People v. Espinosa CA4/3

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Filed 8/14/25 P. v. Espinosa CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063284

v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF1903406)

CARY GLEN ESPINOSA, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside
County, Jeffrey M. Zimel, Judge. Affirmed.
Deanna L. Lopas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Alan L.
Amann and Genevieve Herbert, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Cary Glen Espinosa appeals after a jury convicted him of sexually
abusing three minors and the trial court sentenced him to prison for 50 years
to life consecutive to a three-year term. He contends the court committed
prejudicial error by admitting expert testimony concerning child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) and by instructing the jury on the use of
such evidence with CALCRIM No. 1193. We conclude the court did not abuse
its discretion by allowing the expert testimony and did not err with its
instruction on the consideration of this evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
CHARGES
The district attorney charged Espinosa with commission of a lewd
act upon J.M., a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a);
count 1);1 oral copulation or sexual penetration of M.M., a child 10 years old
or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b); count 2); commission of a lewd act upon M.M.,
a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a); count 3); attempted sexual
intercourse of L.M., a minor 14 years old or older, by force or fear (§§ 664,
264, subd. (c)(2); count 4); and sexual battery of L.M., a misdemeanor
(§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1); count 5). The information alleged Espinosa committed a
qualifying sex offense against more than one victim. (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4).)

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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II.
TRIAL
A. Non-expert Testimony
1. J.M. and M.M.
J.M. and her older sister M.M. frequently stayed with their
paternal grandmother in Espinosa’s house between 2004 and 2006. J.M. was
between the ages of six and eight years old and M.M. was between the ages of
eight and ten years old. The girls slept in their grandmother’s bedroom, and
Espinosa slept in a separate bedroom.
During their stays, Espinosa sexually abused the girls. On
multiple occasions, Espinosa undressed the girls in his bedroom and touched
their chests and vaginal areas. He perpetrated additional sex acts against
both girls, the details of which are not necessary for our analysis of the issues
raised on appeal. Instead, we focus on the facts concerning the girls’ reports
of abuse and retractions. After J.M. saw Espinosa engaging in a sex act with
M.M., J.M. tried to tell her grandmother something was going on, but her
grandmother told her it was just in her head.
Both girls also suffered sexual and physical abuse perpetrated
against them by their father. M.M. was around 10 or 11 years old when the
abuse started, and J.M. was about 13 years old. When J.M. told her
grandmother about the abuse by her father, her grandmother said it was
normal and instructed J.M. not to tell anyone about it. M.M. also told their
grandmother about the abuse by their father, but her grandmother did not
believe her.
M.M. eventually reported the abuse by her father to authorities
in 2011. She was interviewed multiple times by child protective services and
law enforcement concerning the abuse by her father. Her father and

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grandmother told her to lie about the abuse, and her father would beat her if
she did not. During these interviews, M.M. never reported the sexual abuse
by Espinosa.
After M.M. reported the abuse by their father, J.M. was
interviewed by child protective services multiple times, but she denied
anyone had inappropriately touched her. She did not tell them about the
abuse by Espinosa or her father. J.M. told child protective services several
times her sister M.M. was lying. At trial, now an adult, she explained she lied
to child protective services out of fear. When she did not lie about the abuse,
her father beat her with a belt.
In 2019, J.M. was interviewed by a detective regarding sexual
abuse perpetrated against her by Espinosa. She only disclosed some of the
abuse because it was hard for her to discuss all of it. In that interview, she
denied Espinosa committed a certain sexual act during an incident, but at
trial, she testified he did. Both J.M. and M.M. testified at trial in 2023 they
had tried to “block out” and forget a lot of the sexual abuse by Espinosa.
2. L.M.
Espinosa’s sexual abuse of J.M. and M.M. occurred less often
after their younger cousin L.M. moved into the house in 2007 to live with
their grandmother and Espinosa. L.M. was about eight years old at the time.
A couple of months after she moved in, L.M. told J.M. Espinosa was sexually
abusing her. Again, we do not detail all the abuse Espinosa perpetrated
against L.M. as it is unnecessary for our analysis of the appellate issues.
In December 2010, when L.M. was nearly 12 years old, Espinosa
attempted to rape her. L.M. told her grandmother about the incident and
several days later told her bus driver about it. When the police were called,
she also told an officer what happened. Her grandmother took her for a

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forensic interview and a medical evaluation. Before both, her grandmother
told her to lie and tell them nothing happened, threatening to kick L.M. out
of the house if she told the truth.
In 2011, when authorities were investigating the sexual abuse
allegations concerning M.M. and J.M., the police and social workers talked to
L.M.; she told them no one had sexually abused her. Three years later, she
was again interviewed by social workers and maintained she had not been
sexually abused.
In 2018, J.M. moved in with her grandmother and Espinosa for
several months. J.M. witnessed her grandmother physically abuse L.M. every
day and saw Espinosa grope L.M.’s breasts and put his hand down L.M.’s
pants.
L.M. ran away in 2018 because of the abuse by Espinosa and
arguments with her grandmother. L.M. told some family members about the
sexual abuse by Espinosa and wrote a letter to the police describing some of
it. She eventually moved back in with her grandmother and Espinosa
because she had no other place to stay.
After Espinosa and her grandmother were arrested in 2019, L.M.
was upset and told the detective nothing had happened. She did this because
she was worried if she told the truth something bad would happen to her.
B. Expert Testimony
Jody Ward, a clinical and forensic psychologist, testified for the
prosecution as an expert on CSAAS. She explained CSAAS is a pattern of
behaviors exhibited by many children who have been sexually abused by
someone with whom they have an ongoing relationship. Ward testified that
about 90 percent of child sexual abuse is perpetrated by someone with whom
a child has an ongoing relationship. These children respond differently than

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children abused by a stranger. Children abused within an ongoing
relationship tend not to “report the abuse right away out of love and loyalty
toward the abuser.” CSAAS seeks to explain why children do not report
sexual abuse right away and why they may recant after reporting; it
addresses how children react differently than people might expect.
Ward testified the five components of CSAAS are: (1) secrecy,
(2) helplessness, (3) entrapment and accommodation, (4) delayed
unconvincing disclosure, and (5) retraction and recantation. Not all sexually
abused children will exhibit all of these behaviors.
The secrecy component reflects sexual abuse occurs in secret and
children keep sexual abuse secret for a long time. Ward testified “most people
never disclose sexual abuse or any kind of sexual trauma.” Helplessness
refers to the power imbalance between the abusive adult and abused child as
children are dependent and reliant on adults for their emotional and basic
physical needs, including food, clothing, and shelter.
Because of the secrecy and the child’s helplessness, the
perpetrator is able to continue the sexual abuse and this may result in
entrapment and accommodation. The child becomes entrapped in the abusive
situation and has to learn to accommodate it. As a way to accommodate and
cope with the ongoing abuse, children may try to actively suppress their
memories of it. This interferes with their ability to recall memories later.
Ward explained it is common for children to love and care about their
perpetrators.
Ward described delayed unconvincing disclosure as “the most
widely researched aspect of [CSAAS].” She explained research shows two-
thirds of people who report sexual abuse wait until adulthood to report it and
many never report it at all. Those who do report it tend not to report every

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detail the first time they make a disclosure. They may test the listener’s
response before providing more details. If the person to whom they are
reporting the abuse is open to hearing the disclosure, the child will share
more details of the sexual abuse over time as the child becomes comfortable.
But if the person hearing the initial disclosure is not receptive, the child is
less likely in the future to share the details of the sexual abuse. The longer
the abuse continues, the less likely the child is to disclose it.
The final component Ward discussed was recantation and
retraction. She explained “a child may backpedal on the allegations” after the
child begins to experience the consequences of the disclosure. In a minority of
cases, the child may “recant all allegations of sexual abuse altogether.” Ward
testified the research shows children take back the abuse allegations “about
22 [or] 23 percent of the time . . . when the abuse is happening within the
immediate family.” She explained this retraction occurs because the child
wants to keep the family together. Once the consequences start occurring
after a disclosure, a child may go back to secrecy as a way of coping. Ward
stated in “the substantial majority of cases,” children recant and take back
the disclosure of abuse.
Ward testified she knew nothing about the facts of the case. She
explained CSAAS cannot be used to determine whether a sexual assault has
occurred or to diagnose someone. In testifying about CSAAS, she was not
talking about the alleged victims or the facts of this case but about children
generally. She could not say whether the victims in the case were actually
abused or whether CSAAS applies to them.

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III.
VERDICTS AND SENTENCING
The jury convicted Espinosa of all counts and found true the
multiple victim allegation. Prior to sentencing, count 2 was dismissed
pursuant to section 1385 upon the prosecution’s motion.
The trial court imposed a three-year term on Espinosa’s
conviction for attempted sexual intercourse of L.M. by force or fear (count 4)
and ordered Espinosa to serve two consecutive indeterminate terms of
25 years to life for the lewd act convictions (counts 1 & 3). The court also
imposed a concurrent term of 180 days in county jail on the misdemeanor
sexual battery conviction (count 5). Espinosa timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
ADMISSION OF CSAAS TESTIMONY
Espinosa contends the CSAAS evidence should have been
excluded as irrelevant and its admission violated his federal constitutional
rights. We disagree.
A. Additional Background
Prior to trial, Espinosa moved to exclude the testimony of the
prosecution’s expert on CSAAS. The prosecutor, arguing for the admission of
such evidence, asserted it was “needed to disabuse jurors of the commonly
held misconceptions about child sexual abuse and to explain the emotional
antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching behavior,
including delayed disclosure, inconsistent statements and recantation.”
Espinosa argued testimony concerning CSAAS was more prejudicial than
probative and should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352. He
asserted if expert testimony on CSAAS was to be admitted, it should “be

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limited to general descriptors regarding CSAAS, . . . the witness be ordered to
refrain from giving an opinion on the ultimate issue in this case,” and the
court instruct the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 1193, 303, and 332 in connection
with this testimony.
The trial court ruled the evidence was admissible because the
victims’ credibility would be challenged by the defense. The court explained
the expert would be permitted to testify about CSAAS “to help the jurors
decide whether or not the victim[s’] conduct was inconsistent with
someone who had been molested, which, I guess, is what the defense is going
to be arguing. So the prosecution is entitled to present evidence that the
conduct was not inconsistent with someone who has been molested.”
B. Governing Legal Principles
Expert testimony, like all evidence, must be relevant. (Evid.
Code, § 350; People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1303.) “‘Relevant
evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a
witness . . . , having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code,
§ 210; People v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 171 (Lapenias).) “‘[T]he
trial court is vested with wide discretion in determining relevance’ under the
Evidence Code” (McAlpin, at p. 1303), and its decision “to admit expert
testimony ‘will not be disturbed on appeal unless a manifest abuse of
discretion is shown’” (id. at p. 1299).
“Expert testimony on CSAAS has long been held admissible in
California for the limited purposes of dispelling commonly held myths or
misconceptions about child sexual abuse and aiding the jury in ‘evaluating
the credibility of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse.’ [Citations.] CSAAS
testimony is permitted ‘“to explain the emotional antecedents of abused

9
children’s seemingly self-impeaching behavior,”’ such as delayed disclosure of
the abuse. [Citations.] An expert’s explanation of CSAAS ‘is admissible to
rehabilitate [a complaining] witness’s credibility when the defendant
suggests that the child’s conduct after the incident—e.g., a delay in
reporting—is inconsistent with his or her testimony claiming molestation.’”
(People v. Sedano (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 474, 479 (Sedano); accord, People v.
Flores (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 438, 458 [“the defense placed the victims’
credibility at issue using precisely the kind of ‘paradoxical’ behaviors,
including delayed reporting, helplessness, and memory repression, that
CSAAS testimony is admissible to address”]; Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th
at p. 171 [“CSAAS evidence is relevant for the limited purpose of evaluating
the credibility of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse”]; People v. Patino
(1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744 [“CSAAS testimony has been held
admissible for the limited purpose of disabusing a jury of misconceptions it
might hold about how a child reacts to a molestation”]; cf. People v. Clotfelter
(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 30, 64–65 [CSAAS evidence not relevant under the
circumstances of the case].)
However, “a CSAAS expert . . . ‘may not give “‘general’ testimony
describing the components of the syndrome in such a way as to allow the jury
to apply the syndrome to the facts of the case and conclude the child was
sexually abused.”’ [Citation.] Overall, the testimony must respect the ‘“‘fine
but essential’”’ line between an ‘“‘opinion which would be truly helpful to the
jury and that which merely conveys a conclusion concerning [the] defendant’s
legal guilt.’”’” (Sedano, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 480.)
C. Analysis
Espinosa acknowledges CSAAS testimony has generally been
permitted “for the limited purpose of rebutting certain myths or

10
misconceptions that jurors may have about how children react to sexual
abuse while prohibiting its admission to prove the abuse occurred.”
Nonetheless, he asserts the trial court erred by admitting the CSAAS
evidence here. We disagree.
Ward’s expert testimony concerning CSAAS was relevant and
admissible as it provided the jury information it could use in evaluating the
credibility of all three complaining witnesses, which the defense attacked.
J.M. did not tell authorities about Espinosa’s abuse until she was an adult,
despite being questioned by social workers and law enforcement when she
was a minor as to whether anyone had touched her inappropriately. When
she did finally disclose the abuse, she did not tell the detective everything. At
trial, she testified Espinosa committed a certain sex act against her, but in
previously talking to the detective, J.M. denied Espinosa committed that act.
J.M.’s delayed reporting and partial disclosure could have raised questions in
the jurors’ minds as to the veracity of her sexual abuse claims.
Similarly, the jurors could have questioned M.M.’s credibility.
While M.M. reported to authorities the sexual abuse by her father when she
was a child, she did not report the abuse perpetrated upon her by Espinosa.
L.M. also exhibited seemingly paradoxical behavior: as a child, she reported
Espinosa attempted to rape her but she then recanted the allegation; despite
suffering sexual abuse by Espinosa for years, she did not disclose it to
authorities even though she had the opportunity to do so when questioned by
social workers as a child; and after she reported the abuse as an adult and
Espinosa was arrested, she was angry and denied anything had happened.
Ward’s testimony concerning CSAAS was relevant as it dispelled
misconceptions the jurors might have held that a child subjected to sexual
abuse by someone with whom they have an ongoing relationship will

11
immediately report the abuse, disclose all the details of the abuse, and not
recant or retract the abuse allegation after the authorities have been
contacted.
Espinosa challenges portions of Ward’s testimony in which she
provided percentages concerning certain behaviors. He cites her testimony
that “90 percent of the time” children are abused by someone with whom they
have an ongoing relationship and “many times” they are not believed when
they report the abuse. He also refers to Ward’s testimony that “most people
never disclose sexual abuse” and “two-thirds who do report sexual abuse wait
until adulthood to report that abuse.” Lastly, he references Ward’s testimony
that “the most common coping mechanism” is for “children [to] try to forget or
actively suppress” memories of ongoing abuse. Espinosa contends this
testimony in combination with Ward’s explanation of CSAAS was improper
because it “used probability to predict behavior and used statistical testimony
that ignored the relevant population,” which was children who alleged sexual
abuse.
Espinosa acknowledges he did not object to Ward’s “statistical
and likelihood testimony generally.” The Attorney General argues Espinosa
forfeited this portion of his claim by failing to object below. We agree. It is
well-established “‘the “defendant’s failure to make a timely and specific
objection” on the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not
cognizable.’” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433–434; accord, Evid.
Code, 353, subd. (a).) Nevertheless, we address Espinosa’s claim as he has
alternatively argued his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
object.
We conclude this testimony by Ward was properly admitted. This
evidence was not the “the sort of statistics that ‘“‘convey[] a conclusion

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concerning defendant’s legal guilt.’”’” (Sedano, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at
p. 481.) Unlike People v. Julian (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 878, upon which
Espinosa relies, here, Ward did not testify about how frequently people make
false allegations of childhood sexual abuse. Instead, Ward’s testimony
touched on how often children have an existing relationship with their
abuser, whether they are believed when they make an initial disclosure, how
often children delay reporting sexual abuse, and how children cope with
ongoing abuse. Ward’s statistics and generalities were relevant to help the
jury assess the credibility of J.M., M.M., and L.M. “These are not statistics
that improperly bear on the specific complainant’s veracity, as false
allegation statistics necessarily do. They are not statistics that ‘plac[e] a
thumb on the scale for guilt.’ [Citation.] Rather, by attempting to dispel two
common myths and misconceptions—that abusers are usually strangers to
the victim and that victims usually come forward right away—they help the
jury objectively ‘evaluat[e] the credibility of an alleged child victim of sexual
abuse.’ [Citations.] This is precisely what CSAAS testimony is meant to do.”
(Sedano, at p. 481.) “Statistical probabilities are not inherently suspect when
it comes to explaining CSAAS. Though appropriately broached with
caution . . . , CSAAS statistics remain admissible if they merely educate the
jury to counter ‘a specific “myth” or “misconception” suggested by the
evidence.’” (Id. at p. 482, fn. omitted.) Here, Ward’s testimony did just that.
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Ward’s CSAAS
testimony.
Having determined the trial court made a reasoned judgment
Ward’s expert testimony concerning CSAAS was relevant and admissible, we
conclude admission of this evidence did not violate Espinosa’s constitutional
right to a fair trial. (See People v. Patino, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1747

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[“introduction of CSAAS testimony does not by itself deny appellant due
process”]; see also Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 70 [admission of
relevant evidence of battered child syndrome did not violate the defendant’s
due process rights].)
II.
CALCRIM No. 1193
Espinosa contends the trial court committed prejudicial error by
instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 1193 and the instruction violated his
federal constitutional rights by reducing the prosecution’s burden of proof.
We disagree.
Here, as given by the trial court, CALCRIM No. 1193 stated:
“You have heard testimony from Dr. Jody Ward regarding child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome. [¶] Dr. Jody Ward’s testimony about child sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome is not evidence that the defendant
committed any of the crimes charged against him. [¶] You may consider this
evidence only in deciding whether or not the complaining witnesses’ conduct
was consistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested, and in
evaluating the believability of their testimony.”
Espinosa argues the instruction was deficient in two ways. First,
he contends CALCRIM No. 1193 impermissibly told the jurors they could
consider the CSAAS evidence to determine whether the complaining
witnesses were believable and therefore whether he was guilty. Second, he

14
asserts it improperly allowed the jurors to use the CSAAS evidence to find
the victims’ behaviors were consistent with having been abused.2
“We review a claim of instructional error de novo. [Citation.] The
challenged instruction is considered ‘in the context of the instructions as a
whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable
likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’”
(People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326; accord, Lapenias, supra,
67 Cal.App.5th at p. 175.)
Addressing a claim concerning CALCRIM No. 1193, a panel of
this court previously recognized “[c]ourts have held the pattern jury
instruction accurately informs the jury on the limited use of CSAAS evidence,
but the instruction does not: (a) improperly allow an alleged minor victim of
sexual abuse to corroborate her own testimony; (b) violate due process; or
(c) misapply the burden of proof.” (Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 175.)
As People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494 explained: “A reasonable
juror would understand CALCRIM No. 1193 to mean that the jury can use
Ward’s testimony to conclude that [the victim’s] behavior does not mean she
lied when she said she was abused. The jury also would understand it cannot
use Ward’s testimony to conclude [the victim] was, in fact, molested. The
CSAAS evidence simply neutralizes the victim’s apparently self-impeaching
behavior. Thus, under CALCRIM No. 1193, a juror who believes Ward’s

2 We note Espinosa requested the trial court instruct the jury

with CALCRIM No. 1193 and did not specifically object to the instruction’s
language. The Attorney General urges us to reject Espinosa’s instructional
error claim based on invited error and forfeiture. We reach the merits of
Espinosa’s claim because he contends the instruction affected his substantial
rights. (People v. Grandberry (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 599, 604.)

15
testimony will find both that [the victim’s] apparently self-impeaching
behavior does not affect her believability one way or the other, and that the
CSAAS evidence does not show she had been molested. There is no conflict in
the instruction.” (Id. at p. 504.) In Lapenias, the panel of this court agreed
with Gonzales and concluded “the official jury instruction accurately instructs
the jury on the law: the proper use—and the proper limitations on the use—of
CSAAS evidence.” (Lapenias, at pp. 175–176.)
Indeed, the language of CALCRIM No. 1193 has been upheld by
multiple California Courts of Appeal as properly informing the jury of the use
and limitations of CSAAS evidence. (See People v. Ortiz (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 768, 816; People v. Gonzales, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at pp. 503–
504; Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 175–176; People v. Munch (2020)
52 Cal.App.5th 464, 473–474.) While Espinosa asserts some of these cases
were wrongly decided, we are not persuaded. We reach the same conclusion
that CALCRIM No. 1193, as given here, properly instructed the jury on the
use and limitations of use of CSAAS evidence.
Assessing the instruction in light of the entire record, we are not
convinced there is a reasonable likelihood the jurors applied the instruction
in an impermissible manner. Thus, the trial court properly instructed the
jury with CALCRIM No. 1193 and Espinosa’s constitutional rights were not
violated by the instruction.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

MOTOIKE, ACTING P.J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, J.

DELANEY, J.

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