CourtListener 10653127•People v. Wilds CA5
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Filed 8/13/25 P. v. Wilds CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F086648
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. MCR064477)
v.
JASON PAUL WILDS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Katherine
Rigby, Judge.
Jason Paul Wilds, in pro. per.; and Richard Oberto, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Office of the Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Hill, P. J., Meehan, J. and Fain J.†
† Judge of the Fresno Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Appointed counsel for defendant Jason Paul Wilds asked this court to review the
record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (See People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende); In re Kevin S. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 97.)
Counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts relating to this appeal. We then
offered defendant the opportunity to present his own brief by way of a letter. Defendant
submitted a letter brief raising a number of issues. Following our complete review of the
record on appeal and the separate issues raised by defendant, we affirm the judgment.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The District Attorney of Madera County filed a complaint on August 28, 2019,
charging defendant with four counts of committing lewd and lascivious acts on a child.
After defendant rejected the prosecution’s offer to recommend a nine-year sentence in
exchange for his plea of guilty, the trial court suspended criminal proceedings and
appointed an expert to examine defendant’s mental competency. Criminal proceedings
resumed, and the district attorney filed an information charging defendant with seven
counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a))1 and one count
of continuous sexual abuse of a child (§ 288.5, subd. (a)). Defendant pleaded not guilty
and not guilty by reason of insanity, and the trial court ordered further mental
examinations pursuant to section 1026 for defendant.
On March 25, 2021, the district attorney filed a separate criminal complaint
charging defendant with additional counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child. The
trial court consolidated the cases. The district attorney filed a second amended
information on February 14, 2023, charging defendant with lewd and lascivious acts on a
child (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 1–4) and continuous sexual abuse of a child (§ 288.5,
subd. (a); count 5) and alleging aggravating sentencing factors that the victim was
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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particularly vulnerable (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3))2 and defendant took
advantage of a position of trust or confidence (rule 4.421(a)(11)).
Defendant requested a Marsden3 hearing on September 24, 2021, and again on
November 1, 2021, both of which the trial court denied after conducting a hearing. At the
latter hearing, the trial court suspended criminal proceedings and appointed an expert to
again examine defendant’s mental competency. Criminal proceedings later resumed after
the trial court found defendant competent to stand trial. Defendant filed a peremptory
challenge to remove the judge (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6), which the trial court denied as
untimely.
Defendant pleaded guilty to counts 3 and 5 on April 28, 2023, and admitted the
aggravating sentencing factors as part of an agreement with the prosecution to
recommend an 18-year sentence. Defendant executed a declaration in which he
acknowledged awareness of the charges, his desire to plead guilty, his attorney’s
explanation of the nature of the charges and defenses, receipt of advice as to his
constitutional rights and understanding of those rights, and that his decision to plead
guilty was voluntary and not coerced. Defendant’s declaration also set forth the penalties
for the charges and his agreement to a 16-year term of imprisonment as to count 5 and a
consecutive two-year term as to count 3.
The trial court granted the prosecutor’s motion to amend count 3 of the second
amended information to reduce the time frame of the offense to August 25, 2019.4 In
response to questioning by the trial court, defendant acknowledged that he had not been
2 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
3 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
4 The amendment struck the language “and between August 7, 2017 and August 26,
2019” and eliminated any overlap of the offense charged in count 5, which charged
defendant with continuous sexual abuse of a minor between August 7, 2017, and
August 23, 2019.
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promised any sentence less than 18 years, he had received sufficient time to discuss the
plea with his attorney, his decision to plead guilty was freely and voluntarily made, he
understood his right to a jury trial, and he was giving up his constitutional rights as set
forth in his declaration. Defendant agreed the preliminary hearing transcript provided a
factual basis for his plea and said he understood he would be ordered to pay restitution
and other fines. Defendant pleaded guilty to counts 3 and 5 and admitted the aggravating
sentencing factors. The court accepted defendant’s pleas and admissions. The court
found that defendant’s pleas were supported by a factual basis, he understood the nature
of the charges and consequences of his pleas, and he freely and voluntarily entered his
pleas and admissions after having been advised of and waiving his constitutional rights.
The trial court sentenced defendant on July 13, 2023, to an aggregate term of
18 years in prison (16 years as to count 5 & a consecutive two-year term as to count 3)
and further ordered defendant to pay victim restitution (§ 1202.4, subd. (f));
$300 restitution and stayed parole revocation restitution fines (§§ 1202.4, subd. (b),
1202.45); a $960 fine (§ 672) that includes a $60 criminal conviction assessment (Gov.
Code, § 70373) and an $80 court operations assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)); a $1,230
sexual habitual offender fine (§ 290.3); and an $820 sexual offense restitution fine (§ 294,
subd. (a)). In response to defendant’s request for return of his phone and tablet, the
prosecutor advised that some items on the devices needed to be removed and defendant’s
father should make an appointment with the police department.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on July 31, 2023, in which he indicates
that he intends to challenge the validity of his plea and argues that his conviction of
section 288.5, subdivision (a) violates prohibitions against double jeopardy and the
prosecutor threatened to increase the charges if defendant did not plead guilty.
Defendant alleged in his request for a certificate of probable cause that his
attorney threatened to quit the case if he did not accept the plea offer; section 288.5
cannot be charged in the same proceeding or as to the same time periods as offenses
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pursuant to section 288; police officers threatened him to talk or they would bring worse
charges; and defendant lost the opportunity to accept the initial nine-year plea offer
because his former attorney did not communicate it to him or explain to him the nature of
a plea offer, pressured him to accept the plea, and failed to provide any legal advice.
The trial court denied defendant’s request for a certificate of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
After defendant’s counsel filed a Wende brief, defendant provided a 15-page letter
raising the following issues: (1) defendant spoke with police after his arrest because they
threatened to arrest him on “worse charges” and he was suffering from “serotonin
syndrome”; (2) former counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and failed to
explain the original plea offer from the prosecution; (3) a second defense attorney
violated client confidentiality; (4) a third defense attorney had been hired by the victim’s
mother, failed to adequately communicate with him, and was responsible for the lapse of
a plea offer; (5) the court erred in denying his Marsden motions; (6) he was promised that
he could appeal his sentence and request a lower sentence; and (7) the police refused to
release his phone or tablet.
Section 1237.5 provides: “No appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a
judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere … except where both of
the following are met: [¶] (a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a written
statement, executed under oath or penalty of perjury showing reasonable constitutional,
jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings. [¶] (b) The trial
court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause for such appeal with the clerk
of the court.” A certificate of probable cause is a condition precedent to any appeal
within the scope of section 1237.5. (People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1098–
1099; rule 8.304(b)(1).) “The certificate functions as a notice of appeal in cases
involving negotiated dispositions, which notices are of a ‘fundamental jurisdictional
nature.’ ” (People v. Allison (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 688, 698, quoting In re Chavez
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(2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 652.) Because defendant failed to obtain a certificate of probable
cause, we lack jurisdiction to consider any issues affecting the validity of the plea, and
defendant is consequently not entitled to Wende review for such issues.
Under section 1237.5, it is generally accepted that only two types of issues may be
raised in an appeal following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without the issuance of a
certificate of probable cause: “(1) search and seizure issues for which an appeal is
provided under section 1538.5, subdivision (m); and (2) issues regarding proceedings
held subsequent to the plea for the purpose of determining the degree of the crime and the
penalty to be imposed.” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 74.) “ ‘ “By pleading
guilty, a defendant admits the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the crime, and is
therefore not entitled to a review on the merits. [Citations.] ‘[I]ssues which merely go to
the guilt or innocence of a defendant are “removed from consideration” by entry of the
plea.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Moore (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 94, 99.)
Therefore, we do not address defendant’s claim as to the voluntariness of his
statement to police. In this case, defendant did not file a motion under section 1538.5 in
the trial court. Defendant’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to
events prior to his plea cannot be raised without a certificate of probable cause. (See,
e.g., People v. Richardson (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 574, 596 [pre-plea ineffective
assistance of counsel].) Failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause means defendant
may not obtain appellate review of his counsel’s alleged deficient performance that
impugns the validity of his plea. (§ 1237.5; People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 694–
695; Richardson, at p. 596.)
Additionally, defendant’s letter brief contains an extra record statement of his
version of the events in support of his claims, which we cannot consider on direct appeal.
(See In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1102 [appellate court reviews record as it
existed when lower court ruled]; People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266–
267 [ineffective assistance must be demonstrated on appellate record].) Defendant did
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not challenge the admissibility of his statement to police in the trial court, nor do the facts
surrounding his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel appear in the trial court record,
and we cannot consider facts which are not part of the record. For these same reasons,
we also do not address his claim relating to the return of his phone and tablet.
Defendant’s notice of appeal raises an issue relating to whether his conviction of
both sections 288.5, subdivision (a) and 288, subdivision (a) violated his right to be free
from double jeopardy. Section 288.5 provides in part: “No other act of substantial sexual
conduct … with a child under 14 years of age at the time of the commission of the
offenses, or lewd and lascivious acts, as defined in Section 288, involving the same
victim may be charged in the same proceeding with a charge under this section unless the
other charged offense occurred outside the time period charged under this section or the
other offense is charged in the alternative.” (§ 288.5, subd. (c), italics added.) It is
entirely acceptable for prosecutors to charge continuous sexual abuse pursuant to
section 288.5, subdivision (a) and discrete sexual offenses pursuant to section 288,
subdivision (a) that are outside the time period of the alleged continuous abuse. (People
v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 240, 248, citing with approval People v. Cortes (1999)
71 Cal.App.4th 62, 80.) Therefore, even apart from defendant’s agreement to plead to
both counts in exchange for an 18-year prison sentence, we note that the prosecutor
amended count 3 to charge defendant with a violation of section 288, subdivision (a) that
occurred on August 25, 2019, while the charge of continuous sexual abuse of a child in
count 5 alleged offenses committed between August 7, 2017, and August 23, 2019.
Counts 3 and 5 were charged in accordance with these authorities and section 288.5,
subdivision (c).
We have examined the entire record and are satisfied that defendant’s appellate
counsel fully complied with his responsibilities and there are no arguable issues on
appeal. (See Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 440–441.) Defendant was advised of his
constitutional rights and the consequences of his pleas before he entered them. The trial
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court found that his waiver of rights was knowing and intelligent, the pleas were made
freely and voluntarily, and there was a factual basis for the pleas. The court relied on
proper factors in denying probation and sentencing him to the upper term as to count 5
and an aggregate prison term of 18 years, which was a sentence that was expressly
permitted under the plea agreement. He was represented by counsel throughout the
proceedings.
Limiting our review to the sentence and postplea matters that do not affect the
validity of the pleas, we have reviewed the record and found no arguable error that would
result in a disposition more favorable to defendant. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 443.)
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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