People v. Ortega CA2/7

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Filed 8/15/25 P. v. Ortega CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B337203

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA191775)
v.

JOSE LUIS ORTEGA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Karla D. Kerlin, Judge. Affirmed.
Steven Schorr, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, William H. Shin and Wyatt E. Bloomfield,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________
Jose Luis Ortega appeals from a postjudgment order
denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section
1172.6 (former section 1170.95)1 as to his conviction of murder.
He argues substantial evidence did not support the superior
court’s ruling following an evidentiary hearing that he could still
be convicted of felony murder as a major participant in the
underlying robbery and carjacking who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Evidence at Trial2
1. Overview
Denley Wilson was in his green Toyota stopped behind a
van at the intersection of Gage Avenue and Miramonte Avenue in
Los Angeles. A man got out of the van, forced Wilson out of his
car by gunpoint, and shot Wilson in the chest before returning to
the van. The shooter fled in the van while an accomplice drove
away in Wilson’s car. Ortega was identified as the accomplice
who carjacked Wilson’s car. Wilson died later at the hospital
from the gunshot wound.

1 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We draw the facts and procedural history from the trial
transcript and clerk’s transcript from the original appeal.
Although both transcripts were admitted into evidence at the
section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing, neither is part of the record
on appeal. We augment the record with these transcripts on our
own motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)

2
2. The Shooting
During the March 2002 trial,3 two eyewitnesses, Sergio A.
and Baudillo H.,4 testified to slightly different versions of what
happened on the day of the shooting, August 20, 1996.
Sergio testified that he was standing outside a house on
Miramonte. He saw a man drive a “little green Toyota car” out of
a driveway and northbound on Miramonte. As the car
approached the intersection at Miramonte and Gage, it pulled
behind a van that was stopped at a red light.
Sergio saw “four or three” people in the van. Based on how
the assailants were dressed, Sergio thought they were gang
members. A man with a tattoo on the back of his head got out of
the van with a gun in his hand and walked toward the driver’s
side door of the Toyota. The man pointed the gun at the driver of
the Toyota, and the driver stepped out of the car with his hands
up. The driver said something like, “ ‘No. Please don’t.’ ”
Sergio saw a flash, heard a bang, and saw the driver of the
Toyota fall. The shooter got back into the van. A second person
got out of the van, walked by the victim, and got inside the
Toyota. As the second person walked by the victim, Sergio saw
the person make “some type of” “kicking movement” toward the
victim; it seemed like the victim “got kicked.” The van drove
away quickly followed by the Toyota.
Police officers interviewed Sergio on the day of the
shooting. Sergio told them that the second person who got out of

3 Ortega’s first jury trial in 2001 resulted in a mistrial after
the jury hung (11 to one, with 11 in favor of guilt).
4 We refer to the witnesses by their first name and last
initial only. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4), (b)(10).)

3
the van was the shooter. He also said the shooter did not have
any tattoos. At trial, when asked why he gave these inconsistent
statements, he testified he was “confused” and “scared” when he
spoke to the police.
In August 1999, detectives showed Sergio a picture of
Ortega. Sergio identified Ortega as one of the men involved in
the carjacking and shooting. However, Sergio could not
remember exactly what role Ortega played.
Baudillo testified that he was in his car stopped at a red
light at the intersection of Gage and Miramonte when he saw a
man driving a small green Toyota on Miramonte. A van drove
alongside the Toyota and then around it, stopping in front of the
Toyota and blocking its path.
Baudillo saw four men in the van. The driver of the van
stayed inside the car while two or three others, including a man
he identified as Ortega, got out and walked toward the Toyota.
One of Ortega’s accomplices pointed a gun at the driver of the
Toyota. The driver got out of the car with his hands up and said,
“ ‘Don’t shoot; Don’t shoot.’ ” Ortega and the two accomplices
went through the driver’s pockets and took several items.
Ortega got into the Toyota, leaving the two accomplices
behind, including the one with the gun. The accomplice with the
gun shot the driver in the chest, causing him to fall. The shooter
and other accomplice got back into the van, said “ ‘Let’s go; Let’s
go,’ ” and drove off behind the Toyota.
3. Police Investigation
Deputy Medical Examiner Louis Pena testified that Wilson
died at the hospital of a gunshot wound to the chest. According
to Pena, Wilson also had a “large area of bruising” on his

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abdomen. The bruise indicated “some force” had been applied to
the area.
Hours after the shooting, police found Wilson’s Toyota one
mile from the crime scene. The radio and wheels were missing.
Ortega’s fingerprints were not on the car. In 1999, police found
the van used in the shooting. The van was registered to Ortega
at the time of the shooting.
4. Ortega’s Police Interview
In 1999, after discovering the van, Deputy Agustin Ortiz of
the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department found Ortega in
custody in Wyoming and went there to interview him. Ortiz saw
Ortega had a tattoo on the back of his head. Ortega told Ortiz
that he was an active member of the Florencia 13 gang.
Ortega said that on the day of the shooting, he was driving
his van and three other fellow gang members. Ortega stopped at
a traffic light at Miramonte and Gage, and a green car pulled up
behind him. One of Ortega’s passengers got out of the car and
approached the driver of the green car “with intentions of taking
the car by force.” Ortega referred to the action as “ ‘carjacking, I
guess.’ ” Ortega told Ortiz that he did not know “what [his
passenger] was going to do” and he did not know his passenger
had a gun.
Ortega said, “everything happened very, very fast . . . so he
yelled out, ‘Hurry up, let’s go. Don’t shoot him.’ ”5 The passenger
who got out of his van shot the driver of the green car, got into
the victim’s car, and drove away. Ortega followed behind the
stolen car for a short distance.

5 Sergio testified he did not hear any of the men other than
Wilson say anything before the man shot Wilson.

5
B. Defense Evidence
During an interview with the police on the day of the crime,
Baudillo made a statement suggesting he saw multiple guns, but
at trial, Baudillo testified he meant that one of the two men who
got out of the car had a gun. Also, during the initial interview of
Baudillo, the officer asked Baudillo, “ ‘The one that was driving,
did he say anything?’ ” Baudillo replied, “ ‘Let’s go, Let’s go.
Don’t shoot, don’t shoot.’ ” At trial, however, Baudillo testified
“the victim was the one who yelled not to shoot him. and the
driver was the one who shouted, ‘Let’s go, let’s go.’ ” In a second
police interview in 1999, Baudillo similarly indicated that it was
the victim who yelled, “Don’t shoot,” and the driver of the car who
said, “Let’s go.”

C. Verdict, Sentencing, and Appeal
In 2002, a jury found Ortega guilty of first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)), robbery (§ 211), and carjacking (§ 215, subd.
(a)). The jury found true the special circumstance that the
murder was committed while Ortega was engaged in a robbery
and carjacking. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) As to each offense, the
jury also found true that a principal was armed in the
commission of the offense. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).)
The trial court sentenced Ortega to life without the
possibility of parole for murder with the special circumstance
that Ortega committed the murder while engaged in a robbery
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)), plus one year for the firearm
enhancement. The court also imposed and stayed a second term
of life without the possibility of parole for murder with the special
circumstance that Ortega committed the murder while engaged

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in a carjacking (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(L)). As to the robbery
count, the court stayed the middle term of three years, plus one
year for the firearm enhancement. The court imposed but stayed
the middle term of five years for the carjacking count, plus one
year for the firearm enhancement.
Ortega appealed. We affirmed the judgment but struck the
second life sentence because Ortega was charged with only one
count of murder and one special circumstance. (People v. Ortega
(Nov. 8, 2004, B160750) [nonpub. opn.].)

D. Resentencing Proceedings
On April 11, 2019, Ortega filed a petition for resentencing
under former section 1170.95 as to his murder conviction. The
superior court denied his petition at the prima facie stage,
finding Ortega was ineligible for resentencing because of the
special circumstance finding by the jury. The court also found,
based on its analysis of the underlying facts of the case, that
Ortega was a major participant who acted with reckless
disregard for human life.
Ortega appealed. We reversed and remanded for the
superior court to issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d). We
held the court erred in relying on the special circumstance
finding because Ortega was convicted almost two decades before
the Supreme Court’s holdings in People v. Banks (2015)
61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522
(Clark), which clarified the factors a jury should consider in
finding a defendant was a major participant in an underlying
felony who acted with reckless disregard for life. We also held

7
the court erred by engaging in premature factfinding. (People v.
Ortega (Feb. 9, 2022, B308609) [nonpub. opn.].)
On remand, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing.
Neither party submitted new documentary evidence or called
witnesses. The court denied the petition, finding beyond a
reasonable doubt Ortega is guilty of felony murder under current
law as a major participant in the underlying robbery and
carjacking who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
The court reasoned Ortega was a major participant because:
(1) “[h]e [wa]s the one who stopped the van and perhaps blocked
the victim’s vehicle . . . so that . . . Ortega and/or the other could
get out and approach the victim”; (2) there was “[a]t least one”
gun present; (3) Ortega and his accomplices were gang members;
(4) he was present at the scene and “kicked the victim”; and
(5) he drove away after the shooting.
The court found Ortega acted with reckless indifference
because: (1) there “was at least one gun used” and “[i]t is likely
that [Ortega] knew there was a gun”; (2) he “was clearly
physically present at the scene,” and “[t]here is no evidence he
did anything to prevent the crime or aid the victim”; (3) the crime
“rapidly unfolded within a matter of perhaps minutes”; (4) “[i]t is
likely that [Ortega and his accomplices] knew each other’s
propensity for violence” because “[t]hese were fellow gang
members”; and (5) “[t]here was no evidence that [Ortega] made
efforts to minimize the risk of violence other than his . . . self-
serving statement [where] he said, ‘Don’t shoot.’ ”
Ortega timely appealed.

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DISCUSSION

A. Section 1172.6 and Standard of Review
Effective 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
substantially modified the law governing accomplice liability for
murder. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448 (Curiel);
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708 (Strong).)
Relevant here, it narrowed the felony-murder rule by adding
section 189, subdivision (e), to the Penal Code. (Curiel, at p. 448.)
Under that provision, “[a] participant in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of a [specified felony] in which a death
occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven:
[¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was
not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.
[¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e).)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also provided a procedure for a person
convicted of felony murder to petition the superior court to vacate
the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts if the
person could not now be convicted of murder because of the
changes to section 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The resentencing
procedure begins with the filing of a petition containing a
declaration that all requirements for eligibility are met.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A); Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)
The superior court must then determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to
relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)-(c); Strong, at p. 708.)

9
If the petitioner has made a prima facie showing he or she
is entitled to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause
and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate
the murder conviction and resentence the petitioner on any
remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) At the evidentiary
hearing the court may consider evidence “previously admitted at
any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law,”
including witness testimony. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The
petitioner and the prosecutor may also offer new or additional
evidence. (Ibid.)
On appeal from an order denying a petition under section
1172.6, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review.
(People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 885 (Emanuel).)
“Under this standard, ‘we review the record “ ‘ “in the light most
favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of
fact” ’ ” ’ could find [the necessary fact] beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “While the trial judge must review all the
relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make
determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt
standard, our job is to determine whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a
rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ”
(People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 414.)
“ ‘ “Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and
any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.” ’ ” (People
v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 339.)

10
B. Major Participant and Reckless Indifference Standard
A participant in the perpetration of certain enumerated
felonies, including robbery and carjacking, may be liable for
murder if the People prove he or she “was a major participant in
the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life,” within the meaning of section 190.2, the special
circumstances statute. (§ 189, subds. (a), (e); Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) Our Supreme Court in Banks, supra,
61 Cal.4th 788 and Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522 “clarified the
meaning of the special circumstances statute” (In re Scoggins
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 676 (Scoggins)) and identified a
“nonexhaustive” list of factors or considerations relevant to
determining whether a defendant is liable for murder under
section 189, subdivision (e)(3) (Strong, at pp. 706-707). “No one of
these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them
necessarily sufficient.” (Banks, at p. 803; accord, Clark, at
p. 618.) Instead, determining a defendant’s culpability for felony
murder requires a “fact-intensive, individualized inquiry” into
“the totality of the circumstances.” (Scoggins, at pp. 677, 683.)
In Banks, the Supreme Court identified the following
factors courts must consider in determining whether a defendant
is a major participant: “What role did the defendant have in
planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths?
What role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal
weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular
dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past
experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the
defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to
facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own
actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did

11
the defendant do after lethal force was used?” (Banks, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. omitted; accord, Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at p. 611.) The “ultimate question [is] whether the defendant’s
participation ‘in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of
death’ [citation] was sufficiently significant to be considered
‘major’ [citations].” (Banks, at p. 803.)
In Clark, the Supreme Court specified the relevant factors
in determining whether a defendant acted with reckless
indifference to human life. The court observed these factors
“ ‘significantly overlap’ ” with the major participant factors
because “ ‘the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony
murder, the more likely that he [or she] acted with reckless
indifference to human life.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615.)
The factors include “ ‘use of or awareness of the presence of a
weapon or weapons, physical presence at the scene and
opportunity to restrain confederates or aid victims, the duration
of the crime, knowledge of any threat the confederates might
represent, and efforts taken to minimize risks.’ ” (Emanuel,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884; see Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 706, citing Clark, at pp. 618-623.)
“[R]eckless indifference encompasses both subjective and
objective elements. [Citations.] ‘As to the subjective element,
“[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the
violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,” and
he or she must consciously disregard “the significant risk of death
his or her actions create.” ’ [Citations.] ‘As to the objective
element, “ ‘[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and
degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s
conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct

12
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation.’ ” ’ ” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884.)
“ ‘ “Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death
inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient” to establish
reckless indifference to human life; “only knowingly creating a
‘grave risk of death’ ” satisfies the statutory requirement.’ ”
(Ibid.)
“The essential question underpinning our analysis” of the
Banks and Clark factors is “what [the defendant’s] actions reveal
about his mental state.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 891.)
“The nonexhaustive list of factors identified as relevant to the
[major participant and] reckless indifference inquiry must not
supplant the standard they are meant to elucidate.” (Id. at
p. 896.)

C. Substantial Evidence Supported the Finding Ortega Was a
Major Participant
Substantial evidence shows Ortega’s participation in the
underlying robbery and carjacking “was sufficiently significant to
be considered ‘major.’ ” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.)
There was evidence that Ortega “was on the scene from
start to finish.” (People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575,
591 (Mitchell) [defendant’s physical presence “on the scene from
start to finish” supported major participant finding]; see also In
re Loza (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 38, 50-51 [“there may be
significantly greater culpability for accomplices who are
present”]; cf. Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. 5 [“In cases
where lethal force is not part of the agreed-upon plan, absence
from the scene may significantly diminish culpability for
death.”].) From the start, Ortega played an instrumental role in

13
setting up the underlying robbery. Ortega told police that on the
day of the shooting, he drove his own van and three other fellow
gang members to the traffic light at Miramonte and Gage. Based
on Baudillo’s testimony, Ortega drove to where Wilson was
stopped at a red light, and blocked Wilson’s car from moving.
Baudillo testified that Ortega approached Wilson, stood by while
his cohort ordered Wilson out of his car at gunpoint, and
rummaged through Wilson’s pockets. (See Mitchell, at p. 591
[fact that petitioner split proceeds equally with gunman
supported major participant finding].)
Most importantly, there is evidence that Ortega was
present at the scene when his cohort shot Wilson in the chest.
Sergio testified that after the shooting, an accomplice got out of
the van, kicked Wilson, and drove away in Wilson’s car. The
superior court reasonably inferred that Ortega was the one who
kicked Wilson and drove away in Wilson’s car, given that
Baudillo identified Ortega as the accomplice who stole Wilson’s
car. Although other parts of Baudillo’s testimony—namely, that
Ortega drove away in Wilson’s car before the shooting—conflict
with Sergio’s testimony that the accomplice who stole Wilson’s
car fled after the shooting, “ ‘conflicts . . . do not justify the
reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial
judge . . . to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth
or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.’ ”
(People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) Reviewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the
evidence supports the conclusion that “[a]t every stage, [Ortega]
was a full partner in crime.” (Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
p. 591 [fact that petitioner participated in every stage of crime
supported major participant finding].)

14
Even if Ortega was not the one who supplied or used the
gun, the “warning signs that the crime[] posed a serious risk of
danger . . . accumulated as the crime[] unfolded.” (People v.
Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245, 273.) When Ortega got out
of his van and approached Wilson, Ortega would have seen his
accomplice point a gun at Wilson and order Wilson out of the car.
Thus, from the beginning of the robbery, Ortega would have been
aware that his cohort’s use of a gun increased the risk of danger.
(See ibid. [defendant saw his accomplice point a gun directly at
the victim, “which was an implicit threat to shoot her” and served
as a warning sign that the crime posed a serious risk of danger].)
Ortega’s conduct after his accomplice used lethal force also
supports a finding that he was a major participant. As noted, the
superior court credited testimony that after Ortega’s cohort shot
Wilson in the chest, Ortega kicked Wilson.6 Ortega also
singlehandedly carried out the carjacking by getting into Wilson’s
car and driving it away, leaving Wilson fatally wounded. (See
People v. Nieber (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 458, 477 [substantial
evidence supported major participant finding where petitioner
was present when violence was used and left while victims were
bound with their faces covered]; In re Loza, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th
at p. 51 [substantial evidence supported major participant finding
where petitioner was present and “did not intercede in any way”
to stop violent conduct and fled afterward].)
Although Ortega told police a different version of events,
including that he said “ ‘Don’t shoot’ ” before his cohort fired the
gun, his statements were contradicted by Baudillo’s and Sergio’s

6 In addition to Sergio’s testimony that he saw the carjacker
kick Wilson as he lay on the ground, a bruise on Wilson’s
abdomen showed force had been applied to that area.

15
testimony. Baudillo heard Wilson say, “ ‘Don’t shoot; Don’t
shoot,’ ” and Sergio heard Wilson say something like, “ ‘No.
Please don’t.’ ” Sergio testified he did not hear any of the men
involved in the carjacking say anything before Wilson was shot.
And while the transcript of Baudillo’s initial police interview
states Baudillo said he heard the van’s driver say, “Let’s go, Let’s
go, don’t shoot,” in a later interview and in his trial testimony,
Baudillo stated it was Wilson who said “don’t shoot,” and the
driver of the van only said “let’s go.” Thus, the trial court was
free to disregard Ortega’s “self-serving” statements as lacking
credibility. (People v. Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 414
[trial judge must “resolve contradictions, and make
determinations as to credibility,” and appellate court’s “job is to
determine whether there is any substantial evidence”].) And
where the trial court makes such findings upon “conflicting
evidence,” those findings are “conclusive.” (Emanuel, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 885, fn. 7; see People v. Oliver (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 466, 484 [where trial court impliedly found
witness’s testimony credible, appellate court “cannot second-
guess that conclusion”].)
Substantial evidence was presented that Ortega was a
central figure, and at certain moments, the lead figure, in all
aspects of the robbery and carjacking. Thus, his participation
was “ ‘major.’ ” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.)

D. Substantial Evidence Supported the Finding Ortega Acted
with Reckless Indifference
Substantial evidence similarly supports the trial court’s
finding Ortega acted with reckless indifference to human life
during the robbery and carjacking.

16
Ortega’s presence at every step leading up to the murder
weighs against him. (See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619
[stressing “the importance of presence to culpability”].) As
discussed, there is evidence that he observed his cohort point a
gun at Wilson during the entire robbery. The superior court
credited evidence that, despite seeing this risk of lethal violence,
Ortega did not act as a restraining influence. (See ibid. [“ ‘If the
defendant fails to act as a restraining influence, then the
defendant is arguably more at fault for the resulting murders.’ ”];
cf. Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 891 [insufficient evidence of
reckless indifference where defendant said “ ‘let’s go’ ” and began
walking away from the robbery]; Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 678 [defendant, who remained at a nearby gas station during
the crime, “was not in a position to restrain” the shooter]; In re
Taylor (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 543, 559 [defendant “could not even
see” the shooter’s interaction with the victim].)
Most notably, Ortega’s conduct following the shooting
demonstrates his reckless indifference to the shooting of Wilson.
(See Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 893 [“a defendant’s conduct
following the use of lethal force may be reflective of his or her
mental state during the offense”].) Ortega did not appear
surprised, nor did he do anything to suggest he rejected or was
taken aback by his cohort’s lethal actions. Rather, the evidence
at trial supports the conclusion that after seeing his accomplice
shoot Wilson in the chest, Ortega did the opposite of rendering
aid: He kicked Wilson while Wilson was lying on the ground.
Ortega then stole Wilson’s car and fled the scene.
These actions provide a window into Ortega’s state of mind
during the carjacking and suggest he shared his cohort’s
murderous intent. (See People v. Nieber, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th

17
at p. 479 [substantial evidence supported reckless indifference
finding where defendant did not render aid to the murder victim,
“whom intruders left lying face down in a pool of blood”]; Mitchell,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 593 [same where defendant “never
moved away from the violence,” suggesting “the gunshots were
unsurprising to him”]; cf. Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 891
[fact that defendant “abandoned the plan rather than resort to
greater violence” provided “crucial insight into [his] state of
mind”].)
Substantial evidence supports the court’s findings that
Ortega consciously disregarded “ ‘the significant risk of death’ ”
his actions created and that his conduct grossly deviated from the
standard of conduct of a law-abiding person. (Scoggins, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 677.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

STONE, J.
We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

FEUER, J.

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