People v. Ruiz CA2/6

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Filed 8/25/25 P. v. Ruiz CA2/6
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B324477
(Super. Ct. No. 2014011115)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

OPINION ON TRANSFER FROM
v. SUPREME COURT

FRANK RUIZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

This is our fourth opinion in this sentencing matter. In our
original opinion (People v. Ruiz (Feb. 10, 2020, B291732) [nonpub.
opn.] (Ruiz I)), we vacated the trial court’s unauthorized Penal
Code section 654 stay of execution of a 10-year consecutive
sentence for a firearm-use enhancement.1 (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).)
As a result, appellant’s unstayed aggregate sentence was
increased from 18 years to 28 years. Out of fairness to appellant,

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
we directed the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to
strike the firearm-use enhancement as well as a five-year
enhancement for a prior serious felony conviction. (§ 667, subd.
(a)(1).) The trial court refused to strike either enhancement. It
resentenced appellant to prison for an aggregate term of 28 years.
A second appeal followed. In People v. Ruiz (March 29,
2022, B307717) [nonpub. opn.] (Ruiz II), we rejected appellant’s
claims that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
strike the prior serious felony conviction and firearm-use
enhancements, and (2) the cause must be remanded to the trial
court for resentencing in light of Assembly Bill No. 518, which
amended section 654 (Stats. 2021, ch. 441). Again out of fairness
to appellant, we vacated the sentence and remanded the cause for
resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 567 (S.B. 567), which
amended section 1170 (Stats. 2021, ch. 731). (See pp. 6-7, post.)
On remand the trial court resentenced appellant to an
aggregate term of 23 years, calculated as follows: assault with a
firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) – the upper term of four years,
doubled to eight years because of a prior strike; plus the upper
term of 10 years for the firearm-use enhancement; plus five years
for the serious felony conviction. The court stayed the sentence
imposed for a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).
Appellant again appealed, contending: (1) the true finding
on the gang enhancement allegation must be vacated; (2) in
selecting the upper term for both the conviction of assault with a
firearm and the firearm-use enhancement, the trial court relied
on aggravating factors that are inapplicable pursuant to S.B. 567;
(3) the matter must be remanded for resentencing because of a
recent amendment of section 1385; (4) the aggregate sentence
imposed on remand cannot exceed the 18-year aggregate sentence

2
originally imposed; and (5) appellant is entitled to additional
days of custody credit.
In a published opinion filed on December 13, 2023 – People
v. Ruiz (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1068 [316 Cal.Rptr.3d 211] (Ruiz
III) – we accepted the Attorney General’s concession that the true
finding on the gang enhancement allegation must be vacated.
We remanded the matter to the trial court to afford the People an
opportunity to retry the allegation. We modified the judgment to
award appellant additional days of custody credit. In all other
respects, we affirmed.
The California Supreme Court granted appellant’s petition
for review (S283504). On June 11, 2025, it transferred the
matter back to us “with directions to vacate [our] decision and
reconsider the cause in light of People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th
730 [(Lynch)].” (People v. Ruiz (2025) 569 P.3d 392 [333
Cal.Rptr.3d 24, 25.) The Supreme Court ordered that our 2023
published opinion be “rendered either ‘depublished’ or ‘not
citable.’” (Ibid.)
We vacate our prior decision filed on December 13, 2023.
Based on Lynch, the Attorney General concedes that “remand for
resentencing . . . is now required.” We agree. We reverse the
sentence. We accept the Attorney General’s concession that the
true finding on the gang enhancement allegation must be
vacated. We remand the matter to the trial court for a full
resentencing and to afford the People an opportunity to retry the
gang allegation. In all other respects, we affirm.
Facts
The facts are taken from our first unpublished opinion.
(Ruiz I, supra, slip opn. at pp. 3-4.)

3
“One night in October 2013, [R.M. (victim)] and his
girlfriend, [J.M], drove to Vons to buy baby supplies. [J.M.]
entered the store while [victim] remained by the vehicle in the
parking lot. A young, skinny man approached [victim] and
asked, ‘[W]here you from?’ [Victim] replied, ‘I ain’t from nowhere,
where you from?’ The man said he was from ‘Southside’ or ‘Sur
Town.’ The man ‘tried to sucker punch’ [victim] and ‘barely
misse[d]’ him.
“[Victim] chased the man, who was not armed. He heard
[his girlfriend] call out that someone had a gun. [Victim]
suddenly saw a bigger, older man about 15 feet away and ‘could
hear him try to cock [the gun], but he couldn’t.’ [Victim] ‘started
running.’ ‘He was zig-zagging in an attempt not to get shot.’ He
heard one shot fired. The bullet did not strike him.
“[Witness E.W. testified that he had seen] the bigger, older
man chase [victim]. The man shot once at [victim]. He ‘was
definitely trying to hit [him].’ ‘He was aiming directly at [him].’
It was not ‘a warning shot.’ The shooter and his companions ran
to a car, entered it, and drove away ‘at a high rate of speed.’
“The shooter was identified as appellant. He was a long-
time member of the Sur Town Chiques (Sur Town) criminal
street gang. His gang moniker was ‘Villain.’ The trial court took
judicial notice before the jury that in 2002 appellant had been
convicted ‘of a violent felony for the benefit of the Sur Town
criminal street gang against a victim who [was] a documented
member of the Colonia Chiques criminal street gang.’ [Footnote
omitted.] A gang expert opined that appellant was still a
member of Sur Town at the time of the October 2013 Vons
parking-lot shooting.

4
“The skinny, younger man who threw the punch at [victim]
was identified as [J.H.]. A gang expert opined that [J.H.] ‘was a
Sur Town gang member . . . .’
“A police officer found a spent shell casing in the Vons
parking lot. The shell casing had been ejected from the same 9-
millimeter pistol that had been used in four other gang shootings.
“In response to the prosecutor’s hypothetical question
incorporating the facts of the Vons parking-lot shooting, a gang
expert opined that it had been committed for the benefit of a
criminal street gang.”
Gang Enhancement
The jury found true an allegation that appellant had
committed the assault with a firearm for the benefit of a criminal
street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). Assembly Bill No. 333 (Stats.
2021, ch. 699) (A.B. 333) “amended section 186.22 to, in various
respects, increase the evidentiary burden necessary to prove a
gang-related crime enhancement.” (People v. Rodriguez (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 816, 822.) The amendment applies retroactively to
cases not yet final on appeal. (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th
1169, 1206-1207.)
We accept the Attorney General’s concession, which is as
follows: “[T]he elements of the newly amended gang enhancement
under section 186.22 are not satisfied. Namely, the current
record does not establish that the predicate offenses benefitted
appellant’s gang in a manner that was more than reputational.”
We vacate the true finding on the gang enhancement and remand
the matter “‘to give the People the opportunity to prove the
applicability of the enhancements under the amendments to
section 186.22.’” (People v. Vasquez (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1021,
1033.)

5
S.B. 567 Made the Middle Term the Presumptive Term
S.B. 567 became effective on January 1, 2022. It amended
the standards for imposing an upper term sentence. As amended,
section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) provides that, when a person is
convicted of a public offense, “the court shall, in its sound
discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the
middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).”
Paragraph (2) provides, “The court may impose a sentence
exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in
aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” There is an
exception to this rule for prior convictions: “[T]he court may
consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining
sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without
submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).)
S.B. 567 also amended section 1170.1, subdivision (d) to
mandate a presumptive middle term for enhancements. In
People v. Falcon (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 911, 956, disapproved on
other grounds in Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 751, 768-769,
the court noted that, unlike section 1170, subdivision (b)(3),
section 1170.1 contains “no prior conviction exception [based on a
certified record of conviction] . . . for imposing an upper term on
applicable enhancements.”
The Attorney General Concedes that the Trial
Court Considered Inapplicable Aggravating Factors
The trial court said it was imposing the 4-year upper term
for the assault with a firearm and the 10-year upper term for the

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firearm-use enhancement because appellant “poses a serious
danger to society.” In so concluding, the trial court relied on
seven factual findings. In respondent’s brief the Attorney
General concedes that four of the findings “were not found true
beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury, and . . . it cannot be said
with certainty that a jury would . . . conclude [they were true]
beyond a reasonable doubt.” The four findings are: (1)
“[appellant] has a predilection for unprovoked, unpredictable
violent behavior and a disregard for human life”; (2) “[t]his
offense is almost identical in many significant respects to his
prior 2002 violent offense, demonstrating a failure to rehabilitate
or change his violent behavior”; (3) “[t]he present offense was
committed in concert with another person, thereby increasing the
danger to the victims and the public”; and (4) “[appellant] has a
substantial criminal record dating back to the age of 13.”
“[T]o the extent the trial court’s imposition of the upper
term was based on” the above four findings, conceded by the
Attorney General to be inapplicable, “it committed error under
Senate Bill 567. That is because, contrary to the dictates of the
new law, [appellant] had not stipulated to the facts underlying
these [findings], nor were the facts found true beyond a
reasonable doubt by a jury or by a judge in a court trial.” (People
v. Ross (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1346, 1353, disapproved on other
grounds in People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1086 (Wiley);
Lynch, supra, 16 Ca.5th at pp. 768-769.) Moreover, the fourth
finding concerning appellant’s criminal record “dating back to the
age of 13” was not “based on a certified record of conviction.”
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).)

7
Despite Attorney General’s Concession, in Ruiz III
We Upheld Imposition of Upper Term Sentences
In respondent’s brief the Attorney General “maintains that
the trial court properly relied on three of the trial court's seven
factual findings because they ‘were found true beyond a
reasonable doubt by a trier of fact or were supported by a
certified record of conviction.’” (Ruiz III, supra, 316 Cal.Rptr.3d
at p. 216.) Based on these three factual findings, in our original
opinion we upheld the trial court’s imposition of the upper term
sentences. We concluded that the court’s reliance on the four
inapplicable factors was harmless error.
People v. Lynch Requires that the
Matter Be Remanded for Resentencing
In Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768, the Supreme Court
stated: “We hold that under the current [version of section 1170,
subdivision (b)] a Sixth Amendment [right to jury trial] violation
occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts
[i.e., unproven pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b)(2),] to
impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating
facts relied on have been properly established. The violation is
prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the
aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper
term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in
compliance with the current statutory requirements. If the
reviewing court cannot so determine, . . . the defendant is entitled
to a remand for resentencing.” (Italics added.) Prior convictions
are the only exception to this rule. (Id., at p. 767 [“the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right attaches to every aggravating fact,

8
other than a prior conviction, used to justify imposition of the
upper term”].)
Accordingly, we agree with the following statement by the
Attorney General in his post-Lynch supplemental brief: “At the
time of this Court’s December 2023 opinion in this case, the issue
of what prejudice standard applies on appeal when determining
whether a case should be remanded for resentencing in light of
the enactment of SB 567 was unsettled. Lynch settled the issue,
and it no longer can be said in the instant case that the
noncompliance with amended Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (b), was harmless. Therefore, remand for
resentencing in this regard is now required.” (Fn. omitted.)
Appellant Is Entitled to a Full Resentencing; This
Moots Appellant’s Argument Concerning Section 1385
“The full resentencing rule . . . dictates that ‘when part of a
sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing “a full
resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can
exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed
circumstances.”’ [Citations.] . . . A full resentencing may involve
the trial court’s revisiting such decisions as the selection of a
principal term, whether to stay a sentence, whether to impose an
upper, middle, or lower term, and whether to impose concurrent
or consecutive sentences.” (People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
37, 45-46; see also People v. Calderon (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 82,
88 [“A determinate sentence is one prison term made up of
discrete components. When one of them is invalid, the entire
sentence is infected”].)
At the full resentencing hearing, appellant may request
that the trial court reconsider its previous refusal to dismiss the
firearm and prior serious felony enhancements pursuant to

9
section 1385. This moots appellant’s contention that the matter
must be remanded for resentencing so the trial court can consider
new mitigating factors in determining whether the enhancements
should be dismissed in furtherance of justice.2 (See People v.
Gaines (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 91, 142, fn. 33; People v. Buycks
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893-895; People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7
Cal.5th 415, 424-425 [“the full resentencing rule allows a court to
revisit all prior sentencing decisions when resentencing a
defendant”].)
Proceedings on Remand
“Further proceedings on remand are to be conducted in
accordance with the current statutory requirements and
[appellant] given the opportunity for [a] jury trial” as to any
aggravating facts for which a jury trial is required pursuant to
section 1170, subdivision (b). (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp.
777.) The trial court “may rely on any properly proven
aggravating facts, including prior convictions or facts necessarily
found by the jury to support a verdict on underlying counts and
enhancements. The court retains its discretion to impose an
upper term sentence if it concludes that one or more properly
proved circumstances justify such a sentence. (§ 1170(b)(2).) If it
cannot so conclude, it may impose no more than a middle term for
each of the counts on which [appellant] stands convicted. (Id.,
subd. (b)(1).)” (Id. at pp. 777-778.) Appellant’s resentencing

2 “Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 (Stats.

2021, ch. 721, § 1) amended section 1385 to add specific
mitigating factors the trial court must consider when deciding
whether to strike enhancements from a defendant's sentence in
the interest of justice. (§ 1385, subd. (c) . . . .)” (People v. Burke
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 242-243.)

10
shall comply with the new requirements for imposing an upper
term punishment based on the increasing seriousness of a
defendant’s prior convictions or his unsatisfactory performance
on probation. (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 1082-1084.)
Appellant’s Sentence on Remand May
Lawfully Exceed the Sentence Originally Imposed
The trial court originally imposed an aggregate sentence of
28 years, but erroneously stayed a consecutive 10-year upper
term for the firearm-use enhancement pursuant to section 654.
Therefore, appellant’s unstayed aggregate sentence was reduced
to 18 years. (Ruiz I, supra, slip opn. at pp. 16-20.) In Ruiz I we
corrected the error “under the unauthorized sentence concept.”
(Id. at p. 18.) We increased appellant’s unstayed aggregate
sentence from 18 years to 28 years.
Appellant contends that “because [at the original
sentencing] the court could have reached the same total [an
unstayed aggregate sentence of 18 years] in an authorized
manner” by striking the firearm-use enhancement, “the
resentencing court was limited to the total of the original [18-
year unstayed aggregate] sentence on remand.” Thus, “remand is
required with instructions for the trial court to impose a term
totaling 18 years or less.”
We disagree. “Under the general rule of state
constitutional law that the California Supreme Court has
referred to as the Henderson rule, ‘[w]hen a defendant
successfully appeals a criminal conviction, California’s
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy precludes the
imposition of more severe punishment on resentencing.’” (People
v. Vizcarra (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 422, 431.) “However, in

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People v. Serrato (1973) 9 Cal.3d 753, 764 . . . , disapproved on
another point in People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572,
583 . . . , the California Supreme Court ‘set out an exception to
this general [Henderson] rule.’ [Citation.] In Serrato . . . the
Supreme Court explained that ‘[t]he rule is otherwise when a
trial court pronounces an unauthorized sentence. Such a sentence
is subject to being set aside judicially and is no bar to the
imposition of a proper judgment thereafter, even though it is more
severe than the original unauthorized pronouncement.’” (Id. at
pp. 431-432.) “[T]he fact that the trial court at the original
sentencing theoretically could have imposed an [authorized
sentence that was the same length as the unauthorized sentence]
does not mean that the . . . sentence the court actually imposed at
the original sentencing was an authorized sentence.” (Id. at
p. 438.)3

3 After this appeal had been taken under submission, we

received a letter from appellant informing us of a newly filed
opinion, People v. Trammel (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 415. Appellant
contends Trammel “is relevant to whether [his] sentence on
appeal can exceed his original sentence.” Trammel is contrary to
appellant’s position. In Trammel the question was “whether an
erroneous sentence under section 654 which improperly inflated
Trammel's aggregate sentence falls within the Serrato exception,
thus allowing a harsher sentence on remand.” (Id., at p. 434.)
The Court of Appeal held that such a sentence does not fall
within the exception. (Id., at 434-435.) “[T]he Serrato exception
only applies to unauthorized sentences which were unlawfully
lenient to the detriment of the People.” (Id., at p. 435.) Here, the
trial court’s erroneous original sentence under section 654 was
unlawfully lenient. It reduced appellant’s aggregate unstayed
sentence by 10 years. Therefore, the Serrato exception applies.

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Appellant’s Custody Credits
Appellant asserts: “If this case is remanded for
Resentencing, then appellant is entitled to additional custody
credit for the time he is in custody before his third resentencing.”
Appellant is correct. (See People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th
20, 23, 29-30, 37, 40-41.)
Disposition
Our prior decision filed on December 13, 2023, is vacated.
The true finding on the gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1))
is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with
directions to afford the People an opportunity to retry the
enhancement and meet its burden of proof pursuant to A.B. 333’s
new requirements. The sentence is vacated and the matter is
remanded to the trial court for resentencing consistent with the
views expressed in this opinion. Nothing we have said in this
opinion should be construed as suggesting how the trial court
should exercise its resentencing discretion.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. After
resentencing, the trial court shall prepare a new abstract of
judgment and transmit a certified copy to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.
We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.

13
David R. Worley, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Richard Lennon and Jennifer Peabody, Executive
Directors, Cheryl Lutz and Sydney Banach, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Attorney General, Julie A. Harris, Stephanie C. Santoro, and
Amanda V. Lopez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

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