CourtListener 10658211•In re Jade R. CA2/8
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Filed 8/21/25 In re Jade R. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re Jade R., a Person Coming B340611
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP02453A)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
B.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Mark A. Davis, Judge. Reversed.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Respondent J.R.
Shaylah Padgett-Weibel, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Minor.
INTRODUCTION
B.H. (Mother) appeals from the trial court’s order
terminating jurisdiction over her oldest daughter Jade R., who
was 14 years old when the court closed the case. Jade suffered
emotional abuse, physical abuse, and sexual abuse for which the
trial court asserted jurisdiction. As a dependent under court
supervision, three months before the hearing, Jade attempted to
commit suicide by overdosing on her psychotropic medication
after which she was diagnosed with major depressive disorder.
Thereafter, Jade refused mental health treatment consistent
with the views of her stepmother, who was Jade’s caregiver, and
her father. Here, the court erred by terminating jurisdiction as
the uncontradicted evidence was that Jade was at risk of harm
given her recent suicide attempt. We reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Dependency proceedings
While Mother’s two daughters came under dependency
jurisdiction, only Jade is the subject of this appeal. On July 25,
2023, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition requesting that the trial
court take jurisdiction over Jade, then 13 years old, and Jade’s
younger sister, Ayda E., then two years old. DCFS alleged that
Mother physically and emotionally abused Jade, and that Ayda
was also at risk of harm. Jade and Ayda have different fathers.
After the trial court granted an emergency removal order,
Jade was placed in foster care, and Ayda was placed with her
father. When DCFS filed its detention report, J.R., Jade’s father
(Father), could not be found. At the detention hearing, the trial
court detained Jade from Mother, and placed Jade under DCFS’s
care. The trial court ordered no visitation for Father until he
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made himself available to DCFS. DCFS later located Father,
who resided in Mexico.
On July 27, 2023, Jade was placed with a maternal aunt,
and DCFS soon explored other options as the placement was not
successful. On August 7, 2023, the trial court ordered that Jade
be released to Father conditioned on Jade remaining in the
United States. Thus, Father planned for Jade to live with a
different maternal aunt from the one with which Jade was
initially placed, and Jade resided with this maternal aunt.
On August 24, 2023, DCFS amended its petition to add
multiple allegations. DCFS newly alleged that Mother’s abuse of
marijuana placed both children at risk. DCFS further alleged
that Mother’s mental health concerns, and Ayda’s father’s alcohol
abuse placed both children at risk. In addition, DCFS alleged
that Mother neglected Jade’s mental health, which placed both
children at risk. DCFS also alleged Mother emotionally abused
Jade. Finally, DCFS alleged that Ayda’s father sexually abused
Jade, which placed both children at risk. DCFS also alleged that
Mother failed to protect Jade from sexual abuse, placing both
daughters at risk.
On February 13, 2024, the trial court found that Mother
physically abused Jade, emotionally abused Jade, and failed to
protect Jade from her stepfather’s sexual abuse. The trial court
also found that Ayda was at risk of harm based on the physical
abuse and sexual abuse that Jade suffered. Based on these
findings, the trial court asserted jurisdiction. At the dispositional
hearing, the trial court removed Jade from Mother and placed
Jade with Father who established a plan for Jade to be in the
home of Jade’s stepmother, Father’s wife. Jade moved out of her
maternal aunt’s home in early February 2024, and had been
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residing with her stepmother for one week prior to the
dispositional hearing.
At the dispositional hearing, the trial court ordered that
Mother was to have monitored visits with Jade in a neutral
setting for nine hours per week. However, at the outset of the
case after the emergency removal, Jade declined visits with
Mother and said she was not interested in living with Mother
even if Mother went to therapy.
During the assessment period after the court asserted
jurisdiction, Jade resided with her stepmother. Jade was initially
in mental health services and worked on communication,
relationships, safety, symptoms of anxiety, defiant behavior, and
substance abuse. Jade’s mental health team included a
facilitator, therapist, parent partner, and child family specialist.
Jade, however, stopped taking her prescribed psychotropic
medication when she began living with her stepmother. Jade
said she declined to take her psychotropic medication because she
was worried about mixing the medication with marijuana, and
she had already been using marijuana.
In May of 2024, Jade took 20 prescribed pills, and she was
hospitalized for attempting to commit suicide. At that point, she
was diagnosed with major depressive disorder. After the hospital
discharged Jade, her mental healthcare providers had difficulty
providing her care. She had only two sessions with her therapist
and no sessions with her behavioral counselor because Jade
canceled further sessions.
During Jade’s hospitalization, Mother attempted to visit
her, but Jade elected to postpone the visit until after she left the
hospital. When DCFS attempted to schedule a visit after a few
weeks, Mother declined, expressing concerns about her safety.
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According to Mother, Jade passed by Mother’s home in a car with
others, and people in the car gave her and Ayda’s father the
middle finger.
About one year before the May 2024 hospitalization, Jade
previously attempted to overdose, and she was treated for
depression then as well. Thus, her May 2024 overdose was her
second attempt to take excessive medication to harm herself.
In mid-July 2024, during a planning session with DCFS,
Jade’s stepmother explained that the family wanted to pause
services. In a later meeting, Jade stated that she needed a break
from services. Thereafter, Father said that Jade should not be
taking psychotropic medication. After receiving information from
Jade, Father, and Jade’s stepmother, Jade’s healthcare providers
terminated services based on Jade’s disinterest. Nonetheless,
Jade expressed an openness to exploring psychotropic
medication, and her mental health team gave Jade’s stepmother
a letter to take to Jade’s primary doctor. At the time that the
report was finalized, Jade had not yet seen her primary doctor.
In its report, DCFS expressed concern that Jade’s mental
health symptoms were being minimized. DCFS also concluded
that Jade was at high risk of hurting herself if she was not under
the supervision of a psychiatrist.
On August 12, 2024, the trial court presided over a review
hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 364. Jade’s
counsel asked the trial court to terminate jurisdiction over Jade;
Mother argued Jade’s case should remain open; Father argued to
close the case; and DCFS argued to keep the case open.
1 All further statutory citations are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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The trial court ruled, “The court believes it’s in the best
interest of Jade to close the case. She is unwilling to take
medication. Father doesn’t want her to take it. Apparently per
minor’s counsel, it is just a constant reminder of what happened
to her, and it’s been almost a year since this case originated.
I think longer than a year. . . . and we made as much progress as
we are going to make. [¶] Jade seems to be safely in the care of
her father.”
On August 27, 2024, the trial court terminated jurisdiction
over Jade.
On September 11, 2024, Mother appealed from the juvenile
court order terminating jurisdiction over Jade.
DISCUSSION
1. The parties and legal standard
Mother contends the trial court erred in terminating
jurisdiction. While DCFS argued for continued jurisdiction
below, it takes no position on this appeal. Jade and Father are
respondents who argue in favor of the trial court’s ruling
terminating jurisdiction.
While the parties all agree that some level of deferential
review of the trial court ruling is appropriate, each of the parties
urges different legal standards. Mother argues abuse of
discretion applies, Jade argues for substantial evidence, and
Father argues appellant must point to evidence compelling a
result in her favor. We agree with Father on the legal standard.
When, as here, a trial court asserts jurisdiction over a child
and places a child in a parent’s custody, the trial court conducts
review hearings under section 364. Under this section, “the court
shall terminate its jurisdiction unless the [social services agency]
. . . establishes by a preponderance of evidence that the
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conditions still exist which would justify initial assumption of
jurisdiction . . . or that those conditions are likely to exist if
supervision is withdrawn.” (§ 364, subd. (c).) While section 364
specifies that the social services agency has the burden of proof to
establish a basis for continuing jurisdiction, any party arguing for
jurisdiction has that same burden. (In re Aurora P. (2015)
241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1157.) “[B]ecause section 364(c) would
have required the juvenile court to terminate dependency
jurisdiction in the absence of proof of conditions justifying
assumption of jurisdiction, the burden of proof was on
[appellant], because [the appellant must] establish the existence
of those conditions.” (Ibid. [applying this rule to minors arguing
to extend jurisdiction].) When a trial court rejects a parent’s
argument to extend dependency jurisdiction at a hearing under
section 364, subdivision (c), we conclude that the trial court found
that the parent failed to carry her evidentiary burden. (In re
J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 111, review den. June 14, 2023.)
Consequently, we evaluate “whether the evidence compels a
finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” (In re I.W.
(2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527–28, overruled in part on other
grounds as stated in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th
989, 1010.) Mother can only carry her burden by establishing
that the evidence below was both (1) “ ‘uncontradicted and
unimpeached’ ” and of (2) “ ‘a character and weight as to leave no
room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to
support a finding.’ ” (Ibid.)
2. The evidence compels a finding that ongoing
jurisdiction was proper
Here, the juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over Jade
because it found that Mother physically and emotionally abused
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Jade and failed to protect Jade from sexual abuse. In making its
finding that Jade was emotionally abused, the trial court
necessarily found that the emotional abuse was “evidenced by
severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive
behavior toward self or others.” (§300, subd. (c).) As a result,
since the outset of the case, Jade’s mental health was a central
concern for the court. Mother argues that the facts compel a
finding in her favor because Jade’s mental health presented an
uncontroverted basis for continuing jurisdiction. We agree.
Our colleagues in Division Four affirmed an order
terminating jurisdiction in a case where a child suffered
emotional abuse, among other bases for jurisdiction. (In re J.M.,
supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 111, review den.) J.M. provides a
useful reference point for our analysis. There, the trial court
found true allegations that a daughter’s “ ‘mental health declined
due to the family dynamics.’ ” She “stopped attending school . . .
due to severe anxiety.” She went to the emergency room for “not
eating, not engaging with anyone, and was locking herself in her
room.” (Id. at p. 104.) The record also established that this child
contemplated self-harm, and her therapist concluded she was
severely depressed. (Id. at pp. 102, 104.) As the case progressed,
this child and her siblings lived with the mother while staying
with the father on some weekends. (Id. at p. 107.) Thereafter,
the court terminated jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 110–111.) In
appealing the trial court’s decision to terminate jurisdiction
regarding this daughter, the father raised his daughter’s mental
health as a reason to continue jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 111.)
In affirming the trial court ruling, Division Four noted, “While
[this daughter’s] issues with anxiety and depression were not
fully resolved, she was regularly attending individual therapy as
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well as conjoint therapy with mother, was taking medication, and
mother was committed to ensuring her continued care.” (Ibid.)
The underlying facts regarding the child’s mental health in
J.M. differ significantly and materially from the case before us.
(In re J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 111, review den.) Here,
Jade was not in therapy and was not taking medication. In
addition, unlike the mother in J.M., both Jade’s caregiver and
Father discouraged her from accessing mental health services.
(Ibid.) Moreover, when the trial court terminated jurisdiction
here, Jade had recently attempted suicide, so her mental health
posed a serious risk to her well-being.
Further, Jade’s mental stability was a basis for jurisdiction
based on the emotional abuse finding, and the record was devoid
of any evidence that Jade’s mental health had improved. If
anything, Jade appeared to need significant mental health
support at the time when the court terminated jurisdiction.
Thus, the evidence compelled a finding that “the conditions still
exist which would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction.”
(§364, subd. (c).)
While J.M. provides helpful guidance, we note that there
the court found that the facts did not compel a finding in the
parent’s favor. (In re J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 111,
review den.) In reaching the opposite conclusion here, we do not
suggest that a trial court’s order terminating jurisdiction will
only be affirmed where a child’s emotional health is as
conclusively addressed as was the case in J.M. (Ibid.) Instead,
we find in favor of Mother here because Jade faced significant,
unusually serious risks to her health when jurisdiction was
terminated, and no contrary evidence existed.
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Further, consistent with the thrust of Mother’s primary
argument, we also find that continuing jurisdiction is consistent
with Jade’s best interests because of the serious health risks
here. We understand that the trial court and DCFS may have
challenges in encouraging Jade to take part in mental health
services, but she at least expressed an openness to potentially
restarting psychotropic medication. At a minimum, the trial
court should ensure that all options have been exhausted to re-
engage Jade in services with the goal of addressing her mental
health before considering terminating jurisdiction.
Finally, Mother also argues court supervision is required
because of her frayed relationship with Jade. However, the trial
court ameliorated any risk Mother posed to Jade by allowing
Father to create a plan for Jade to live with her stepmother.
(In re J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 111, review den.
[noncustodial father’s deteriorating relation with child did not
support continued jurisdiction].) Thus, this argument is not a
basis for our ruling.
In summary, Mother has carried her heavy burden, and we
find the court erred in terminating jurisdiction.
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DISPOSITION
The order terminating jurisdiction over Jade is reversed.
The trial court is to reinstate jurisdiction over Jade.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
WILEY, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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