People v. Alvarez CA1/5

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Filed 8/22/25 P. v. Alvarez CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for pur-
poses of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A170812, A170813
v.
STEPHEN GABRIEL ALVAREZ, (Humboldt County Super. Ct.
Defendant and Appellant. Nos. CR-2303634, CR-2400874)

In these consolidated appeals involving two criminal cases
(CR-2303634 and CR-2400874), Stephen Gabriel Alvarez
challenges judgments imposed after he pled guilty to three counts
of burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460).1 Alvarez’s appointed
appellate counsel filed a brief raising no issues and asking us to
independently review the record pursuant to People v. Wende
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.2

Alvarez elected not to file a supplemental brief raising
issues for appeal. Nonetheless, based on our independent review
of the record, we invited the parties to file supplemental briefs
addressing (1) whether Alvarez admitted either of two burglaries
were violent felonies within the meaning of section 667.5,
subdivision (c)(21) and if there was a factual basis for any such

Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1

Alvarez also filed a related petition for writ of habeas
2

corpus (No. A172024), which we address by separate order.
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admission, and (2) whether the trial court erred by awarding
Alvarez presentence conduct credits pursuant to section 4019.
Having considered the parties’ briefs, we modify the trial court’s
award of presentence custody credits but otherwise affirm.

BACKGROUND

A.

A defendant convicted of a violent felony, as defined in
section 667.5, may not accrue presentence conduct credits greater
than 15 percent of their actual period of confinement. (§ 2933.1,
subd. (c).) “One such violent felony is first degree burglary
‘wherein it is charged and proved that another person, other than
an accomplice, was present in the residence during the
commission of the burglary.’ (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21).)” (People v.
Garcia (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 271, 274, italics added.)

B.

In December 2023, J.C. was checking on a house for its out-
of-town owner when she found Alvarez sleeping in a bedroom.
Alvarez had entered through a window, consumed the owner’s
food and alcohol, damaged the water heater, and taken the
owner’s credit card.

Alvarez was charged by information (case number CR-
2303634) with first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)) and
felony vandalism (§ 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)). The information
specifically alleged the burglary was a violent felony, within the
meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21), because “another
person, other than an accomplice, was present in the residence
during the commission of the [burglary].”

Alvarez initially pled guilty to first degree burglary in
exchange for a grant of probation, an agreement that no
additional jail time would be sought, and dismissal of the
vandalism count. Alvarez also admitted (both orally and in the

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written waiver form) that he was pleading guilty to a violent
felony and acknowledged, “by pleading guilty . . . to a . . . violent
felony (‘strike’), the penalty for any future felony conviction will
be increased as a result of my conviction in this case” and that
“jail or prison conduct/work-time credit I may accrue will not
exceed 15 percent.”

At the change of plea hearing, the trial court advised
Alvarez of the direct consequences of his plea, took an oral and
written waiver of rights, found a factual basis, and found that the
plea was freely and voluntarily made. After entry of his plea, the
trial court released Alvarez on a Cruz waiver,3 conditioned on
(among other terms) him obeying all laws and appearing for the
sentencing hearing scheduled for March 21, 2024.

Four days before his sentencing in the CR-2303634 case,
Alvarez broke into two inhabited houses and, in fleeing, dropped
a backpack that contained personal property belonging to one of
the owners.

A new criminal complaint was filed (case number CR-
2400874) that included four charges: first degree burglary
(§§ 459, 460, subd. (a); count one); second degree burglary
(§§ 459, 460, subd. (b); count two); misdemeanor resisting,
delaying or obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count
three); and misdemeanor cutting of a utility line (§ 591). The
complaint specifically alleged that count one was a violent felony,
within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21), “because

3 People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247 permits the
defendant and the court to enter into an agreement that a
sentence in excess of the bargained-for term will be imposed if
the defendant fails to appear for sentencing. (Id. at p. 1254, fn. 5;
People v. Puente (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1146, fn. 3.) Here,
the trial court advised Alvarez that if he were to violate one of
the terms of the waiver (including the requirement that he obey
all laws), then “the plea would stand, but the terms would be off,
meaning that the Court could select all the way up to prison.”
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another person, other than an accomplice, was present in the
residence during the commission of the burglary.”

In exchange for dismissal of the “special allegation” (as well
as counts three and four) and a stipulated six-year prison term
(to run concurrently to the sentence to be imposed for the CR-
2303634 case), Alvarez pled guilty to counts one and two. At the
change of plea hearing, the trial court advised Alvarez of the
direct consequences of his plea, took an oral and written waiver
of rights, found a factual basis, and found that the plea was freely
and voluntarily made. The written plea form stated that the
special allegation was being dismissed, along with counts three
and four. But Alvarez also acknowledged, “by pleading guilty . . .
to a . . . violent felony (‘strike’), the penalty for any future felony
conviction will be increased as a result of my conviction in this
case” and that “jail or prison conduct/work-time credit I may
accrue will not exceed 15 percent.”

After Alvarez waived a presentencing report, the trial court
imposed the stipulated six-year prison sentence on count one, a
concurrent two-year term on count two, and a four-year
concurrent term for the burglary in CR-2303634. The court
awarded Alvarez credit for time served presentence. Although
the court’s and counsel’s discussion of credits is somewhat
ambiguous, the abstract of judgment indicates, in both cases, that
full presentence conduct credits were awarded under section
4019.

In the CR-2303634 case, Alvarez was awarded total
presentence credits of 281 days: 141 days’ actual and 140 days’
conduct credit. In the CR-2400874 case, Alvarez was awarded
total presentence credits of 116 days: 58 days’ actual and 58 days’
conduct credit. Alvarez obtained certificates of probable cause
(§ 1237.5) to challenge the judgments against him.

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DISCUSSION

A.

Alvarez contends that there was no factual basis to support
an admission, in either case, that he committed a violent felony
within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21). We
disagree. The People correctly concede that, in case CR-2400874,
Alvarez did not admit the person present allegation; the special
allegation was dismissed. However, the People are correct that
Alvarez admitted the person present allegation in case CR-
2303634, and that admission is supported by a sufficient factual
basis. Accordingly, the trial court should have limited Alvarez’s
conduct credits.

1.

Whether a defendant’s sentence is subject to the 15 percent
credit-earning limitation under section 2933.1 is a matter of law
we review de novo. (In re Borlik (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 30, 35.)
The People must give a defendant notice of the facts that restrict
his ability to earn credit. (See People v. Lara (2012) 54 Cal.4th
896, 906.) The 15 percent credit limitation does not apply to a
person convicted of first degree residential burglary unless it is
pleaded and proven that the residence was occupied by a
nonaccomplice at the time of the burglary. (People v. Garcia,
supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 274.)

“A negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract, and it is
interpreted according to general contract principles. [Citations.]
‘The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give
effect to the mutual intention of the parties. (Civ. Code, § 1636.)
If contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs. (Civ.
Code, § 1638.) On the other hand, “[i]f the terms of a promise are
in any respect ambiguous or uncertain, it must be interpreted in
the sense in which the promisor believed, at the time of making

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it, that the promisee understood it.” ’ ” (People v. Shelton (2006)
37 Cal.4th 759, 767.)

When taking a plea, the trial court must “satisfy itself that
the plea is freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a
factual basis for the plea.” (§ 1192.5, subd. (c); see People v.
Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th 432, 435.) “[A] trial court possesses
wide discretion in determining whether a sufficient factual basis
exists for a guilty plea. The trial court’s acceptance of the guilty
plea, after pursuing an inquiry to satisfy itself that there is a
factual basis for the plea, will be reversed only for abuse of
discretion.” (Id. at p. 443.)

2.

“[T]he occupied burglary enhancement applies if there is a
person other than an accomplice present at any time prior to the
perpetrator’s final departure from the residence.” (People v.
Munguia (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 103, 107 (Munguia), italics added.)
“The briefest of overlaps between entry and the presence of a
nonaccomplice suffices for the enhancement [citations], and it
matters not whether a nonaccomplice is present at the time of
entry or interrupts the burglary in progress; in either
circumstance, the nonaccomplice is present during the
commission of the burglary, thereby creating the very situation of
danger at which the enhancement is directed.” (Id. at p. 112.)

The record demonstrates that, in the CR-2303634 case,
Alvarez was charged with first degree residential burglary and
there were specific allegations that a nonaccomplice was present
during his commission of that offense. When he entered his
guilty plea, Alvarez explicitly acknowledged (both orally and in
writing) that he was pleading to a violent felony (as charged) and
that his presentence credits would be limited as a result. The
prosecutor and Alvarez’s counsel also stipulated that the
preliminary hearing transcript provided the factual basis for
Alvarez’s plea. The preliminary transcript shows that J.C. (who
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was not an accomplice) entered the home before Alvarez left.
Despite Alvarez’s argument to the contrary, that is all that is
required. (See People v. Holmes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 442;
Munguia, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at pp. 112–113.) There is no
requirement that a nonaccomplice be present at the time of entry.
(Munguia, at pp. 107, 112–113.)

Alvarez’s reliance on People v. Singleton (2007) 155
Cal.App.4th 1332 is misplaced. Singleton involved burglary of an
apartment while the tenant was outside the apartment in an
exterior, common hallway of the apartment building at all times.
(Id. at pp. 1336–1337.) The Singleton court construed the
statutory term “ ‘present in the residence’ ” to mean “that a
person, other than the burglar or an accomplice, has crossed the
threshold or otherwise passed within the outer walls of the house,
apartment, or other dwelling place being burglarized.” (Id. at p.
1337.) Accordingly, the tenant’s presence outside of the
apartment in an exterior common hallway was not sufficient to
establish presence in the residence as required under the statute.
(Id. at pp. 1337–1338.)

Here, in contrast, there is no question J.C. crossed the
threshold of the residence during the burglary. She merely was
not present at the time of Alvarez’s entry. Thus, People v.
Singleton, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th 1332 is not on point. (See
Munguia, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 113.)

The record shows that the parties intended, in the CR-
2303634 case, for Alvarez’s guilty plea to include an admission
that someone other than an accomplice was present in the
residence during the burglary. There is an adequate basis for
that admission. However, in the CR-2400874 case, we accept the
People’s concession that the record demonstrates the parties
intended to dismiss the special allegation.

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B.

The above conclusion leads us to agree with the People that
the trial court erred by awarding Alvarez full presentence
conduct credit under section 4019, rather than limiting the award
to 15 percent pursuant to section 2933.1, subdivisions (a) and (c).

“A sentence that awards custody credits exceeding
statutory limits is unauthorized, and may be corrected whenever
the error is discovered.” (People v. Valenti (2016) 243
Cal.App.4th 1140, 1184, superseded by statute on another ground
as stated in People v. Brooks (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 932, 946.)

Alvarez insists that section 2933.1 has no application
because he was purportedly “initially granted probation” in the
CR-2303634 case. He is wrong.

“Section 2933.1[, subdivision] (c) generally limits
presentence credits to 15 percent of actual time served when a
defendant . . . is convicted of a violent felony listed in section
667.5, subdivision (c). But, section 2933.1[, subdivision] (c) only
applies when the judgment results in the defendant’s
incarceration in state prison, and not when a defendant is on
probation even if he or she was convicted of a section 667.5,
subdivision (c) felony.” (People v. Daniels (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th
736, 739.) “The calculation of conduct credits for purposes of
granting probation is controlled by section 4019.” (People v.
Arevalo (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 821, 827.) If the trial court later
revokes probation and imposes a prison sentence, it must limit
the defendant’s conduct credits to 15 percent under section
2933.1, subdivision (c). (People v. Arevalo, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th
at p. 828; People v. Daniels, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at pp. 739-
740.)

First, Alvarez was never placed on probation; he was
released on a Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1247 waiver pending
sentencing. Second, after the charges in the CR-2400874 case

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were filed, he was sentenced to a prison term in the CR-2303634
case. Having imposed a prison sentence, the trial court was
required to limit Alvarez’s conduct credits to 15 percent under
section 2933.1, subdivision (c). (People v. Arevalo, supra, 20
Cal.App.5th at p. 828; People v. Daniels, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 739-740.)

It is also no matter that, as the People concede, Alvarez did
not admit the person present enhancement in the CR-2400874
case. Section 2933.1, subdivision (c)’s limitation on presentence
conduct credits applies, by its terms, to the offender, not to the
offense, and limits a violent felon’s conduct credits irrespective of
whether all their offenses are violent felonies. (See People v.
Valenti, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184; accord, People v.
Nunez (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 761, 765 [“[i]t is often said that the
15 percent cap applies to the offender, not the offense; thus, the
15 percent limit applies to each offense of a defendant’s entire
prison term if any of the offenses for which he is sent to prison is
violent”]; People v. Marichalar (2003) 144 Cal.App.4th 1331,
1337.)

Under section 2933.1, subdivision (c), Alvarez was entitled
to local conduct credit of only 15 percent, rather than full conduct
credits under section 4019. In the CR-2303634 case, Alvarez
should have been awarded total presentence credits of 162 days:
141 days’ actual and 21 days’ conduct credit. In the CR-2400874
case, Alvarez should have been awarded total presentence credits
of 66 days: 58 days’ actual and eight days’ conduct credit. (See
People v. Ramos (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 810, 815-816 [15-percent
calculation is rounded down to “the largest whole number of days
which [does] not exceed 15 percent”].) We must order the
judgment modified accordingly.

DISPOSITION

The judgment in each case (CR-2303634 and CR-2400874)
is modified to provide the correct presentence credits:
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respectively, 162 days of total credits with 21 conduct credits for
case CR-2303634 and 66 days of total credits with eight days
conduct credits for case CR-2400874. The trial court is directed
to prepare amended abstracts of judgment reflecting the
corrected calculation and the proper statutory basis (§ 2933.1,
subd. (c)). The clerk shall forward certified copies of the amended
abstracts of judgment to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. As modified, the judgments are affirmed.

BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

SIMONS, ACTING P.J.
CHOU, J.
People v. Alvarez (A170812, A170813)

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