People v. Wade CA2/5

CourtListener 10658916CalctappAug 22, 2025

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Filed 8/22/25 P. v. Wade CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B337566

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA518652)
v.

JOSHUA WADE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Robert C. Vanderet, Judge. Affirmed with
directions to correct the abstract of judgment.

Adrian K. Panton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Gabriel Bradley, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Joshua Wade (defendant) argues that the trial court abused
its discretion in imposing a term of imprisonment rather than
placing him on probation. There was no abuse of discretion, so
we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
On October 3, 2023, defendant went to the apartment
where his girlfriend lived with their infant child. Defendant and
his girlfriend argued, which escalated to physical violence that
included defendant slapping the girlfriend across the face. At the
time of this incident, defendant was on probation following a
conviction for injuring the same girlfriend, who is the mother of
his child.
II. Procedural Background
In the operative amended information, the People charged
defendant with (1) injuring the mother of his child within seven
years of a prior conviction for the same (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd.
(f)(1)),1 (2) assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury
(§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), (3) first degree residential burglary (§ 459),
and (4) second degree robbery (§ 211).

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

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A jury convicted defendant of the first charge, and
acquitted him of the other charges.
At the April 2024 sentencing hearing, defendant asked that
he “be given the opportunity to be on probation” with domestic
violence classes “so he can learn from this behavior[ and] grow
from this behavior,” and because the jury acquitted him of what
he viewed as the more serious charges. The People requested a
term of imprisonment, urging that defendant was not “suitable
for probation” because “he was on probation when this conduct
occurred.” The court imposed a mid-term of four years’
imprisonment, after noting that defendant was on probation at
the time of the October 2023 crime and that the prior probation
term included a requirement to attend domestic violence classes.
Defendant filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing a
term of imprisonment rather than a probationary term. The
Penal Code imbues trial courts with a “broad discretion” whether
to grant probation after considering a number of factors relating
to the crime and to the defendant. (People v. Welch (1993) 5
Cal.4th 228, 233; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.414.) Those factors
include “[w]hether the defendant inflicted physical or emotional
injury,” “[w]hether the defendant was an active or a passive
participant” in the crime, and the defendant’s “[p]rior record of
criminal conduct, . . . including the recency and frequency of prior
crimes[] and whether the prior record indicates a pattern of
regular or increasingly serious criminal conduct.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.414(a)(4), (a)(6), (b)(1).) We review a trial court’s
exercise of this discretion for an abuse of discretion. (People v.

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Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978
(Alvarez).)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant probation. Defendant inflicted physical injury, was an
active (and, indeed, the sole) participant in that crime, and was
on probation for committing essentially the same crime against
the exact same person at the time he did it again. Faced with
such focused recidivism, a trial court does not abuse its discretion
in refusing to give a defendant a third chance by granting him
probation a second time.
Defendant responds with two arguments. First, he argues
that the court’s comment that it was denying probation because
defendant was on probation “implied” a “practice of the trial court
to deny probation” to all defendants on probation, especially
when it did not explicitly cite any other factors. For support, he
cites People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298. As Penoli itself
expressly observes, a trial court’s recitation of a reason for
making a decision in a particular case is not evidence of an
implicit and unwavering standard practice it follows in every case
because, in the absence of the trial court expressly stating it had
such a practice (as was the case in Penoli), appellate courts are to
presume the court is following the law and making a case-by-case
determination. (Id. at p. 303; see Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at
pp. 977-978.) Second, defendant argues that probation is
warranted because the case against him was “weak”; as proof, he
points to the jury’s acquittal on three of the four charges and
conversations his counsel had with jurors after the trial
indicating that they only believed that defendant “slapped” the
girlfriend. Aside from the fact that the juror testimony is
inadmissible hearsay (Evid. Code, § 1150), defendant is

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effectively inviting us to reweigh the pertinent factors or to hold
that acquittal of some charges warrants probation for all others
as a matter of law. We decline both invitations.
We have also identified a clerical error in the abstract of
judgment. The abstract erroneously notes the conviction resulted
from a guilty plea instead of by way of jury verdict. The trial
court has a duty to ensure a correct abstract is prepared;
accordingly, a corrected abstract, with the correct disposition of
the action, must be prepared. (See People v. Zackery (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 380, 389-390.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to prepare a modified abstract of
judgment that correctly indicates the disposition of the action by
way of jury verdict and not by plea, and to transmit a certified
copy of the modified abstract to the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P.J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:

_________________________, J.
BAKER

_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)

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