People v. Washington CA2/7

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Filed 8/21/25 P. v. Washington CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B336891

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA079441)
v.

DAWUAN JAVONYA
WASHINGTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Stefanie Yee, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________

Dawuan Javonya Washington appeals from a postjudgment
order denying his motion for a proceeding under People v.
Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 283-284 (Franklin) to preserve
mitigating evidence for his eventual youth offender parole
hearing. Washington contends, the People concede, and we agree
the superior court erred in denying his motion. We also agree
with the People that the superior court has discretion on how the
Franklin proceeding is conducted, but we disagree that the court
may deny an eligible defendant a Franklin proceeding entirely.
We reverse and remand for the trial court to conduct a Franklin
proceeding.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Shooting1
On July 15, 2020 Samahjzea Golden drove her car into a
gas station and parked at a gas pump. Her passenger,
Amya Malbrue, exited the car. Washington, wearing a black
hooded sweatshirt and black shorts, and codefendant

1 We provide a summary of the facts as set forth in
Washington’s probation report for background purposes only. We
recognize that in People v. Gibbs (February 9, 2024, B329530)
(nonpub. opn.), we identified Washington as the shooter based on
the testimony of his codefendant, Dwight Antwan Gibbs, after
Gibbs pleaded no contest to the attempted second degree murders
of Golden and the victim of an unrelated July 14, 2020 shooting.
Whether Washington was the actual shooter or an aider and
abettor does not affect whether he is entitled to a Franklin
proceeding.

2
Dwight Antwan Gibbs, wearing a red face mask and a red hooded
sweatshirt, parked their car behind Golden’s car. They exited
their car and approached Golden’s car. Washington attempted to
open the passenger-side door of Golden’s car, but it did not open.
Gibbs then walked to the driver’s side of the car, pulled out a
handgun, and, standing less than a foot away from the driver’s
side window, fired five shots through the glass into the car. After
being shot, Golden heard one of the defendants say, “Give me
your rings, give me your gold, give me everything!” Washington
reached through the broken glass of the driver’s side window and
grabbed a white purse containing $4,500 and jewelry that he took
from Golden’s hands, wrist, and neck. Malbrue (a codefendant)
walked back to Washington and Gibbs’s car and entered the rear
seat; the car drove off. Golden later identified the shooter as
Gibbs, who was Malbrue’s boyfriend. Golden suffered bullet
wounds that left her paralyzed.

B. The Sentencing
At the November 1, 2022 sentencing hearing, pursuant to a
negotiated plea, the trial court sentenced Washington to an
aggregate sentence of 34 years in state prison.2 The court
imposed the upper term of nine years for the attempted murder
of Golden (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a);3 count 1), plus five
years for inflicting great bodily injury causing permanent
paralysis (§ 12022.7, subd. (b)), and 20 years for personally and
intentionally discharging a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). The
court also sentenced Washington to a concurrent term of five

2 Judge Daviann L. Mitchell sentenced Washington.
3 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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years for a second degree robbery committed on July 14, 2020
(§ 211; count 9). The court dismissed all remaining counts under
section 1385 pursuant to the negotiated plea.

C. Washington’s Motion for a Franklin Proceeding
On December 18, 2023 Washington, representing himself,
filed a motion for a Franklin proceeding and requested
appointment of counsel. Washington argued he was eligible for a
youth offender parole hearing during his 15th year of
incarceration under section 3051, subdivision (b), because he was
sentenced to a determinate term of 34 years in state prison, and
he was under the age of 25 when he committed the crimes. He
requested a Franklin proceeding to preserve the mitigating
youth-related evidence for his eventual youth offender parole
hearing pursuant to section 1203.01 and In re Cook (2019)
7 Cal.5th 439, 452 (Cook).
On January 9, 2024 the superior court4 denied
Washington’s motion for a Franklin proceeding without holding a
hearing. The court found Washington “appear[ed] statutorily
eligible for a youth offender parole hearing” under section 3051,
subdivision (b)(1), because he was 23 years old when he
committed the crimes, and he was sentenced to 34 years in state
prison. But the court found Washington “was not entitled to a
new evidence preservation hearing” because he was sentenced in
2022, well after the enactment of section 3051 and publication of
the opinions in Franklin and Cook. The court reasoned, “At
sentencing, through his attorney, [Washington] was given
sufficient opportunity to make a record of any information
relevant to his eventual youthful offender parole hearing.”

4 Judge Kathleen Blanchard.

4
Washington timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Franklin Proceeding to Preserve Mitigating Youth-related
Evidence for Youth Offender Parole Hearing
Section 3051, subdivision (a)(1), provides for a “youth
offender parole hearing” by the Board of Parole Hearings “for the
purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who
was 25 years of age or younger . . . at the time of his or her
controlling offense.” Where, as here, the defendant is convicted of
a controlling offense “when the person was 25 years or younger
and for which the sentence is a determinate term,” that person
“shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole
hearing during the person’s 15th year of incarceration. The
youth parole eligible date for a person eligible for a youth
offender parole hearing under this paragraph shall be the first
day of the person’s 15th year of incarceration.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).)
“In assessing growth and maturity, psychological evaluations and
risk assessment instruments, if used by the board, shall be
administered by licensed psychologists employed by the board
and shall take into consideration the diminished culpability of
youth as compared to that of adults, the hallmark features of
youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the
individual.” (Id., subd. (f)(1).) In addition, “[f]amily members,
friends, school personnel, faith leaders, and representatives from
community-based organizations with knowledge about the
individual before the crime or the individual’s growth and
maturity since the time of the crime may submit statements for
review by the board.” (Id., subd. (f)(2).)

5
In Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pages 283 to 284, the
Supreme Court held a defendant who did not have an
opportunity to make a record of mitigating “youth-related factors”
relevant to a later youth offender parole hearing should have an
opportunity to make a record on remand. The court explained
that sections 3051 and 48015 “contemplate that information
regarding the juvenile offender’s characteristics and
circumstances at the time of the offense will be available at a
youth offender parole hearing to facilitate the Board’s
consideration. . . . Assembling such statements ‘about the
individual before the crime’ is typically a task more easily done at
or near the time of the juvenile’s offense rather than decades
later when memories have faded, records may have been lost or
destroyed, or family or community members may have relocated
or passed away.” (Franklin, at pp. 283-284.)
The Supreme Court in Franklin remanded the matter to
determine whether the defendant “was afforded sufficient
opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his
eventual youth offender parole hearing,” and if not, to allow the
defendant to “place on the record any documents, evaluations, or
testimony (subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant at
his eventual youth offender parole hearing, and the prosecution

5 Section 4801, subdivision (c), provides, “When a prisoner
committed his or her controlling offense, as defined in
subdivision (a) of Section 3051, when he or she was 25 years of
age or younger, the board, in reviewing a prisoner’s suitability for
parole pursuant to Section 3041.5, shall give great weight to the
diminished culpability of youth as compared to adults, the
hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and
increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant
case law.”

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likewise may put on the record any evidence that demonstrates
the juvenile offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity, or
otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors.”
(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284; see People v. Rodriguez
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 1123, 1131-1132 [remanding for defendant to
supplement record in trial court with information relevant to his
eventual youth offender parole hearing].)
Three years after Franklin, the Supreme Court in Cook,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at page 458 held that a juvenile offender with a
final judgment could move for a postjudgment proceeding under
section 1203.016 to present evidence of youth-related factors. The
Cook court reasoned, “[R]ecognizing the court’s authority under
section 1203.01 to gather youth offender evidence effectuates
sections 3051 and 4801.” (Cook, at p. 453.) The Supreme Court
elaborated, “For inmates like Cook who seek to preserve evidence
following a final judgment, the proper avenue is to file a motion
in superior court under the original caption and case number,
citing the authority of section 1203.01 and today’s decision,” that
“establish[es] the inmate’s entitlement to a youth offender parole

6 Section 1203.01, subdivision (a), provides in part,
“Immediately after judgment has been pronounced, the judge and
the district attorney, respectively, may cause to be filed with the
clerk of the court a brief statement of their views respecting the
person convicted or sentenced and the crime committed, together
with any reports the probation officer may have filed relative to
the prisoner. The judge and district attorney shall cause those
statements to be filed if no probation officer’s report has been
filed. The attorney for the defendant and the law enforcement
agency that investigated the case may likewise file with the clerk
of the court statements of their views respecting the defendant
and the crime of which they were convicted.”

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hearing” and “indicate[s] when such hearing is anticipated to
take place, or if one or more hearings have already occurred.”
(Id. at p. 458.) Further, “consistent with Franklin and the court’s
inherent authority, the offender shall have the opportunity to
‘place on the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony
(subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant at his
eventual youth offender parole hearing, and the prosecution
likewise may put on the record any evidence that demonstrates
the juvenile offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity, or
otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors.’” (Id. at
pp. 458-459.)
Cook added, “Some offenders who file these postjudgment
motions in the trial court may have spent a decade or more in
prison. Some may have even come before the Board for a youth
offender parole hearing. The court may consider whether a
Franklin proceeding is likely to produce fruitful evidence
considering such factors as the passage of time and whether the
offender has already benefitted from the factfinding procedures
set forth in section 3051, subdivision (f)(1) and (2) with the
assistance of appointed counsel (§ 3041.7; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15,
§ 2256, subd. (c)). Additionally, some offenders may choose not to
present certain forms of evidence, such as live testimony, or to
forgo a Franklin proceeding altogether.” (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th
at p. 459.)

B. Washington Is Entitled to a Franklin Proceeding
Washington contends, the People concede, and we agree the
superior court erred in denying Washington’s motion for a
Franklin proceeding. As mandated by Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
page 458, Washington filed his motion in the superior court
under the original caption and case number, citing

8
section 1203.01 and Cook. The People acknowledge that
Washington established his entitlement to a youth offender
parole hearing under section 3051, subdivision (b)(1), because he
was 23 years old when he committed the crimes and he was
sentenced to a determinate term of 34 years in state prison.7 The
record does not reflect that Washington had a prior parole
hearing or a Franklin proceeding.
As discussed, the superior court denied Washington’s
postjudgment motion for a Franklin proceeding because
Washington’s sentencing occurred after the Franklin and Cook
decisions, and thus Washington had an opportunity through his
attorney to make a record at sentencing of information relevant
to his eventual youthful offender parole hearing. But Cook
specifically provides for the filing of a postjudgment motion under
section 1203.01, and nowhere in Cook is there a requirement that
a defendant file the motion at the time of sentencing.
Although the People concede it was error to deny
Washington’s motion, they contend the matter should be
remanded for the trial court to consider whether a Franklin
proceeding “is warranted,” relying on People v. Howard (2021)
74 Cal.App.5th 131, 145 (Howard). Howard is distinguishable.
In that case, the defendant introduced youth-related evidence at

7 Although Washington in his motion did not state the
anticipated date of his youth offender parole hearing or whether
he had a prior parole hearing (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 458),
this is not a mandatory pleading requirement to initiate a
Franklin proceeding. (See People v. Lipptrapp (2021)
59 Cal.App.5th 886, 896 [“A trial court does not need to know the
date of the next parole hearing, or the dates of prior hearings, to
begin overseeing Franklin proceedings. The date is simply a
logistical consideration.”].)

9
a prior parole hearing, including about his parents’ neglect,
bullying by his peers in elementary school, and his use of alcohol
and drugs. (Id. at p. 145.) A year later the defendant filed a
motion for a Franklin proceeding, which the trial court denied on
the basis the parole board had already considered the evidence.
(Howard, at p. 149.) The Court of Appeal held the trial court
“prematurely denied [the defendant’s] request” because the
“motion met the legal requirements to initiate the Franklin
process,” and thus “the court should have provided [the
defendant] an opportunity to explain the evidence he sought to
introduce before determining whether a Franklin proceeding was
warranted.” (Ibid.)
Unlike in Howard, where the defendant introduced youth-
related evidence at an earlier parole hearing, Washington did not
present any youth-related evidence at sentencing, and he did not
have a prior parole hearing. Moreover, the court in Howard
clarified that “given the low threshold on such motions, at a
minimum, the court should have afforded [the defendant] the
opportunity to offer proof of any relevant, noncumulative
evidence he sought to preserve.” (Howard, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th
at p. 153.) Here, presentation of cumulative evidence is not an
issue.
Although Washington is entitled to a Franklin proceeding,
the superior court has discretion to set the parameters of the
proceeding. As the Supreme Court explained in Cook, “Although
Franklin mandates an opportunity for evidence preservation, the
trial court may ‘exercise its discretion to conduct this process
efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant,
noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules,
statutes, and regulations.’ [Citation.] The court may, for

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example, require an offer of proof regarding the evidence the
offender seeks to present, so that it can determine whether such
evidence is relevant to youth-related factors and meaningfully
adds to the already available record. It may also determine
whether testimony is ‘appropriate’ (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 284), or if other types of evidentiary submissions will suffice.”
(Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459.)

DISPOSITION

The order denying Washington’s motion for a Franklin
proceeding is reversed. Upon remand, the superior court shall
conduct a Franklin proceeding consistent with this opinion.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

SEGAL, J.

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