CourtListener 10658212•In re Ja.H. CA2/5
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Filed 8/21/25 In re Ja.H. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re Ja.H., et al., Persons Coming B340834, consolidated
Under the Juvenile Court Law. with B342262,
___________________________________ B341238, &
LOS ANGELES COUNTY B342264
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
Plaintiff and Respondent, 24CCJP01440,
24CCJP01441, &
v. 24CCJP01435)
J.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephen C. Marpet, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Johanna R. Shargel, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Senior Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for minor D.C.
******
J.H. (father) is the father of a teen girl and two infants (the
minors). The juvenile court assumed dependency jurisdiction
over the minors after finding that father had sexually abused
minors’ teenage half-sister K.F.—plying her with alcohol and
drugs, raping her on numerous occasions, and video recording his
adult son raping her. The court later terminated jurisdiction
with exit orders granting sole legal and physical custody of the
minors to their mothers and ordering no visitation for father with
the two infants and very limited monitored visitation once per
year with the teenager. We hold the juvenile court’s visitation
orders were not an abuse of discretion and accordingly affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The family
Father has three minor children—D.C. (a 14-year-old girl),
J.H. III (a 13-month-old boy), and Ja.H. (an 8-month-old girl).1
Each has a different mother.
1 These were the minors’ ages at the initiation of dependency
proceedings.
2
B. Father’s repeated sexual assault of a half-
sibling
In early 2024, K.F.—who is the daughter of the woman
with whom father had Ja.H, and who was at that time 14 years
old—was raped by father and by her adult stepbrother J.H., Jr.
K.F. subsequently reported during a forensic interview that
father had plied her with alcohol and drugs before the sexual
assaults. Father had also filmed her being raped by J.H., Jr. In
May 2024, K.F. called 911 to report the assaults because, when
she told her mother, her mother did not believe her. Some of the
videos were later recovered, and father was ultimately charged
with one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child (Pen. Code,
§ 269, subd. (a)(2)), two counts of committing lewd or lascivious
acts with a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)),
and one count of committing a lewd act on a child 14 or 15 years
of age by a person 10 years older (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (c)(1)).
Father categorically denied engaging in the sexual
assaults. Instead, he insisted that he was the victim of K.F.’s
attempts to escape responsibility for her own misconduct.
D.C. consistently denied any sexual abuse or inappropriate
touching by father,2 but she admitted she “always thought he was
a little weird,” because, among other things, he would go into the
bathroom while K.F. was showering to observe her “ass,” and had
once remarked on the size of D.C.’s breasts—which made her feel
uncomfortable.
2 D.C. related she only learned father was her biological
father a few months prior to his arrest after receiving the results
of a DNA test; as a result, she and father were not “that close”
and had only started to “build[] a relationship.”
3
II. Procedural Background
A. The petition
Two days after K.F.’s 911 call, the Los Angeles Department
of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed three
separate but identical dependency petitions under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, one petition for each of the three
minors.3 The petitions alleged that the minors were at
substantial risk of physical harm or sexual abuse as a result of
father’s and J.H., Jr.’s sexual abuse of K.F., and father’s knowing
failure to protect K.F. from J.H., Jr.’s sexual abuse of her.4
B. Jurisdictional hearing and issuance of “exit
orders”
In September 2024, the juvenile court held a jurisdictional
and dispositional hearing. Father was present at the hearings
but did not testify or introduce other evidence. After admitting
into evidence various Department reports and supporting
documentation, including transcripts of the forensic interviews,
and after hearing argument from counsel, the court sustained
each petition’s allegations, finding K.F.’s account of abuse “true
and correct.”
3 Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
4 The petition brought on behalf of Ja.H. also alleged she was
at risk due to her mother’s failure to protect her and K.F. (There
were no similar failure to protect allegations made against the
mothers in the other two petitions.) The juvenile court would
later strike the allegations against T.C. and find her to be non-
offending.
4
The juvenile court bypassed providing father any
reunification services, and subsequently terminated dependency
jurisdiction through a series of exit orders. Each minor was
placed with their respective mother.5 Although the juvenile court
had initially ordered that father have monitored visits with each
child, and although the Department had initially recommended
that father have monitored visits with all three children and
then—after the forensic interview with K.F. and after learning
from D.C. that she was starting to “build[] a relationship” with
him and would be open to phone (but not in-person visits)—
revised that recommendation to permit father to have monitored
visits only with D.C. and J.H. III, the juvenile court ultimately
ordered that father have “no contact” and “no visits” with Ja.H
and J.H. III (the infants) after finding that father was
responsible for the severe sexual abuse of K.F., which was
“outrageous.” Although the juvenile court had initially entered
the same order for D.C., the court in the final exit order allowed
father “to have monitored visits with [D.C.] a minimum of once a
year for two hours.”
C. Appeals
As to all three children, father noticed an appeal from the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings, and from the disposition
orders. At father’s request we consolidated for all purposes the
two Ja.H.-related appeals (case numbers B340834 and B342262)
5 The juvenile court also entered a protective order
precluding father from having any contact or visits with Ja.H.,
from which father appealed (in case number B340834). Father
does not make any arguments challenging the protective order in
his briefs.
5
and then, on our own motion, consolidated for argument and
decision those appeals with the J.H. III- and D.C.-related appeals
(case numbers B341238 and B342264).
DISCUSSION
Father challenges the juvenile court’s visitation orders as
to each of the minors.6
I. Pertinent Law
When “the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a
minor who has been adjudged a dependent child . . . the juvenile
court on its own motion[] may issue . . . an order determining the
custody of, or visitation with, the child.” (§ 362.4, subd. (a); see
also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.700.) A custody and visitation
order issued under section 362.4 is commonly referred to as an
“‘exit order.’” (See, e.g., In re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961,
970 & fn. 13; In re Cole Y. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1455.)
Such exit orders remain in effect until modified or terminated by
a subsequent order of the superior court. (§ 362.4, subd. (b); see
also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.700(a).) A juvenile court has
“broad discretion” in fixing the terms of an exit order at the
termination of a dependency case. (In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112
Cal.App.4th 251, 265, fn. 4.) When fashioning an exit order, “the
court’s focus and primary consideration must always be the best
6 The Department filed a “no position” letter in the D.C.
appeal because it did not oppose monitored visitation in the
juvenile court. D.C. filed a respondent’s brief in support of the
monitored visitation order ultimately entered by the juvenile
court.
6
interests of the child.”7 (Id. at p. 268; accord, In re T.S. (2020) 52
Cal.App.5th 503, 513.) In reaching its decision about a
dependent child’s best interests, the court must be guided by “the
totality of a child’s circumstances.” (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13
Cal.4th 196, 201; accord, In re J.T. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 953,
963.)
We review an exit order pursuant to section 362.4 for abuse
of discretion. (In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 902; In re
N.M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1094.) “‘“The precise test is
whether any rational trier of fact could conclude that the trial
court order advanced the best interests of the child.”’” (In re
Natalie A. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 178, 186-187.)
II. Analysis
The juvenile court ultimately ordered monitored visitation
between father and D.C. at least once per year, but father argues
this was too little. In our view, however, the court acted well
within its discretion to award the minimal visitation that it did;
indeed, even the no visitation order the court was initially
inclined to make would have been within the bounds of reason in
light of father’s deeply aberrant sexual abuse of one of his
stepdaughters. (E.g., In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 778; Los
Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior
Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 962, 969; see also In re Nada R.
(2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1179 [exposing children to “risk of
serious physical . . . harm” is not in child’s “best interest”]; In re
7 The same standard also applies under section 361.2. (In re
Jaden E. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1283 [when making a
determination under section 361.2 “‘the court’s focus and primary
consideration must always be the best interests of the child’”].)
7
Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1383 [juvenile court
“need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to
assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the
child”], overruled on other grounds by In re N.R. (2023) 15
Cal.5th 520, 560, fn. 18.) Though D.C. was willing to maintain
some limited contact with father, declining to order more
frequent visitation was not an abuse of discretion in light of
father’s sexual abuse of K.F. and D.C.’s opposition to anything
more than episodic telephone contact.
For essentially the same reasons, the no visitation orders
the juvenile court made for Ja.H. and J.H. III were also not an
abuse of discretion. Father’s sexual abuse of another of his
children, which the juvenile court fairly labeled “outrageous,”
established any interaction between him and his other minor
children was fraught with risk and not in their best interests.
Insofar as father argues the no visitation orders for Ja.H. and
J.H. III cannot be squared with the limited visitation order for
D.C., we disagree. The court could reasonably have relied on
D.C.’s older age and relatively greater autonomy (she was old
enough to have developed some relationship with father, old
enough to express a desire to maintain some contact with him,
and old enough to be better able to protect herself from abuse) to
permit limited visitation that it believed would not be in the best
interests of the younger children. In addition, father’s custodial
status is irrelevant to the analysis because what poses the risk to
the half-siblings—and hence justifies curtailed or prohibited
visitation—is father’s conduct, and that risk exists wholly apart
from whether or not he is incarcerated.
8
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
I concur:
_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)
9
In re Ja.H. et al.
B340834, B342262, B341238, & B342264
BAKER, J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
I agree there is no basis to reverse the juvenile court’s
visitation order as to teenage daughter D.C.—which no party
other than father J.H. (Father) challenges on appeal—in light of
his shocking sexual abuse of his other teenage daughter K.F. I
disagree, however, with affirmance of the no visitation orders for
toddler son J.H. III and toddler daughter Ja.H. because the
record, and the visitation order for D.C. in particular, leaves me
convinced the orders for J.H. III and Ja.H. are not the product of
a reasoned best interests determination. Allowing visitation with
the one child (D.C.) who is most similarly situated to sexual
abuse victim K.F. while denying any visitation with the other two
children makes no rational sense—and all the more so when
considering the juvenile court granted Father monitored
visitation with Ja.H. and J.H. III earlier in the dependency
proceedings.
Had the juvenile court made the same visitation order for
all three children—whether a no visitation order or an order for
limited once-per-year monitored visitation of the type made as to
D.C.—I likely would have agreed there was no abuse of
discretion. But that is not the ruling the court made, and I am
unconvinced the difference in treatment reflects a determination
that was properly focused on the children’s best interests. (See,
e.g., In re Korbin Z. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 511, 516 [“the juvenile
court cannot delegate the decision whether visitation will occur to
any third party, including the child”].)
BAKER, J.
2
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