Morris v. Ziegler CA2/2

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Filed 8/14/25 Morris v. Ziegler CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

P. KEVIN MORRIS, B333812

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23SMCV01418)

GARRETT ZIEGLER et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Mark H. Epstein, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded with directions.

Early Sullivan Wright Gizer & McRae, Bryan M. Sullivan
and Zachary C. Hansen, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Jennifer L. Holliday for Defendants and Appellants.

_________________________
P. Kevin Morris (Morris) sued Garret Ziegler (Ziegler) and
ICU, LLC doing business as Marco Polo (Marco Polo) (collectively
defendants), asserting five causes of action. Morris’s claims arise
from allegations that defendants impersonated a Democratic
fundraiser to obtain personal information about Morris’s client,
Hunter Biden (Biden), and the then-emerging political and legal
controversy surrounding his laptop (the Biden laptop).
Defendants moved to strike the entire complaint pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, California’s anti-
SLAPP statute.1 The trial court partially granted and partially
denied defendants’ motion, striking one of Morris’s five claims.
Both parties appeal.
We affirm the trial court’s order in all respects but one.
The court allowed Morris’s civil harassment claim to go forward,
but we find that claim lacks the minimal merit required to
survive an anti-SLAPP motion. Accordingly, we reverse the order
insofar as it denies relief on civil harassment, and remand with
directions to strike that claim from the complaint.

1 “A ‘SLAPP’ is a “‘strategic lawsuit against public
participation’” [citation], and special motions to strike under
[Code of Civil Procedure] section 425.16 are commonly referred to
as ‘[a]nti-SLAPP motions’ [citation].” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health
System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1007, fn. 1 (Bonni).)

2
BACKGROUND
I. Facts2
A. The parties
Ziegler worked as a political aide and White House staff
member during President Donald Trump’s first administration.
In 2020, Ziegler transitioned to a private-sector career as an
activist, publishing online exposés about President Trump’s
political opponents and their associates.
In July 2021, Ziegler founded Marco Polo, which he
describes as “a research group whose mission is to expose
corruption and blackmail.” Ziegler distributes his exposés
through Marco Polo’s Web site, as well as its associated pages on
various social media platforms.3
Morris is an attorney. In 2019, he began representing
Biden, the son of then-President Joseph Biden.
B. Ziegler targets Morris; a fight ensues
In May 2022, several news outlets reported that Morris was
financially supporting Biden. On May 19, 2022, Ziegler—using
the name of a major fundraiser for the Democratic party, Jon
Cooper (Cooper)—began texting Morris for information about

2 We draw these facts from Morris’s complaint and
admissible evidence submitted in connection with the anti-
SLAPP motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2) [in
adjudicating an anti-SLAPP motion, “the court shall consider the
pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the
facts upon which the liability or defense is based”].)
3 Ziegler is the sole member of Marco Polo.

3
Biden.4 Believing that “Cooper” wanted to help Biden, Morris
gave him “information and analyses” about the Biden laptop.
On May 29, 2022, “Cooper” texted an image of a cartoon
purple squid perched atop planet Earth, circled by the words
“Marco Polo” and “NOTHING IS BEYOND OUR REACH.” He
then texted that Morris “ha[d] given us plenty. Thank you!”
Morris immediately began referring to “Cooper” as “Garrett[,]”
apparently realizing that he was actually communicating with
Ziegler.
Morris and Ziegler then began antagonizing each other
over text. At this point, Ziegler demanded that Morris
“immediately cease and desist any and all further threats and/or
harassing messages, communications and [similar] activities of
any kind[,]” and informed Morris that he would “document[] all
communications for potential civil, criminal, and historical
purposes.”
Morris responded with a series of insults and invectives,
including the following threat of legal action: “We have 8
[Southern District of New York (SDNY)] prosecutors on our team.
[¶] All this took was a phone call. [¶] 8 lawyers with 10 + years
as [Assistant United States Attorneys] in SDNY. . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
You’re going to prison and we’re going to get all of the money
your family has and you will work for us for the rest of your life.
[¶] You’ll come to my house everyday and wash my car. [¶] . . .
[¶] . . . We will follow you to the ends of the earth.”

4 Ziegler denies that he was the person impersonating
Cooper, attributing this operation to an independent, unnamed
“whistleblower.”

4
C. Defendants’ publications
Within roughly 75 minutes of sending the initial “Marco
Polo” image to Morris on May 29, 2022, Ziegler posted a
screenshot of the message on social media.5
The following day, Ziegler posted additional portions of his
text message conversation with Morris on Truth Social, saying
that he “[j]ust got threatened by . . . Biden’s attorney and fixer,
. . . Morris.”
Ziegler also distributed Morris’s address and phone number
to his social media followers; shortly after telling his followers
about “MPolo’s first move[,]” Ziegler said that “[w]e will be
sending our Report” on the Biden laptop “to Morris at his
home[,]” and solicited people to hand out flyers about Morris near
his home. On the internet messaging service Telegram, users in
Ziegler’s feed suggested that they could help by calling and
texting Morris en masse, and driving to his home. A few said
that they had already begun calling him.
In October 2022, Marco Polo published a 644-page report
about the Biden laptop. The report, which was widely reported
on, included excerpts of Ziegler and Morris’s text exchange, as
well as photos of Morris and his family members.
Morris alleged that after these publications, he was
“continually harassed via phone calls by numerous different
people[,]” and feared people “driving past his houses.”
II. Morris’s Complaint
On April 3, 2023, Morris sued Ziegler and Marco Polo for
(1) harassment in violation of section 653.2 of the Penal Code

5 The text message was sent at 10:42 p.m. on May 29; the
screenshot was posted to social media sometime before midnight.

5
(i.e., doxing);6 (2) civil harassment; (3) criminal impersonation in
violation of section 529 of the Penal Code; (4) false light; and
(5) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Morris
sought both injunctive relief and monetary damages.
III. Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion
On June 20, 2023, defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion
seeking to strike Morris’s complaint in its entirety. Morris
opposed the motion. The parties argued the motion across two
hearings in July 2023.
IV. Trial Court’s Ruling
On October 13, 2023, the trial court issued an order
partially granting and partially denying defendants’ anti-SLAPP
motion. The court found that while Morris’s claims arose from
protected activity, he demonstrated a probability of prevailing on
four of his five claims (i.e., civil harassment, criminal
impersonation, false light, and IIED). The court struck Morris’s
remaining claim, ruling that the criminal statute prohibiting
doxing (Pen. Code, § 653.2) does not provide a private right of
action, and thus cannot be pursued in a civil suit.
V. Appeals
Defendants timely appealed from the partial denial of their
anti-SLAPP motion. Morris filed a cross-appeal challenging the
partial grant of the motion.

6 “‘Doxing’ is a relatively recent Internet-based form of
harassment that involves posting a target’s private personal
information online so it can be used by other parties—perhaps
the poster’s supporters or internet ‘trolls’—to attack the targeted
individual.” (Dziubla v. Piazza (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 140, 145,
fn. 1.)

6
DISCUSSION
I. Anti-SLAPP Motion
A. Applicable law and standard of review
“Familiarly known as the anti-SLAPP statute, [section
425.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure] . . . allows defendants to
seek early dismissal of unmeritorious claims arising from
protected speech and petitioning activities. [Citation.]” (Bonni,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1004.)
The anti-SLAPP statute provides that “[a] cause of action
against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under
the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion
to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
“[A] trial court tasked with ruling on an anti-SLAPP
motion must ask two questions: (1) has the moving party ‘made a
threshold showing that the challenged cause of action arises from
protected activity’ [citation], and, if so, (2) has the nonmoving
party ‘established . . . a probability that [it] will prevail’ on the
challenged cause of action by showing that the claim has
‘minimal merit’ [citations]?” (Abir Cohen Treyzon Salo, LLP v.
Lahiji (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 882, 887.)
“We review the trial court’s disposition of an anti-SLAPP
motion de novo.” (Tukes v. Richard (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1, 11.)
“[I]n the ‘summary-judgment-like procedure’ of a special motion
to strike we do not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual
claims[,]” and “must draw all reasonable inferences from the

7
evidence in favor of [Morris] as the plaintiff.” (Lee v. Kim (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 705, 720 (Lee).)
We also review de novo any underlying questions of
statutory interpretation. (Santa Clarita Organization For
Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 1143, 1154 (Santa Clarita Organization).)
B. Analysis
Both parties agree that Morris’s claims arise from protected
activity. Accordingly, our inquiry on appeal is limited to whether
Morris’s claims have the minimal merit required to survive an
anti-SLAPP motion.
When evaluating a claim for minimal merit, we assess
whether the plaintiff has “‘“demonstrate[d] that the complaint is
both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie
showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence
submitted by the plaintiff is credited[.]”’” (Navellier v. Sletten
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88–89 (Navellier).)
As discussed below, we conclude that the trial court
properly struck Morris’s doxing claim but should have also struck
Morris’s civil harassment claim. The court properly allowed the
remaining three claims to go forward.
1. The trial court properly struck the doxing claim
Morris sued defendants for doxing in violation of section
653.2 of the Penal Code.7 The trial court struck his claim because

7 All statutory references in this section are to the Penal
Code unless otherwise indicated.
Section 653.2, subdivision (a) makes it a misdemeanor for a
person who “intend[s] to place another person in reasonable fear
for his . . . safety, or the safety of [his] . . . immediate family” to,
“for the purpose of imminently causing that other person
unwanted physical contact, injury, or harassment by a third

8
section 653.2 does not provide for a private right of action,
rendering Morris’s claim “legally [in]sufficient . . . to sustain a
favorable judgment[.]” (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89.) On
independent review, we agree.
“[A] criminal statute can expressly or impliedly give rise to
a private right of action for its violation[.]” (Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Mendes (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 136, 141 (Animal
Legal).) The question of whether such a right exists is “primarily
one of legislative intent. . . . If we determine the Legislature
expressed no intent on the matter either way, directly or
impliedly, there is no private right of action (Moradi–Shalal v.
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 305
(Moradi–Shalal) (en banc)), with the possible exception that
compelling reasons of public policy might require judicial
recognition of such a right. [Citations.]” (Animal Legal, supra,
160 Cal.App.4th at p. 141.)
Section 653.2 does not “contain ‘“clear, understandable,
unmistakable terms,”’ which strongly and directly indicate that
the Legislature intended to create a private cause of action.” (Lu
v. Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 592, 597
(Lu).) Nor does the legislative history of section 653.2 suggest
any intent to create a private right of action.8 (See Moradi-

party[,]” “electronically distribute[] [or] publish[] . . . personal
identifying information . . . which would be likely to incite or
produce that unlawful action[.]”

8 Morris argues that the legislative history of section 653.2
“expressed a desire to permit a private right of action” by “leaving
open the question” of whether civil sanctions would be equally
effective at deterring doxing. But that is not a “clear indication”

9
Shalal, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 300 [“The fact that neither the
Legislative Analyst nor the Legislative Counsel observed that the
new act created a private right of action is a strong indication the
Legislature never intended to create such a right of action”].)
Further, no related statute shows implied legislative
recognition of a private right of action. The only statute that
provides for civil enforcement of comparable conduct is section
6218 of the Government Code,9 which expressly limits relief to
“[a] reproductive health care services patient, provider, or
assistant whose personal information or image is made
public[,] . . . or any individual entity or organization authorized to
act on their behalf.” (Gov. Code, § 6218, subd. (a)(2).) This
limited civil remedy, narrowly drawn to protect specific persons,
does not imply legislative recognition of a general private right of
action for all victims of misdemeanor doxing.10

of legislative intent to create a private right of action in section
653.2. (Lu, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 600.)
9 In relevant part, that statute prohibits a person from
“knowingly publicly post[ing] . . . on internet websites or social
media[] the personal information or image of any reproductive
health care services patient, providing or assistant, or other
individuals residing at the same home address with the intent
to[,]” among other things, “[i]ncite a third person to cause
imminent great bodily harm to the” targeted individual. (Gov.
Code, § 6218, subd. (a)(1)(A).)

10 This is especially true where, as here, the two doxing
statutes do not reference each other and contain different
definitions of the prohibited act. (Contra, Angie M. v. Superior
Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1225 [“The Legislature’s intent
to allow a civil action for violation of” a penal statute “is made
abundantly clear where” a civil procedure statute “specifically

10
Morris urges that section 653.2 necessarily provides a
private right of action because a “[v]iolation of a statute
embodying a public policy is generally actionable even though no
specific civil remedy is provided in the statute” itself and “[a]ny
injured member of the public for whose benefit the statute [was]
enacted may bring the action.” (Angie M., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1224.) This isolated language is taken directly from
Michael R. v. Jeffrey B. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 1059 (Michael R.),
which “appl[ies] a too-broad standard for implying a private right
of action” that “has [since] been superseded by the legislative
intent approach reiterated in Moradi-Shalal.”11 (Animal Legal,
supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 144.)
Alternately, Morris argues that the trial court should have
recognized a private right of action in section 653.2 because, in
Morris’s view, he will be left without a remedy if he cannot
pursue a civil claim under that statute.12

defines” the civil action “to include acts prescribed by” the penal
statute].)
11 Moreover, Michael R. did not involve direct civil
enforcement of a criminal statute; “Michael R. was a negligence
action,” in which the penal statute was used not as a source of
civil liability, but as the standard establishing the tortfeasor’s
duty. (Animal Legal, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 144.)

12 The cases that Morris cites for this proposition (Faria v.
San Jacinto Unified School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1939;
Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1997) 120 F.3d 171)
have been found unpersuasive by our Supreme Court (Lu, supra,
50 Cal.App.4th at p. 603, fn. 8).

11
When, as here, “‘neither the language nor the history of a
statute indicates an intent to create a new private right to sue, a
party contending for judicial recognition of such a right bears a
heavy, perhaps insurmountable, burden of persuasion.’” (Lu,
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 601.) Morris does not meet that heavy
burden here, as our holding “does not necessarily foreclose the
availability of other remedies[,]” including the IIED claim
pursued by Morris in this action.13 (Id. at p. 603.) And “‘nothing
we hold herein would prevent the Legislature from creating
additional civil or administrative remedies, including . . . a
private cause of action for violation of’” section 653.2. (Id. at
p. 604.)
2. The trial court should have struck the civil
harassment claim
On appeal, defendants challenge only the legal sufficiency
of Morris’s claim for civil harassment, contending that California
law “does not recognize a private cause of action for civil
harassment for money damages, and harassment claims must be
pursued through a restraining order under Code of Civil
Procedure [section] 527.6 using the mandatory Judicial Council
form.”14 Because Morris sought both injunctive relief and
monetary damages, and failed to follow statutory procedures

13 On appeal, Morris characterizes his IIED claim as a
remedy for, among other thing, the same conduct targeted by his
doxing claim (i.e., that defendants unlawfully “post[ed] Morris’[s]
contact information on the internet[,]” causing their followers to
harass Morris).

14 All statutory references in this section are to the Code of
Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

12
required for injunctive relief, defendants insist that his claim
fails.15
“Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1) enables a victim of
‘harassment’ to ‘seek a temporary restraining order and an order
after hearing prohibiting harassment.’” (Olson v. Doe (2022)
12 Cal.5th 669, 677 (Olson).) The provision was designed to
“supplement existing causes of action for emotional distress and
invasion of privacy available to a victim of harassment”
(Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal
Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1260
(Huntingdon Life Sciences) by ‘“provid[ing] an expedited
procedure for enjoining acts of ‘harassment’”’ in order ‘““to
provide quick relief to harassed persons[]”’” (Olson, supra,
12 Cal.5th at p. 677). To “‘provide a quick, simple and truncated
procedure’” for obtaining injunctive relief from ongoing
harassment “section 527.6 from its inception has required the
Judicial Council to develop forms for use in these proceedings
[citations], and current law requires that . . . [‘]their use by
parties in actions brought pursuant to [section 527.6] is
mandatory’ (§ 527.6, subd. (x)(1)).” (Olson, supra, at p. 678.)
This narrowly tailored statutory scheme does not create or
imply the existence of a general civil claim for harassment.
Indeed, our Supreme Court has held that neither the text nor
legislative history of section 527.6 gives claimants the “ability to
seek . . . redress of past wrongs through damages or otherwise[,]”
foreclosing any statutory claim for monetary relief. (Olson,

15 In his complaint, Morris alleges a cause of action for civil
harassment without citing section 527.6. However, both below
and on appeal, Morris allows that the claim arises out of that
statute.

13
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 682.) And to seek injunctive relief under
the statute, a plaintiff must use the “‘mandatory’” Judicial
Council forms developed for that purpose. (Id. at p. 678.) “[T]his
specialized statutory procedure for imminent injunctive relief”
does not allow Morris to pursue a claim for civil harassment
outside of its strictures. (Id. at p. 682)
Morris resists this conclusion, arguing that the plain text of
section 527.6 demonstrates that “the Legislature intended for
plaintiffs to be able to pursue civil harassment claims under
[section 527.6] even if certain procedural strictures . . . were not
followed.” We are not persuaded. The provision that section
527.6 “does not preclude a petitioner from using other existing
civil remedies” (§ 527.6, subd. (w), italics added) confirms that “a
petitioner [does not] waive[] the right to separately seek” relief
for “common law torts of invasion of privacy and intentional
infliction of emotional distress” merely by filing for a restraining
order under section 527.6. (Olson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 682.) It
does not evince an intent for section 527.6 to provide a basis for
broader civil harassment claims.
Moreover, the fact that the statute confers a discretionary
right to petition (§ 527.6, subd. (a)(1), italics added) [“A person
who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary
restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting
harassment as provided in this section”]) does not, without more,
imply the existence of a separate general claim for civil
harassment.
Morris also cites numerous cases that he purports
“recognize[] . . . [section] 527.6 . . . as a basis for the cause of
action of civil harassment.” All of these cases were decided before
our Supreme Court’s recent analysis of the statute’s legislative

14
intent in Olson, supra, 12 Cal.5th 669. And in any event, none of
them hold that section 527.6 authorizes pursuit of a civil
harassment claim that exceeds the bounds of the statute.16
(People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1268, fn. 10 [“It is
axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not
considered”].)
Lastly, Morris repeats his prior arguments against using a
legislative intent analysis to determine whether a statute
provides a private right of action. (Michael R., supra,
158 Cal.App.3d 1059.) Those arguments are irrelevant. The
issue here is not whether section 527.6 creates a private right of
action, but whether, under standard principles of statutory
interpretation, the statute’s scope is broad enough to encompass
Morris’s purported claim. For the reasons above, we conclude
that it is not.17

16 Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635, 646 [a
petition for a civil harassment restraining order per section 527.6
is a “cause of action” that can be targeted by an anti-SLAPP
motion]; Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners’ Assn. (1989)
207 Cal.App.3d 719, 732 [civil harassment restraining order is a
cause of action]; Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327,
335 [same]; JKC3H8 v. Colton (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 468, 476
[mentioning the existence, but not considering the merits, of a
general claim for civil harassment]; Huntingdon, supra,
129 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1249–1258 [assessing a general
harassment claim’s factual sufficiency and constitutionality,
without considering whether it was authorized by statute].

17 This conclusion renders moot defendants’ alternate
argument that Morris’s civil harassment claim, as pled, cannot
withstand First Amendment scrutiny.

15
3. The trial court properly found that the
remaining claims survive
i. Criminal impersonation
As relevant here, section 529 of the Penal Code provides
criminal liability for “[e]very person who falsely personates
another in either his . . . private or official capacity, and in that
assumed character” “[d]oes any other act whereby, if done by the
person falsely personated, he might . . . become liable to any suit
or prosecution . . . or whereby any benefit might accrue to the
party personating, or to any other person.” (§ 529, subd. (a)(3).)
Morris met his burden of demonstrating minimal merit on
this claim. Morris alleged—and provided text messages to
support—that Ziegler contacted him, pretended to be Cooper, and
used that guise to obtain private information. Ziegler revealed
his ruse by texting Morris an image associated with Marco Polo,
suggesting that, as Morris alleged, Marco Polo “participated in or
otherwise knowingly assisted in the aforementioned conduct and
activity.” And Marco Polo also benefitted from Ziegler’s
impersonation, as it used the texts Ziegler received in its widely
circulated report on the Biden laptop. These facts sufficiently
substantiate Morris’s claim to establish minimal merit under the
anti-SLAPP law. (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 88–89.)
Defendants argue that because Ziegler denies being the
person who messaged Morris under Cooper’s name, Morris
cannot prove his criminal impersonation claim. Defendants
ignore that, when evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion, “‘[t]he
question is what is pled—not what is proven.’ [Citation.]”
(Central Valley Hospitalists v. Dignity Health (2018)
19 Cal.App.5th 203, 217.) We thus accept as true Morris’s
pleaded facts and may not weigh Ziegler’s declaration against

16
Morris’s allegations and supporting evidence. (Lee, supra,
41 Cal.App.5th at p. 720.)
Defendants also argue that Morris’s criminal
impersonation claim should fail for the same reason as his doxing
claim—namely, that the claim is based on a violation of a penal
statute that does not provide a private right of action. However,
defendants did not raise this argument below. And their
arguments on appeal are conclusory, comprising roughly six
sentences across the appellate briefs and lacking any analysis of
the statute’s text or legislative history. (City of Santa Maria v.
Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286–287 (Santa Maria) [“In
order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the
reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal
analysis”].)
“Generally, issues not raised in the trial court cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal[,]” including in appeals from
anti-SLAPP proceedings. (Wisner v. Dignity Health (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 35, 44 (Wisner); see also Premier Medical
Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn.
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4h 550, 564 [“‘“Appellate courts are loath to
reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not
have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an
opportunity to consider”’”].) While we “have discretion to
consider an issue in the first instance if it raises a question of law
on undisputed facts, our Supreme Court has cautioned that such
discretion should be exercised rarely[.]” (Wisner, supra,
85 Cal.App.5th at p. 44.) We decline to do so here.18

18 Our conclusion does not preclude defendants from raising
this issue in future proceedings. When litigation resumes, they
will have further opportunity to test the legal sufficiency of

17
ii. False light
“‘False light is a species of invasion of privacy, based on
publicity that places a plaintiff before the public in a false light
that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and where
the defendant knew or acted in reckless disregard as to the
falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the
plaintiff would be placed.’ [Citation.]” (Jackson v. Mayweather
(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1264 (Jackson).)
‘To defeat [defendants’] anti-SLAPP motion on [his] false
light claim, [Morris], as a public figure, must demonstrate a
reasonable probability []he can prove [defendants] broadcast
statements that are (1) assertions of fact, (2) actually false or
create a false impression about h[im], (3) highly offensive to a
reasonable person or defamatory, and (4) made with actual
malice.”19 (De Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC (2018)
21 Cal.App.5th 845, 865.) In this context, “‘“actual malice”’”
means publishing statements that are either false or that create
a false impression with either knowledge of or reckless disregard
for falsity. (Jackson, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1260.)
Morris alleges that defendants selectively published his
text messages to create the false impression that Morris
baselessly harassed defendants to chill their scrutiny of him and
his powerful political associates. To that end, Morris submitted
screenshots of multiple social media posts; in these posts, Ziegler

Morris’s criminal impersonation claim. But they have forfeited
the opportunity to do so as part of their anti-SLAPP motion.
19 The parties agree that, for the purposes of this appeal,
Morris is a public figure subject to heightened standards of proof
on libel and similar claims.

18
accused Morris of threatening him and published a handful of
Morris’s text messages without context (i.e., that Ziegler
provoked Morris’s outbursts by impersonating Cooper for weeks
to obtain confidential information).20 Marco Polo also published
the texts—similarly devoid of context—in its widely circulated
report on the Biden laptop.
The bombastic text messages are highly offensive, as is the
implication that Morris improperly wielded his money and
influence to silence political opponents. And because defendants
both participated in the original text thread (as described above),
they knew—or, at the very least, recklessly disregarded—the
false impression that would be created by publishing the
messages without context.
These facts sufficiently establish that Morris’s false light
claim has the minimal merit required to survive an anti-SLAPP
challenge.21 (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 88–89.)
Defendants assert, without argument or citation to
authority, that Morris’s evidence of malice was not sufficient to
carry his anti-SLAPP burden. We need not address this
conclusory argument (Santa Maria, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 286–287), but reiterate that on review of an anti-SLAPP
motion, we cannot “weigh evidence” and “must draw all

20 Defendants urge us to disregard evidence of any posts and
statements about Morris made after this lawsuit was filed. As
such evidence is unnecessary to resolve this appeal, we do not
refer to it.

21 Our conclusion should in no way be understood as
condoning the substance of Morris’s text messages to Ziegler.

19
reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of” Morris. (Lee,
supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 720.)
iii. IIED
Defendants only challenge Morris’s IIED claim by reprising
their unsuccessful false light arguments, contending that Morris
failed to show actual malice. (See Reader’s Digest Assn. v.
Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 265 [if “based upon the
same facts as [a] cause of action for libel[,]” IIED claim against a
public figure requires a showing of actual malice].) For the same
reasons described above, their IIED argument fails.
4. Defendants’ additional counterarguments
Defendants raise three additional counterarguments that
apply to all of Morris’s claims, all of which are meritless.
First, defendants urge that all of Morris’s claims are barred
by the litigation privilege.22 They are wrong. The litigation
privilege “‘immuniz[es] participants [in a judicial proceeding]
from liability for torts arising from communications made during
judicial proceedings.’” (Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump
Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95, 116
(Optional Capital); see also Civ. Code, § 47.) The privilege
“applies ‘to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants
authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and
(4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.’”
(Ibid.)
Here, there are three groups of communications that give
rise to defendants’ liability for criminal impersonation:

22 Although defendants did not raise the litigation privilege
below, we may consider it on appeal. (Herterich v. Peltner (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 1132, 1139.)

20
(1) defendants’ texts with Morris using Cooper’s name, including
the final text revealing their true identities; (2) defendants’ social
media posts containing select text messages; and (3) Marco Polo’s
report on the Biden laptop. Defendants argue that by explicitly
threatening prosecution (i.e., texting defendants that “[w]e have 8
SDNY prosecutors on our team. [¶] . . . [¶] You’re going to
prison[,]” etc., Morris rendered all of these communications
privileged.
Defendants fail to establish that the litigation privilege
applies to any of these communications. The first group occurred
before litigation was threatened. (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v.
City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1251 [“A
prelitigation communication is privileged only when it relates to
litigation that is contemplated in good faith and under serious
consideration”].) And defendants present no argument as to how
communications in any of the three groups served “to achieve the
objects of the litigation” (Optional Capital, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th
at p. 116), instead resorting to overbroad assertions that the
privilege attaches to all communications that are in any way
relevant to litigation. These insufficient arguments do not
establish applicability of the litigation privilege. (Santa Maria,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 286–287.)
Second, defendants allege that Morris did not show
sufficient facts to support Marco Polo’s liability for Ziegler’s
conduct. This argument is forfeited by defendants’ failure to
raise it below. (Wisner, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 44.) It also
fails on the merits; as described above, Morris submitted
sufficient facts to show that Marco Polo is liable for its own
alleged involvement in his surviving claims.

21
Third, defendants criticize the trial court’s reasons for
partially denying the anti-SLAPP motion. But attacking the trial
court’s reasoning does “not compel reversal of the
judgment . . . . [‘]No rule of decision is better or more firmly
established by authority . . . than that a ruling or decision, itself
correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because
given for a wrong reason.’” (D’Amico v. Board of Medical
Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 18–19 (en banc).)
II. Prevailing Party Fees
Finally, defendants argue that “[b]ecause [Morris’s] claims
are legally and constitutionally deficient,” they “are entitled to
full recovery of attorney’s fees and costs.” The argument exceeds
the scope of their appeal.
While generally, prevailing parties in an anti-SLAPP
proceeding are entitled to fees (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd.
(c)), “‘“a fee award is not required when the [anti-SLAPP] motion,
though partially successful, was of no practical effect’ . . . . [¶]
Whether a partially successful cross-defendant achieved a
sufficient benefit to qualify as a prevailing party lies within the
broad discretion of the trial court[.]” (Gumarang v. Braemer on
Raymond, LLC (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 370, 388.)
In its order on the merits of defendant’s anti-SLAPP
motion, the trial court acknowledged that because defendants
“were successful on one cause of action[,]” they could be
“technically entitled . . . to fees.” Defendants “state[d] they will
file a motion for fees[,]” and the court directed them to focus on
whether their partial success “‘achiev[ed] any practical benefit[.]’”
The appellate record contains neither a fee motion nor an
award of fees; it appears that the issue is still pending in the trial
court. Accordingly, defendants’ fee claim is unripe for appellate

22
review. (Redondo Beach Waterfront, LLC v. City of Redondo
Beach (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 982, 1000.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed in part and reversed in
part. We remand the matter and direct the trial court to strike
Morris’s claim for civil harassment from the complaint. In all
other respects, the order is affirmed. The parties shall bear their
own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:

________________________, P. J.
LUI

________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

23

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