Sandra V. v. Nicholas A. CA2/1

CourtListener 10658790CalctappAug 22, 2025

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Filed 8/22/25 Sandra V. v. Nicholas A. CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

SANDRA V., B339669

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STRO02715)
v.

NICHOLAS A.,

Defendant and Respondent.

NICHOLAS A., B339596

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STRO03452)
v.

SANDRA V.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Michael R. Powell, Judge. Affirmed.
Sandra V., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant (No.
B339669) and Defendant and Appellant (No. B339596).
Oscar D. Sandoval for Defendant and Respondent
(No. B339669). No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent
(No. B339596).
____________________________

This is a consolidated appeal from a two-year domestic
violence restraining order (DVRO) protecting plaintiff and
respondent Nicholas A. from defendant and appellant Sandra V.,
his aunt, and the denial of a competing restraining order request
by Sandra against Nicholas.1 The DVRO protecting Nicholas,
inter alia, prohibits Sandra from contacting him, coming within
100 yards of him when he is outside the residence he shares with
Sandra, and being within 10 feet of Nicholas when the two of
them are in the dwelling. In support of his request for the order,
Nicholas presented evidence that Sandra has attempted to
remove him from the residence by hurling homophobic slurs at
him, opening his mail, breaking into and entering his bedroom
unannounced, and directing a man Nicholas estimated was four
times his size to enter Nicholas’s room and demand he leave the
residence. Conversely, Sandra asserted that she, her children,
and her nanny needed a DVRO protecting them from Nicholas
because he had been verbally and physically abusive.

1 As a person seeking protection from alleged domestic
violence, we refer to Nicholas A. initially by his first name and
last initial (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(1)), and thereafter by
his first name only for ease of reference. We do the same for
Sandra V. No disrespect is intended.

2
On appeal, Sandra, representing herself, argues the trial
court applied the wrong legal standard in determining whether to
issue the order protecting Nicholas, the DVRO lacks sufficient
evidentiary support, and the court erred by ordering her to leave
the residence. Her first claim of error fails because the record
shows the court found she disturbed Nicholas’s peace, which is
abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA; Fam.
Code,2 § 6200, et seq.). We reject Sandra’s evidentiary challenges
to the DVRO because she fails to demonstrate error under the
deferential substantial evidence standard. Sandra’s argument
that the court excluded her from the residence is unavailing
because the court expressly denied Nicholas’s request for an
order requiring Sandra to move out of the residence. Sandra’s
remaining claims of error fail because they either lack
evidentiary support or she does not raise them properly. We thus
affirm the DVRO protecting Nicholas and the order denying
Sandra’s request for a DVRO.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We summarize only those facts pertinent to our resolution
of this appeal.
On April 18, 2024, Sandra filed, in pro per, a request for a
DVRO, the contents of which she declared to be true under
penalty of perjury, in which Sandra sought an order protecting
her, her two children, and her nanny from Nicholas.3 In the
request and its attachments, Sandra raised a litany of allegations

2 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Family Code.
3 In our Discussion, part A, post, we augment the record to
include Sandra’s and Nicholas’s requests for a DVRO, along with
their respective attachments.

3
against Nicholas, whom she identified as a nephew living at her
residence at the time she filed the request. Although the request
is not a model of clarity, Sandra apparently asserted, inter alia,
(1) in November 2023, Nicholas “chased [Sandra] around [her]
car, threw trash on [her] car[,] . . . damaged furniture in [her]
room,” and cut her right index finger with a steel rod, causing it
to bleed; (2) on other occasions, Nicholas yelled at Sandra and her
children, threatened to kill her, stalked her, hit the doors and
walls of the home, and played heavy metal music at a loud
volume while Sandra’s children were trying to nap; (3) Nicholas
refused to (a) get a job, (b) clean his room and his bathroom,
(c) move his disabled vehicle out of the driveway, (d) pay any of
the expenses for the home, and (e) vacate the home; and
(4) Nicholas “s[old] and use[d] illegal street drugs.” Sandra
attached four exhibits to her request, which she identified as (A)
“car issues”; (B) “drug issues/violence”; (C) “Police Reports”; and
(D) “Notice to vacate [&] 3 day notice.” Among other things,
Sandra sought a court order requiring Nicholas to move out of the
residence.
On May 15, 2024, Nicholas filed a request for a DVRO
against Sandra, the contents of which Nicholas declared were
true under penalty of perjury; attached to the request were
Nicholas’s declaration and several exhibits.4 Sandra is the sister
of Nicholas’s deceased mother. Nicholas, Sandra, and Nicholas’s
sister live at a residence in Montebello that used to be owned by
Nicholas’s late grandmother. According to Nicholas, the home
now belongs to a trust for which Nicholas and his sister are

4 The remainder of the textual paragraph accompanying
this footnote and the following three paragraphs summarize
portions of these documents.

4
beneficiaries and Sandra is the trustee. Since his grandmother’s
death, Sandra has attempted to “remove [Nicholas] from [the
r]esidence.”
“Every single week [Nicholas would] get berated and
harassed by [Sandra]. [He would] get called a ‘faggot[,]’[ ]
‘fag[,]’[ ] ‘low life[,]’[ ] amongst other insults.” Additionally,
Sandra “consistently br[oke] into [Nicholas’s] bedroom,
unannounced, to see what [Nicholas was] doing,” and Sandra
went “through [Nicholas’s] computer and emails” in his room
when he was not home. The door to Nicholas’s bedroom is a
“pocket door that slides and has a hook as a lock and does not
have a standard door knob[, s]o it is easy for anyone to just use a
fork or knife to slide the hook up and come into [his] room.”
Sandra also “open[ed Nicholas’s] mail on [a] daily basis.”
On April 16, 2024, the door to Nicholas’s room “open[ed]
really fast” and he saw Sandra and a man who was
approximately 6 feet 4 inches tall, weighed about 275 pounds,
and was “maybe 4 times [Nicholas’s] size.” “They both rushed
into [his] room and [Nicholas] got really scared.” After Sandra
looked at Nicholas and yelled, “ ‘[T]here he is!’ ”; the man
“step[ped] up really close to [Nicholas] in a menacing and
threatening ma[nner], with a hostile looking face[,] . . . . [and
said] in a loud and hostile manner, ‘[Y]ou need to leave!’ ”
Nicholas “just froze” because he believed “if [he] had stood up
that the man was going to punch [Nicholas].”
Nicholas attested that one of the exhibits attached to his
request for a DVRO is a screenshot of a text message and an
accompanying photograph of the large man, which text and
photograph Sandra had sent to Nicholas’s other aunt (Diane). In
the text message, Sandra identified the man as her “new property

5
manager,” and asserted he was 6 feet 3 inches tall, had a “[b]lack
belt,” and was “very [i]ntimidating.”
The trial court heard the parties’ DVRO requests on
June 7, 2024. Sandra, Nicholas, and Nicholas’s counsel appeared
at the hearing. Sandra, Nicholas, Diane, and Hector Gonzalez
testified.5 At the conclusion of the proceeding, the trial court
granted Nicholas’s request for a two-year DVRO and denied
Sandra’s request for a restraining order. Among other things, the
DVRO bars Sandra from contacting Nicholas, obligates Sandra to
complete a 52-week batterer intervention program, and requires
Sandra to stay (a) at least 100 yards away from Nicholas while
outside the residence, and (b) at least 10 feet away from Nicholas
“[w]hen at home[ or in] the curtilage of said home.”
Sandra timely appealed from the DVRO and the denial of
her request for a restraining order. Sandra filed an opening brief
in pro per in both appeals. Although Nicholas did not file an
appellate brief in the appeal from the DVRO, his counsel did file
a respondent’s brief in the appeal from the order denying
Sandra’s request for a DVRO, and Sandra filed a reply thereto.
We consolidated the two appeals for purposes of decision only.

APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. The DVPA
The DVPA authorizes a court to issue a DVRO “ ‘ “ ‘to
restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of
domestic violence and ensuring a period of separation of the
persons involved’ ” upon “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of

5 Sandra represented to the trial court that Gonzalez had
witnessed several altercations between her and Nicholas.

6
abuse.” ’ [Citation.]” (See Parris J. v. Christopher U. (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 108, 112, 115 (Parris J.).) “The DVPA defines
‘abuse’ as ‘any of the following: [¶] (1) To intentionally or
recklessly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury. [¶] (2) Sexual
assault. [¶] (3) To place a person in reasonable apprehension of
imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another. [¶]
(4) To engage in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined
pursuant to Section 6320.’ [Citation.] ‘Abuse is not limited to the
actual infliction of physical injury or assault.’ [Citation.]”
(Parris J., at pp. 115–116, quoting § 6203, subds. (a) & (b).)
“Behavior that may be enjoined under section 6320
includes ‘disturbing the peace of the other party[.]’ [Citation.]”
(See Parris J., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 116, quoting § 6320,
subd. (a).) The DVPA does not prescribe “an objective, reasonable
person standard [for] deciding whether a person has ‘disturb[ed]
the peace of the other party’ within the meaning of section 6320.”
(See Parris J., at p. 121.) Rather, “ ‘ “disturbing the peace of the
other party” refers to conduct that, based on the totality of the
circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the
other party. This conduct may be committed directly or
indirectly, including through the use of a third party, and by any
method or through any means . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 116,
quoting § 6320, subd. (c).)
“[T]he court may issue a DVRO based solely on the affidavit
or testimony of the person requesting the order . . . ‘after notice
and a hearing.’ [Citations.]” (See In re Marriage of D.S. & A.S.
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 926, 934; see also Sanchez v. Bezos (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 750, 758, fn. 1 & 763, fn. 3 [noting the Supreme
Court has found that Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5 “ ‘allows use of
“unsworn” declarations made under penalty of perjury’ in place of

7
an affidavit”].) “ ‘The burden of proof is by a preponderance of
the evidence.’ ” (Parris J., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 116.)

B. Standards of Review
“ ‘We review the grant of a DVPA restraining order for
abuse of discretion, and, to the extent we are called upon to
review the court’s factual findings, we apply the substantial
evidence standard of review. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Parris J., supra,
96 Cal.App.5th at p. 116.)
“ ‘Review for abuse of discretion is . . . focused not primarily
on the evidence but the application of a legal standard. A court
abuses its discretion only when “ ‘ “the trial court has exceeded
the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious,
or patently absurd determination.” ’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
Whether a trial court applied the correct legal standard in
exercising its discretion is a question of law that we review
de novo.” (In re A.P. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1143.)
“[The substantial evidence] standard of review is highly
deferential. It has three pillars. First, we accept all evidence
supporting the trial court’s order. Second, we completely
disregard contrary evidence. Third, we draw all reasonable
inferences to affirm the trial court. . . . Under this standard of
review, parties challenging a trial court’s factfinding bear an
‘ “enormous burden.” ’ [Citation.]” (See Schmidt v. Superior
Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 581–582 (Schmidt).)
In applying the substantial evidence standard, “ ‘[w]e must
accept as true all evidence supporting the trial court’s findings,
resolving every conflict in favor of the judgment. [Citation.] We
do not determine credibility or reweigh the evidence. [Citation.]
If substantial evidence supports the judgment, reversal is not

8
warranted even if facts exist that would support a contrary
finding.’ [Citation.]” (Parris J., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 116.)
Furthermore, “ ‘the doctrine of implied findings’ ” provides
that in a case in which the trial court acted as the factfinder,
“ ‘the reviewing court must infer . . . that the trial court impliedly
made every factual finding necessary to support its decision.’
[Citation.]” (See Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970,
981.)
As for Sandra’s appeal from the denial of her request for a
DVRO, “ ‘the question [is] . . . whether the evidence compels a
finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.]
Specifically, the question [is] whether the appellant’s evidence
was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (See Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v.
County of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838.)
“ ‘ “A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be
correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are
indulged in favor of its correctness.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
Thus, ‘ “ ‘it is the appellant’s responsibility to affirmatively
demonstrate error’ ” ’ by ‘ “ ‘supply[ing] the reviewing court with
some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to
the record.’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] The appellant bears this
burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness accorded to
the trial court’s decision, regardless of the applicable standard of
review.” (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of
Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 776–777.)
These same rules of appellate procedure apply to self-
represented parties. (See Scholes v. Lambirth Trucking Co.

9
(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 590, 595.) Although “[a] party may choose
to act as his or her own attorney[, w]e treat such a party like any
other party,” meaning “he or she ‘ “is entitled to the same, but no
greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.
[Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (See ibid.) Additionally, Nicholas’s
failure to file a respondent’s brief in one of the two appeals before
us does not relieve Sandra of her burden to demonstrate the trial
court erred. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2) [providing
that if no respondent’s brief is filed, “the court may decide the
appeal on the record, the opening brief, and any oral argument by
the appellant”].)

DISCUSSION

A. We Augment the Record To Include Sandra’s and
Nicholas’s Respective DVRO Requests, and We Deny
Sandra’s Request for Judicial Notice
As a preliminary matter, we note Sandra’s and Nicholas’s
DVRO requests do not appear in the clerk’s transcripts. We
exercise our discretion to augment the record to include these two
requests, along with their respective attachments. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A) [“At any time, on . . . its own
motion, the reviewing court may order the record augmented to
include: [¶] . . . Any document filed or lodged in the case in
superior court.”].)
Additionally, in the appeal from the denial of her request
for a DVRO, Sandra moves for judicial notice of “the existence
and content of a currently pending Unlawful
Detainer/Eviction . . . action filed . . . against . . . [Nicholas,] . . . et
al.” (Boldface omitted.) Sandra attaches to her request a
document she identifies as “a file-stamped copy of the Unlawful

10
Detainer Summons and Complaint,” which has a stamp
indicating the document was filed in the unlawful detainer action
on July 1, 2025.6 (Boldface omitted.) Sandra asserts that the
unlawful detainer “action names [Nicholas] as an unauthorized
occupant and alleges causes of action including nuisance, waste,
vandalism, and unlawful possession,” and that “[t]hese acts
mirror his prior conduct—including inflicting bodily harm on
[Sandra]—thus directly undermining his status as a ‘protected’
party.”
“When reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s
judgment, we only consider matters that were part of the record
at the time the court entered the judgment; ‘ “[t]his rule
preserves an orderly system of [litigation] by preventing litigants
from circumventing the normal sequence of litigation.”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Brewster & Clevenger
(2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 481, 498.) Thus, “[t]he appellate court
does not take judicial notice of matters not considered by the trial
court, absent exceptional circumstances.” (Ibid.) Sandra
does not identify any exceptional circumstances that warrant a
departure from the general rule here. Accordingly, we deny her
request for judicial notice of “the existence and content” of the
unlawful detainer action.

6 Sandra also attaches to her request documents she
identifies as “Trial Court demonstrating of bodily injury [sic]
caused by Respondent to Appealant [sic], with witness, police
report and photograph not taken into consideration”; and
“Respondent violating court rules and decorum, mocking the
judicial system.” Sandra does not request judicial notice of these
additional documents.

11
B. Sandra Does Not Show the Trial Court Applied the
Wrong Legal Standard
Sandra argues the trial court “applied the wrong legal
standard” in ruling on Nicholas’s request for a DVRO. (Boldface
& underscoring omitted.) She contends, “A restraining order
cannot issue unless the court finds past acts of ‘abuse’ ” as that
term is defined in section 6203. According to Sandra, although
section 6203 contains an “exhaustive” list of the conduct that
satisfies the definition of abuse, the trial court made an oral
remark demonstrating it applied a “catch-all provision” that does
not appear in the statute. (See Applicable Law & Standards of
Review, part A, ante [discussing § 6203’s definition of abuse].)
Specifically, Sandra asserts the trial court stated, “ ‘I find there is
domestic violence and/or restrainable conduct.’ ” (Italics added.)
Sandra provides no record citation showing that the trial
court made such a statement. That failure is fatal to her claim of
error. (See Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016)
4 Cal.App.5th 574, 590, fn. 8 [“[C]ourts will decline to consider
any factual assertion unsupported by record citation at the point
where it is asserted.”].)
In fact, page 92 of the reporter’s transcript reveals that the
trial court found Sandra “disturb[ed Nicholas’s] peace” by
entering his “private room” because Sandra was “unwelcome.”
“ ‘[D]isturbing the peace of the other party’ ” falls within
section 6203’s definition of “ ‘abuse[.]’ ” (See Parris J., supra,
96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 115–116.) In sum, we reject Sandra’s claim
the trial court did not apply the proper legal standard in
determining whether to issue the DVRO protecting Nicholas.

12
C. Sandra Fails To Establish the DVRO Protecting
Nicholas Is Not Supported by Substantial Evidence
Sandra raises several challenges to the evidentiary
sufficiency of the DVRO protecting Nicholas. Sandra contends
(1) her “one act of asking a mediator to offer [Nicholas] cash for
keys . . . . is hardly . . . ‘domestic violence’ ”; (2) Nicholas’s claim
that “he felt insulted” when Sandra asked him if he was gay does
not constitute abuse, and Nicholas “fabricated [his claims that
Sandra used] other more offensive language such as ‘fag, faggot,
and homo’ ”; and (3) Nicholas was “the aggressor and . . . Sandra
was the victim in this case” because she “presented evidence [that
she] . . . had blood on her finger from [Nicholas] striking her with
a steel rod . . . .” Sandra further argues, “Even if everything in
[Nicholas’s] declaration were true,” Nicholas failed to discharge
his burden of proof because the “declaration nowhere shows that
[Sandra] intentionally or recklessly attempted to cause [Nicholas]
bodily injury” or “placed him in reasonable apprehension of
serious bodily injury . . . .”
In asserting she merely asked a “mediator/property
manager to enter into a settlement negotiation for exchanging
cash for [keys],” Sandra ignores the deferential standard
governing our review of the trial court’s ruling. As discussed in
our Applicable Law and Standards of Review, part B, ante, we
must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable
inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor.” (See Schmidt,
supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 582.)
Nicholas attested in his declaration that on April 16, 2024,
the door to his room “open[ed] really fast”; Sandra and a man
“maybe 4 times [Nicholas’s] size” “rushed into [his] room”; Sandra

13
looked at Nicholas and “yell[ed], ‘[T]here he is!’ ”; the man
“step[ped] up really close to [Nicholas] in a menacing and
threatening ma[nner][ ] with a hostile looking face”; and “[t]he
man . . . sa[id] in a loud and hostile manner, ‘[Y]ou need to
leave!’ ” Viewing this testimony in the light most favorable to
Nicholas, we conclude it constitutes substantial evidence that
Sandra had instructed a physically imposing man to intimidate
Nicholas in the hopes of forcing him to move out of the residence.
Next, by arguing that Nicholas falsely claimed Sandra
called him a “ ‘fag, faggot, and homo’ ” and that she offered
evidence showing Nicholas cut her finger with a steel rod, Sandra
asks us to disregard evidence from Nicholas’s declaration that
supports the DVRO and, instead, credit evidence favorable to her
argument that Nicholas “was the aggressor and . . . [Sandra] was
the victim in this case.” Yet, we may “reject . . . the statements of
a witness who has been believed by the trier of fact[ only if] it
[is] . . . physically impossible for the statements to be true, or
their falsity [is] apparent without resorting to inferences or
deductions.” (See In re Jordan R. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111,
136.) Because Sandra makes no attempt to satisfy this standard,
we may not disregard Nicholas’s testimony that she called him
these homophobic slurs. Furthermore, we are required to “draw
all reasonable inferences [from the evidence] to affirm the trial
court” (see Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 581) and
“resolv[e] every conflict in favor of the judgment” (Parris J.,
supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 116). Sandra does not direct us to
evidence in the record supporting her claim that Nicholas cut her
finger, let alone make any showing the only reasonable inference
from that evidence is that Nicholas was the aggressor and
Sandra was the victim. We thus decline to address these

14
evidentiary challenges further. (See Cahill v. San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 (Cahill) [“ ‘We are
not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them. [Citation.]
The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority
allows this court to treat the contention as waived.’ ”].)
Lastly, notwithstanding Sandra’s argument to the contrary,
the DVPA’s definition of abuse includes not only “ ‘intentionally
or recklessly caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause bodily injury” ”
and “ ‘plac[ing] a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent
serious bodily injury[,]’ ” but also, “ ‘disturbing the peace of the
other party[.]’ [Citation.]” (See Parris J., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 115–116, quoting § 6203, subd. (a) & § 6320, subd. (a).)
Disturbing someone’s peace “refers to conduct that . . . destroys
the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” (See § 6320,
subd. (c).)
Nicholas attested that a large man intimidated Nicholas at
Sandra’s behest, Sandra frequently berated him with
discriminatory language, and Sandra repeatedly broke into his
bedroom and opened his mail and e-mails. (See Factual &
Procedural Background, ante.) Absent from Sandra’s briefing is
any argument this declaration testimony does not constitute
substantial evidence that she disturbed Nicholas’s peace. Sandra
thus fails to show the trial court erred in finding “there is abuse
with respect to [Sandra] against [Nicholas]” warranting issuance
of the DVRO. (See Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co., Inc. (2015)
239 Cal.App.4th 750, 762 [“It is not this court’s role to construct
arguments that would undermine the lower court’s judgment and
defeat the presumption of correctness.”].)
For these reasons, we conclude Sandra has not rebutted the
presumption that substantial evidence supports the DVRO.

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D. We Reject Sandra’s Argument That the Trial Court
Excluded Her From the Residence
Section 6340, subdivision (a)(1) provides in pertinent part:
“The court may issue any of the orders described in Article 1
(commencing with Section 6320) after notice and a hearing.
When determining whether to make any orders under this
subdivision, the court shall consider whether failure to make any
of these orders may jeopardize the safety of the petitioner . . . .”
(§ 6340, subd. (a)(1).) As relevant here, subdivision (c) provides:
“The court may issue an order described in Section 6321
excluding a person from a dwelling if the court finds that physical
or emotional harm would otherwise result to the other
party . . . .” (Id., subd. (c).)
In turn, section 6321, subdivision (a) authorizes a court to
issue “an ex parte order excluding a party from the family
dwelling, the dwelling of the other party, [or] the common
dwelling of both parties . . . for the period of time and on the
conditions the court determines, regardless of which party holds
legal or equitable title or is the lessee of the dwelling.” (See
§ 6321, subd. (a).) “The court may issue an order under
subdivision (a) [of section 6321] only on a showing of all of the
following: [¶] (1) Facts sufficient for the court to ascertain that
the party who will stay in the dwelling has a right under color of
law to possession of the premises. [¶] (2) That the party to be
excluded has assaulted or threatens to assault the other
party . . . . [¶] (3) That physical or emotional harm would
otherwise result to the other party . . . .” (See id., subd. (b).)
Sandra argues the trial court erroneously issued a “kick-
out” or “residence-exclusion order” by “forc[ing Sandra] to leave
her own home that she is still paying for with her minor

16
children . . . .” Although the basis for Sandra’s assertion the trial
court excluded her from the residence is not altogether clear,
Sandra intimates in her briefing that because the court permitted
Nicholas to remain in the house, “[Sandra] has had to vacate her
home for her safety and that of her children, ages 5 and 6.”
According to Sandra, the court’s supposed “dwelling exclusion
order” contravenes sections 6321 and 6340 because “there was
absolutely no evidence of assaultive behavior toward or injury to
[Nicholas],” and “no evidence was presented regarding physical or
emotional harm that would support the residence-exclusion order
after hearing.”
The record belies Sandra’s claim that the trial court
excluded her from the residence. Although Nicholas sought an
order requiring Sandra to move out of the home, the trial court
denied that request. The trial court indicated at the June 7, 2024
hearing it had elected not to “grant[ ] move-out orders” because
the court did not “have any evidence that the . . . house belongs
to” Nicholas.
To the extent Sandra’s argument is that the DVRO has the
effect of excluding her from the residence, Sandra offers no legal
analysis or authority to support the proposition that a restrained
party may be deemed “exclud[ed] from a dwelling” for the
purposes of sections 6321 and 6340 if that party voluntarily
leaves the residence purportedly to seek refuge from the
protected party after the trial court expressly refused to issue an
exclusion order in favor of the protected party.7 Additionally,

7(See § 6340, subd. (c); see also § 6321, subd. (a)
[employing substantially similar language to describe the orders
governed by that provision, that is, an “order excluding a party

17
Sandra does not argue cogently that the DVRO provision
ordering her to stay at least 10 feet away from Nicholas “[w]hen
at home” or in “the curtilage” thereof constitutes an order subject
to the requirements of sections 6321 or 6340. We thus reject
Sandra’s argument that the trial court violated those provisions.8
(See Cahill, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 956.)
Insofar as Sandra believes the provision barring her from
being within 10 feet of Nicholas while in the home or its curtilage
is impracticable, the record does not indicate that this provision
prevents Sandra from using common areas without violating the

from the family dwelling[ or] . . . the common dwelling of both
parties”].)
8 We observe that whether section 6321, subdivision (b)’s
requirements for an ex parte residence-exclusion order apply to
an order issued pursuant to section 6340 after notice and a
hearing appears to be an open question. (Compare Nicole G. v.
Braithwaite (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 990, 992–993, 999–1001
[affirming a residence-exclusion order issued after a trial because
the elements of § 6321, subds. (b)(1), (b)(2), & (b)(3) were
satisfied], with Hogoboom & King, Cal. Prac. Guide: Family Law
(The Rutter Group 2025) ¶¶ 5:73–5:76, ¶ 5:78 [“A lesser showing
is required to support a § 6321(a) dwelling exclusion order after
notice and hearing [than must be established to obtain an
ex parte residence-exclusion order]: The court need simply find
‘physical or emotional harm’ would otherwise result to the
applicant [as set forth in § 6340, subd. (c)]. I.e., it need not
necessarily be shown that the cause of the ‘physical or emotional
harm’ was an assault or threatened assault [as provided in
§ 6321, subd. (b)(2)].”].) Because Sandra has not shown the trial
court excluded her from the residence for the purposes of either
section 6321 or section 6340, we need not decide whether
section 6321, subdivision (b)’s requirements apply to an exclusion
order issued after notice and a hearing.

18
DVRO (e.g., the precise dimensions of the residence), and,
because we are reviewing the evidence presented to the trial
court prior to the issuance of the DVRO, our record necessarily
does not include evidence concerning whether Nicholas is
engaging in behavior just to cause her to violate the 10-feet
restriction. In the event the 10-feet restriction proves
impractical, Sandra may seek relief from the trial court. DVROs
are “ ‘subject to termination or modification by further order of
the court,’ either upon stipulation or after a noticed hearing
[citations]; and, such a termination or modification is proper
‘upon a showing that there has been a material change in the
facts upon which the injunction . . . was granted . . . or that the
ends of justice would be served by the modification or dissolution
of the injunction . . .’ [citations].” (Salmon v. Salmon (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 1047, 1052, 1057–1058.)

E. Sandra’s Remaining Arguments From Her Opening
Briefs Fail
In our Discussion, parts B–D, ante, we addressed
contentions Sandra asserts in the argument section of her
opening briefs for the instant appeals. In other parts of Sandra’s
opening briefs, Sandra raises several additional complaints, none
of which is supported by legal analysis or citation to authority
and some of which allegedly occurred only after the June 7, 2024
hearing. Illustrative are: “[Nicholas] has had a long standing
history of drug abuse since he was expelled from high school”;
Nicholas “has taken [Sandra’s] USPS mail”; the trial court should
not have credited Diane’s (Nicholas’s other aunt’s) testimony
“suggest[ing]” that Nicholas “was ‘very calm[’] in nature” because
this witness had previously forged a grant deed; and, “[a]fter the
DVRO was issued [against] . . . [Sandra], she was able to obtain

19
many videos where [Nicholas] was the aggressor and was chasing
and stalking [Sandra] inside and outside of the home, disturbing
the peace by blasting music full blast, and yelling and screaming
each night when she would come home from work.”
We decline to address these claims of error because Sandra
failed to raise them properly. (See Browne v. County of Tehama
(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 725–726 [holding that appellants
forfeited a contention by failing to “present [it] in the argument
section of” their briefing]; United Grand Corp. v. Malibu
Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 162 [holding that an
appellant forfeits a claim of error if the party does not “ ‘supply
the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by
legal analysis and citation to the record’ ”].)

F. We Reject the Arguments Sandra Raises In Her
Reply
In the reply brief Sandra filed in her appeal from the denial
of her request for a DVRO, Sandra levels several arguments that
we address below.
First, Sandra cites page 81 of the reporter’s transcript for
the June 7, 2024 hearing to substantiate her contention that
because Diane “admi[tted] under oath that she forged her
mother’s signature on a notarized grant deed—a criminal act,”
the trial court erred in “treat[ing Diane] as a credible witness.”
That excerpt from the reporter’s transcript, however, shows only
that Diane testified she signed a document “[w]ith [her] mother’s
permission.” The document itself is not in the record before us.
This argument thus fails for lack of evidentiary support.
Second, Sandra seems to argue that after the June 7, 2024
hearing, she unsuccessfully requested temporary restraining
orders against Nicholas and his sister, and “submitt[ed] 13 videos

20
from June to August 2024 documenting harassment, stalking,
and physical altercations . . . .” These videos are not in the
appellate record. Even if this footage were before us, however,
we could not consider it. (See In re Marriage of Brewster &
Clevenger, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 498 [holding that an
appellate court generally does not consider matters that were not
before the trial court at the time it rendered the decision being
appealed].)
Lastly, Sandra raises new arguments in her reply that she
omitted from her opening brief. Specifically, Sandra argues for
the first time that (1) Nicholas admitted at the June 7, 2024
hearing that “he threw metal cans at [Sandra’s] vehicle” and
(2) Diane’s “credibility is further undermined by her implausible
claim that she was ‘shocked’ . . . to discover [Nicholas’s] drug use,
despite well-documented evidence—including school records of
his expulsion, text messages sent directly to her referencing
cocaine use, and [Nicholas’s] own admissions of addiction to
opiates and cocaine, all of which were submitted at trial.” By
withholding these arguments from her opening brief, Sandra
forfeited them. (See Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of
San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 467, 482, 518 [concluding that
an appellant “forfeited [a] point” “[b]y not raising [it] in [the]
opening brief”].)

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DISPOSITION
We deny Sandra V.’s request for judicial notice that she
filed in case No. B339669. We affirm the trial court’s
June 7, 2024 order denying Sandra V.’s request for a domestic
violence restraining order against Nicholas A. in case
No. B339669. We also affirm the domestic violence restraining
order issued on June 7, 2024 against Sandra V. in case
No. B339596. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

M. KIM, J.

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