People v. Romero CA4/1

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Filed 8/15/25 P. v. Romero CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085994

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SWF2007390)

VICENTE DAVID ROMERO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Timothy F. Freer, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with directions to correct
abstract of judgment.
Valerie G. Wass, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
Roges and Adrian R. Contreras, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury convicted Vicente David Romero of second degree murder (Pen.

Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) and other crimes after he provided Kelsey King with
a fatal dose of fentanyl. He appeals from the judgment, asserting there was
not sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he acted with

implied malice and that the jury was improperly instructed.2 Finding no
error, we affirm the judgment and remand the case for correction of the
abstract of judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We focus our summary of the facts primarily on the evidence relevant
to the implied malice contentions on appeal.
In June 2020, Romero lived as part of the Temecula transient
community. On or around June 15, 2020, Romero purchased six “M30” blue
pills from someone named Greg. He previously purchased methamphetamine
from Greg, but admitted it was the first time he purchased M30 pills from
him. When he purchased the blue pills, Romero believed they contained
fentanyl and stated he had twice previously overdosed or nearly overdosed on
similar pills.
Romero attested that he did not believe an overdose was a medical
emergency but rather becoming “too high” followed by a lengthy period of
unconsciousness. He also testified that he used “oxycodone M30 pills” “five,
six times,” was aware that his pills were counterfeit oxycodone pills, and
believed his pills contained fentanyl. Romero understood the pills to be laced
with fentanyl because the first person to sell him M30 pills told him as much.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Romero also highlights that the abstract of judgment lists the wrong
date of conviction. We order the abstract of judgment corrected accordingly.
2
Nevertheless, Romero confirmed that he could not tell by looking at an
M30 pill if it was genuine or counterfeit.
Benedict G., another transient, reported that in the days leading up to
June 16, he declined an invitation from Romero to sell fentanyl, advising him
that fentanyl kills people. On June 16, Benedict shared his
methamphetamine with Romero and Kelsey before selling Romero additional
methamphetamine. When Benedict left them, he did not observe Kelsey to be
in pain or experiencing any medical issue.
Romero, Kelsey, and a third person consumed the methamphetamine
he purchased from Benedict. Romero testified that he and Kelsey agreed
something was off about the methamphetamine and that both of them
developed a headache. Romero offered Kelsey a share of one of his M30 pills
to help with her headache, a remedy he had previously used. When he made
the offer, he understood Kelsey had previously used heroin, but had not
previously used M30 pills. He asserts he told her they were “strong,” but
believed that they would not “hurt” her because of her reported drug history.
Although he believed there was fentanyl in the pills and that fentanyl was
stronger than heroin, Romero claimed he did not know fentanyl was
dangerous.
Romero described the pill he shared with Kelsey as physically different
from the pills he previously consumed, finding them to be shinier and more
difficult to crush. Ultimately, Romero ingested one-half of the crushed pill
and Kelsey consumed the remainder. Romero testified that his headache
began to feel better within a few minutes, and that he and Kelsey spoke
briefly before he passed out.
When Romero awoke hours later, he was half-naked and another man
was putting a shirt on him. He located his misplaced glasses and backpack

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before looking for Kelsey. Romero discovered her face down “like she was
praying” and was unable to rouse her. Romero sought assistance, explaining
he and Kelsey ingested fentanyl. Responding police officers followed
Romero’s directions to Kelsey, finding her cold and stiff to the touch, kneeling
in the fetal position. Officers could not detect a pulse and determined Kelsey
was deceased.
While he received medical care for his own reaction, Romero explained
that he knew Kelsey had never taken M30 pills before but he believed she
could handle it because of her reported drug history.
The forensic toxicologist determined Kelsey died due to a combination
of heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl. She had a low level of
norfentanyl, a metabolite of fentanyl, in her system when she passed,
indicating she died shortly after consuming fentanyl. The toxicologist opined
that Kelsey ingested heroin within one or two days before her death.
Law enforcement officers discovered the remaining five blue M30 pills
in Romero’s backpack. A study of those pills confirmed they contained
fentanyl. The criminalist who tested those pills explained that about
95 percent of the M30 pills she analyzed contained fentanyl, while only
approximately five percent were oxycodone pills.
A sheriff’s department investigator testified as an expert in fentanyl,
summarizing the illicit fentanyl market in the county. He explained that
fentanyl is sold in pills and powder form, and that counterfeit M30 pills were
the primary source of fentanyl overdose deaths in Riverside County in 2020
and 2021. He opined that a quarter of a single M30 pill could be lethal.
Further, he offered that it was common knowledge counterfeit M30 pills
contained fentanyl. The expert explained that the fentanyl dosage in each
pill varied, even among a single batch, likening the fentanyl to the number of

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chocolate chips in a chocolate chip cookie. As he explained, fentanyl works
almost instantaneously to slow respiration and heart rate, which may result
in death.
Over defense counsel’s objection, the court provided CALCRIM No. 520
regarding the elements of murder. The instruction stated in relevant part:
“The defendant is charged in Count One with murder in
violation of Penal Code section 187. To prove that the
defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove
that:

1. The defendant committed an act that caused the death of
another person

AND

2. When the defendant acted or failed to act, he had a state
of mind called malice aforethought.

There are two kinds of malice aforethought, express malice
and implied malice. Proof of either is sufficient to establish
the state of mind required for murder.

The defendant had express malice if he unlawfully intended
to kill.

The defendant had implied malice if:

1. He intentionally committed the act or failed to act;

2. The natural and probable consequences of the act or
failure to act were dangerous to human life;

3. At the time he acted or failed to act, he knew his act or
failure to act was dangerous to human life;

AND

4. He deliberately acted or failed to act with conscious
disregard for human life.”

5
The court also instructed the jury with a version of CALCRIM No. 252
which described second degree murder as a specific intent crime, requiring
the intentional commission of the prohibited act and the specific intent or
mental state explained in CALCRIM No. 520. Counsel contended the phrase,
“dangerous to human life,” in CALCRIM No. 520 was “unconstitutionally
vague.”
During deliberation, the jury sought clarification from the judge on the
fourth element of CALCRIM No. 520. The court directed the jury back to
CALCRIM Nos. 520 and 200 (an instruction regarding legal meanings and
plain meanings of words and phrases). The jury deliberated for
approximately one day and returned a verdict finding Romero guilty of
murder in the second degree. Counsel renewed his objection to CALCRIM
No. 520 following the jury’s verdict.
In accordance with the jury’s findings, the court sentenced Romero to a
term of 15 years to life.
DISCUSSION
Romero challenges whether substantial evidence supports his
conviction for murder and contends that his conviction must be overturned on
a purported instructional error. We disagree.
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Romero first argues that the finding he acted with malice is not
supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, he challenges whether
consuming counterfeit M30 pills objectively carried with it a high probability
of resulting in death and whether the People proved he subjectively believed
the pills to be dangerous.
When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, we determine
whether the record discloses substantial evidence from which, considered as a

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whole, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the crime was committed
as charged. (See People v. Truong (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 551, 555–556.) We
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and presume
every fact in support of the judgment that the jury could have reasonably
deduced from the evidence. (Id. at p. 556.) Substantial evidence is “evidence
that is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (People v. Kraft (2000)
23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) The same standard applies to our review of
circumstantial evidence. (See People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1138.)
“The focus of the substantial evidence test is on the whole record of evidence
presented to the trier of fact, rather than on ‘ “isolated bits of evidence.” ’ ”
(People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 261.) The testimony of a single
witness, if believed by the finder of fact, can constitute sufficient evidence.
(People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 885.) When two or more
inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, we do not substitute our
deductions for those of the trier of fact. (People v. Garcia (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 123, 144–145.)
“Second degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought but without the additional elements, such as willfulness,
premeditation, and deliberation, that would support a conviction of first
degree murder.” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 151 (Knoller).)
Malice may either be express, i.e., when a defendant manifests an intention
to kill, or implied. (People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 87.) “To support
a finding of second degree murder based on implied malice, the evidence
must establish that the defendant deliberately committed an act, the natural
consequences of which were dangerous to life, with knowledge of its danger to
life and a conscious disregard of that danger.” (People v. Superior Court
(Chagolla) (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 499, 514.) Thus, implied malice involves

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an objective component―an intentional act endangering the life of
another―and a subjective component―knowledge and disregard of the
danger. (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 299.) Implied malice
does not require an intent to kill. (People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593,
602.)
a. Objective High Probability of Death
Romero claims the People failed to show “furnishing another with half
of a crushed up illicit M30 pill sold on the street” involves a “high probability”
of causing death. He challenges whether the evidence offered was
appropriately temporally limited and whether they provided enough evidence
of fentanyl’s lethality. We conclude, however, that the People introduced
ample evidence regarding the lethality of unregulated street fentanyl at the
time of Kelsey’s death. It follows that sharing unregulated street fentanyl
with another, in this case via illicit M30 pills, involves a high probability of
causing death.
An expert in fentanyl described the physical effects of ingesting
fentanyl and the speed with which it could kill. He opined that a quarter of a
counterfeit M30 pill―half the dose Kelsey consumed―could kill someone. He
also described the prevalence of such pills in the surrounding community.
Against that background, the expert explained that counterfeit M30 pills
were the primary cause of fentanyl overdoses in the year Romero shared his
pill with Kelsey. A reasonable trier of fact could take this testimony together
and find that furnishing one-half of an illicit M30 pill known to contain
fentanyl involved a high probability of death.
b. Subjective Knowledge
Romero repeatedly stated that he believed the illicit M30 pills he
purchased contained fentanyl but disavowed any knowledge that fentanyl

8
was dangerous or deadly. He testified that he did not believe that half of a
pill would kill someone or make them sick, even though he twice overdosed
on similar pills. That is, Romero believed he had twice overdosed on pills
containing fentanyl, even though he had only ingested the pills “five, six
times.” He stated that he believed overdoses to consist of getting too high
and becoming unconscious for prolonged periods. He claimed he did not
believe overdoses to constitute a medical emergency or were otherwise
dangerous.
However, Romero made assertions that cut against his expressed
understanding of the dangers of illicit M30 pills. He told the court that he
thought it would be “safe” for Kelsey to consume just half of the pill because
it was less likely that she would get “hurt.” It follows that he understood the
pills he shared could cause harm. He believed, because of her prior heroin
use, that Kelsey would be able to handle the fentanyl he offered to her. This
indicates he understood certain conditions made ingesting one of the pills he
purchased more, or less, dangerous. He admitted knowing fentanyl was
stronger than heroin, a drug he understood to be dangerous.
Romero knew Kelsey had not used M30 pills before, so he warned her
that the pills were “strong.” He gave Kelsey half of a pill to prevent her from
getting “hurt” or “too high.” By his own reported definition of the word,
Romero gave Kelsey just half of a pill because he did not wish for her to
overdose.
Benedict also testified that, in the days or hours leading up to Kelsey’s
death, he told Romero fentanyl kills people. Nevertheless, Romero furnished
a pill he believed to contain fentanyl, a drug he understood bore risk
including the risk of death, to Kelsey, killing her.

9
With that evidence before them, a rational trier of fact could conclude
Romero acted with conscious disregard for human life when he provided
Kelsey with one-half of an illicit M30 pill. Accordingly, we conclude
substantial evidence supports a finding that Romero acted with implied
malice.
2. Instructional Error
Romero further contends his conviction for second degree murder must
be reversed because the jury did not receive additional instruction regarding
when an act is “dangerous to human life.” He argues “[t]he omission of the
Reyes definition of ‘dangerous to human life’ rendered CALCRIM No. 520
unconstitutionally vague, lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof, and
violated [Romero’s] constitutional right to a jury determination of all facts
required for conviction.” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 989 (Reyes).)
The trial court correctly instructed the jury on the elements of murder
using CALCRIM No. 520. The instruction properly informed the jury that
the People must prove malice aforethought as a necessary murder and
correctly defined both express and implied malice. The court also instructed
the jury that when the People were required to prove something, they were
required to do so beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court rejected the same argument Romero makes here in
People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 110–111 (Nieto Benitez) and
Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th 139.

10
The defendant in Nieto Benitez argued that CALJIC No. 8.313
“misstates the law because the instruction omits a requirement that
defendant commit the act with a high probability that death will result.”
(Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 111.) The Supreme Court disagreed and
concluded that the instruction correctly distilled applicable case law. (Ibid.)
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted it had previously concluded in
Watson “that the two linguistic formulations―‘an act, the natural
consequences of which are dangerous to life’ and ‘an act [committed] with a
high probability that it will result in death’ are equivalent and are intended
to embody the same standard.” (Nieto Benitez, at p. 111.)
In Knoller, the trial court granted a new trial to a defendant convicted
of second degree murder on an implied malice theory, finding insufficient
evidence that the defendant subjectively knew her conduct involved a high
probability of resulting in the death of another. (Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at
p. 142.)
Romero highlights that his case came to trial after Reyes was decided.
He argues that the jury should have received further instruction on the
objective component of implied malice. In doing so, he seems to suggest Reyes
impliedly overruled Nieto Benitez and Knoller. We disagree. There, the court
was reviewing a trial court’s denial of a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. The Supreme Court concluded that there was insufficient
evidence to support a theory that the defendant was guilty of murder as a

3 The version of CALJIC No. 8.31 given in Nieto Benitez stated in
relevant part: “ ‘Murder of the second degree is [also] the unlawful killing of
a human being when: [¶] 1. The killing resulted from an intentional act, [¶]
2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life, and [¶]
3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and
with conscious disregard for, human life.’ ” (Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at
p. 100.)
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direct perpetrator who harbored implied malice. The court based its
decisions primarily on the lack of substantial evidence of probable cause, but
it also took issue with the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant’s
conduct was “ ‘dangerous to human life.’ ” The Supreme Court explained:
“To suffice for implied malice murder, the defendant’s act must not merely be
dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense; it must ‘ “involve[ ] a
high degree of probability that it will result in death.” ’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 989, quoting Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152.) The court
found that the defendant’s conduct in traveling to rival gang territory with
other gang members did “not by itself give rise to a high degree of probability
that death will result.” (Reyes, at p. 989.)
Reyes did not involve a jury instruction issue and the court did not
suggest that either Nieto Benitez or Knoller was wrongly decided. The Reyes
court’s reference to the “high probability of death” standard in deciding a
sufficiency of the evidence question under section 1172.6 does not amount to
a holding that trial courts must include such language in the jury
instructions defining implied malice. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 989-
990.) Reyes did not call into question the Supreme Court’s own prior holdings
that the “high probability” and “natural consequences” standards of implied
malice are the same, or that instruct solely on the latter was proper. (Nieto
Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 111.) Because the Supreme Court in Reyes did
not decide this issue and did not overrule or otherwise disapprove of its own
precedent, we remain bound by its decisions in Nieto Benitez and Knoller. We

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therefore find no error in the implied malice instruction given at Romero’s

trial.4
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to amend the
abstract of judgment to correctly reflect Romero’s date of conviction and to
forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

I CONCUR:

KELETY, J.

4 We recognize that since Romero’s trial, CALCRIM No. 520 has been
modified to state in relevant part: “The natural and probable consequences of
the (act/[or] failure to act) were dangerous to human life in that the (act/[or]
failure to act) involved a high degree of probability that it would result in
death.” (Italics added.) In making this modification, however, the CALCRIM
committee did not suggest that it was legal error to give the prior version, the
substance of which was approved in Nieto Benitez.
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CASTILLO, J., Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, as I disagree substantial evidence supports the
subjective component of implied malice. No record evidence supports finding
Vicente David Romero knew giving Kelsey King the other half of the M30 pill
he had already ingested endangered her life. (See maj. opn., at pp. 9-10.)
“[A] conviction for second degree murder, based on a theory of implied
malice, requires proof that a defendant acted with conscious disregard of the
danger to human life.” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156.) The
subjective component requires evidence the defendant “knows that his [or
her] conduct endangers the life of another.” (Id. at p. 143 [cleaned up].) For
example, in People v. Tseng (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 117, 129-131, sufficient
evidence of the subjective component existed because the physician defendant
(1) “had expert knowledge of the life-threatening risk posed by her drug
prescribing practices” and (2) continued to prescribe stronger medications
with no medical justification despite knowing her other patients with “similar
patient profiles” had died.
Such evidence is lacking here. Nothing in the record indicates Romero
knew half of this M30 pill could kill. For example, there is no evidence (1) the
dealer warned Romero either (a) these M30 pills were particularly strong or
lethal or (b) others had died after taking the pills, and (2) despite this
knowledge, Romero gave Kelsey half of the M30 pill anyway. In the past, it
took ingesting “two or three pills” for Romero to overdose and pass out for
“like a day or two.” Based on his understanding of the pill’s strength and
because he knew Kelsey had never used it before, Romero suggested she
“take it slow” by “just do[ing] half.” Romero ingested the first half of the pill
before offering the remainder to Kelsey.

1
In short, Romero gave Kelsey four to six times less than the quantity of
pills that had previously caused him nonlethal harm. The only reasonable
inference I can draw from this evidence is that Romero was not aware giving
Kelsey half a pill endangered her life. Though Romero was told fentanyl
“kills people,” this general statement does not change Romero’s subjective
understanding of the relative strength, and corresponding danger, of the
M30 pill at issue here.
Yet on this same evidence, the majority concludes Romero understood
the pill could “cause harm” and “certain conditions made ingesting one of the
pills he purchased more, or less, dangerous.” (Maj. opn., at p. 9.) Each move
Romero took, however, reflects a conscious attempt to reduce the danger to
Kelsey. At most, it could indicate Romero was aware half of one pill could
injure her. But as our Supreme Court has determined, to permit a conviction
of second degree murder based on a defendant’s knowledge the conduct risked
causing serious bodily injury “set[s] the bar too low.” (Knoller, 41 Cal.4th at
p. 143.) Implied malice requires “awareness of engaging in conduct that
endangers the life of another—no more, and no less.” (Ibid.) As I discern no
evidence of that requisite awareness here, I must depart from the majority.
Instead, I would reverse Romero’s conviction of second degree murder,
which would in turn make it unnecessary to reach his claim of instructional
error. When, as here, insufficient evidence supports the conviction for a
greater offense, we may modify the judgment to reflect a conviction for a
lesser included offense. (People v. Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 671, citing
Pen. Code, §§ 1181(6) & 1260.) The parties agree such modification would be
appropriate here, and so do I. I would thus modify the judgment to reflect a
conviction for the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter—an

2
unlawful killing without malice (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 813-
814)—and remand for a full resentencing.

CASTILLO, J.

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