CourtListener 10654048•In re J.P. CA2/3
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Filed 8/14/25 In re J.P. CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re J.P., a Person Coming B340700
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 24CCJP01339
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
D.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Mark A. Davis, Judge. Dismissed as moot in part
and affirmed.
Laura D. Pedicini, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s findings
and orders made at the July 15, 2024 combined jurisdiction/
disposition hearing. Mother contends: (1) substantial evidence
does not support the juvenile court’s findings as to one of the
three counts on which it declared her son J.P. a dependent
—that mother had certain mental health diagnoses and her
mental health issues posed a serious risk of harm to J.P.; (2) the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) and the juvenile court failed to comply with their duties
of initial inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA), and the California statutes
implementing ICWA (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.)
(Cal-ICWA);1 and (3) DCFS failed to exercise due diligence to
investigate, locate, and contact J.P.’s available relatives (family
finding investigation), and the juvenile court failed to make
an express finding as to whether DCFS exercised due diligence.
We dismiss as moot mother’s jurisdictional and ICWA challenges.
We conclude mother has forfeited her challenge to DCFS’s family
finding investigation and the court’s implied due diligence
finding. We therefore affirm the court’s orders.
BACKGROUND
1. Events leading to petition
On April 30, 2024, DCFS filed a petition under section
300 subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm) and (b) (failure to
protect) alleging mother’s and father’s son J.P. (born August
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code. “[W]e use the term ‘Indian’ throughout
to reflect the statutory language.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16
Cal.5th 1112, 1125, fn. 1 (Dezi C.).) We intend no disrespect.
2
2023) was at substantial risk of harm due to: his parents’ history
of domestic violence (counts a-1 and b-1); mother’s “mental and
emotional problems, including a diagnosis of schizophrenia,
bi-polar, multiple personality disorder, anxiety, and depression”
(count b-2); and parents’ having maintained a dirty home with
safety hazards (count b-3).2
DCFS became involved after receiving a report of child
abuse. According to father, mother had struck J.P. on his hand
with a comb and with her hand. Mother hit father when he
intervened, scratching him. She was arrested on March 20, 2024
for domestic violence. Father was concerned for J.P.’s safety
because mother had “a tendency to use physical punishment
when she is upset.”
Later, on April 3, 2024, father explained to a social worker
that he saw mother hit J.P. on the hand with the comb when
J.P. started crying while mother was combing his hair. Father
grabbed the baby from mother. Father stated his mother, sister,
and aunt all had seen mother strike J.P. They lived in the home
with father, mother, and J.P. After mother’s arrest, father let
maternal great-aunt Tracie keep J.P. with her for a few days,
but she hadn’t brought the baby back. Father believed mother
—who had been released on bail—was with J.P. at Tracie’s.
Father told the social worker mother had a seizure disorder
and “a history of mental health.” She had been prescribed
2 The juvenile court dismissed count b-3. Father is not
a party to this appeal, and mother does not challenge the a-1
and b-1 counts. We thus discuss the facts relating to father and
the sustained domestic violence allegations only to the extent
they are relevant to mother’s appeal.
3
medication for the seizures. Father said mother had experienced
psychiatric hospitalizations as a child.
The social worker also interviewed paternal great-aunt
M.H.3 who said she had seen mother strike J.P. with a comb.
M.H. said mother “is always hitting the baby when she gets
upset, or when the baby starts to cry.”
The next day, the social worker interviewed mother at a
daycare residence that Tracie apparently ran.4 Mother said she
had experienced domestic violence in father’s home. She denied
having hit J.P. and said father “was doing the hitting.” Mother
said father and his family had verbally, physically, and mentally
abused her. She stated father had “kicked her out of the house”
and kept J.P., but she had returned with Tracie to retrieve J.P.
Mother and J.P. currently were living with Tracie. Mother
did not want to return to father. Mother stated J.P. had not
seen a doctor since his birth because father wanted the baby
to stay inside and refused to let mother take him to the doctor.
When she moved in with Tracie, however, mother and
Tracie took J.P. in for a medical exam on March 26, 2024.
The doctor diagnosed J.P. with atopic dermatitis (eczema) and
plagiocephaly—a condition that occurs when a baby sleeps or
stays on his or her back “a lot.” The condition was not harmful,
but J.P. was referred to a craniotech for a helmet to correct the
condition. J.P. also had not had his childhood immunizations.
3 M.H. is described as both paternal aunt and paternal
great-aunt. She appears to have been father’s aunt (paternal
great-aunt).
4 Tracie ran several daycares in the Los Angeles area.
4
Mother told the social worker she “had mental health
issues” and had been diagnosed with anxiety. Mother stated
she “used to have a therapist and take psychotropic medications
but stopped because father . . . forced her to stop.” Mother was
willing to seek help from a therapist and resume taking her
medications. Mother explained she’d had seizures since she
was a child and could not drive—she relied on her family for
transportation. She said she never cared for J.P. alone. Mother
told the social worker she was seeking custody of J.P. and
a restraining order against father.
The social worker also questioned Tracie. Tracie said
the abuse allegations against mother were false—she had no
concerns about mother physically abusing J.P. Tracie said J.P.
had been “living in bad conditions” when mother was living
with father and his family. Tracie had been caring for J.P.
and providing support for mother for almost a month. She
had helped mother enroll in public services, taken J.P. to
see the doctor, and provided a home for them both.
Tracie told the social worker maternal grandmother
had been on drugs when mother was a baby. Tracie had taken
mother into her care. Tracie also told the social worker that
mother had been diagnosed with mental illness, specifically,
“schizophrenia, bi-polar, multiple personality disorder,
anxiety, and depression.” Tracie was worried about mother
not addressing her mental health issues. Tracie told the social
worker the maternal family would “step in to help raise and keep
baby [J.P.] safe”—mother had “a lot of support from her aunties,
and siblings.” Tracie had seen mother care for J.P., and mother
was appropriate. Due to mother’s seizures, Tracie supervised
mother and did not leave her alone. Tracie was willing to do
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a home assessment. She agreed to have J.P. and mother in her
care, and to help mother file for legal custody and a restraining
order against father.
The next day, April 5, 2024, mother gave the social worker
J.P.’s medical records and court documents. The court had
ordered parents to share 50/50 custody of J.P., but J.P. was to
remain with mother until the next court date, April 25, 2024.
The court had granted a restraining order in part until that
court date.
On April 24, 2024, Tracie called the social worker to inform
DCFS that mother had left her home with J.P. and was headed
to father’s house. Tracie was worried about J.P.’s safety: mother
had left without a car seat, diapers, or baby food, and the
restraining order against father still was in effect. DCFS went
to father’s home address—paternal grandmother’s home—with
law enforcement. Paternal uncle answered the door and said
father and mother had taken J.P. to a motel. He gave the social
worker permission to enter the home. The social worker observed
signs of neglect: stained carpet and sticky substances on the
floors; piles of clothes and trash; broken kitchen cabinets with
unknown substances and trash on the counters; reptiles in cages
on the ground; and a dirty, broken bassinet on the floor where
J.P. slept.
The social worker called Tracie to discuss a safety plan
for J.P. Tracie was concerned with both parents’ mental health.
She stated that since mother had been living with father, he had
“stopped” mother from taking her medications. Tracie had been
“on the verge of getting [mother] reconnected” with a psychiatrist
when mother had left.
6
Social workers interviewed parents at their motel. Parents
had violated the restraining order. The social workers discussed
DCFS’s concerns about J.P.’s medical needs and the family’s
current living conditions. Father said the family had been living
with paternal great-aunt, who would not let them leave the house
because she feared she’d be evicted for having unauthorized
guests. The family then moved back into paternal grandmother’s
home. Father said the house “ ‘look[ed] a mess’ ” because
paternal grandmother was “ ‘getting her carpet done.’ ” Parents
planned to return to paternal great aunt’s home. Parents agreed
to a seven-day safety plan requiring J.P. to stay with Tracie
with monitored visits for parents.
On April 26, 2024, DCFS placed J.P. into protective custody
after receiving court authorization. DCFS filed an addendum
report the day of the May 1, 2024 detention hearing. The
report noted J.P. was placed in relative caregiver Tracie’s home.
According to Tracie, J.P. was doing well in her care. She had
taken J.P. to be fitted for his helmet and was doing exercises
with him. J.P. was moving more, though his legs appeared weak.
At the detention hearing, mother entered a general denial and
submitted on the child’s detention. The court detained J.P.
and ordered separate, monitored visitation for parents.
2. Jurisdiction/disposition reports and hearing
DCFS filed its jurisdiction report on May 30, 2024.
Mother’s restraining order against father had been dissolved
after she failed to appear at the hearing. DCFS noted J.P.
now was placed with “resource parent” J.B. The dependency
investigator (DI) met with J.B. on May 22, 2024. J.B. said J.P.,
then eight months old, ate well, but spit up a lot. He was not yet
meeting developmental milestones. He was trying to—but could
7
not yet—hold a bottle, push himself up, and roll over. He was
able to make eye contact but did not respond to his name.
J.B. had known mother’s family for a long time. J.B. said
she had let mother and the baby stay in her home for a few weeks
as a favor to Tracie—mother needed a place to stay and J.B. had
a spare room.5 Mother had a seizure while staying with J.B. J.B.
called an ambulance, but mother was released from the hospital
and returned to J.B.’s home. J.B. said that, while mother was
living with her, J.B. “had to regularly give [mother] directives
such as telling her to bathe and to eat.” She also had to direct
mother to pick up J.P. and to feed him. If J.P. cried, mother
would tell him to wait—while she ate—or would take 20 minutes
to make a bottle for him. At times, J.B. called Tracie for support
because “she did not want to have to nag [mother] constantly.”
J.B. described mother as “sweet” but “ ‘not there at all.’ ” She
said mother “seems to behave like she’s 14- or 15-years-old.”
J.B. was concerned about mother’s ability to make appropriate
decisions.
A few days after mother had her seizure, she left J.B.’s
home with the baby and returned to father. (That apparently
was the point in late April when DCFS and law enforcement
went to father’s home to retrieve J.P. from parents and obtained
the order to detain J.P.)
J.B. told the DI that parents had not reached out since
J.P.’s placement with her. Visits were scheduled to begin
5 From what we can tell, before J.P. was detained, mother
had been staying at J.B.’s home, rather than Tracie’s home,
as mother and Tracie initially had reported.
8
the next week. The DI had difficulty reaching parents. Mother
said she could meet with the DI only when father did. Parents
were living together again. Whenever the DI called mother,
father answered the phone. During a phone conversation on
May 22, 2024, father told the DI that mother did not have any
mental health issues, only seizures.
Parents scheduled an interview with the DI for May 30.
The DI interviewed father over the phone. Due to time
constraints, the DI arranged to speak with mother the next
week. During his interview, father again denied that mother
had mental illness. He told the DI that he and mother were
“ ‘going to the doctor and getting the paperwork and the proof
will show that [mother] doesn’t have schizophrenia or bipolar.
They’re using that against her because she’s soft and she’s weak,
she’s not strong enough to stand up to them.’ ” By “ ‘they’ ” and
“ ‘them’ ” father meant Tracie. Father stated mother was not
taking any medication because she didn’t have a mental health
diagnosis. He said mother’s medication was for her seizures.
Father texted the DI photos of mother’s medications (folic acid,
Levetiracetam, and Lamotrigine). Father explained mother
was not herself when she had a seizure—she “ ‘won’t answer
[questions] in a way that makes sense.’ ” Mother had seizures
once or twice a month. Father stated that Tracie “ ‘manipulates
and . . . controls’ ” mother.
Father also told the DI that he and mother temporarily
had moved back into paternal grandmother’s house, which still
needed repairs. They planned to move out that weekend. The DI
asked father about visits with J.P. He admitted parents had not
visited yet, stating, “ ‘It’s going to hurt us more to know we can’t
take him with us. . . . We miss him a lot, but it’ll hurt [mother]
9
more to see him and not be able to take him.’ ” The DI explained
monitored visits typically started at the DCFS office before
transitioning to other venues, but father did not want to visit J.P.
“in a room.” As of June 5, 2024, parents still had not visited J.P.
That same day, the social worker met with parents outside their
home—they wouldn’t allow the worker to come inside. Father
signed a visitation agreement. Mother said she could not write
her name due to carpal tunnel syndrome and scribbled on the
agreement. Parents missed their visits scheduled for June 7
and June 10.
DCFS’s report noted father had been the primary contact
person in almost all of its interactions with parents since the
detention hearing. DCFS was worried father was asserting
“coercive control” over mother. The report noted father isolated
mother from others and “limit[ed] her ability to engage with
others when he is not present.” DCFS also was troubled by
parents’ lack of visitation and engagement with J.P.—they
were “not prioritizing the parent-child bond or the benefits
of attachment on child development.” DCFS believed court
intervention was “necessary to ensure [J.P.’s] safety and
well-being and to prevent future abuse/neglect.”
The DI was unable to reach mother to interview her
before DCFS filed its supplemental report on June 12. The DI
also had been unable to reach Tracie and paternal great-aunt.
At mother’s counsel’s request, the court continued the jurisdiction
hearing to July 15, 2025 to give DCFS an opportunity to
interview her. When the court asked, mother’s counsel responded
she had “[n]othing further.”
DCFS filed a supplemental report on July 5, 2024. J.P.
remained placed with J.B. On June 16, 2024, the DI interviewed
10
mother by phone. She was alert, coherent, and cooperative.
Throughout the interview, however, mother would ask the DI
to hold while she “check[ed]” with father “about some of her
answers.” At times, the DI could hear a male voice murmuring
unintelligibly from mother’s side of the call.
Mother denied that she had hit father or purposefully
scratched father—she was in “ ‘seizure mode.’ ” Mother told
the DI Tracie had “ ‘made it all up,’ ” and it was Tracie who
had called the police, not father. Mother also said father never
“ ‘laid his hands on me ever.’ ” Mother admitted she violated
the restraining order and returned to father but said she did so
“ ‘because of the abuse at [J.B.]’s home.’ ” Mother complained
that J.B. would not let mother cook or buy her own food or
clean her own or J.P.’s clothes. Mother said J.B. “ ‘only made
seafood and vegetables, she never made full meals, no meat
or anything.’ ” Mother said she had lost weight as a result.
Mother also denied the allegations about her mental
health. She said the “ ‘only thing’ ” she had was anxiety and
seizures. Mother said she last saw her neurologist for her
seizures in April and took the medication Kepra for them.
Mother said she had seen a psychiatrist in the past, and
he told her she only had anxiety “ ‘and that’s not a mental
problem.’ ” Mother continued, “ ‘I’m not bipolar, I’m not
schizophrenic, I don’t have multiple personality disorder. I am
a very loving person and I have never wanted to hurt anyone.
I have never heard voices. I have never wanted to harm anyone.
There’s nothing wrong with me except for my anxiety and my
seizures.’ ” Mother said she stopped seeing her psychiatrist
because she “ ‘didn’t feel like [her] anxiety was bad’ ” and felt
it had “ ‘gotten better.’ ” The DI told mother it was important
11
for the DI to check with mother’s service providers to verify
mother’s statements about her lack of mental health diagnoses
and to help DCFS provide her with supportive services. Mother
stated she and father “would be going to the doctor to get a
printout of her diagnoses and would provide it to the court.”
Mother also told the DI that she and father had not moved
from paternal grandmother’s home—they still were trying
to find a place. Mother confirmed she had not visited J.P. yet
but said a visitation schedule had been created. However, as of
July 5, neither parent had visited J.P.
On July 15, 2024, the court held a combined adjudication/
disposition hearing. The court admitted DCFS’s reports into
evidence by reference. Counsel for DCFS and for J.P. asked
the court to sustain the petition. Mother’s and father’s counsel
asked the court to dismiss all counts. With respect to the b-2
count, mother’s counsel argued there was insufficient evidence
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that mother had
“schizophrenia, bipolar, multiple personality disorder, and that
these alleged disorders impact her ability to care for the child.”
Counsel noted mother had been forthcoming about her seizure
disorder and anxiety diagnosis but had denied having been
diagnosed with the other disorders. Counsel also argued
there was no proof that mother’s medications were prescribed
for anything other than her seizure disorder. Nor was there
evidence that mother had exhibited any behaviors harmful to J.P.
“that would stem from these disorders”—she was not suffering
from delusions, hallucinations, or mood swings. Mother also was
alert and coherent during her telephonic interview with the DI.
DCFS’s counsel argued there was “ample evidence
regarding mother’s mental health,” including mother’s own
12
admissions and Tracie’s statements. Counsel argued that if left
untreated, mother’s mental health issues “could lead to things
that le[d]” to DCFS’s allegations about the “unkempt and unsafe
home,” and to poor decisionmaking, “such as going back to a
person who is abusive.” The court sustained counts a-1, b-1,
and b-2 of the petition, finding those allegations “to be true
in their entirety,” and declared J.P. a dependent of the juvenile
court under section 300.
The court proceeded to disposition. Through counsel,
mother asked the court to release J.P. to her “with a safety plan
of living with the paternal relatives in the home for now.” J.P.’s
counsel believed the domestic violence issues between parents
were due to “mother’s mental health diagnosis/neurological
issues.” Counsel asked the court to order mother to submit to
an Evidence Code section 730 evaluation “so that we can address
these issues better,” and to a neurological exam to address her
seizures. The court removed J.P. from parents’ custody, found
J.P.’s “current placement [was] appropriate,” and ordered DCFS
to provide family reunification services.
For mother’s case plan, the court ordered mother to
attend an anger management program; to participate in conjoint
counseling with father, mental health counseling—including
a psychological assessment and psychiatric evaluation, and
individual counseling; and to take all prescribed psychotropic
medications. The court ordered DCFS to refer mother “for
a neurological exam to address her seizures.” The court also
ordered mother to submit to the requested Evidence Code section
730 evaluation, “[i]n light of the mental health counseling and
the fact that the court is unsure of the actual situation, sounds
like there was some mental health treatment offered to her
13
previously.” The court granted mother monitored visitation with
J.P. three times a week, for three hours each visit, and gave
DCFS discretion to liberalize mother’s visits.
Toward the end of the hearing, father’s counsel informed
the court that father had safety concerns about J.P. in non-
relative caregiver J.B.’s home—father had heard J.B. had acted
unsafely with another foster child in her care. Father wanted
DCFS “immediately” to assess the child’s safety and to
“continu[e] to make best efforts” to place J.P. “with family.”
J.P.’s counsel recently had seen J.P. in J.B.’s home and did not
know about any other foster child. The court asked father’s
counsel to prepare a relative placement information sheet “[s]o
placement might be considered down the road.” The court set
a six-month review hearing date and ordered DCFS to report
on whether it had “considered other relatives for potential
placement” and how mother was doing with her services.
Mother appealed from all appealable orders made at
the July 15, 2024 adjudication/disposition hearing.
3. ICWA inquiry and findings
In its detention report, DCFS stated father had denied any
known Indian ancestry on April 3, 2024, and mother and Tracie
had denied any known Indian ancestry on April 4. On May 1,
2024, father filed an unsigned parental notification of Indian
status (ICWA-020) form. He indicated none of the categories
listed under the heading “Indian Status” applied to him. Mother
filed a signed ICWA-020 form on May 1 and also indicated none
of the “Indian Status” categories applied to her. At the detention
hearing, the juvenile court explained ICWA to parents and noted
they each had discussed the issue with their respective attorneys.
The court acknowledged each parent had denied having Indian
14
ancestry and thus found it had no reason to believe ICWA
applied. The court ordered DCFS to make ongoing inquiries
and to comply with its ongoing ICWA obligations. The court
told parents the social workers would be “digging deeper” and
talking to grandparents and extended family members.
On May 30, 2024, the DI asked father about possible
Indian ancestry. He stated he had no knowledge of J.P. having
any Indian ancestry. Father also denied that he, paternal
relatives, mother, or maternal relatives had Indian ancestry.
On June 16, 2024, the DI asked mother if she knew whether
J.P. had any Indian ancestry, and mother said no. Mother also
denied that she, maternal relatives, father, or paternal relatives
had Indian ancestry.
DISCUSSION
1. Post-judgment evidence
DCFS filed a separate request asking us to take judicial
notice of the juvenile court’s January 29, 2025 order designating
Tracie as a co-holder of J.P.’s educational rights and identifying
her as his “relative caregiver,” the court’s minute order filed
after the January 29, 2025 review hearing identifying parents
and Tracie as co-educational rights holders, and an attorney
order signed by the court on March 4, 2025 that orders DCFS to
interview/attempt to interview all known and available extended
family members about J.P.’s Indian status. Mother objects to
the request in her reply brief. Mother argues that, as stated
in In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1094 (Kenneth D.),
“absent exceptional circumstances, a reviewing court may not
generally consider postjudgment evidence to conclude [an ICWA
inquiry error is] harmless.” Mother contends DCFS has not
established the existence of exceptional circumstances.
15
We do not grant the request for judicial notice to establish
DCFS has made an adequate ICWA inquiry or to determine if
any ICWA error was harmless. Rather, we consider the court’s
order requiring DCFS to interview extended family members
to determine whether we can grant mother any effective relief.
Similarly, we consider the juvenile court’s January 2025 orders to
determine if we can grant mother effective relief on her challenge
to DCFS’s investigation of J.P.’s relatives under section 309,
subdivision (e). Accordingly, we now grant DCFS’s request for
judicial notice in its entirety. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (a), (d),
459, subds. (a), (b).)
2. Mother’s challenge to the jurisdictional finding
Mother contends substantial evidence did not support the
b-2 count’s allegation that she was diagnosed with schizophrenia,
bipolar disorder, and multiple personality disorder or that her
alleged mental and emotional problems placed J.P. at risk of
serious harm. DCFS contends mother’s jurisdictional challenge
should be dismissed as moot because the other sustained counts
each provide an independent basis for the court’s jurisdiction
over J.P.
a. Mother’s challenge to the b-2 count is moot
“[T]he critical factor in considering whether a dependency
appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any
effective relief if it finds reversible error.” (In re N.S. (2016) 245
Cal.App.4th 53, 60, quoted by In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266,
276 (D.P.).) “[R]elief is effective when it ‘can have a practical,
tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’ ” (D.P.,
at p. 277.) An appeal may be rendered moot where “jurisdictional
findings have been made as to both parents but only one parent
brings a challenge.” (Id. at p. 283.) An appeal is not moot,
16
however, where the jurisdictional finding against the appealing
parent “ ‘serves as the basis for dispositional orders that are
also challenged on appeal.’ ” (Ibid.)
Mother’s appeal from the b-2 count jurisdictional finding
is moot. Mother does not challenge the other jurisdictional
findings the court made against her and father based on domestic
violence. Father has not appealed at all. Accordingly, even if
we were to reverse the b-2 count, J.P. would remain a dependent
of the juvenile court based on both mother’s and father’s
conduct. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283 [“[T]he principle
that ‘[d]ependency jurisdiction attaches to a child, not to his
or her parent’ [citation], means that ‘ “[a]s long as there is one
unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that another
might be inappropriate.” ’ ”].) Critically, mother does not
independently challenge the dispositional findings and orders
removing J.P. from her custody or requiring her to participate
in mental health services. Indeed, at the disposition hearing,
mother’s counsel did not object to—nor ask the court to change—
mother’s case plan ordering her to participate in a psychological
assessment and psychiatric evaluation, and to take all prescribed
psychotropic medications. Nor did she object to the court’s order
that she submit to an Evidence Code section 730 examination.
Accordingly, mother has not shown how reversal of the b-2 count
would have a tangible effect on her legal status or conduct.
b. We decline to exercise discretionary review
Even if a case is moot, however, “courts may exercise their
‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.” (D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) Generally, that discretion is
exercised “when ‘the case presents an issue of broad public
interest that is likely to recur,’ ‘when there may be a recurrence
17
of the controversy between the parties,’ or ‘when a material
question remains for the court’s determination.’ ” (Ibid.)
Dependency proceeding appeals are “particularly prone to
mootness problems,” however. (Id. at p. 284.) Our high court,
therefore, has identified a non-exhaustive list of factors for
assessing whether a court should exercise discretionary review of
a moot appeal in a dependency proceeding. (Id. at pp. 285–286.)
Courts may consider (1) “whether the challenged
jurisdictional finding ‘could be prejudicial to the appellant
or could potentially impact the current or future dependency
proceedings,’ or ‘ “could have other consequences for [the
appellant], beyond jurisdiction” ’ ”; (2) “whether the jurisdictional
finding is based on particularly pernicious or stigmatizing
conduct”; and (3) “why the appeal became moot.” (D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at pp. 285–286.) Although “no single factor is
necessarily dispositive of whether a court should exercise
discretionary review of a moot appeal,” a court ultimately
“should be guided by the overarching goals of the dependency
system” in deciding whether to exercise that discretion on a
case-by-case basis. (Id. at pp. 286–287.)
Mother contends discretionary review is appropriate
here because diagnoses of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and
multiple personality disorder are “highly stigmatized by our
society and carry immediate, corrosive implications—not only in
how mother is perceived by social workers and those monitoring
her visits with [J.P.] in the instant case, but in snap judgments
that may be made about the mother in any future family law
or dependency case.” “Though stigma alone will not sustain an
appeal, a court may consider the nature of the allegations against
the parent when deciding whether discretionary review is proper.
18
The more egregious the findings against the parent, the greater
the parent’s interest in challenging such findings.” (D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 286.)
We understand that a mental health diagnosis such
as those mother contests can be stigmatizing. Nevertheless,
when considering the circumstances here, we find the potential
stigma associated with the specific mental health diagnoses of
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and multiple personality disorder
—and the speculative future harm from such diagnoses that
mother claims—do not weigh in favor of exercising our
discretionary review.
We can infer the juvenile court did not sustain the
b-2 count based only on the diagnoses supported by Tracie’s
statements to DCFS. The b-2 count also alleged mother’s “mental
and emotional problems, including” anxiety and depression—
diagnoses mother does not challenge—rendered her “unable
to provide regular care for” J.P. (Italics added.) The b-2 count
alleged mother failed to take her prescribed psychotropic
medication and “failed to maintain consistent mental health
treatment.” Mother admitted to these facts. In her initial
conversation with the social worker, she admitted she had
“mental health issues,” had been diagnosed with anxiety, and
had been seeing a therapist and taking psychotropic medication
until father “forced her to stop.” In her restraining order
request, mother declared father “would not allow me to go to
my psychiatric appointments for my mental health or go get
my prescriptions so it affected my mental health.” Father also
told DCFS that mother suffered from both a seizure disorder
and“a history of mental health.”
19
Accordingly, even if we were to strike the challenged
diagnoses, mother still would face some alleged stigma as ample
evidence in the record indicated she suffered from mental
health issues for which she required psychiatric care. Nor does
mother contend her case plan would have been different had
the sustained b-2 count stated only that she had been diagnosed
with anxiety and depression.
Moreover, contrary to mother’s contention, the record
amply demonstrates mother had mental health issues that
endangered J.P.’s “physical health and safety” and placed him
“at risk of serious physical harm, damage, and danger.” A child
falls under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under subdivision
(b)(1) of section 300 if, as relevant here, “there is a substantial
risk that the child will suffer[ ] serious physical harm or illness,
as a result of” the inability of the parent to provide regular care
for the child due to the parent’s mental illness. (§ 300, subd.
(b)(1)(D).) DCFS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence:
“(1) the parent’s . . . neglectful conduct or failure or inability to
protect the child; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or
illness or a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.”
(In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601; In re L.W. (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848.) “[H]arm may not be presumed from
the mere fact of a parent’s mental illness.” (In re A.L. (2017)
18 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1050.)
Here, there was sufficient evidence from which the
juvenile court could find mother’s untreated mental health issues
impaired her ability to care for J.P. and thus placed him at an
ongoing risk of harm. Mother demonstrated both an inability to
put J.P.’s needs first and a lack of insight as to how her mental
health issues posed a risk to him. Until Tracie became involved,
20
mother had not taken J.P. to see a doctor. J.B. observed that
mother let J.P. cry, waiting until she finished eating before
feeding him or taking 20 minutes to fix his bottle. J.B. had to
remind mother to pick J.P. up and to feed him. J.B. described
mother as “ ‘not there at all’ ” and acting like a teenager. Mother
did not visit J.P. after he was detained despite the importance
of forming a parent-child bond with him while he was so young.
According to father, it would “ ‘hurt [mother] more to see [J.P.]
and not be able to take him.’ ”
Alarmingly, mother took J.P. back to father’s home—
paternal grandmother’s house—despite having told DCFS
that father had abused her, had kept her from taking J.P. to
the doctor, and had forced her to stop taking her medication
and seeing her therapist. Mother left J.B.’s without taking
any supplies for J.P.—then eight months old—and took him
to an unsafe environment. Even after J.P.’s detention, mother
remained with father in paternal grandmother’s home and—
though coherent—seemingly could not answer the DI’s questions
without first consulting father.
Moreover, despite mother’s initial willingness to resume
psychiatric treatment and medication—and having told the
social worker father forced her to stop that treatment—mother
minimized her anxiety after she returned to father. She told the
DI she had stopped seeing her psychiatrist because she “ ‘didn’t
feel like [her] anxiety was bad.’ ” She felt it had “ ‘gotten better.’ ”
Mother told the DI she would get documentation of her mental
health diagnoses—or lack thereof—and provide it to the court,
but she never did. Mother also recanted her domestic violence
accusations against father. Based on the record, the juvenile
court reasonably could conclude that, without court intervention,
21
mother’s mental health issues would remain untreated and
pose an ongoing risk to J.P., who was only 11 months old
at the adjudication hearing. (See In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203
Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One cannot correct a problem one fails to
acknowledge.”]; In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1036,
1044 [recognizing “denial is a factor often relevant to determining
whether persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future
without court supervision” but finding that was not the case
there].)
As we conclude the record supports the jurisdictional
finding that mother’s mental health issues placed J.P. at a
substantial risk of harm, our review of whether the evidence
supports a finding that mother had been diagnosed with
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and multiple personality disorder
would not result in our reversal of the b-2 count. And, as DCFS
notes, Tracie’s statement that mother received those diagnoses
would be part of the DCFS record—and available in any future
dependency or family law proceeding—even if we were to strike
those allegations. Moreover, the issue here did not become
moot because mother promptly completed her case plan, and
the unchallenged jurisdictional findings involved conduct just
as severe as the challenged finding. (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 286.)
Finally, we do not conclude the “overarching purposes of
the dependency system . . . counsel in favor” of our discretionary
review. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 286–287.) The findings
mother challenges do not involve particularly egregious conduct
—such as substantial physical and sexual abuse—where
preservation of the family, and the child’s emotional and physical
well-being, could make discretionary review appropriate. (See
22
id. at pp. 285–286 [citing cases where courts elected to review
“ ‘pernicious’ ” findings that parent exposed children to a
substantial risk of physical and sexual abuse].)
3. Mother’s ICWA challenge is moot
Mother contends DCFS and the court failed to comply
with their initial inquiry duties under Cal-ICWA. She asks us
to conditionally reverse the disposition order and remand the
matter with directions to DCFS to comply with the inquiry
requirements under section 224.2, supported with proper
documentation as required under rule 5.481(a)(5) of the
California Rules of Court.
ICWA was enacted “ ‘to protect the best interests of Indian
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards
for the removal of Indian children from their families and the
placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which
will reflect the unique values of Indian culture . . . .’ ” (Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1128–1129, quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1902.)
Under Cal-ICWA, the juvenile court and DCFS “have ‘an
affirmative and continuing duty’ in every dependency proceeding
to determine whether ICWA applies by inquiring whether a
child is or may be an Indian child.” (Dezi C., at pp. 1131–1132,
quoting § 224.2, subd. (a).)
Under the current version of section 224.2, DCFS’s duty
to inquire arises when it is first contacted about the abuse or
neglect of a child, and on DCFS’s first contact with the child
or the child’s family. (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1); see also Kenneth D.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1099.) At first contact with each family
member, including extended family members, DCFS must ask
if the child is or may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1).)
23
When DCFS takes a child into its temporary custody, its duty to
inquire “includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents,
legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members,
others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting
child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian
child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).) Extended family members include
adults who are the child’s “grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother
or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first
or second cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1).)6 And
at the first hearing on a petition, the juvenile court “shall ask
each party to the proceeding and all other interested persons
present whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child, [and]
whether they know or have reason to know that the child is
an Indian child . . . .” (§ 224.2, subd. (c); see also Kenneth D.,
at p. 1099, quoting former § 224.2, subd. (c).)
The juvenile court may find ICWA does not apply to a
child’s proceeding if it finds DCFS’s “inquiry and due diligence
were ‘proper and adequate,’ and the resulting record provided
no reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1134; § 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) The juvenile court’s
finding that ICWA does not apply thus implies that DCFS
fulfilled its duty of inquiry. (In re Josiah T. (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 388, 401.)
We generally review the juvenile court’s factual finding
that ICWA does not apply for substantial evidence. (§ 224.2,
6 Extended family member “has the same meaning as
defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe,” if such
a law or custom exists. (§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1).)
24
subd.(i)(2) [juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply
to the proceedings is “subject to reversal based on sufficiency
of the evidence”].) “[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific
determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly
diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation]
subject to a deferential standard of review.” (Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)
Here, the record demonstrates DCFS asked mother, father,
and maternal great-aunt Tracie about J.P.’s potential Indian
ancestry, and each parent filed an ICWA-020 form. Parents and
Tracie denied having any known ancestry. Parents also denied
that maternal or paternal relatives had any Indian ancestry.
Although the court did not directly ask parents about their
possible Indian ancestry at the initial hearing, the court directly
addressed parents when it acknowledged they had spoken to
their attorneys and had denied Indian ancestry. The court thus
found it had no reason to believe ICWA applied. The court also
explained to parents that it was ordering DCFS to “make ongoing
inquiries through the life of this case,” and social workers were
going to “dig deeper” and talk to extended family members.
Nevertheless, as mother notes, nothing in the record
indicates DCFS asked paternal extended family members with
whom DCFS had contact about their knowledge of their or J.P.’s
potential ancestry—specifically a paternal great aunt and a
paternal uncle. According to Tracie, mother had 11 siblings and
“aunties,” but Tracie apparently did not provide their names
or locations. Mother thus argues the court’s finding that ICWA
did not apply was not supported by substantial evidence because
DCFS did not inquire of known extended family members as
required under section 224.2, subdivision (b), and the court
25
“failed to ensure [DCFS] conducted an adequate inquiry and
documented its findings for the court’s review.”
DCFS contends mother’s ICWA challenge should be
dismissed because the court’s ICWA finding is not final—as
DCFS’s and the court’s duty of inquiry is ongoing—and because
the issue is moot. We agree that mother’s challenge is moot.
Mother already has received the relief she seeks—an order that
DCFS comply with its section 224.2 inquiry duties and document
its efforts.7 (See, e.g., People v. Gregerson (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th
306, 321 [appeal moot where appellant already received the relief
he sought on appeal].) On March 4, 2025, the juvenile court
ordered DCFS to “interview/attempt to interview all known and
available extended family members about whether the child is,
or may be, an Indian child as required by . . . section 224.2, subd.
(b),” to document its efforts, and to submit a written report on the
results to the court before a hearing scheduled for June 30, 2025.
7 Mother also asks us to conditionally reverse the disposition
order but that request is premature as the proceedings here are
ongoing. (Cf. Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1125, 1152 [finding
conditional reversal of judgment terminating parental rights
was required where department failed to conduct an adequate
ICWA inquiry].) At the detention hearing the court found it had
no reason to believe, or to know, ICWA applied “at this point.”
Under section 224.2, subdivision (i)(2), a juvenile court must
reverse a determination that ICWA does not apply if it receives
information giving it reason to believe a child is an Indian child.
We can presume the juvenile court will follow its order (and
section 224.2) and will have determined whether ICWA applies
to this case—based on new information not before us—by the
time this opinion is filed.
26
The court’s order also states that, after it has reviewed DCFS’s
report and determines whether DCFS “has interviewed all
available extended family members, the juvenile court shall make
a finding regarding the ICWA’s applicability.” Even if we were to
decide DCFS and the juvenile court failed to comply with section
224.2, directing the juvenile court to do what it already has done
would have no practical effect and, if anything, would further
delay these proceedings. (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276
[effective relief requires ongoing harm capable of being rectified
by the outcome the appellant seeks].) Mother has not asked us to
exercise discretionary review over this issue. We find no reason
to do so. Accordingly, we dismiss mother’s appeal on the ICWA
issue as moot.
4. Mother’s challenge to the family finding investigation
Finally, mother contends DCFS failed to exercise due
diligence in investigating J.P.’s relatives under section 309,
subdivision (e)(1), and the juvenile court failed to make an
express finding under section 358, subdivision (b)(2) as to
whether DCFS exercised due diligence. DCFS contends mother
forfeited her challenge to its “family finding efforts” and to the
court’s failure to make an express finding as to those efforts, she
lacks standing to challenge DCFS’s family finding investigation,
her challenge is moot, DCFS’s investigation was sufficient,
and any alleged error was harmless.
a. Applicable law
When a child is removed from parental custody, the social
worker must conduct, within 30 days, an investigation to identify
and locate all adult relatives of the child. (§ 309, subd. (e)(1);
In re K.B. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 689, 697 (K.B.).) “ ‘[A]dult
relatives’ include all grandparents, adult relatives who are
27
‘suggested by the parents,’ and other adults who are ‘related to
the identified child by blood, adoption, or affinity’ ‘within the
fifth degree of kinship, including stepparents, stepsiblings,
and all relatives whose status is preceded by the words “great,”
“great-great,” or “grand,” or the spouse of any of these persons.’ ”
(K.B., at p. 697, quoting § 309, subd. (e)(1), § 319, subd. (h)(2).)
The social worker must use “due diligence in investigating the
names and locations of the relatives.” (§ 309, subd. (e)(3)(A).)
Within 30 days of the child’s removal, the social worker
also is required to give written notification to all adult relatives
who have been located that the child has been removed from
parental custody. (§ 309, subd. (e)(1)(A); K.B., supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 697.) The notice must include “[a]n explanation
of the various options to participate in the care and placement
of the child and support for the child’s family, including any
options that may be lost by failing to respond,” and “information
about providing care for the child while the family receives
reunification services with the goal of returning the child
to the parent . . . , how to become a resource family, and
additional services and support that are available in out-of-home
placements.” (§ 309, subd. (e)(1)(B).) The social worker also must
provide oral notification of the above information—by telephone
or in person—“whenever appropriate.” (§ 309, subd. (e)(1).)
Rule 5.534(b)(3) of the California Rules of Court8 also
requires the social worker to give any located relative certain
documents, including relative information form JV-285. (K.B.,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 697.) Form JV-285 “asks relatives to
8 Rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
28
identify ways in which they may want to help the child, parents,
or social worker, and to provide contact information for other
relatives who might be able to help the child.” (Ibid.)
If the court removes a child from parental custody at the
disposition hearing, the court must “make a finding as to whether
the social worker has exercised due diligence in conducting
the investigation . . . to identify, locate, and notify the child’s
relatives.” (§ 358, subd. (b)(2); see also rule 5.695(e)(1).)
“When making this finding, the court may consider examples
of due diligence that include, among other things, whether the
social worker has (1) obtained information about the location
of relatives; (2) reviewed the case file for any information
regarding relatives; (3) telephoned, emailed, or visited all
identified relatives; (4) asked located relatives for the names
and locations of others; and (5) used online search tools.” (K.B.,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 698; see § 358, subd. (b)(3)(B)–(F);
rule 5.637(d)(3).) “The court must document its determination
by making a finding on the record.” (Rule 5.695(e)(1).)
Here, the juvenile court did not expressly find DCFS
exercised due diligence in conducting its family finding
investigation. Nor does it appear DCFS asked the court to
make such a finding in any of its reports. At the disposition
phase of the July 15, 2024 hearing, father—through counsel—
asked DCFS to “continu[e] to make best efforts” to place J.P.
“with family.” Counsel did not yet have information from father
to submit a relative placement request form, however. The court
asked father’s counsel “to put together . . . [a] relative placement
information sheet so placement might be considered down the
road.” The court’s minute order from the hearing in turn ordered
DCFS “to investigate all relatives for possible placement.”
29
(Capitalization omitted.) We thus deem the court impliedly
to have found that DCFS exercised due diligence in its family
finding investigation, as of the July 15 hearing.
b. Mother has forfeited her challenges relating
to the family finding investigation
Mother concedes she did not directly challenge DCFS’s
family finding investigation and thus did not preserve the
issue below. Ordinarily, a reviewing court “will not consider
a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was
not made in the trial court.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287,
1293.) The purpose of the forfeiture rule “is to encourage parties
to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they
may be corrected.” (Ibid.) Application of the forfeiture rule
is not automatic, however. Nevertheless, an appellate court
should exercise its discretion to excuse forfeiture “rarely and
only in cases presenting an important legal issue.” (Ibid.)
In dependency matters—where the well-being of children is
at stake—the reviewing court must exercise that discretion
“with special care,” considering the “paramount importance”
of issues “such as permanency and stability.” (Ibid.)
Mother first argues she could not object—and thus the
forfeiture rule does not apply—because she had no notice of
any due diligence findings. DCFS’s reports did not document
its efforts to investigate J.P.’s relatives, DCFS did not ask the
court to make any due diligence findings, and the court made no
express oral or written due diligence findings. We reject mother’s
position. As DCFS notes, mother was represented by appointed
counsel. Counsel never objected at the adjudication/disposition
hearing that the court had not made a due diligence finding
as to DCFS’s investigation of J.P.’s relatives. Mother’s implied
30
insinuation that her court-appointed attorney was unaware of
the law and the requirements relating to relative placement
is without merit. (See People v. Rucker (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d
342, 346 (“A presumption exists that an attorney has performed
his duty in protecting his client’s interest.”) Moreover, mother
does not contend she received inadequate representation. In
any event, counsel did not raise any concerns about or object to
J.P.’s placement even after father’s attorney mentioned father’s
concerns about J.B. Nor did mother’s counsel join father’s
request that DCFS “continu[e] to make best efforts . . . to place
his child with family,” or say anything—such as identify a
preferred relative—when the court ordered father’s attorney
to provide relative information for DCFS.9
Mother also argues the forfeiture rule does not apply
because she is challenging the court’s implied due diligence
findings for lack of substantial evidence. (Citing In re R.V. (2012)
9 We also disagree with mother that the court’s directive
impermissibly shifted the burden of relative identification to
father, excusing her failure to raise the issue. As DCFS notes,
in considering relative placement, “[t]he court shall order
the parent to disclose to the county social worker the names,
residences, and any other known identifying information
of any maternal or paternal relatives of the child.” (§ 361.3,
subd. (a)(8)(B); see also In re S.K. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 29, 38
[“ ‘[t]hroughout the dependency process, the responsibility
for identifying potential relative placements is shared by all
participants’ ”].) In any event, we do not see how the court’s
direction to father’s counsel would excuse mother from objecting
to J.P.’s placement or at least raising the family finding issue
with the court.
31
208 Cal.App.4th 837, 848 for the proposition that “[a] challenge
to the court’s dispositional orders on ‘the ground of insufficient
evidence’ . . . ‘is not forfeited even if not raised in the juvenile
court.’ ”) We disagree. In R.V., the father challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s disposition order
removing his child from the mother’s custody. (Ibid.) Similarly,
in In re Javier G. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453, also relied on
by mother, the mother challenged the juvenile court’s findings
and orders sustaining a supplemental section 387 petition and
removing her children from parental custody on substantial
evidence grounds. (Id. at pp. 456–458, 461–465.) The court
reasoned the mother—who had failed to object at trial—had
not forfeited her challenge to the juvenile court’s finding that
reasonable efforts had been made to prevent her children’s
removal because her appeal contested the merits of the
section 387 proceedings. (Id. at pp. 463–464.) In contrast,
as DCFS notes, mother neither challenges the court’s assertion
of jurisdiction over J.P. nor the court’s dispositional findings
removing J.P. from her custody. Mother’s challenge to the
court’s due diligence finding simply is not a substantial
evidence challenge to the underlying merits of the jurisdiction
or disposition orders.
Finally, we see no reason to exercise our discretion
to depart from the forfeiture rule. Mother has not raised an
important legal issue. Nor is there any indication that issues
relating to J.P.’s permanency and stability will be affected if we
do not review the merits. Mother argues we should follow K.B.,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 696, where the First District declined
to apply the forfeiture rule to a parent’s challenge—for the first
time on appeal—to the juvenile court’s finding that the social
32
services department exercised due diligence in its family finding
investigation. We decline to do so. The court in K.B. specifically
concluded that “[i]mposing forfeiture to bar [m]other’s appeal
would not be in [the children’s] best interests.” (Ibid.) In K.B.,
however, the court had placed the children in a non-relative
foster home—in other words, with a stranger. (Id. at p. 694.)
J.P., on the other hand, initially was detained with a relative—
Tracie—and then placed with “resource parent” J.B.—a long-time
family friend whom DCFS refers to in its brief as a nonrelative
extended family member (NREFM). Critically, minor’s counsel
did not object to J.P.’s placement with J.B. at the disposition
hearing, nor did minor’s counsel appeal on J.P.’s behalf.
Accordingly, we conclude application of the forfeiture rule here
will not adversely affect J.P. In any event, even if we were
to consider mother’s claim, she can show no prejudice as J.P.
since has been placed with a relative—his great-aunt Tracie.
On appeal, mother also does not suggest J.P. should be placed
with a particular relative.10
We nevertheless encourage the court to ensure DCFS has
acted diligently in its section 309 family finding investigation.
If J.P. were to be removed from his current placement, the
relative placement preference still would apply. (§ 361.3, subd.
10 Mother merely notes that, at the disposition phase of
the July 15, 2024 hearing, she asked that J.P. be released to
her “with a safety plan of living with the paternal relatives
in the home for now”; and father—who lived with paternal
grandparents—asked that J.P. be returned to him, or,
alternatively, that visits be allowed in that home with
paternal grandparents to act as monitors.
33
(d); In re J.Y. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 473, 478 [relative placement
preference applies after disposition if child’s placement must
change].) We need not consider the parties’ other contentions
on this subject.
DISPOSITION
We dismiss as moot mother’s appeal based on the juvenile
court’s ICWA finding and jurisdictional findings. We affirm the
July 15, 2024 jurisdictional and dispositional orders.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
We concur:
ADAMS, J.
GAAB, J.
Judge of the Fresno Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
34
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