CourtListener 10655889•People v. Paschal CA2/7
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Filed 8/18/25 P. v. Paschal CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B336281
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA112018)
v.
PATTIE PASCHAL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Teresa P. Magno, Judge. Affirmed.
Wayne C. Tobin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Chelsea Zaragoza, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In 2010 a jury convicted Pattie Paschal of carjacking (Pen.
Code, § 215, subd. (a))1 and grand theft of an automobile (§ 487,
subd. (d)(1)). The trial court sentenced Paschal under the three
strikes law to a prison term of 31 years to life, consisting of 25
years to life, plus a five-year prior serious felony enhancement
under section 667, subdivision (a), and a one-year prior prison
term enhancement under section 667.5, former subdivision (b).
More than a decade later, the superior court resentenced
Paschal under section 1172.75 by striking the now-legally invalid
one-year enhancement, as well as the five-year enhancement.
The court, however, denied Paschal’s request under People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 to dismiss her
prior serious or violent felony convictions under the three strikes
law.
Paschal argues the superior court erred in denying her
request to dismiss her prior serious or violent felony convictions
without determining whether she would endanger public safety
under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1). Paschal also argues the
court abused its discretion in denying her request to strike her
prior convictions by relying on an incorrect assessment of her
health. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2010 Alejandra Castro drove to a gas station and walked
into the convenience store. Castro left her car parked with the
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
engine running, the doors unlocked, and her nine-year-old
daughter in the front passenger seat. While Castro was inside
the store, Paschal entered Castro’s car through the driver’s side
door and put the car in gear. Castro heard her daughter scream,
left the convenience store, and saw her daughter jump out of the
moving car. Police were called to the gas station and made a
report of the incident. Two days later, police found Castro’s car
and arrested Paschal.
A jury convicted Paschal of carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)) and
grand theft of an automobile (§ 487, subd. (d)(1)). The trial court
found Paschal had a prior conviction for a serious felony, within
the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a), and two prior
convictions for serious or violent felonies, within the meaning of
the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12,
subds. (a)-(d)). The court also found Paschal had served a prior
prison term, within the meaning of section 667.5, former
subdivision (b).
The trial court sentenced Paschal to a prison term of
31 years to life, consisting of 25 years to life for the carjacking
conviction, plus five years for the prior serious felony conviction
and one year for the prior prison term. The court imposed a term
of 25 years to life on the grand theft conviction, but stayed
execution of the sentence under section 654.
In 2023 Paschal filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
arguing her one-year prior prison term enhancement under
section 667.5, former subdivision (b), was legally invalid. The
superior court set the case for a hearing under section 1172.75.
Paschal later filed a motion for a full resentencing and asked the
superior court to strike the one-year enhancement under section
667.5, former subdivision (b), the five-year enhancement under
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section 667, subdivision (a), and the prior serious or violent felony
convictions under the three strikes law. The People stated that
they did not object to the court striking the prior prison term
enhancement, but that they did object to the court striking the
prior serious felony enhancement and the prior serious or violent
felony convictions under the three strikes law.
The superior court struck the one-year prior prison term
enhancement and the five-year prior serious felony conviction
enhancement, which reduced Paschal’s sentence from 31 years to
life to 25 years to life. The superior court denied Paschal’s
motion to dismiss her prior serious or violent felony convictions
under the three strikes law. Paschal timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Resentencing
Paschal Under Section 1172.75
Paschal argues that, “under the plain language of
section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1),” a defendant with at least one
prior strike is entitled to a “risk assessment . . . [to] determine
whether dismissal of one of the prior strikes would endanger
public safety” and that the superior court failed to make that
finding. The plain language of the statute, however, says the
opposite.
1. Statutory Interpretation
“As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our
fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so
as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We begin by examining the
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statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.
We look to ‘the entire substance of the statute . . . to determine
the scope and purpose of the provision . . . . We must harmonize
the various parts of the statutory enactment . . . by considering
the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory
framework as a whole.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
961, citation modified.) “If the statutory language permits more
than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other
aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public
policy.” (People v. Brown (2023) 14 Cal.5th 530, 536; see People v.
Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050,1059.)
2. Section 1172.75
Before January 1, 2020 section 667.5, former
subdivision (b), required courts to “impose a one-year term for
each prior separate prison term” the defendant had served,
unless the defendant had been free of custody for five or more
years. Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020
Reg. Sess.) amended section 667.5 and limited enhancements to
prior prison terms for convictions of sexually violent offenses.
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.) requires the court to apply Senate Bill No. 136 “to all
persons currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison
for these repealed sentence enhancements.” Senate Bill No. 483
added section 1172.75, subdivision (a), which states: “Any
sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1,
2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense . . . is legally invalid.” Section 1172.75 “applies
automatically and mandatorily when a sentence enhancement
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was imposed under” section 667.5, former subdivision (b) (People
v. Dowdy (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1, 11), and “‘requires a full
resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly
“invalid” enhancements’” (People v. Garcia (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 848, 854).
Section 1172.75, subdivision (c), requires the court to recall
sentences that include invalid enhancements under section 667.5,
former subdivision (b), and to resentence the defendant. The
resentencing must “result in a lesser sentence than the one
originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed
enhancement.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) “The reference to a
‘lesser’ sentence is reasonably understood to mean . . . the new
sentence must eliminate the adverse effects flowing from the
now-invalid section 667.5[, subdivision] (b) enhancements.”
(People v. Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1062.) The superior
court, however, can decline to dismiss an enhancement under
section 667.5, former subdivision (b), when the court “finds by
clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence
would endanger public safety.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1); see
People v. Renteria (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276, 1290 [“the
Legislature did not intend to require trial courts to dismiss
sentencing enhancements where doing so would endanger public
safety”].)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2), provides that, to
“eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing,” the court “shall apply the sentencing rules of the
Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences.” In doing so, the court “may consider postconviction
factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and
record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated,
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evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished
physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for
future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances
have changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(3).)
3. The Superior Court Did Not Have To Conduct a
Risk Assessment
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), states the court must
conduct a public safety assessment only when resentencing under
the statute does not result in a lesser sentence than the original.
The superior court here reduced Paschal’s sentence by six years:
a mandatory one-year reduction for the legally invalid
enhancement under section 667.5, former subdivision (b), and a
discretionary (under section 1385, subdivision (c)) five-year
reduction for the enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a).
That resulted “in a lesser sentence than the one originally
imposed.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1); see People v. Bravo (2025)
107 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1156 [defendant receives a “lesser
sentence” under section 1172.75 when the superior court strikes
an enhancement under section 667.5, former subdivision (b), even
where the enhancement was originally stayed].) Thus, the
“unless” clause (“unless the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public
safety”) of section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), did not apply to
Paschal. Contrary to Paschal’s argument, the court did not have
to make a public safety determination.
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B. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying Paschal’s Romero Motion
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“[E]xtraordinary must the circumstance be by which a
career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very
scheme within which he squarely falls once he commits a strike
as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the continuation
of which the law was meant to attack.” (People v. Strong (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 328, 338; see People v. Rogers (2025)
108 Cal.App.5th 340, 365 [“The ‘great power’ to deviate from the
Three Strikes law ‘should only be used in ‘extraordinary’
circumstances, when the ends of justice demands it.”]; People v.
Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140 [“Only extraordinary
circumstances justify finding that a career criminal is outside the
Three Strikes law.”].)
In deciding whether to strike a prior serious or violent
felony conviction under the three strikes law, the court “‘must
consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his
present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and
prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s
spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though
he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious
and/or violent felonies.’” (People v. Nunez (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
362, 370-371; see People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 674, 689.)
The three strikes law “establishes a ‘strong presumption’ in favor
of a harsher sentence and requires the court to explicitly
articulate its reasoning if it is to depart from a harsher sentence
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by granting the Romero motion.” (People v. Salazar (2023)
15 Cal.5th 416, 428.)
We review the court’s refusal to strike a prior conviction for
abuse of discretion, a standard met only “in limited
circumstances.” (People v. Edwards (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 523,
528.) Absent such a showing, “the trial court is presumed to have
acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives,” and a
reviewing court will not disturb the trial court’s decision. (People
v. Strother (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 563, 571.)
2. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its
Discretion
Paschal argues the superior court abused its discretion in
denying her request under People v. Superior Court (Romero),
supra, 13 Cal.4th 497 to strike her prior serious or violent felony
convictions. Paschal maintains the court erred in assuming she
had recovered from her health issues despite (according to
Paschal) “compelling evidence” to the contrary. The record does
not support Paschal’s argument, and the court did not abuse its
discretion.
In 2021 the parole board granted Paschal medical parole
after finding she suffered from several serious conditions—
including post-COVID-19 disabilities, respiratory failure,
diabetes, schizophrenia, anxiety, hypertension, asthma, morbid
obesity, bed sores, and sleep apnea—that left her physically and
cognitively impaired. The board concluded that she did not pose
a public safety risk at the time, but stated that, if her condition
improved, she would be returned to custody. Paschal’s medical
parole was later revoked after she violated a material restriction
on her parole by using marijuana.
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In support of her motion in 2023 to have the superior court
resentence her under section 1172.75 and strike her prior
convictions, Paschal argued she was no longer a danger to public
safety because her health had deteriorated. While counsel for
Paschal admitted at the hearing Paschal had “marginally
recovered,” he could not confirm the extent of her recovery, and
Paschal did not submit any medical documentation to support
her claims about her current health. The superior court found
Paschal’s condition had improved and stated to Paschal: “It
appears to the court that [your condition is] temporary by virtue
of how it appears that you’ve gotten better,” and it “doesn’t
appear to be [a] chronic” condition. The court’s finding was not
contrary to the evidence.
Moreover, the superior court’s assessment of Paschal’s
health was just one factor in the court’s Romero analysis. The
court also considered Paschal’s criminal history, which the parole
board had described as “rather lengthy” and “violent”; her prison
record, which included multiple rule violations, the most recent of
which was in 2019 for fighting; and her failure to comply with the
terms and conditions of her medical parole, which led to its
revocation. (See People v. Mayfield (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1096,
1107-1108 [“strike convictions do not deserve judicial forgiveness
unless the defendant has used them as a pivot point for
reforming his ways”].) The court stated, “What is very dispositive
for the court are the underlying facts . . . that gave rise to your
case and also your criminal history. The strike was not remote in
time when you suffered this current conviction. . . . I will also
mention that you have not done well in prison. From the
evidence presented to the court, it appears that you were cited for
engaging in, perhaps, [prison] fights [that] . . . only stopped
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because you contracted COVID. . . . While you were being
paroled medically, you failed to follow all the rules. . . . And so
the statement that you’ve done well in prison, I don’t think is
supported by the facts.” Given these circumstances, the superior
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Paschal’s motion
under Romero to strike her prior serious or violent felony
convictions. (See People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087,
1099 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
defendant’s Romero motion where the court “assessed the claimed
mitigating factors and, finding one such factor, acknowledged its
great weight but determined that other factors were collectively
weightier”]; People v. Mendoza (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 843, 861 [in
ruling on a Romero motion, “trial judges [have] substantial
leeway in determining the most significant facts in each case”];
see also People v. Edwards, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 529
[“Only in an extraordinary case—where the relevant factors
manifestly support the striking of a prior conviction and no
reasonable minds could differ—would the failure to strike be an
abuse of discretion.”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J. STONE, J.
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