People v. Lewis CA2/7

CourtListener 10654035CalctappAug 14, 2025

Full text

Filed 8/14/25 P. v. Lewis CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B336966

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA083145)
v.

DANTE XAVIER LEWIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Emily J. Cole, Judge. Affirmed.
Christian E. Kernkamp, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Ryan M.
Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

Dante Xavier Lewis appeals from his conviction and
sentence to six years in state prison for reckless driving causing
specified injuries to another. (Veh. Code, §§ 23103, 23105.)
Lewis contends the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting
evidence of his prior felony convictions and an uncharged crime,
refusing to instruct the jury on a necessity defense, instructing
the jury on consciousness of guilt involving false statements and
suppression of evidence, and refusing to strike his prior strike.
Lewis also contends there was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

An amended information charged Lewis with reckless
driving on a highway, which as described below, caused Bailey
Sulek to lose consciousness and suffer brain injury, a concussion,
bone fracture, and protracted loss or impairment of function of a
bodily member or organ after Lewis’s vehicle struck the truck
Sulek was riding in as a passenger. (Veh. Code, §§ 23103,
subd. (a), 23105.) The information further alleged Lewis inflicted
great bodily injury on Sulek and suffered a prior strike. (Pen.
Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, 12022.7, subd. (a).) The
cause was tried to a jury.

A. The People’s Evidence
1. The Vehicle Collision
On May 10, 2021, Adam Aceves was driving a pickup truck
on Summerwind Drive. Sulek sat in the front passenger seat. As
Aceves’s truck passed through the intersection of Summerwind

2
and Rancho Vista Boulevard, witnesses testified that a second
vehicle traveling on Rancho Vista Boulevard also entered the
intersection. The second vehicle, driven by Lewis, passed
through a red light, entered the intersection, and collided with
Aceves’s truck. Lewis’s vehicle t-boned Aceves’s truck, hitting the
passenger side. Aceves’s truck came to a rest on the curb.
Lewis’s vehicle stopped shortly after spinning and hitting a pole
across the intersection. Aceves noticed Sulek appeared
unconscious and exited the vehicle to assist Sulek. Upon exiting
the vehicle, Aceves realized he was limping. The passenger side
of Aceves’s vehicle was crushed in, and firefighters had to remove
Sulek from the vehicle.
After the incident, Aceves had some bruising and a sore
shoulder. Sulek had a serious head injury, and she spent two
weeks in the hospital and three weeks in a rehabilitation facility.
Nearly three years after the incident, Sulek continued to
experience pain. Sulek experiences migraines, body pain, short-
term memory loss, has scars on her face and body, and nerve
damage. The injuries Sulek suffered have affected her ability to
walk, see, feel sensation on the right side of her body, and work.

2. The Investigation
Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Jesus Carbajal
investigated the incident the day it happened. Deputy Carbajal
took measurements, photographs, and statements at the scene
from Aceves, Lewis, and his wife, Sandra Lewis.1 Lewis

1 For ease of reference and to avoid confusion, we refer to
Lewis’s wife as Sandra. We also refer to Lewis’s girlfriend at the

3
volunteered for a breathalyzer, and after a DUI investigation,
Deputy Carbajal concluded Lewis was not driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs.
Deputy Carbajal determined the speed limit on
Summerwind Drive was 45 miles per hour and the speed limit on
Rancho Vista Boulevard was 50 miles per hour. Further
investigation by Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
Detective Elizabeth Sherman, the traffic investigator assigned to
the case, concluded the accident resulted from “a high-speed
impact” involving speeds of 50 to 60 miles per hour or higher.

B. Defense Evidence
Lewis and Sandra testified that after picking up food and
drinks, Lewis drove a passenger vehicle down Rancho Vista
Boulevard with Sandra in the passenger seat. As they
approached the intersection of Rancho Vista Boulevard and
Summerwind Drive, Sandra reached for a drink in the backseat.
Lewis explained he became distracted and looked away from the
road when the lid popped off the drink and Sandra spilled the
contents over herself, the center console, and on Lewis. Lewis
and Sandra testified they did not tell Deputy Carbajal about the
spilled drink at the time of the accident.
Lewis testified he did not see the traffic light, but when he
looked back at the road, he saw the vehicle driving in front of him
braking. Sandra confirmed Lewis’s account of events and
recalled seeing a yellow light before the accident. To avoid rear-

time of trial, who happens to share the same last name, as
Kimberly.

4
ending the braking vehicle, Lewis swerved to the empty left turn
lane. Lewis explained he was a professional truck driver, who
was trained not to brake hard to avoid “jackknif[ing]” the trailer.
Lewis stated he reacted in line with his training. As a result,
Lewis did not hit his brakes, traveled into the intersection
without slowing, and collided with Aceves’s truck.

C. Verdict and Sentence
The jury convicted Lewis of one count of reckless driving with
specified injuries. (Veh. Code, §§ 23103, subd. (a), 23105.) Lewis
then admitted a prior strike conviction of criminal threats in
2006. The trial court sentenced Lewis to six years in state prison,
comprised of the upper term of three years, doubled for the prior
strike pursuant to the Three Strikes law. (Veh. Code, § 23015;
Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a).)
Lewis timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting
Evidence of Lewis’s Criminal History
Lewis argues the trial court prejudicially erred by
admitting evidence of his prior felony convictions and an
uncharged vandalism incident between him and Sandra in the
courthouse parking lot. Lewis contends the prejudice evinced by
the evidence substantially outweighed its probative value and the
trial court should have excluded it pursuant to Evidence Code
section 352.

5
1. Governing Law and Standard of Review
The California Constitution and Evidence Code section 788
authorize the use of certain prior convictions for impeachment.
(See Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f)(4) [“Any prior felony
conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding, whether
adult or juvenile, shall subsequently be used without limitation
for purposes of impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any
criminal proceeding.”]; Evid. Code, § 788 [“For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness, it may be shown by the
examination of the witness or by the record of the judgment that
he has been convicted of a felony,” except in circumstances not
relevant here.].) Prior felony convictions admissible under
article I, section 28, subdivision (f) of the California Constitution
and Evidence Code section 788 must be crimes of moral
turpitude, “‘even if the immoral trait is one other than
dishonesty.’” (People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 888; see
People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 654.)
“Because evidence of other crimes may be highly
inflammatory, the admission of such evidence ‘“‘must not
contravene other policies limiting admission, such as those
contained in Evidence Code section 352.’”’” (People v. Davis
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 602; see People v. Anderson (2018)
5 Cal.5th 372, 407 [“a witness may be impeached with any prior
felony conviction involving moral turpitude, subject to the trial
court’s discretion under Evidence Code section 352”].)
Evidence Code section 352 gives the trial court “discretion
[to] exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or

6
of misleading the jury.” “When determining whether to admit a
prior conviction for impeachment purposes, the court should
consider, among other factors, whether it reflects on the witness’s
honesty or veracity, whether it is near or remote in time, whether
it is for the same or similar conduct as the charged offense, and
what effect its admission would have on the defendant’s decision
to testify.” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 931.)
“‘“The ‘prejudice’ referred to in Evidence Code section 352
applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional
bias against defendant as an individual and which has very little
effect on the issues. In applying section 352, ‘prejudicial’ is not
synonymous with ‘damaging.’”’” (People v. Williams (2013)
58 Cal.4th 197, 270; accord, People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297,
320.) “‘Evidence is substantially more prejudicial than
probative . . . if, broadly stated, it poses an intolerable “risk to the
fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome.”’”
(People v. Tran (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1040, 1047.) Because evidence
of uncharged crimes “may be viewed as ‘inherently prejudicial’
[citation], ‘“uncharged offenses are admissible only if they have
substantial probative value.”’” (People v. Rogers (2013)
57 Cal.4th 296, 331 (Rogers); accord, People v. Foster (2010)
50 Cal.4th 1301, 1331; see People v. Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th
at p. 271 [evidence was “probative in that it would allow the jury
to accurately assess the credibility of the prosecution’s central
witness”].)
We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision
to admit prior convictions or uncharged crimes under Evidence
Code section 352. (See People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658,
722; People v. Carkhum-Murphy (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 289, 295.)

7
2. Proceedings Below
At the beginning of trial, the court considered the parties’
evidentiary motions, including whether evidence of Lewis’s
criminal record should be excluded. The prosecutor urged the
trial court to admit four felony convictions and two misdemeanor
convictions for impeachment purposes: grand theft in 2004 in
violation of Penal Code section 487, subdivision (a); criminal
threats in 2006 in violation of Penal Code section 422; resisting
arrest in 2009 and 2013 in violation of Penal Code section 69; and
misdemeanor convictions for petty theft in 2006 and domestic
violence against Sandra in 2013. Defense counsel argued the
convictions were “significantly old” with the most recent ones
occurring a decade ago in 2013. Defense counsel also asserted
the convictions were not for motor-vehicle-related offenses and
would confuse the issues.
The court indicated it was concerned with the age of the
offenses but stated the prior convictions were less prejudicial
because they were not motor-vehicle related. The prosecutor
argued that, aside from the criminal convictions, there were a
number of incidents that “close that gap” between 2013 and 2023,
including incidents of domestic violence against Sandra in 2013,
2014, and 2017. The prosecutor explained these cases were
“either declined to be filed due to lack of sufficient proof or
uncooperative witnesses, and one case was actually filed and
Ms. [Sandra] Lewis became uncooperative and so it had to be
dismissed.” The prosecutor also stated Lewis could have a
pending misdemeanor case of vandalism that occurred during
trial. Defense counsel argued the domestic violence incidents
were not related to Lewis’s prior convictions and were not
admissible under Evidence Code section 1101 as prior bad acts.

8
The court stated it would allow the admission of the four
felony convictions as crimes of moral turpitude if Lewis chose to
testify. The court explained it had reached this conclusion by
conducting an Evidence Code section 352 analysis.
Later that day, the prosecutor expanded on her request to
admit evidence of the potential vandalism case against Lewis and
other prior incidents of domestic violence. The prosecutor
indicated the vandalism incident occurred during trial in the
court parking lot and involved Lewis jumping on Sandra’s car
and breaking the windshield. The prosecutor explained Sandra
was a percipient witness to the accident and “the jury cannot
assess her credibility accurately without this history.” Defense
counsel argued that allowing such evidence would result in a
mini-trial, confuse the jurors, and result in severe prejudice.
The trial court determined the prior domestic violence
incidents were more prejudicial than probative and excluded
them. The trial court, however, ruled that it would allow
evidence of the uncharged vandalism offense. The court
explained the incident was “so highly probative that . . . it
completely outweighs the prejudicial nature” because Sandra was
a witness and it bore on her credibility. The court stated it
viewed the incident “almost as an incident of witness tampering.”
At trial, Lewis testified and admitted to the four prior
felony convictions the court ruled were admissible on direct
examination. Sandra testified regarding the vandalism incident
in the court parking lot. She explained she had been separated
from Lewis since 2014. On October 30, 2023, during Lewis’s trial
for the present charge, Sandra received a phone call from Lewis’s
then-girlfriend, Kimberly, who stated she had just engaged in an
altercation with Lewis in the court parking lot and wanted to get

9
a restraining order against him. Sandra went to the courthouse
and retrieved paperwork for a restraining order from the clerk’s
office for Kimberly. When she exited the courthouse, she
observed Kimberly attempting to drive Sandra’s car out of the
parking lot with Lewis jumping on the hood and screaming at
Kimberly. Kimberly drove Sandra’s car around the parking lot
and onto a street with Lewis still on top.
Sandra located Kimberly’s unlocked car, found the keys in
it, and drove after her. Sandra managed to switch cars with
Kimberly. Lewis, who was no longer on the car, asked Sandra to
drive him back to the courthouse. When Sandra refused, Lewis
got on top of her car again and kicked in her windshield. Lewis
fell off the car, hit his head, and lost consciousness after Sandra
drove off. Sandra drove back to the court because she felt it was
a safe place for her. She told the deputies who arrived on the
scene that she would not testify on Lewis’s behalf at trial, but
later changed her mind.

3. Prior Felony Convictions
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it admitted evidence of Lewis’s prior felony convictions.
There is no question the evidence was admissible under article I,
section 28, subdivision (f) of the California Constitution and
Evidence Code section 788 for impeachment purposes. The prior
felony convictions for theft, resisting arrest and criminal threats
were crimes of moral turpitude. (See People v. Mendoza (2000)
78 Cal.App.4th 918, 925 (Mendoza) [“burglary, robbery, and other
various theft-related crimes are probative on the issue of the
defendant’s credibility”]; People v. Williams (1999)
72 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1465 [resisting arrest under Pen. Code, § 69

10
is a crime of moral turpitude]; People v. Lepolo (1997)
55 Cal.App.4th 85, 90 [“conduct involving violence, menace or
threats” “evinces moral turpitude”].) Here, Lewis’s credibility
was a central issue at trial because his defense rested on his
testimony that he did not act recklessly given his training and
the circumstances of the accident. Lewis does not address the
admissibility of his prior convictions under article I, section 28,
subdivision (f) of the California Constitution or Evidence Code
section 788.
Lewis instead argues the trial court abused its discretion
by admitting the prior convictions under Evidence Code
section 352 because they were “old and unrelated” to the charged
offense and framed Lewis as “a career felon and unhinged abuser
of women.” Lewis does not demonstrate the trial court abused its
discretion.
Although the prior convictions were remote in time, that
does not render them “automatically inadmissible for
impeachment purposes.” (Mendoza, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at
p. 925 [11- and 21-year-old convictions were not too remote in
time under Evid. Code, §§ 352 and 788 to be admissible where
the defendant suffered multiple convictions and served several
prison terms between offenses]; see People v. Campbell (1994)
23 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1497, fn. 14 [“a 10-year-old conviction is not
too remote in time to be admissible under [Evidence Code]
section 352”]; see also People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 602
[17-year-old crimes were admissible under Evid. Code, § 1101].)
Remoteness of a prior conviction tends to favor exclusion only “‘if
it occurred long before and has been followed by a legally
blameless life.’” (People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 453, noting
abrogation by statute on a different ground by People v. Diaz

11
(2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1190.) Thus, “[d]espite its age” a
conviction may nonetheless be admitted when the defendant “did
not subsequently lead a blameless life.” (People v. Green (1995)
34 Cal.App.4th 165, 183.) “[T]he systematic occurrence of
defendant’s priors over a [long] period creates a pattern that is
relevant to defendant’s credibility.” (People v. Muldrow (1988)
202 Cal.App.3d 636, 648.)
Here, Lewis suffered felony convictions over a period of
nine years, from 2004 to 2013. Although he was not convicted of
any crimes after 2013, the record shows he did not then lead a
“legally blameless” life; he engaged in domestic violence incidents
that did not result in charges primarily due to uncooperative
victims. The record shows he acted violently towards Sandra
during the trial by jumping on her car and kicking in her
windshield (which we examine below). Sandra told the
authorities she did not want to press charges. At the time of
Sandra’s testimony, the People had not charged Lewis with any
crime for this incident.
The fact that the prior convictions did not involve
motor-vehicle-related crimes does not mean they should not have
been admitted. Indeed, the nature of the prior convictions for
theft, resisting arrest, or criminal threats was sufficiently
different from the present offense that it was not likely the jury
would convict Lewis because it believed he had a propensity to
drive recklessly. (See People v. Rist (1976) 16 Cal.3d 211, 219 [“A
jury which is made aware of a similar prior conviction will
inevitably feel pressure to conclude that if an accused committed
the prior crime he likely committed the crime charged. . . . [If]
the dissimilar prior crimes are available as grounds of
impeachment [ ] exclusion of the similar one is the wiser path.”].)

12
Nor did the prior convictions tend to evoke an irrational
emotional response against Lewis. (See People v. Scully (2021)
11 Cal.5th 542, 587 [trial court acted within its discretion under
Evid. Code, § 352 because “[n]one of the prior crime evidence was
particularly inflammatory or likely to invoke an emotional bias
against defendant”].) Neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor
elicited any details about the convictions such that Lewis was
portrayed as “a career felon and unhinged abuser of women.”
Aside from the uncharged vandalism incident, the trial court
disallowed the admission of the domestic violence arrests and
incidents. On their face, the four brief questions asked by
defense counsel about Lewis’s convictions for theft, resisting
arrest, and criminal threats did not pose a risk of undue
prejudice. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it allowed evidence of Lewis’s prior
felony convictions.

4. Uncharged Vandalism Offense
Nor are we persuaded the trial court abused its discretion
when it allowed evidence of the uncharged vandalism offense that
occurred during trial. “‘Where, as here, a discretionary power is
statutorily vested in the trial court, its exercise of that discretion
“must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the
court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or
patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage
of justice.’”” (People v. Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 270-
271.) The uncharged vandalism evidence was damaging and
prejudicial, but the question before us is whether the trial court
abused its discretion in deciding the evidence had substantial

13
probative value that outweighs the prejudice. (See Rogers, supra,
57 Cal.4th at p. 331.)
Here, the uncharged vandalism evidence was highly
probative because Sandra was a crucial witness for the defense.
Evidence showing that Sandra may have feared Lewis’s violent
temper could explain why she initially failed to tell officers at the
scene of the accident about the spilled drink but later testified to
it at length at trial. Sandra also told responding officers at the
courthouse parking lot that she would not testify in this case, yet
she changed her mind and testified. The evidence of the
uncharged vandalism allowed the jury to accurately assess
Sandra’s credibility and the inconsistencies in her testimony and
statements to police. (See People v. Lopez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 339,
360 [evidence that defendant broke witness’s leg was “probative
in that it would explain to the jury why [witness] was afraid to
testify against [defendant], allowing the jury to accurately assess
[her] credibility and the inconsistencies in her testimony”].) The
court did not abuse its discretion by concluding this evidence was
more probative than prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352.

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Instructing the Jury
Lewis argues the trial court made several errors in
instructing the jury. We conclude the arguments lack merit.

1. The Trial Court Did Not Err When It Declined to Give
a Necessity Instruction
At trial, Lewis requested the court to instruct the jury on
the affirmative defense of necessity under CALCRIM No. 3403
because “a reasonable person . . . would believe that veering into
that left-hand lane was necessary under those circumstances.”

14
The court declined to do so, citing the lack of evidence supporting
that instruction. Lewis challenges this determination on appeal
and contends it was prejudicial error.

a. Governing law and standard of review
We review de novo the trial court’s decision not to instruct
on a defense on the basis that substantial evidence did not
support the instruction. (See People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th
1158, 1218; People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 581, 584;
People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.)
“‘It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a
request, the trial court must instruct on the general principles of
law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.]
The general principles of law governing the case are those
principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the
court, and which are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the
case.’” (People v. Najera (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1132, 1136.)
A trial court is required to give a requested instruction
concerning a theory of defense “‘only if there is substantial
evidence to support the defense.’”2 (In re Christian S. (1994)

2 Lewis argues, “The court must give any correct instructions
on defendant’s theory of the case which the evidence justifies, no
matter how weak or unconvincing that evidence may be,” citing
People v. Bynum (1971) 4 Cal.3d 589, 604, overruled on another
ground by People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 669. Bynum
is inapt because it addressed a court’s duty to instruct sua sponte
on the lesser included offense of second degree murder, not on its
duty to instruct on a theory of defense. (See People v. Barton
(1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 199 [discussing difference between “the
trial court’s broad duty to instruct on lesser included offenses and
its narrower obligation to instruct on particular defenses”].)

15
7 Cal.4th 768, 783 (italics omitted); accord, People v. Stitely
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 551; People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th
646, 715 [trial court has the authority to refuse requested
instructions on a defense theory for which “only minimal and
insubstantial evidence” has been presented], disapproved on a
different ground by People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421,
fn. 22.) “In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to
warrant a jury instruction,” the courts do not “determine the
credibility of the defense evidence, but only whether ‘there was
evidence which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982.)
“To justify an instruction on the defense of necessity, a
defendant must present evidence sufficient to establish that [he]
violated the law (1) to prevent a significant and imminent evil,
(2) with no reasonable legal alternative, (3) without creating a
greater danger than the one avoided, (4) with a good faith belief
that the criminal act was necessary to prevent the greater harm,
(5) with such belief being objectively reasonable, and (6) under
circumstances in which [he] did not substantially contribute to
the emergency.” (People v. Kearns (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1128,
1135-1136; see CALCRIM No. 3403.)

b. Analysis
Lewis contends the necessity instruction was supported by
evidence that Sandra spilled her drink, thus distracting Lewis,
who swerved to avoid hitting the vehicle stopped at the light. In
short, Lewis contends it was necessary for him to drive recklessly
to avoid hitting the vehicle in front of him (i.e., the “significant
and imminent evil”). Even if we were to accept this argument,
Lewis fails to cite any substantial evidence that he lacked a

16
reasonable legal alternative to reckless driving. A reasonable
legal alternative to swerving and entering an intersection at a
high speed was to brake. (See, e.g., People v. Coulthard (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 743, 768 [“‘The necessity defense is very limited
and depends on the lack of a legal alternative to committing the
crime.’”].) Lewis testified he “never hit [his] brakes” because he
was trained to prevent a semi-truck from jackknifing. But Lewis
was not driving a semi-truck during the incident and was instead
driving a passenger car. Even if Lewis had a good faith belief
that swerving without braking was necessary to prevent the
purported greater harm of rear-ending a stopped vehicle, there
was no evidence this belief was objectively reasonable.
Lewis also fails to cite any evidence that he did not
substantially contribute to the emergency. Lewis suggests the
“emergency” was created by Sandra spilling a drink and
distracting him. Yet, the evidence at trial was that Lewis was
speeding and failed to brake before entering the intersection and
hitting Aceves’s truck. Under these circumstances, Lewis’s own
actions substantially contributed to the emergency. There was
insufficient evidence to warrant instructing the jury on the
defense of necessity.

2. The Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury with
CALCRIM No. 362
Lewis next contends there was insufficient evidence to
warrant instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 362, which
addresses a defendant’s consciousness of guilt by making false
statements. CALCRIM No. 362 provides: “If the defendant made
a false or misleading statement before this trial relating to the
charged crime, knowing the statement was false or intending to

17
mislead, that conduct may show he was aware of his guilt. [¶] If
you conclude that the defendant made the statement, it is up to
you to decide its meaning and importance. However, the
evidence that the defendant made such a statement cannot prove
guilt by itself.”
The instruction is proper where the evidence indicates that
the defendant invented a story to explain his or her conduct. (See
People v. Williams (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 467, 478-479
[discussing CALJIC No. 2.03, predecessor to CALCRIM No. 362].)
“Deliberately false statements to the police about matters that
are within an arrestee’s knowledge and materially relate to his or
her guilt or innocence have long been considered cogent evidence
of a consciousness of guilt, for they suggest there is no honest
explanation for incriminating circumstances.” (People v.
Williams (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1167-1168.) The false
nature of the defendant’s statement may be shown by
inconsistencies in the defendant’s own testimony, his or her
pretrial statements, or by any other prosecution evidence. (See
People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 498.)
The record reveals Lewis did not disclose to the responding
officer that Sandra spilled a drink in the car and caused him to
be distracted at the time of the accident. Yet, his defense at trial
rested on his and Sandra’s testimony that he became distracted
by the spilled drink. This discrepancy is sufficient evidence to
justify the court’s instruction on CALCRIM No. 362. (See
People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1057 [consciousness of
guilt instruction proper in light of discrepancies between
defendant’s statement to the police and his trial testimony].)

18
Lewis argues the instruction was improper because his
statement about the spilled drink was not made for self-
protection, citing People v. Rankin (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 430, 436.
According to Lewis, he was unaware at the time of the accident
that any serious injuries resulted from the crash or that he would
be charged with a crime. Thus, he could not have made that
statement to protect himself from criminal charges he did not
know would arise one year after the accident. Lewis presents no
authority for the argument that the instruction requires a
defendant to know at the time he made the false statement that
he would be charged with a crime. Rankin, on which Lewis
relies, states only that CALJIC No. 2.03 (predecessor to
CALCRIM No. 362) “should never be given unless it can be
inferred that the defendant made the false statement for the
purpose of deflecting suspicion from himself, as opposed to
protecting someone else. [Citation.] Only under such
circumstances does a false statement indicate a consciousness of
the defendant’s own guilt, thus becoming admissible against
him.” (Rankin, at p. 436, fn. omitted.) Here, the statement
regarding the spilled drink was not intended to protect Sandra or
anyone other than Lewis from liability for the accident. Rankin
does not apply to these facts.

3. The Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury with
CALCRIM No. 371
Lewis also contends the trial court erred when it instructed
the jury with CALCRIM No. 371 without substantial evidence to
support it. CALCRIM No. 371 states: “If the defendant tried to
hide evidence or discourage someone from testifying against him,
that conduct may show that he was aware of his guilt. If you

19
conclude that the defendant made such an attempt, it is up to you
to decide its meaning and importance. However, evidence of such
an attempt cannot prove guilt by itself.”
“[I]n order for a jury to be instructed that it can infer a
consciousness of guilt from suppression of adverse evidence by a
defendant, there must be some evidence in the record which, if
believed by the jury, will sufficiently support the suggested
inference.” (People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 620.) An
appellate court determines whether there was substantial
evidence in the record to support giving an instruction on
suppression or fabrication of evidence. (See ibid.) There need
only be some evidence, not conclusive evidence, of the facts giving
rise to the inference. (See People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004)
34 Cal.4th 1, 102.)
There is sufficient evidence in the record here which, if
believed by the jury, would support an inference of Lewis’s
consciousness of guilt from his conduct involving Sandra. In
particular, Sandra initially told responding officers she was
unwilling to testify for Lewis after his violent conduct against her
in the court parking lot. Yet, she later changed her mind and her
testimony corroborated his version of events. The trial court
correctly viewed the incident “almost as an incident of witness
tampering.”
Lewis argues CALCRIM No. 371 is warranted only when
the conduct prevents a witness from testifying. In Lewis’s view,
CALCRIM No. 371 does not apply because he wanted Sandra to
testify. The law does not support the contention. Consciousness
of guilt may be inferred from conduct that convinces a witness to
testify in favor of the defendant. (See, e.g., People v. Hunt (1982)
133 Cal.App.3d 543, 560 [consciousness of guilt may be inferred

20
when defendant urges his fiancée to give false testimony].) The
trial court did not err by instructing the jury with CALCRIM
No. 371.

C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It
Declined To Strike Lewis’s Prior Strike Offense
Lewis next argues the trial court erred when it denied his
request to strike his 18-year-old prior strike offense of criminal
threats (Pen. Code, § 422) under People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) and Penal Code
section 1385. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court reasoned,
“In a vacuum it would appear that the 2006 strike would be
remote and would be worthy of striking. However, the court does
not find that the strike prior is remote based on subsequent
conduct after the strike.” The court then indicated it
incorporated the People’s argument into its reasoning.3
The purpose of the three strikes law is “to provide greater
punishment for recidivists.” (People v. Davis (1997) 15 Cal.4th
1096, 1099.) Where a defendant does not fall within the spirit of
the three strikes law, however, a trial court may strike or dismiss
a prior conviction in the furtherance of justice. (See Pen. Code,
§ 1385, subd. (a); see also Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504.)
“[I]n ruling whether to strike or vacate a prior serious and/or
violent felony conviction allegation or finding under the Three

3 The People argued that although Lewis alleged he had not
been in prison in over 10 years, his criminal history was
extensive and included multiple domestic violence incidents from
2012 to 2023 involving Sandra and Kimberly that did not result
in charges only due to their unwillingness to cooperate in the
prosecution.

21
Strikes law . . . or in reviewing such a ruling, the court . . . must
consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his
present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and
prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the [law’s]
spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though
he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious
and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th
148, 161.)
“‘The striking of a prior serious felony conviction is not a
routine matter. It is an extraordinary exercise of discretion, and
is very much like setting aside a judgment of conviction after
trial.’” (People v. McGlothin (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 468, 474.) It
is a conclusion “that an exception to the [sentencing] scheme
should be made because, for articulable reasons which can
withstand scrutiny for abuse, this defendant should be treated as
though he actually fell outside the Three Strikes scheme.” (Id. at
p. 474.)
“[T]he three strikes law not only establishes a sentencing
norm, it carefully circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart
from this norm and requires the court to explicitly justify its
decision to do so. In doing so, the law creates a strong
presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing
norms is both rational and proper. [¶] In light of this
presumption, a trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing
to strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited
circumstances.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378
(Carmony); see People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1020.)
An abuse of discretion occurs, for example, where the trial court
was not aware of its discretion to strike a prior conviction, where

22
the court considered impermissible factors in declining to strike a
prior conviction, or where imposing the three strikes law
produces an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd result under
the facts of a particular case. (See Carmony, at p. 378; Lua, at
p. 1020.)
“‘[I]t is not enough to show that reasonable people might
disagree about whether to strike one or more’ prior conviction
allegations. [Citation.] Where the record is silent [citation] or
‘[w]here the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the
relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity
with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling,
even if we might have ruled differently in the first instance.’”
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) Only extraordinary
circumstances where the relevant factors manifestly support the
striking of a prior conviction will support a finding that a
defendant falls outside the spirit of the three strikes law. (See
ibid.) The burden is on the party challenging the sentence to
clearly show the sentence was irrational or arbitrary. (See id. at
p. 376.)
With this guidance in mind, we conclude the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Lewis’s request to dismiss his
prior strike conviction. The trial court expressly considered
Lewis’s involvement in domestic violence incidents as part of its
decision. The court thus properly considered Lewis’s background,
character, and prospects in denying his Romero motion.
Lewis contends the remoteness of the prior conviction
coupled with his current gainful employment and support of his
daughter are reasons to strike the prior strike. These arguments
are unavailing under the circumstances presented.

23
The “remoteness of a prior conviction, ‘by itself, cannot be
the basis for dismissing a prior strike conviction.’” (People v.
Dowdy (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1, 12; see Pen. Code, § 667,
subd. (c)(3) [“[t]he length of time between the prior serious or
violent felony conviction and the current felony conviction shall
not affect the imposition of sentence”]; People v. Strong (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 328, 342 [§ 667, subd. (c)(3), “suggests, at a
minimum, that remoteness alone cannot take a defendant outside
the spirit of the very law that expressly rejects remoteness as a
basis for avoiding the law”], disapproved on another ground by
People v. Dain (Aug. 4, 2025, No. S283924) ___Cal.5th___ [2025
Cal. LEXIS 4911] (Dain).) “[O]lder strike convictions do not
deserve judicial forgiveness unless the defendant has used them
as a pivot point for reforming his ways.” (People v. Mayfield
(2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1107.)
The record here shows Lewis did not use the 2006 strike
conviction as a pivot point for reforming his ways. Lewis
continued to commit crimes after 2006; he suffered felony
convictions until 2013. Although he was not convicted of any
crimes after 2013, the record shows the trial court found Lewis
could not be deemed outside the spirit of the three strikes law
due to his subsequent conduct. He engaged in acts of domestic
violence even during the time of trial. The record shows he acted
violently towards Sandra during the trial by jumping on her car
and kicking in her windshield. This incident did not result in
charges against Lewis because Sandra told the authorities she
did not want to press charges.

24
Lewis argues the trial court could not base its Romero
ruling on incidents that did not result in convictions, citing a
number of cases where courts declined to strike prior convictions
due to the defendants’ subsequent convictions for serious and
violent felonies. (See, e.g., People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th
at p. 152; People v. Pearson (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 740; People v.
Gaston (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 310, disapproved on another
ground by Dain, supra, (Aug. 4, 2025, No. S283924)
___Cal.5th___ [2025 Cal. LEXIS 4911].) None of these cases
stands for the proposition that a trial court may consider only
subsequent convictions in its decision. Instead, the California
Supreme Court has directed courts to consider, in addition to any
felony convictions, “the particulars of [a defendant’s] background,
character, and prospects” to determine whether he may be
deemed outside the spirit of the three strikes law. (People v.
Williams, at p. 161.) As stated, the trial court properly
considered the domestic violence incidents in denying his Romero
motion even if they did not amount to felony convictions.
Lewis further contends the court failed to consider that he
is gainfully employed and supporting his young daughter.4 In
Lewis’s Romero motion, Lewis only asserted he drove “thousands
of miles” during the pandemic to deliver refrigerated goods and
medical supplies to various states, without reference to his
daughter. The court expressly noted it considered Lewis’s motion
as well as counsel’s arguments in making its decision. From
these facts, we may infer the court knew about and did consider
his current circumstances in its ruling. In all events, a court “is

4 Sandra testified at trial that she had “full, sole custody”
and that Lewis did not provide any financial support for their
child.

25
presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors in the
absence of an affirmative record to the contrary.” (People v.
Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310; accord, People v. Galvez
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1264 [“‘[A]bsent a showing to the
contrary, the trial court is presumed to have known and followed
the applicable law and to have properly exercised its
discretion.’”].)

D. Substantial Evidence Supports the Conviction for Reckless
Driving
Lewis argues that in light of all the evidence in the record,
a rational trier of fact could not have found him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. According to Lewis, his actions could at most
be considered negligent, but did not “rise to the level of wanton
disregard for the safety of others.”

1. Governing Law and Standard of Review
To assess a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we
“review the whole record to determine whether any rational trier
of fact” could have found the defendant guilty of the offense.
(People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357; see People v.
Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.) “In applying this test, we
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution
and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.”
(Zamudio, at p. 357; see People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557,
576.)
Vehicle Code section 23103 provides, “[a] person who drives
a vehicle upon a highway in willful or wanton disregard for the
safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving.” (Veh.

26
Code, § 23103, subd. (a).) “‘As the reckless driving statute has
never defined driving with “willful or wanton disregard for the
safety of persons or property,” courts have determined that it
targets driving manifesting a particular state of mind [citation],
namely, “consciousness of the results with intent to omit or do an
act, realizing the probable injury to another; or acting in reckless
disregard of the consequences; or conduct exhibiting reckless
indifference as to the probable consequences with knowledge of
likely resulting injury.”’” (People v. Walker (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th
27, 32; accord, People v. Young (1942) 20 Cal.2d 832, 837.)

2. Substantial Evidence Supports a Finding Lewis Acted
with Wanton Disregard of Others’ Safety
Lewis testified at trial he became distracted by the spilled
drink, swerved into a left turn lane to avoid rear-ending the
stopped vehicle in front of him, and without braking or knowing
what color the stoplight was, continued into the intersection.
Lewis agreed that it would be “very risky to the safety of other
people to enter that intersection against a red light.”
Additionally, the traffic investigator testified the incident
involved “a high-speed impact” caused by Lewis’s vehicle. Rather
than braking as he approached the intersection, eyewitnesses
testified that Lewis “rev[ved]” his engine as he passed their
stopped vehicles and collided with Aceves’s truck. Eyewitnesses
also testified that Lewis’s traffic light was red at the time he
entered the intersection. This constitutes substantial evidence of
a “wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property”
pursuant to Vehicle Code section 23103. (See People v. Barber
(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 787, 808 [substantial evidence supported
defendant’s conviction for reckless driving where he drove in an

27
area where pedestrians and bicycles were known to occupy and
where a reasonable person would know was likely to cause
serious injury]; People v. Escarcega (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 362,
366-367 [reckless driving conviction affirmed where defendant
had been speeding and intentionally crossed into oncoming
traffic, despite not being able to see the oncoming traffic].)
Lewis argues there is no evidence that he was speeding or
driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Lewis explains
he only entered the intersection to avoid rear-ending another
vehicle, and he failed to brake due to his training as a commercial
truck driver. According to Lewis, these facts support a finding he
was not driving recklessly.
Lewis presented his alternate explanation of how the
accident occurred to the jury, which rejected it, and on appeal his
explanation does not override the substantial evidence
supporting his conviction outlined above. As the reviewing court,
we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact can
interpret the record to support the judgment. (See People v.
Jones (1962) 211 Cal.App.2d 63, 71-72.) Since there is
substantial evidence supporting the jury’s finding that Lewis was
driving recklessly, Lewis’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge
does not carry the day. “‘“[O]ur opinion that the circumstances
also might reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding” does
not render the evidence insubstantial.’” (People v. Tafoya (2007)
42 Cal.4th 147, 170.)

28
DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J. STONE, J.

29

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.