CourtListener 10656695•People v. St. Pierre CA2/4
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Filed 8/18/25 P. v. St. Pierre CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B336963
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA352850
v.
JASON EDWARD ST. PIERRE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Curtis B. Rappe. Affirmed.
Gary V. Crooks, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H.
Chung, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2010, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Jason
Edward St. Pierre of two counts of willful, deliberate and
premeditated attempted murder. (Pen. Code,1 §§ 664, 187, subd.
(a).) In 2022, St. Pierre filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6.2 The trial court denied St. Pierre relief as a
matter of law, concluding he was prima facie ineligible for
resentencing because his jury was not instructed on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine as a theory of attempted
murder liability.
On appeal, St. Pierre argues that the aiding and abetting
instructions given at his trial allowed the jury to convict him of
attempted murder without finding that he harbored the intent to
kill, and consequently, his case should be remanded for an
evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d). We
reject this contention. As the trial court correctly noted, St.
Pierre’s jury was never instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. Moreover, although the jury was
instructed on aiding and abetting as a form of liability, the jury
was also instructed that it could not convict St. Pierre of
attempted murder unless it explicitly found that he harbored the
intent to kill the victims. We therefore affirm the trial court’s
order denying St. Pierre section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 Section 1172.6 allows resentencing relief for certain
individuals convicted of “attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine[.]” (1172.6, subd. (a).)
2
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
As noted above, in 2010 a jury convicted St. Pierre of two
counts of willful, deliberate, premeditated attempted murder.
The jury also found that St. Pierre committed the attempted
murders for the benefit of a criminal street gang; and that a
principal personally used and personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm in the commission of the offenses,
proximately causing great bodily injury to the victims.
(§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(c); 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d) & (e)(1).)
On the attempted murder counts, the trial court sentenced St.
Pierre to consecutive terms of 15 years to life, with each term
enhanced by 25 years to life (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)), for a
total of 80 years to life in state prison. A different panel of this
court affirmed the judgment on direct appeal. (People v. St.
Pierre (Aug. 21, 2012, B233738) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2022, St. Pierre filed a petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6), and the trial court
appointed counsel to represent him. In 2023, the People filed a
response, noting that St. Pierre’s jury was not instructed on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, and arguing that
because the jury instructions required a finding that St. Pierre
harbored the intent to kill in the commission of each attempted
murder, the record demonstrated that he was ineligible for
section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. In 2024, St. Pierre’s trial
counsel filed a reply, arguing in general terms that because the
prima facie bar in section 1172.6 proceedings is low, St. Pierre
3 We omit recitation of the facts underlying St. Pierre’s
attempted murder convictions because they have no bearing on
our resolution of this appeal.
3
should be granted an evidentiary hearing under subdivision (d) of
the statute. At St. Pierre’s prima facie hearing, the trial court
denied him section 1172.6 relief, concluding that the jury
instructions demonstrated ineligibility as a matter of law. St.
Pierre timely appealed.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
In 2018, the Legislature, through Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), amended section
188 to eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine
as it applies to murder and to require, with certain exceptions
under the felony murder rule, that a defendant act with malice to
be convicted of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) In 2021, through
Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551),
the Legislature clarified that the amendments made by Senate
Bill No. 1437 were also intended to eliminate the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as a theory of liability for
attempted murder. (People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 441;
People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558; see § 1172.6, subd.
(a).)
Under section 1172.6, a defendant convicted of attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
must attest to the following: “(1) A complaint, information, or
indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of . . . attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of . . . attempted
murder . . . following a trial . . . at which the petitioner could
have been convicted of . . . attempted murder . . . . [¶] (3)
The petitioner could not presently be convicted of . . .
attempted murder [under current law].” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
4
After a facially sufficient petition is filed, the trial court
determines whether the petitioner is prima facie eligible for
relief. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) If the
trial court determines that the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing of eligibility for relief, the court must issue an order to
show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the
prosecution bears the burden “to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of . . . attempted murder”
under current law. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(3).)
DISCUSSION
We review de novo a trial court’s determination of whether
a petitioner has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for
section 1172.6 relief. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45,
52.) Applying this standard, we conclude the trial court was
correct that St. Pierre’s record of conviction demonstrates he is
ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. (See Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971 [“The record of conviction will
necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under
section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless”].)
As previously mentioned, it is true, as St. Pierre points out,
that his jury was instructed on aider and abettor liability.4 We
4 The trial court instructed the jury as follows using
CALCRIM No. 400: “A person may be guilty of a crime in two
ways. One, he may have directly committed the crime. I will call
that person the perpetrator. Two, he may have aided and abetted
a perpetrator, who directly committed the crime. A person is
equally guilty of the crime whether he committed it personally or
aided and abetted the perpetrator who committed it.” The court
then instructed the jury using CALCRIM No. 401, which defined
5
reject St. Pierre’s contention, however, that the aider and abettor
instructions allowed the jury to convict him of attempted murder
on an imputed-malice theory of liability. As the trial court noted
in denying relief, St. Pierre’s jury was never instructed on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. Moreover, and
crucially, the court instructed the jury using CALCRIM No. 600,
which defined the elements of attempted murder, and explicitly
stated that in order to convict St. Pierre of attempted murder, the
jury was required to find that he “intended to kill [the victims].”5
Because the instructions explicitly required the jury to find St.
Pierre harbored the intent to kill the victims in order to convict
him of attempted murder, it is clear that the trial court was
correct in denying St. Pierre section 1172.6 relief as a matter of
law, as the statute does not extend relief to individuals convicted
of attempted murder under the theory that they harbored the
aiding and abetting to require: “1. The perpetrator committed the
crime; [¶] 2. The defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to
commit the crime; [¶] 3. Before or during the commission of the
crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in
committing the crime; [and] [¶] 4. The defendant’s words or
conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of
the crime.”
5 The language of CALCRIM No. 600 that the trial court
gave the jury stated: “To prove that the defendant is guilty of
attempted murder, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The
defendant took at least one direct but ineffective step toward
killing another person; [and] [¶] 2. The defendant intended to kill
that person.” (Italics added.) St. Pierre was the sole defendant
tried at his trial (there was no co-defendant), so CALCRIM No.
600 explicitly required the jurors to find St. Pierre personally
harbored the intent to kill in order for them to convict him of
attempted murder.
6
intent to kill. In other words, regardless of whether the jury
found St. Pierre guilty of the attempted murders as the direct
perpetrator or as an aider and abettor, he is prima facie ineligible
for section 1172.6 relief, because under the instructions given, the
jury necessarily found he harbored the intent to kill in the
commission of the attempted murders.6
6 St. Pierre in part argues that the trial court erred by
relying on People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539 (Coley) in
denying him relief as a matter of law, and he further contends
that certain aspects of Coley were incorrectly decided. Because
we conclude that St. Pierre is ineligible for relief as a matter of
law based narrowly and specifically on our review of his record of
conviction, we need not address whether Coley applies here or
was correctly decided. Additionally, we need not address the
arguments the parties raised in supplemental briefing because
they have no direct bearing on our resolution of this appeal. For
the same reasons we reject St. Pierre’s arguments that the trial
court’s ruling denying him relief violated state statutory law, we
likewise reject his contention that the court’s ruling violated his
federal constitutional right to due process.
7
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying St. Pierre section
1172.6 relief.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P.J.
MORI, J.
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