People v. Ulloa CA4/1

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Filed 8/22/25 P. v. Ulloa CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084217

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN440789)

ARTURO JAVIER ULLOA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Daniel F. Link, Judge. Affirmed.
Jeffrey S. Kross, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Heather
B. Arambarri and Steve Oettting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Arturo Javier Ulloa brutally stabbed his fiancée 25 times
with a steak knife while her two young children stood about three feet away.
He then attempted to carjack a neighbor’s vehicle while fleeing. A jury found
defendant guilty of three felonies — attempted murder, aggravated mayhem,
and attempted carjacking — and two counts of misdemeanor child
endangerment. The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for 64 years to
life on the felonies, and to time served on the misdemeanors. On appeal,
defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

misdemeanor child endangerment convictions. (Pen. Code,1 § 273a,
subd. (b).) We conclude the record supports those convictions. Accordingly,
we affirm the judgment.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

In July 2022, defendant began dating Cassandra O., who had a son
(Son) who was then around seven years old and a daughter (Daughter) who
was then around four years old. A few months later, defendant and
Cassandra got engaged and moved with Son and Daughter into a small
apartment in Escondido. The children viewed defendant as a father figure.
The apartment was small — a one-bedroom unit about “as big as a studio” —
and the living room and kitchen “kind of mesh[ed] together.” Defendant and
Cassandra slept on the living room floor; the children slept in the bedroom.
Around 5:30 a.m. on February 1, 2023, Cassandra awoke to find
defendant on top of her, lightly choking her. Cassandra was confused and
thought defendant might be feeling playful. She pushed him off and asked

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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what he was doing. Defendant did not respond and his face looked “scary.”
As Cassandra lay in bed debating whether to go back to sleep, defendant
“jumped on top of [her] and really started choking [her].” Cassandra tried to
speak but defendant covered her mouth with one hand while still choking her
with the other. Cassandra bit his fingers, freed herself, and yelled loudly for
defendant to leave.
The yelling woke Daughter, who came to the living room doorway and
said, “Why are you yelling at Daddy Arturo? I love him. You’re breaking my
heart.” For protection, Cassandra got a steak knife from the adjoining
kitchen and held it at her side to conceal it from Daughter. To encourage
defendant to leave, Cassandra texted his sister and began videorecording him
with her cellphone. Defendant grabbed the phone and knife from Cassandra,
breaking the knife’s blade from the handle. Defendant put the broken blade
and handle in his pocket. Cassandra grabbed another knife but defendant
took it from her. Defendant got Cassandra on the ground, pinned her down,
and began stabbing her. Cassandra could not get up so she screamed for
help.
The second knife broke so defendant got up to get another one.
Cassandra tried to get up but defendant pushed her back down. At one point,
Cassandra was on her hands and knees and defendant kicked her head,
sending her “flying into the kitchen.” There was “a lot of wrestling, stabbing
everywhere.” Defendant “was really focused on [Cassandra’s] neck” and face,
stabbing completely through one of her cheeks. At some point, defendant
grabbed Cassandra’s head and “slit [her] throat.” Defendant sometimes held
the knife over his head and plunged it down at Cassandra. The knives kept
breaking because they were poorly made, so defendant would get

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replacements from the kitchen. Defendant went through a total of five knives
and stabbed Cassandra 25 times.
During the melee, Daughter woke Son. The children entered the living
room and stood — in shock — about three feet from the wrestling and
stabbing. Even though the children “were right there,” defendant “didn’t
even notice them there and was on top of [Cassandra] stabbing [her].” Son
asked, “Is this real?” Cassandra responded that it was and told him to go to
the neighbors’ apartment for help. Son snuck out the bedroom window
wearing only a tank top and underwear. The attack continued “for some time
after that.”
As Cassandra began to feel like she “didn’t . . . ha[ve] any more energy
to fight,” she raised a hand and said, “God, please help me.” Defendant
abruptly “stopped and walked out the door.” Cassandra crawled to the door,
locked it, and called 911.
Meanwhile, an employee in the parking lot of a business next door
heard a “pretty loud” disturbance at the apartment complex. He looked over
and saw Son alone in the apartment parking lot. The employee also saw
defendant, covered in blood, leave the apartment.
Around the same time, a young woman (Rosa) who lived in the
apartment complex was leaving for work in her vehicle and saw Son outside
screaming for help. Rosa stopped, rolled down her window, and asked Son
what he needed. She could hear loud screaming coming from the apartment.
Son asked Rosa to call 911 so she did. After Rosa hung up from the 911 call,
defendant approached her vehicle and said, “ ‘Get the fuck out of the car or
I’m going to kill you.’ ” Defendant tried to open the doors but they were
locked. Rosa called 911 again and defendant fled on foot.

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Police responded and apprehended defendant. One of the officers
testified the apartment “looked like a bomb went off” — “things were knocked
over,” “there was a bunch of stuff everywhere,” and blood was in “places you
think blood couldn’t get.”
Medical personnel transported Cassandra to the hospital where she
was treated by trauma and reconstructive surgeons. She survived her
injuries but has scars from every stab wound.
Daughter and Son made spontaneous statements to a responding police
officer. Daughter volunteered, “My dad was stabbing my mom; there was
blood all over the place.” Daughter said defendant was “biting [Cassandra]
like a vampire.” Son corrected Daughter, “No, no, no. He was stabbing her
with a knife.” Son added that he saw defendant stab Cassandra “about 20
times.”
Defendant did not present any evidence.

B. Procedural Background

Defendant was charged with five crimes: (1) attempted murder as to
Cassandra (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), with allegations that the offense was
willful, deliberate, and premediated (§ 189), that defendant and Cassandra
were in a dating relationship (§ 1203.097, subd. (a); Fam. Code, § 6211), that
defendant personally used a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)), and that he inflicted
great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence
(§ 12022.7, subd. (e)); (2) aggravated mayhem as to Cassandra (§ 205);
(3) attempted carjacking as to Rosa (§§ 664, 215, subd. (a)); (4) felony child
endangerment as to Daughter (§ 273a, subd. (a)); and (5) felony child
endangerment as to Son (ibid.). The jury found defendant guilty on all
charges relating to Cassandra and Rosa and made true findings on the
allegations attached to the attempted murder count. The jury found

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defendant not guilty on the felony child endangerment counts but found him
guilty of the two lesser included offenses of misdemeanor child
endangerment. (§ 273a, subd. (b).)
Defendant admitted having one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)) and 11 prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subd. (b)–(i), 1170.12). In
a bifurcated trial, the court found several aggravating factors true beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The trial court sentenced defendant to 64 years to life on the felony
convictions relating to Cassandra and Rosa, and to time served on the
misdemeanor convictions relating to Daughter and Son.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that insufficient evidence
supports his convictions for misdemeanor child endangerment. We disagree.

A. Relevant Legal Principles

Section 273a “is an omnibus statute that proscribes essentially four
branches of conduct.” (People v. Sargent (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 1215
(Sargent); see In re L.K. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1445.) Those branches
are: “[(1)] willfully caus[ing] or permit[ting] any child to suffer, or
[(2)] inflict[ing] thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or
[(3)] having the care or custody of any child, willfully caus[ing] or permit[ting]
the person or health of that child to be injured, or [4] willfully caus[ing] or
permit[ting] that child to be placed in a situation where his or her person or

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health may be endangered.” (§ 273a, subds. (a), (b);2 see People v.
Moussabeck (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 975, 980.)
A violation of section 273a “ ‘can occur in a wide variety of situations:
the definition broadly includes both active and passive conduct, i.e., child
abuse by direct assault and child endangering by extreme neglect.’ ”
(Sargent, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 1215–1216.) “When the harm to a child is
directly inflicted, the requisite mental state for the section 273a offense is
general criminal intent. [Citations.] When that harm is indirectly inflicted,
the requisite mental state is criminal negligence. [Citations.] Criminal
negligence is aggravated, culpable, gross or reckless conduct that is such a
departure from that of the ordinarily prudent or careful person under the
same circumstances as to be incompatible with a proper regard for human
life. [Citation.] A defendant may be deemed to be criminally negligent if a
reasonable person in his position would have been aware of the risk.”
(Burton, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 454; see Sargent, at pp. 1215–1216;
Valdez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 783.)

2 Section 273a, subdivision (b) sets forth the misdemeanor form of child
endangerment as follows: “Any person who, under circumstances or
conditions other than those likely to produce great bodily harm or death,
willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable
physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child,
willfully causes or permits the person or health of that child to be injured, or
willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in a situation where his or
her person or health may be endangered, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”
Subdivision (a) of the statute sets forth the felony form of the offense. “The
primary difference between the two subdivisions is that subdivision (a)
requires the proscribed conduct occur under ‘circumstances or conditions
likely to produce great bodily harm or death’; subdivision (b) . . . has no such
requirement.” (People v. Valdez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 783, fn. 3 (Valdez); see
People v. Burton (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 447, 454, fn. 4 (Burton).)
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The People charged defendant under the fourth branch of section 273a,
which is an indirect form of violating the statute. (In re L.K., supra,
199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1445.) Accordingly, the People were required to prove
that defendant, acting with criminal negligence, and having Daughter and
Son in his care or custody (a point defendant does not dispute on appeal),
placed them in a situation where their person or health may be endangered.
The trial court instructed the jury regarding these principles with CALCRIM
No. 823.
“ ‘ “In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not
determine the facts ourselves. Rather, we ‘examine the whole record in the
light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence — evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid
value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] We presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from
the evidence. [Citation.] [¶] . . . ‘[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the
jury’s findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’
[Citation.] We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s
credibility.” ’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1117–1118.)

B. Analysis

Substantial evidence supports the jury’s findings that defendant placed
Daughter and Son in a situation where their person or health may be
endangered and that he acted with criminal negligence in doing so.
The jury could reasonably find that defendant endangered Daughter’s
and Son’s physical safety by brutally attacking their mother while they were
only about three feet away. The attack began in the confined living room of

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small apartment unit. The fighting, however, did not remain confined.
There was “[a] lot of wrestling” and “stabbing everywhere” (italics added);
defendant kicked Cassandra’s head so hard she flew from the living room to
the kitchen; and the apartment looked “like a bomb went off” — “things were
knocked over,” “there was a bunch of stuff everywhere,” and blood was in
“places you think blood couldn’t get.” The fighting was so intense that one
neighbor heard it from inside her running car in the apartment complex
parking lot and an employee at the adjacent property heard it from his
location. During the commotion, defendant seemed oblivious to the fact the
children were within feet of him as he continued attacking Cassandra, at
times raising the knife over his head and plunging it down into her.
Although the children were not physically injured, the jury could reasonably
conclude on this record that defendant’s brutal attack on Cassandra within
mere feet of the children placed them in danger of suffering physical injury.
It is legally inconsequential that defendant inflicted no actual physical harm
on the children; it is sufficient that he merely exposed them to the risk of it.
(See People v. Lee (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1220 [stating with respect to
the felony offense that “[i]t is the likelihood of foreseeable injury, rather than
whether such injury in fact occurs, that is relevant”]; see, e.g., People v. Little
(2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 766, 771–772 [holding substantial evidence supported
the defendant’s misdemeanor child endangerment conviction where he left a
six- to 12-month-old child unattended on a three-foot-tall bed without
restraints or railings, even though the child never fell off the bed]; People v.
Perez (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1473 [holding substantial evidence
supported the defendant’s misdemeanor child endangerment conviction

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where he left bindles of drugs and syringes within reach of a four-year-old,

even though the child never accessed the contraband].)3
Defendant acknowledges the jury could have found he acted with
criminal negligence as to Cassandra, but he maintains “the record lacks
sufficient evidence that [he] acted with criminal negligence towards
[Daughter] or [Son].” We disagree. The jury — composed of reasonable
people — could conclude on the record here that “a reasonable person in
[defendant’s] position would have been aware of the risk” his brutal attack on
Cassandra posed to the physical safety of her nearby children. (Burton,
supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 454.)

3 Because substantial evidence supports the finding that defendant
endangered the children’s “persons,” we need not address the People’s
alternative argument that the fourth branch of section 273a is satisfied when
a child’s mental “health” is endangered. (See § 273a, subd. (b) [the offense
involves endangering a child’s “person or health”]; Burton, supra,
143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 455–457 [finding substantial evidence supported
convictions under the first and second branches of § 273a where the
defendant slashed his wife with a knife while her son was nearby; although
the child was not in physical danger, he was traumatized by seeing the
bloody aftermath].)
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IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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