chained up. At Larry’s request, Butts kept her dogs inside, in the
hallway which led to the back door, and would commonly use the
back door to take the dogs outside. In the middle of April, Cordell
called Butts at work to tell her that he had let her dogs out and

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her dog named Tiger had been injured. Butts took Tiger to the
veterinarian and paid $1,300, using money she borrowed from
Rios and some other friends. If Butts had to blame anyone for
the incident, it would be Cordell, who let Tiger out. Butts spoke
to Larry or Nate about having Nate contribute to the cost of the
veterinarian’s services because Nate’s dog caused the injuries.
Butts installed two security cameras. One had to be in
Larry’s room because that was where the router was located and
Butts wanted the camera to cover the driveway. Butts installed
the security cameras so she could see if her dogs got out. Butts
installed the camera in Larry’s room while he was in Las Vegas.
Larry took the camera in his room out about a week or two after
Butts put it in.
Butts had known Rios for almost two years. Rios had
cancer, walked with a cane, had trouble driving, and was often in
pain. Butts bought marijuana from Rios three times a month.
Butts also saw Larry buy marijuana from Rios four times.
When she received Rios’s April 11 texts—“the homie said
he’s down to touch that fool up for a HUNNIT $,” “HUNNIT
means $100,” and “Ur white, so just in case u didn’t know”—
Butts did not know what the texts were about. She responded,
“Hey” in response to the text about her being “white” because she
understood it to be an insult. She responded “Hey yeah” to the
text “HUNNIT means $100” because she knew what the word
meant. Butts did not recall having any conflict with Larry at
that time or telling Rios she had any conflict with Larry. Butts
denied putting glue in the lock of the front door or having a
disagreement with Larry about the front door.
Butts often coordinated with Rios about purchasing
marijuana through texts. She sometimes left her car unlocked so

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that Rios could drop off marijuana. If Rios was dropping
marijuana off at Larry’s home and Butts was not there, it was not
unusual for Rios to give it to Larry.
On April 28, Butts’s car keys, house key, and bike lock key
went missing. Larry returned the keys on April 29. Someone
informed Butts the keys had been given to Nate by mistake. The
next day, April 29, Butts’s bikes went missing, including one she
had bought from Rios. Butts still owed Rios $650 for the bike.
Butts accused Larry of either having stolen the bikes or having
someone else steal them. When Butts texted “$200” and then
“$250 cash. Right now” at 10:57 p.m. the night of the assault,
Butts was referring to how much she was going to pay Rios for
both marijuana and the bike.
Butts admitted messaging the Uber driver on April 30 at
1:16 a.m. Butts sometimes let Rios borrow her car and would
arrange for Rios to come to Larry’s house to pick up the car.
Butts had offered to loan Rios her car on April 29 so that he could
visit his daughter and his mother’s gravesite.
Butts was waiting for Rios to bring marijuana, and when
Butts texted “Knock” to Rios at 2:01 a.m., she anticipated that
Rios would knock at the back door.
In the early morning hours of April 30, Butts asked Larry
for a massage. Although she felt betrayed because she believed
Larry was involved in the disappearance of her bikes, she
“wanted to work things out and talk to him about it.” While
Larry was giving her the massage, Butts heard a loud noise and
suggested it might be a dog scratching at the kitchen door. She
denied having any music on at that time. Larry went to
investigate the noise. Butts heard Larry scream, so she left the
bedroom and saw a man with a bandanna across his face holding

16
a gun with a sock over his hand. The man appeared to have dark
skin. Larry stepped forward and got his hands on the gun. As
Larry and the intruder struggled over the gun, Larry was struck
in the head with the butt of the gun and the gun went off. The
intruder then ran out of the house. Larry immediately blamed
Butts for the assault.
Butts denied setting up Larry to be beaten, and stated, “I
would never be upset enough to harm anyone.”
In the late morning after the assault, when Rios
complimented her by text, Butts responded “Stop!!” and “I don’t
feel like it” because she was too tired to text.
Butts had activated her HTC phone after the assault. Prior
to that phone, Butts had been using a Motorola Droid Mini phone
which she acquired in March 2016. Butts told Stearns about the
Motorola phone but did not give it to him. Butts had a habit of
deleting Rios’s texts because they involved marijuana sales.
b. The Cross-examination of Butts
Butts authenticated a recording of her call to 911 just after
the incident. Butts told the 911 operator that she thought the
noise was just a dog, and that she heard a slap, but did not tell
the operator that she saw a gun.
Butts also authenticated a tape of her statement to Officer
Elenes and his partner. Butts told the officers she was not sure
whether the intruder had a gun and said she did not see a gun.
Butts told the officers she was with a friend, “Stoney,” earlier;
she claimed she did not know Stoney’s last name. Butts admitted
she was talking about Rios but claimed she did not remember
Rios’s real name at the time. Butts told the officers she had
known Stoney for five years. Butts told the officers she went

17
outside during the massage, and when she came back inside she
locked the door.
When she was interviewed on April 30 by Stearns and
Myers, she told them she had a friend, “Stoney,” whose true
name was Brandon. Butts told the detectives that she went to
meet up with Brandon in the evening on April 29 after she got
home from buying a new bike at Target. She gave Brandon her
car, and Brandon later called her and asked about the interior
lights in her car.
c. Redirect Examination of Butts
Butts explained that at the time of the incident she did not
know Rios’s real name, she met Rios through a person named
Brandon, and she was hesitant to give the detectives information
about Rios because she was buying marijuana from him. If Butts
was “fiddling with” her phone as one of the detectives stated, it
was because she “like[d] to do things with [her] hands in stress
situations.” If Butts went outside during the April 30 massage,
she would not have gone out the front door and would have used
the back door instead. She could have locked the front door
because it had a handle-operated lock. Only Larry had the key
to the other lock.
D. The Verdict and Sentencing
On July 17, 2023, the jury found Butts guilty on both
counts and found the principal-armed enhancement allegation
true.
On January 25, 2024, the trial court sentenced Butts to the
mid-term of three years on the assault, plus one year for the
firearm use enhancement, for a total sentence of four years. The
court stayed the sentence for the conspiracy count. Butts timely
appealed.

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DISCUSSION
Butts does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
against her. She claims the trial court made four erroneous
evidentiary rulings, seeks our independent review of the trial
court’s ruling on her motion for discovery of Stearns’s and
Myers’s personnel records, contends the trial court erred in
failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on simple assault as a
lesser included offense, and asks us to conditionally reverse her
conviction and direct the trial court to determine whether she
should be granted mental health diversion.
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Butts’s
Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained from the
Warrantless Searches of her Cell Phone
Prior to trial, Butts moved to suppress evidence obtained
through two warrantless searches: Myers looking at her HTC
phone during the April 30 interview to see whether any texts or
calls had occurred around the time of the assault, and the LAPD’s
logical download of data from that same phone. Butts claimed
she did not consent to these searches, and they were therefore
improper.7 The trial court denied the motion to suppress.

7 Butts’s appellate briefing erroneously asserts that the
chip off extraction of data from the HTC phone’s memory chip
was performed before Stearns obtained a search warrant. In fact,
that search was performed pursuant to a warrant which Butts
does not challenge on appeal. Furthermore, the search of the
memory chip was not the subject of Butts’s motion to suppress.
Butts did move to traverse the warrant which led to the chip off
extraction of data, arguing that the affidavit requesting the
warrant improperly included evidence from the allegedly non-

19
On appeal, Butts contends the trial court could only have
upheld the warrantless searches if she consented to them, and
the trial court erred because it made no express finding that she
in fact did consent. The People contend we should imply a
finding of consent.
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“Our review of issues related to the suppression of evidence
seized by the police is governed by federal constitutional
standards.” (People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1118; see
Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f)(2).) “ ‘[T]he ultimate touchstone
of the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness.” ’ [Citation.] Our
cases have determined that ‘[w]here a search is undertaken by
law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal
wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness generally requires the obtaining
of a judicial warrant.’ [Citation.] . . . In the absence of a
warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific
exception to the warrant requirement.” (Riley v. California
(2014) 573 U.S. 373, 382 [134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430].) “It
is ‘well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions
to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a
search that is conducted pursuant to consent.’ ” (People v. Woods
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 674, quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
(1973) 412 U.S. 218, 219 [93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854].)
“[T]he prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating a
legal justification for [a warrantless] search. [Citation.] ‘The

consensual warrantless searches at issue in this appeal. The
trial court denied the motion to traverse. As Butts does not
appeal the denial of the motion to traverse, we do not discuss it
further.

20
standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion
to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court’s
factual findings, express or implied, where supported by
substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so
found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.’ ” (People v.
Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 719.)
2. Factual Background
a. The April 30 Interview and the Initial Search of
Butts’s HTC Phone
Stearns recorded a portion of the interview he and Myers
conducted of Butts on April 30. The recording indicates Myers
asked to see Butts’s cell phone to look at her text messages from
“around 3:00” because Larry claimed that Butts was texting just
before the assault. Butts equivocated about what she had been
doing on her phone during the massage, and began to look
through her phone, purportedly to find out whether she had been
texting then. After a passage of time, Myers noted that Butts
had been “fiddling with [her] phone now for the better part of four
minutes,” and asked if she had found any texts. Butts stated that
she could not find any, and Myers asked, “would you mind if I
took a look?” Butts responded, “I would not mind at all.” Myers
looked and stated that there were no text messages from
April 30.
Butts then told the detectives that she had been using a
different phone prior to 3:00 a.m. that morning, which she
believed was in her car; she claimed the phone she had been
using “died” while she was on a call with 911 and she was unable
to “revive” it. Myers then stated, “maybe we can start with that
phone,” referring to the phone Butts had been using prior to

21
3:00 a.m. that morning, and Butts responded, “Yes. Absolutely.”
The detectives stepped away and agreed that they needed to
obtain Butts’s phones because Butts might have deleted data
from them.
The detectives returned to Butts and indicated they wanted
to take her phones. Butts then called her father, and the group
spoke. Myers stated he felt he could legally seize the phones, and
a judge would thereafter authorize searching them, but he hoped
that Butts would consent. After speaking privately with her
father, Butts indicated she would require the detectives to obtain
a warrant. Stearns then stated he was going to seize the phones
for safekeeping. Butts asked, “So you’re taking them right now,
is what you’re saying?” Stearns responded, “Yeah.” The
detectives then had a discussion with Butts’s father to explain
why they felt they needed to seize the phones, and Butts’s father
told her not to turn over her phone. At that point, the recording
stops.
According to Stearns, after the recording stopped, Butts
signed a consent form authorizing the search of her two phones.
Stearns delivered the HTC phone to the LAPD technical
investigation division, which did a preliminary examination of
the phone (the logical download) and reported that there was a
complete lack of data from April 4 to 30, 2016.
b. Stearns Obtains a Warrant to Further Search
the HTC Phone, and Subpoenas Verizon
Wireless
Stearns testified that Butts had consented to a search on
her phone for activity during the first eight hours of April 30.
When Stearns learned about the lack of data on the HTC phone,
he decided “[he] needed to expand the search of the phone beyond

22
the consent that was initially provided by . . . Butts, at which
point the examination of the phone stopped until a search
warrant was obtained.”
On May 2, Stearns sought and obtained a warrant
authorizing a broader search of the HTC phone to include its
memory cards. Stearns also obtained authorization to subpoena
records from various wireless carriers for records associated with
Butts’s cell phone number. Stearns served a subpoena on
Verizon Wireless, which later provided a report of the activity
from Butts’s cell phone account. As summarized previously, at
trial the prosecution presented the results from the chip off
extraction from the phone’s memory card and a report from
Verizon Wireless showing the content of text messages. Butts
does not contend that the trial court erred in admitting the
content of any text messages.
3. The Motion to Suppress
a. Butts Files a Motion to Suppress
On April 13, 2021, Butts filed a motion seeking to suppress
evidence from Myers’s visual search of the HTC phone during the
interview and the logical download conducted by the LAPD
technical investigation division which “found no activity on the
device between the dates of April 4th and April 30th.” Butts
claimed that she objected to Stearns and Myers entering her
mother’s Denver Avenue residence, where the interview was
conducted, and that Myers blocked her from leaving and confined
her to the area around the kitchen table. She further contended
that she was “intimidate[d] and coerce[d] . . . into signing a
single-page, pre-filled consent form fraudulently authorizing the
seizure of additional electronic devices from another residence.”
Butts argued “the court should find that detectives Stearns and

23
Myers ‘seized’ everything in the house including [Butts]’s person,
when they entered the property without a warrant, remained for
more than two hours, and limited [Butts]’s freedom of
movement.”
b. The Prosecution Opposes the Motion
In its opposition the prosecution submitted a transcript of
the audio recording of the April 30 interview discussed above,
which it asserted undermined Butts’s claim the detectives
entered the home without requesting permission and showed
Butts allowed Myers to view her phone. The prosecution also
asserted that, after the audio recording ended, Butts gave
consent for the search of her HTC phone and an additional phone.
c. The Hearing
The court held a hearing on Butts’s motion on April 23, 26
and 29, 2021. Butts’s father testified that he had purchased the
HTC phone and that it was registered to his account. Butts’s
father said Stearns and Myers asked both for access and to take
the phone, and he refused. On cross-examination, Butts’s father
conceded that Butts was the phone’s primary user. He also
testified that Butts told him she had signed a consent to search
form. Butts’s father further said that, after the phone call with
the detectives ended, he drove to the Denver Avenue residence.
Once at the house, he saw Butts redact 50 to 60 percent of a
document she signed, but he did not look at it or know what the
document was. Butts told him at the time it was a receipt for her
phone.
Stearns testified that when he and Myers arrived at the
Denver Avenue house, Butts invited them inside and she never
told them not to enter. Butts signed a consent form authorizing
the search of her two phones. Later, Stearns found a third phone

24
and called and obtained Butts’s consent to search that phone as
well. Butts’s father was present when Butts signed the consent
form and he told her to sign.
Retired LAPD Captain William Hayes testified he went to
the Denver Avenue residence on April 30 and spoke with Stearns,
Myers, Butts, and Butts’s father. Hayes heard Butts’s father tell
her to consent to a search of the phone. Hayes authenticated the
consent form that Butts signed in his presence, which contained
no redactions. Hayes denied that anyone threatened Butts to get
her consent and stated, “we did explain to her that we would
seize the phone no matter what, and that if she chose not to give
consent, that there would still be a search warrant authored to
examine the phone. We gave her the choice.”
d. The Trial Court’s Ruling
On April 29, 2021, the trial court denied Butts’s motion to
suppress, finding it was “clear from the recording . . . that [the
detectives] calmly asked if they could come in and speak to
[Butts], and she voluntarily agreed.” Butts was not in custody,
and “the detectives did not conduct an unlawful search of
[Butts]’s home.” The court further found that “there was
probable cause to believe that [Butts]’s phone may have
contained evidence, that [Butts] may have used her phone to
communicate with the male who assaulted the victim
immediately before the alleged crime occurred, and that such
evidence would or could show [Butts] coordinated a planned
assault with the male. As such, there existed probable cause to
seize the phone. Even if [Butts] did not consent, or the consent
was not valid, their initial search of the phone did not reveal any
evidence that is suppressible. The subsequent search of the

25
phone was lawfully conducted pursuant to a lawful search
warrant.”
e. Butts Files a Motion for Reconsideration Which
the Trial Court Denies
In June 2021, Butts filed a motion for reconsideration of
the trial court’s ruling on her motion to suppress. As purported
new evidence, Butts submitted a forensic expert’s report which
concluded “an audio file named ‘4-30.wav’ provided to [him]” was
a “manufactured recording” which “likely resulted from editing
and/or dubbing audio portions of a 4000 Hz recording into an
8000 Hz recording to create the resulting file.”
The trial court held a hearing on the motion on July 19,
2021. Butts argued she had presented new evidence from her
forensic expert regarding the audio file and intended to present
testimony from a handwriting expert that the search consent
form was “a fraudulent document.” The court asked Butts, “Why
couldn’t [her two experts] have been retained before the [motion
to suppress] was originally heard?” and Butts responded, “You
know, I don’t know, your Honor. I don’t know.” The court denied
the motion for reconsideration, finding Butts’s purported new
evidence “was not obtained with reasonable diligence,” and that
Butts “should have and could have continued the [motion to
suppress] until she obtained these expert opinions regarding the
handwriting and the recording so that they could be considered at
the original [motion to suppress] hearing and motion. And she
did not do that.”
4. The Trial Court Did Not Err
On appeal, Butts does not dispute the court’s finding that
she consented to the detectives entering the residence. She
instead contends the trial court erred because it did not expressly

26
find that she consented to having her phone searched. While the
court did not make an express finding to this effect, it made no
finding that Butts did not consent. Under such circumstances,
we presume the court made an implied finding of consent when
denying the suppression motion if substantial evidence supports
such a finding. (People v. Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 719 [when
considering Fourth Amendment issues, appellate courts “ ‘defer
to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where
supported by substantial evidence’ ”]; People v. Benson (2025) 110
Cal.App.5th 1068, 1081-1082 [“ ‘[I]t is a fundamental principle of
appellate procedure that a trial court [order or] judgment is
ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to
the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that
justifies reversal of the judgment’ ”].) That presumption makes
sense here, as the phrasing of the court’s ruling indicates that it
was making an alternative holding that it would deny the motion
“[e]ven if [Butts] did not consent, or the consent was not valid.”
Substantial evidence supports the implied finding that
Butts consented to Myers looking at her phone during the
interview. As is reflected on the audio recording, Myers asked
Butts, “would you mind if I took a look?” and she responded, “I
would not mind at all.” At no point while Myers was looking at
the phone did Butts object in any way. There was also ample
evidence to support the finding that Butts consented to the
limited forensic search of her phone that was performed without
a warrant. Stearns and Hayes both testified that Butts signed
the consent form in their presence, and the prosecution submitted
a signed copy of the consent form. Butts’s father testified that
Butts told him she had signed a consent form. Hayes denied

27
coercing Butts into signing the form, stating that the officers
“gave her the choice” of giving consent or having the phone seized
without her consent. Butts did not submit her own declaration or
testify that she was coerced into signing the consent form or that
she did not sign the form.8
Lastly, we reject Butts’s conclusory assertion that the trial
court erred in failing to grant her motion for reconsideration of
the denial of the suppression motion. (See People v. Gallardo
(2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 51, 69, fn. 11 [appellate court may deem a
party’s claim waived where they make a “conclusory assertion”
unsupported by “legal argument”].)9
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Excluding Rios’s
Statements During the Uber Ride
During trial, the prosecution moved to exclude testimony
from Muniz, the Uber driver, about statements he heard Rios and
his associate make during the ride. After soliciting briefing, the

8 Butts also contends the trial court erred in finding “[e]ven
if [Butts] did not consent, or the consent was not valid, [the
detectives’] initial search of the phone did not reveal any evidence
that is suppressible” because the absence of evidence can in some
cases be relevant. Whether or not the trial court was correct in
this conclusion is irrelevant because it did not err in denying the
motion to suppress. “On appeal we consider the correctness of
the trial court’s ruling itself, not the correctness of the trial
court’s reasons for reaching its decision.” (People v. Letner and
Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 145.)
9 Butts later filed a second motion for reconsideration,
which the trial court denied. Butts does not contend that the
trial court erred in denying this second motion for
reconsideration.

28
trial court granted the motion. Butts contends the court erred
because the statements were admissible to show Rios’s intent or
motive in going to Larry’s house, and the court abused its
discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in concluding those
statements would create confusion.
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“ ‘ “Hearsay evidence” is evidence of a statement that was
made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and
that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.’ (Evid.
Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) ‘Except as provided by law, hearsay
evidence is inadmissible.’ (Id., subd. (b).) ‘We review claims
regarding a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence
for abuse of discretion.’ ” (People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1,
31.)
Evidence Code section 352 provides the trial court with
“discretion [to] exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” (Ibid.) This provision “ ‘permits the trial
court “to strike a careful balance between the probative value of
the evidence and the danger of prejudice, confusion and undue
time consumption.” ’ ” (People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551,
578.) We review the trial court’s application of Evidence Code
section 352 for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
“The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard;
the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial
court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are
reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is

29
reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v.
Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712, fns. omitted.) We
will imply findings in support of an order where they are
supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Redd, supra, 48
Cal.4th at p. 719; People v. Benson, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1081-1082.)
2. Factual Background
During the first trial, Muniz testified that Rios10 and his
associate said they were meeting up with a woman to have sexual
relations, and that Rios showed Muniz a photograph of the
woman and asked if he wanted to join them. The two passengers
talked about condoms and Muniz heard the word “orgy.” Rios
stated there was a man at the house of whom he was not fond, he
“wanted to possibly assault the guy,” the man was attracted to
the woman, and if the man “tried anything” then Rios “would
beat his ass.” Rios’s associate stated that the woman they were
going to see was rich and they were going to get money from her.
3. The Prosecution’s Motion, the Defense’s Opposition,
and the Trial Court’s Ruling
In moving to exclude this testimony from the retrial, the
prosecution argued that Muniz’s statements about what Rios said
were hearsay and did not fall within the exception for statements
by a coconspirator under Evidence Code section 1223. The
prosecution also argued the statements were irrelevant and
should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 as they
would confuse the issues and create further undue delay.

10 Muniz testified that one of the passengers said he had
cancer, and the parties agree this individual was Rios.

30
In opposition the defense argued the coconspirator
exception did apply. The defense also argued that the statements
were admissible under Evidence Code section 356 to provide
context for text messages which Rios had sent around the same
time. The defense further contended that Rios’s statements were
admissible under Evidence Code section 1250 to show his state of
mind. Lastly, the defense argued that Rios’s statement that
Larry was attracted to Butts was admissible to impeach Larry.
The trial court granted the motion, concluding the
statements were hearsay and the coconspirator hearsay exception
did not apply. The court also excluded the statements under
Evidence Code section 352, stating, “It clearly doesn’t assist the
jurors in trying to determine whether there’s a conspiracy or not.
I think it will derail the jurors in starting to hear stories . . . that
Ms. Butts is willing to have this orgy . . . .” The court indicated it
had considered Butts’s arguments under Evidence Code sections
356 and 1250, and later stated “[t]he other exceptions [apart from
the coconspirator exception] do not meet the qualifications
either.”
4. The Trial Court Did Not Err
On appeal, Butts no longer contends that the coconspirator
exception or Evidence Code section 356 applies or that Rios’s
statements were admissible to impeach Larry, and instead
argues that Rios’s statements should have been admitted as a
statement of his intent or motive in going to Larry’s house.
Evidence Code section 1250 provides, in relevant part, “Subject to
[Evidence Code s]ection 1252, evidence of a statement of the
declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, or physical
sensation (including a statement of intent, plan, motive, design,
mental feeling, pain, or bodily health) is not made inadmissible

31
by the hearsay rule when: [¶] (1) The evidence is offered to prove
the declarant’s state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation at
that time or at any other time when it is itself an issue in the
action; or [¶] (2) The evidence is offered to prove or explain acts or
conduct of the declarant.” (Id., subd. (a).) Evidence Code section
1252 provides, “Evidence of a statement is inadmissible . . . if the
statement was made under circumstances such as to indicate its
lack of trustworthiness.”
The trial court did not abuse its discretion excluding
testimony from Muniz about Rios’s statements to him because it
could have reasonably concluded the statements were
untrustworthy. “ ‘To be admissible under Evidence Code section
1252, statements must be made in a natural manner, and not
under circumstances of suspicion, so that they carry the
possibility of trustworthiness. Such declarations are admissible
only when they are “ ‘made at a time when there was no motive
to deceive.’ ” (People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 778-779.)
Rios had a motive to deceive: he was on his way to help assault
Butts’s landlord in an Uber arranged by Butts on her account,
and had texted with Butts about getting money from her to
facilitate the assault. Rios therefore had a reason to fabricate
evidence that he was provoked or acted in self-defense, and had a
reason to get money from Butts, should he later be fingered for
assaulting Larry. Indeed, Butts argued in her trial court
opposition that Rios’s statements were in furtherance of the
conspiracy because they “[could] be considered some type of ruse
or advanced explanation for any potential violence against
[Larry].”
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in applying
Evidence Code section 352. The court’s conclusion that the

32
balancing required by Evidence Code section 352 tipped in favor
of excluding the evidence was within the bounds of reason. Butts
contends that Rios’s statements would have assisted the jury by
offering an alternative reason for Rios going to Larry’s house, but
the probative value of this evidence was minimal and
substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice and
confusion of the issues. The probative value was minimal
because the evidence was not consistent with evidence of Butts’s
text exchanges with Rios or with evidence of what actually
occurred during the assault, and was not related in any way to
Butts’s defense, which was not that Rios was coming to Larry’s
house in the middle of the night to have sex but instead to borrow
her car.11 In contrast, having jurors wonder about whether Butts
was going to participate in an orgy created a substantial danger
of undue prejudice and confusion of the issues.

11 We also reject Butts’s contention the exclusion of Rios’s
statements violated her due process rights under the state and
federal constitutions because “[a] defendant has no constitutional
right to present evidence that contains hearsay and is lacking in
foundation or other indicia of reliability.” (People v. Williams
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1166, 1198; see People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th
43, 90 [“Application of the ordinary rules of evidence, such as
[Evid. Code, §] 352, generally does not deprive the defendant of
the opportunity to present a defense” as constitutionally
guaranteed].) Butts fails to explain how the application of the
hearsay rule or the trial court’s reliance on Evidence Code
section 352 denied her a fair trial. Butts’s suggestion that Rios’s
statements “call[ed] into doubt the reliability of the evidence on
which the [prosecution relied]” is unfounded, as the statements
did not directly relate to any of the evidence the prosecution
relied upon.

33
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Excluding Evidence
of a Post-assault Altercation Butts and her Father
Had with Larry’s Friends and Family
Prior to trial, the prosecution moved to exclude evidence of
an altercation between Larry’s friends and family, Butts, and her
father that occurred after the charged assault. The trial court
excluded the evidence under Evidence Code section 352,
concluding it would confuse the issues. Butts contends this was
error.
1. Factual Background
After Larry was released from the hospital, he went to his
house accompanied by several friends and relatives. When they
arrived, Butts and her father were there. Larry’s friends and
relatives accused Butts of being involved in the assault, and a
melee resulted in which Butts’s father was struck. Butts and her
father left and reported the incident to the police. Butts made an
audio recording of the altercation on her phone.
2. The Prosecution Moves to Exclude Evidence of the
Post-assault Altercation and the Trial Court
Ultimately Grants the Motion
Before trial, the prosecution moved in limine to exclude
evidence of the altercation. Butts opposed the motion on the
ground that Larry, in trying to stop the altercation, told his
family and friends that Butts was not involved in the assault.
The court denied the motion in limine, finding Larry’s alleged
statements could potentially be relevant. The court also
indicated the prosecution could seek to introduce evidence that
when Larry and his entourage arrived at the house they saw
Butts cleaning up the gunpowder residue.

34
The prosecution also moved to exclude evidence of the
audio recording of the post-assault altercation under Evidence
Code section 352 and based on relevance. Butts argued that the
recording was relevant to show “the volatility of the overall
relationships . . . here.” The court initially indicated that the
recording might be relevant “depending on what the things were
that were said.” The court later said it was inclined to exclude
the recording because it appeared irrelevant and would tend to
confuse the jurors, but that it would allow the defense to make a
showing to justify admitting the evidence. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the court said that if the defense was claiming
someone said something relevant during the post-incident
altercation, the court would review the audio before making a
final ruling.
During trial, Butts sought to introduce evidence of the post-
assault altercation, arguing that she needed to explain what she
meant when she wrote in a text later that morning that she “just
got jumped right now.” Butts also argued the altercation was
relevant because Larry told his family and friends that she was
not involved in the assault. The court excluded the proffered
evidence.
During Butts’s redirect examination, after the prosecution
had played the recording of her April 30 police interview, the
defense again sought to introduce evidence of the altercation,
arguing that “Butts’[s] demeanor on the stand cannot be properly
assessed without understanding that a few hours earlier, she was
in an altercation.” The court denied the request.
3. The Trial Court Did Not Err
The trial court’s exclusion of evidence of the post-assault
altercation under Evidence Code section 352 was not arbitrary or

35
capricious. It is undisputed that the incident took place several
hours after the assault and, as Butts concedes, there was no
suggestion that Larry himself was involved in any violence or
aggression during the altercation.
Butts argues this evidence was relevant in several respects
but does not explain how the probative value of the evidence
outweighed the risk of confusing the issues. That alone is fatal to
her appellate claim of error. (People v. Gallardo, supra, 18
Cal.App.5th at p. 69, fn. 11.)12
Regardless of this waiver, the probative value of the
evidence was minimal. First, Larry’s expressed opinion of
whether Butts was involved when attempting to de-escalate the
altercation had little probative value, because the incriminating
evidence of Butts’s guilt (such as her text messages with Rios)
came from other sources that were unknown to Larry when he
made the alleged statement.13 Second, Butts contends the
altercation was relevant to show Larry’s “bias” against her, but at
most the altercation showed that Larry’s family and friends—not
Larry—had negative feelings about Butts resulting from the
assault. Third, Butts contends the altercation was relevant to

12 To the extent Butts contends the trial court did not base
its ruling on Evidence Code section 352, we disagree. It is clear
from the court’s statements that it excluded the evidence based
on the risk it would confuse the issues.
13 Butts contends evidence of Larry’s purported statement
during the altercation was relevant to impeach his testimony he
accused Butts almost immediately after the intruder(s) left.
However, the defense did not seek to impeach Larry in cross-
examination, and Butts herself testified that Larry blamed her
for the assault immediately after it occurred.

36
support her claim that Rios complimented her in their text
exchange because she had been “jumped” and not because she
had Larry assaulted; however, Butts was permitted to explain
that her reference to being “jumped” related to a separate
incident that occurred after the assault, and further detail was
not necessary to explain the reference. Lastly, Butts contends
the altercation was relevant to explain her “demeanor” during
the interview by Stearns and Myers because “it was clear that
the detectives believed she was being manipulative and evasive.”
Butts cites to Stearns’s testimony that he saw Butts
manipulating her phone and was concerned she had deleted data.
We fail to see any meaningful connection between the altercation
and Butts manipulating her phone during the later interview
with Stearns and Myers, and Butts does not elucidate one.
In light of this minimal probative value, the trial court did
not err in finding the substantial confusion that evidence of the
altercation would generate outweighed the minimal probative
value of the proffered evidence.14

14 Butts also argues that the exclusion of evidence of the
altercation violated her constitutional rights because it was
“critical to the prosecution’s case against [her].” As we have
explained, evidence of the altercation had minimal, if any,
probative value, and it was not critical to the prosecution’s case
or to Butts’s defense. Butts fails to identify any other aspect of
the ruling which implicates her constitutional rights. (People v.
Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 90 [application of Evid. Code, § 352
generally does not implicate a defendant’s constitutional right to
present a defense].)

37
D. The Trial Court Did Not Prejudicially Err in
Permitting Cross-examination About Butts’s
Expulsion from Law School
Over the defense’s objection, the trial court allowed the
prosecution to ask Butts during cross-examination whether she
had been expelled from a law school for being hostile to others
and for lying and manufacturing evidence in attempting to
explain why she was late to an exam. After Butts denied those
reasons led to her expulsion, the court permitted the prosecution
to introduce a letter from the law school to Butts notifying her of
the expulsion and the reasons for it. Butts contends the trial
court prejudicially erred in allowing this evidence, and in
precluding her from introducing evidence to rebut the law
school’s conclusions.
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
The prosecution used this evidence partly to rebut
character evidence Butts had adduced and partly to impeach her
credibility as a witness. Thus, we set forth the applicable law
regarding these two uses.
a. Rebutting Character Evidence Adduced by a
Criminal Defendant
Under Evidence Code section 1102, in criminal cases
“evidence of the defendant’s character or a trait of his character
in the form of an opinion or evidence of his reputation is”
generally admissible where it is: “(a) Offered by the defendant to
prove his conduct in conformity with such character or trait of
character[; ¶ or] (b) Offered by the prosecution to rebut evidence
adduced by the defendant under subdivision (a).” (Ibid.) “[W]hen
a defendant offers evidence of his good character ‘to prove his
conduct in conformity with such character or trait of character,’

38
the prosecution may offer evidence to rebut it.” (People v. Hall
(2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 576, 591, quoting Evid. Code, § 1102,
subd. (a).) However, “ ‘ “the scope of rebuttal must be specific,
and evidence presented or argued as rebuttal must relate directly
to a particular incident or character trait [the] defendant offers in
his own behalf.” ’ ” (Hall, supra, at p. 591.)
b. Evidence of a Witness’s Credibility
Under Evidence Code section 780, the jury “may consider in
determining the credibility of a witness any matter that has any
tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his
testimony at the hearing, including” the witness’s “character for
honesty or veracity or their opposites.” (Id., subd. (e).) “A
witness may be impeached with any prior conduct involving
moral turpitude whether or not it resulted in a felony conviction,
subject to the trial court’s exercise of discretion under Evidence
Code section 352.” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 931.)
“Because the court’s discretion to admit or exclude impeachment
evidence ‘is as broad as necessary to deal with the great variety of
factual situations in which the issue arises’ [citation], a reviewing
court ordinarily will uphold the trial court’s exercise of
discretion.” (Id. at p. 932.)
2. Background
During direct examination Butts testified to her character
for peacefulness, namely that “[she] would never be upset enough
to harm anyone.”
Before cross-examining Butts, the prosecutor requested
permission to impeach her with the fact that Pacific Coast
University, School of Law had expelled her. Business records
subpoenaed from the school included a July 27, 2014 letter from
the school informing Butts that she was being expelled and

39
listing the reasons for it. The prosecutor argued that two of the
school’s five grounds for the expulsion—that “Butts ha[d] been
hostile toward teachers, staff administration and other students
creating a hostile and offensive learning environment” and “was
deceitful as to why she was late to a final examination and falsely
manufactured an envelope so as appear official”—could be used
as impeachment regarding her testimony that “[she] would never
be upset enough to harm anyone” and Butts’s veracity as a
witness.
The defense argued the evidence was stale, as Butts was
expelled in 2014. The defense also objected that the school’s
findings were hearsay, and asserted that Butts contested the
school’s action and would seek to introduce evidence that it was
unfounded. The prosecutor responded that the expulsion letter
fell within the business records hearsay exception.
The court ruled that the prosecutor could ask Butts
whether she had been expelled from the law school for the two
reasons. If Butts answered “yes,” then the matter was concluded;
if Butts did not respond “yes,” then the prosecutor could
introduce the expulsion letter.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Butts if she
was expelled from Pacific Coast University, School of Law for the
two reasons. Butts responded she “was expelled, but not for the
reason[s] [the prosecutor] stated.” The court then permitted the
prosecutor to introduce the school’s expulsion letter over the
defense’s objection.
On redirect, defense counsel asked whether Butts had
contested the two reasons for her expulsion, and she responded,
“I don’t know.” The trial court sustained objections to defense
counsel’s questions about whether Butts had hired a lawyer to

40
“correct” some of the records regarding her expulsion, whether
Butts had “go[ne] through any sort of hearing,” and whether
Butts agreed with the reasons for her expulsion.
3. Analysis
a. The Accusation of Hostile Behavior
Butts placed at issue her character for peacefulness when
she testified that “[she] would never be upset enough to harm
anyone.” This permitted the prosecution, under Evidence Code
section 1102, subdivision (b), to adduce contrary evidence. That
included evidence that Butts had personally engaged in other
violence, including an incident in which she bit a police officer,
that Butts does not challenge on appeal. It also included
evidence that Butts had been expelled from law school in part for
hostile behavior towards others. The law school’s letter was
evidence “in the form of an opinion” “[o]ffered by the prosecution
to rebut evidence adduced by” Butts to show her character for
peacefulness, which she had already “[o]ffered . . . to prove [her]
conduct in conformity with such . . . trait of character.” (Evid.
Code, § 1102.)
Butts argues evidence of her hostility had no probative
value to her character for peacefulness. She claims that because
the law school provided no details as how Butts had been hostile,
it could have been “verbal” hostility. Even if this is true, the
school’s accusation was relevant to undermine Butts’s claim at
trial, which was not merely that she was not inclined to harm
people, but that she would never become “upset enough to harm
anyone.” The school’s accusation that Butts had become upset
enough to create a “hostile” environment harmful to others was
therefore relevant to impeach her own claim about her character.
(See People v. Hawara (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 704, 713 [“Once a

41
witness testifies, on direct examination, to the defendant’s good
character, it is a common and accepted method of cross-
examination to ask whether the witness is aware of instances of
the defendant’s bad character”].)
Butts further argues the trial court erred in admitting the
expulsion letter over her hearsay objection. We are not
persuaded as concerns the school’s statement regarding Butts’s
hostility towards others. The court did not abuse its discretion in
finding the business records hearsay exception (Evid. Code,
§ 1271) applied. Under this exception, the letter was admissible
to prove that the law school was of the opinion that Butts had
engaged in sufficiently hostile conduct to justify expelling her.
b. The Accusation of Lying and Fabricating
Evidence
Evidence that Butts had lied about being late to a law
school exam and fabricated evidence in support of that excuse
was relevant to show she lacked credibility as a witness. Thus,
the trial court did not err in permitting the prosecution to ask
Butts whether she had been expelled for lying and fabricating
evidence because the prosecutor had a good faith belief Butts had
done so based on the expulsion letter. (See People v. Steele (2000)
83 Cal.App.4th 212, 223 [party can only ask a witness about
misconduct relevant to credibility if they have a good faith belief
that the witness engaged in such misconduct].)
Butts did not admit that she had been expelled for lying
and/or fabricating evidence, so the trial court permitted the
prosecution to introduce the expulsion letter to impeach her
denial and credibility as a witness. Butts contends this was
error, and we agree. To the extent the letter was relevant, it was
to prove that Butts had previously lied and falsified evidence.

42
And as to that ground, the letter was inadmissible hearsay.
(People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 300-301, fn. 15
(Wheeler).)
In Wheeler, which involved the use of a misdemeanor
conviction to impeach the credibility of a defense witness, the
Supreme Court rejected the People’s argument that “the fact of
conviction alone” was relevant to credibility, concluding that the
evidence must show prior conduct involving moral turpitude.
(Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 299.) Thus, “even if [the
defendant]’s testimony was competent to establish the fact of
conviction, the conviction itself was inadmissible hearsay
evidence of underlying criminal conduct relevant to
impeachment. We therefore conclude that evidence of a
misdemeanor conviction, whether documentary or testimonial, is
inadmissible hearsay when offered to impeach a witness’s
credibility.”15 (Id. at p. 300, fn. omitted; see People v. Steele,
supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 223 [in a criminal case, “where a
witness denies having committed a misdemeanor consisting of
moral turpitude, he or she may only be impeached by evidence of
the underlying conduct of that misdemeanor”].)
Although the expulsion letter was not a misdemeanor
conviction, the principle of Wheeler still applies because, like such
a conviction, the letter summarized a conclusion regarding an act

15 This analysis is inapplicable to felony convictions
because Evidence Code section 788 creates an exception to the
hearsay rule for felony convictions. (Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at
p. 298.)

43
of moral turpitude and was not a prior felony conviction.16
Accordingly, the prosecution could not rely on the expulsion letter
to show that Butts had previously lied and fabricated evidence
because it was hearsay as to that issue. Under the business
records hearsay exception (Evid. Code, § 1271) the letter was
admissible to show that the law school had expelled Butts based
on its conclusion she had lied and fabricated evidence, but that is
not sufficient to establish that Butts had in fact lied and
fabricated evidence. (Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 299; People
v. Steele, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 223.) Accordingly, the trial
court erred in overruling Butts’s hearsay objection to the
expulsion letter as to the portion of the letter stating Butts had
lied and fabricated evidence.
c. Remaining Arguments
Butts also argues the trial court should have excluded
evidence of her law school expulsion in its entirety as unduly
prejudicial and because the expulsion was too remote in time
(roughly nine years before the trial). We disagree. Butts herself

16 The Wheeler court quoted and adopted the following
analysis by the California Law Revision Commission:
“ ‘[a]nalytically, a judgment that is offered to prove the matters
determined by the judgment is hearsay evidence. [Citations.] It
is in substance a statement of the court that determined the
previous action [i.e., other than by a testifying witness] . . . that is
offered “to prove the truth of the matter stated.” [Citation.]
Therefore, unless an exception to the hearsay rule is provided, a
judgment would be inadmissible if offered in a subsequent action
to prove the matters determined.’ (Cal. Law Revision Com. com.,
29B West’s Ann. Evid. Code (1966 ed.) § 1300, pp. 342-343.)”
(Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 298.) This reasoning applies with
equal force to the expulsion letter.

44
put in issue her character, and prior acts of moral turpitude were
relevant to the jury evaluating the credibility of her testimony
seeking to explain her texts and other actions. Nor are we
persuaded that the trial abused its “broad” discretion in
overruling her Evidence Code section 352 objection that the
evidence was stale. (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 931;
see also People v. DeCosse (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 404, 412 [“any
contention that [a 12-year-old conviction] was necessarily remote
and therefore inadmissible must . . . be rejected”].)17
Lastly, we reject Butts’s contention that the trial court
erred in sustaining objections to questions her counsel asked her
in redirect. The court permitted defense counsel to ask Butts
whether she had contested the two reasons for her expulsion (to
which she responded, “I don’t know”) but sustained objections to
questions whether Butts had hired a lawyer to “correct” some of
the records regarding her expulsion and whether she had “go[ne]
through any sort of hearing there.” The trial court did not abuse
its discretion in concluding these additional questions sought
irrelevant information. The trial court also sustained an
objection to defense counsel’s question whether Butts agreed with
the law school’s “conclusions.” Given Butts’s lack of recollection
about any contemporaneous challenge to the grounds for her
expulsion, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
testimony about Butts’s subjective feelings concerning the

17 Butts points out that the court measured remoteness
from the time of the assault, and not the time of the testimony,
but the court was responding to defense counsel’s argument that
referred to the time of the assault.

45
grounds for her expulsion would result in “undue consumption of
time” under Evidence Code section 352.
4. The Error Was Harmless
The error by the trial court admitting the expulsion letter
for the truth of its assertions that Butts had in fact lied and
fabricated evidence was harmless. We “cannot reverse a
judgment based on the erroneous admission of evidence unless
the admitted evidence ‘resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’
(Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (b).) In a criminal case, a miscarriage of
justice can only be found when the reviewing court determines it
is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the
defendant would have been reached had the trial court excluded
the erroneously admitted evidence.” (People v. Lapenias (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 162, 170, fn. omitted; see also People v. Collins
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 378, 391 [the improper admission of evidence
impeaching a criminal defendant’s veracity is harmless where the
defendant has testified and “it is reasonably probable that a
result more favorable to the defendant would not have been
reached in the absence [of the evidence]”].)18
No miscarriage of justice occurred here, and it is not
reasonably probable Butts would have achieved a more favorable
result had the letter not been admitted for the truth of the law
school’s conclusion Butts had lied and fabricated evidence. The
evidence of Butts’s guilt was overwhelming and was based

18 We reject Butts’s claim that the introduction of evidence
regarding her law school expulsion implicated her constitutional
rights and that therefore any error must be harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
18 [87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.E.2d 705].

46
primarily on Butts’s text exchanges with Rios, including their
communications in the minutes leading up to the assault. Butts
did not deny that she participated in the text exchanges, her
alternate explanations about those texts were not credible, and
she failed to even address the most incriminating texts.
Furthermore, evidence regarding the reasons why Butts was
expelled from law school was not significantly prejudicial. The
jury heard other evidence that Butts had been deceitful, such as
audio recordings of her statements to police in which she gave
materially different accounts of key events and repeatedly lied
about Rios’s true name.
E. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Ruling on Butts’s
Pitchess19 Motion
In July 2017, Butts filed a Pitchess motion for discovery of
personnel records of detectives Stearns and Myers related to
prior wrongful acts, “[d]ishonesty/untruthfulness,” or
“[m]ishandling of evidence.” The trial court granted the motion
limited to potential evidence of false police reports by Stearns or
Myers. The court reviewed the detectives’ personnel records in
camera and found no discoverable information.
Butts does not challenge the trial court’s ruling as to the
scope of discoverable material. Butts does, however, request that
we independently review the transcript of the in camera
proceeding and the personnel files provided to the trial court.
The People do not oppose Butts’s request. We review the trial
court’s ruling on a Pitchess motion for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 827.)

19 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.

47
Having reviewed the transcript of the in camera
proceeding, we find no error in the trial court’s determination
that the detectives’ personnel records contained no discoverable
information.20
F. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Failing to Sua Sponte
Instruct the Jury on Simple Assault
Butts’s defense at trial was to deny any involvement in the
assault and not to quibble with the amount of force used during
it. Butts nevertheless contends the trial court erred in failing to
sua sponte instruct the jury on simple assault as a lesser
included offense. The jury convicted Butts of assault “by . . .
means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.” (§ 245,
subd. (a)(4).) In contrast, under section 240, a simple assault is
“an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a
violent injury on the person of another.” Butts argues there was

20 The record does not include the detectives’ personnel
records reviewed by the trial court. Butts filed a motion to
augment the record with the personnel records, along with the
transcript of the in camera proceedings. We granted the request,
and the superior court augmented the record with the transcript.
However, the superior court could not locate the personnel
records, presumably because the trial court did not retain those
records or have copies made. Although Butts received notice that
the superior court did not have the personnel records, she
undertook no further efforts to obtain the documents. In any
event, our review of the transcript is sufficient, as it describes the
records provided to the trial court. (See People v. Myles (2012) 53
Cal.4th 1181, 1209 [“The sealed transcript that is before us, in
which the court ‘state[d] for the record what documents it
examined,’ is adequate for purposes of conducting a meaningful
appellate review”].)

48
substantial evidence that the amount of force used in the assault
was not likely to cause great bodily injury such that a simple
assault instruction was required.
“[A] trial court must instruct the jury on a lesser included
offense, whether or not the defendant so requests, whenever
evidence that the defendant is guilty of only the lesser offense is
substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury.” (People v.
Choyce (2025) 18 Cal.5th 86, 104.) “ ‘ “To justify a lesser included
offense instruction, the evidence supporting the instruction must
be substantial—that is, it must be evidence from which a jury
composed of reasonable persons could conclude that the facts
underlying the particular instruction exist.” ’ ” (People v. Thomas
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 385.) “ ‘Speculative, minimal, or
insubstantial evidence is insufficient to require an instruction on
a lesser included offense.’ ” (Ibid.) “We independently review a
trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense and
view the evidence in the light favorable to the defendant.”
(People v. Aguilar (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1023, 1027.)
For purposes of section 245, “[g]reat bodily injury is bodily
injury which is significant or substantial, not insignificant, trivial
or moderate.” (People v. McDaniel (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 736,
748.) Here, Larry testified the attacker hit him in the head with
something hard, causing him to bleed from the head. Larry was
struck two more times in his arm, which he had raised to block
the strikes. Larry was hit hard enough to suffer a concussion and
required six stitches to close a laceration on his forehead. When
she was interviewed by police at the hospital, Butts stated she
saw the attacker strike Larry with a three-foot long metallic
object. At trial, she testified the attacker struck Larry in the
head with the butt of a gun.

49
In light of all this, the trial court did not err in failing to
sua sponte instruct the jury on simple assault. Blows to the head
with a hard object with force sufficient to break the skin and
cause bleeding constitute force likely to cause great bodily injury,
and there was no evidence of lesser injury. Butts argues,
“Granted, the blow to [the] head did end up causing Larry great
bodily injury given that he suffered bleeding and concussive
symptoms. But the jury did not have to accept this.” The point of
this argument is unclear. There was no dispute at trial that
Larry was struck in the head with a hard object with substantial
force. Apparently contradicting her concession that Larry
actually suffered great bodily injury, Butts goes on to minimize
his injuries as not “life threatening.” This argument fails because
“[s]ection 245 ‘prohibits an assault by means of force likely to
produce great bodily injury, not the use of force which does in fact
produce such injury.” (People v. McDaniel, supra, 159
Cal.App.4th at p. 748.)
Lastly, Butts argues that the evidence shows the attacker
did not fire the gun at Larry. While the evidence was equivocal
as to whether the attacker intended to shoot Larry, Butts was not
charged with assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) and, as
we have explained, striking a person’s head with a hard object
with sufficient force to break the skin constitutes force likely to
cause great bodily injury.
G. There Was No Cumulative Error Requiring Reversal
Butts argues that, when considered cumulatively, the trial
court’s errors denied her a fair trial. We have concluded the trial
court only erred in one ruling, namely, the admission of the
portion of the letter indicating Butts had been expelled from law

50
school due to lying and fabricating evidence. As noted, this error
was harmless. There are no other errors to cumulate.
H. Butts Has Waived Her Claim to Relitigate the Court’s
Denial of Her Request for Mental Health Diversion
Butts asks us to conditionally reverse her conviction and
remand with directions for the trial court to consider whether she
is entitled to mental health diversion under section 1001.36.
Butts unsuccessfully moved for mental health diversion several
times during the case. The last time was in August 2022; the
trial court denied that motion in September 2022. Butts concedes
that the trial court’s denial was correct under the version of
section 1001.36 then in effect but contends the trial court
“effectively erred and abused its discretion” because section
1001.36 was later amended. Those amendments, however,
occurred months before Butts’s trial began and she had ample
time to argue to the trial court that they applied to her. She
never did and therefore has waived her claim.
1. Section 1001.36
“The Legislature in June 2018 enacted section 1001.36,
creating a pretrial diversion program for certain persons with
mental health disorders.” (People v. Doron (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th
1, 7.) “As originally enacted, section 1001.36 provided that a trial
court may grant pretrial diversion if it finds all of the following:
(1) the defendant suffers from a qualifying mental disorder;
(2) the disorder played a significant role in the commission of the
charged offense; (3) the defendant’s symptoms will respond to
mental health treatment; (4) the defendant consents to diversion
and waives his or her speedy trial right; (5) the defendant agrees
to comply with treatment; and (6) the defendant will not pose an

51
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the
community.” (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626-627.)
The Legislature has amended section 1001.36 several times
since its enactment. At issue here are amendments that created
a rebuttable presumption in favor of defendants relating to the
connection between the defendant’s disorder and the charged
offense. In September 2022, when the trial court denied Butts’s
last diversion motion, the statute provided:
“A court may conclude that a defendant’s mental disorder
was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense
if, after reviewing any relevant and credible evidence, including,
but not limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts,
witness statements, statements by the defendant’s mental health
treatment provider, medical records, records or reports by
qualified medical experts, or evidence that the defendant
displayed symptoms consistent with the relevant mental disorder
at or near the time of the offense, the court concludes that the
defendant’s mental disorder substantially contributed to the
defendant’s involvement in the commission of the offense.”
(Former § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(B); Stats. 2022, ch 47, § 38.)
Later, effective January 1, 2023, this provision was
amended as follows:
“If the defendant has been diagnosed with a mental
disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder
was a significant factor in the commission of the offense unless
there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a
motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the
defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense. A court may
consider any relevant and credible evidence, including, but not
limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts,

52
witness statements, statements by the defendant’s mental health
treatment provider, medical records, records or reports by
qualified medical experts, or evidence that the defendant
displayed symptoms consistent with the relevant mental disorder
at or near the time of the offense.” (Former § 1001.36, subd.
(b)(2); Stats. 2022, ch. 735, § 1.)
“Under the amended statute . . . a defendant is generally
eligible for diversion if the defendant ‘has been diagnosed’ with a
recognized mental disorder. [Citations.] Beyond that, the
amended statute creates a presumption that the defendant’s
diagnosed mental disorder was a significant factor in the
commission of the charged crime, ‘unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that [the mental disorder] was not a
motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the
defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.’ ” (People v.
Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 120.)
2. Background
As previously noted, Butts filed the last in a series of
motions for mental health diversion on August 16, 2022. The
motion was based on a report from a clinical and forensic
psychologist, Nadim N. Karim, Ph.D., who diagnosed Butts with
generalized anxiety disorder, persistent depressive disorder, post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and substance abuse disorder.
Dr. Karim opined that Butts’s disorders significantly contributed
to the commission of the crimes. Dr. Karim further opined that
Butts’s symptoms could be successfully treated through
outpatient mental health treatment, including individual therapy
for depression, anxiety and PTSD, substance use counseling, “and
a referral to a psychiatrist for a medication review.”

53
To respond to Butts’s motion, the prosecution sought an
evaluation of Butts by its expert. On September 2, 2022, the
court appointed Jody Ward, Ph.D. to complete a mental health
evaluation of Butts for purposes of determining her eligibility
under section 1001.36.
Butts failed to appear for her appointment to be evaluated
by Dr. Ward. The court accordingly denied the diversion request,
concluding that Butts had failed to show she was eligible for
mental health diversion by failing to show her disorders were a
substantial factor in the assault and that there was a plan for
treatment of her disorders.
3. Analysis
Butts has waived her appellate claim that statutory
amendments made after the court denied her last motion for
mental health diversion made her eligible for such diversion,
because she failed to make that argument in the trial court. The
new law became effective in January 2023. Butts’s trial did not
start until July 2023, so she had ample time to present this
argument to the trial court. She never did. Although we do not
know the exact reason for this, her prior refusal to participate in
an evaluation by anyone other than her handpicked expert would
appear to indicate such a motion would have failed regardless of
the change in law. “ ‘ “No procedural principle is more familiar to
this Court than that a constitutional right,” or a right of any
other sort, “may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by
the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal
having jurisdiction to determine it.” ’ ” (People v. Saunders
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590.) “ ‘ “ ‘The purpose of the general
doctrine of waiver is to encourage a defendant to bring errors to
the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected or

54
avoided and a fair trial had . . . .’ ” ’ ” (People v. Simon (2001) 25
Cal.4th 1082, 1103.)
Butts relies on People v. Brown, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th
113, where the Court of Appeal rejected forfeiture in a mental
health diversion matter. (Id. at p. 128.) We find the situation in
Brown distinguishable. Given the “narrow circumstances”
presented in that case, where the defendant was sentenced only
10 days after the amendments to section 1001.36 became
effective, the Court of Appeal reasonably excused the defendant’s
failure to seek relief based on the amendments in the trial court.
(Brown, supra, at pp. 116-117.) By the time the amendments
took effect, the defendant in Brown was precluded from seeking
mental health diversion in the trial court because he had already
been convicted. (Id. at p. 126; see also People v. Braden (2023) 14
Cal.5th 791, 824-825 [concluding “the Legislature intended to
require that a defendant request pretrial mental health diversion
before jeopardy attaches at trial or before the entry of a plea of
guilty or no contest, whichever occurs first”].) Thus, the Brown
court concluded, “we cannot fault [the defendant]’s trial counsel
for failing to seek reconsideration based on a recent amendment
that had become effective only 10 days earlier, and that no court
had yet found to be retroactive, particularly in light of Braden’s
focus on the general requirement that such motions be brought
prior to trial.” (Brown, supra, at p. 128.)
In stark contrast, Butts had six months after the
amendments to section 1001.36 became effective to seek relief in
the trial court before her trial began. Under these circumstances,
she waived her claim to mental health diversion under the
amended statute.

55
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

M. KIM, J.

56

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