CourtListener 10652354•People v. Knight CA3
Full text
Filed 8/12/25 P. v. Knight CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Nevada)
----
THE PEOPLE, C101528
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. F21000238B)
v.
SUSAN ANN KNIGHT,
Defendant and Appellant.
After a jury found defendant Susan Ann Knight guilty of second degree burglary
and conspiracy to commit a crime, the trial court placed her on probation subject to
various terms and conditions, including that she “enter into and continue such education,
psychological, psychiatric, drug, alcohol, or other rehabilitation program as ordered by
probation.” On appeal, Knight argues the condition impermissibly delegates judicial
authority to her probation officer. We agree that the condition is an improper delegation
1
of authority. We therefore direct the trial court either to modify the probation condition
or strike it completely. We otherwise affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
In April 2024, a jury found Knight guilty of second degree burglary (Pen. Code,
§ 459) and conspiracy to commit a crime (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also
found true an allegation that Knight’s crimes demonstrated planning, sophistication, or
professionalism. In a bifurcated bench trial, the trial court found true allegations that
Knight previously served a term in prison and performed poorly under prior supervision.
On May 2, 2024, Knight submitted a statement in mitigation, in which trial
counsel indicated that she was “willing to comply with any and all terms of probation that
this Court orders or as recommended by the Probation Department and desires the
opportunity to accept the job and room she has been offered, to be a productive member
of society.” The statement included an apology from Knight, as well as a recitation of her
efforts to improve her situation.
On May 6, 2024, the probation department (the department) submitted a
presentence report to the trial court. The department reported that, when asked about
“potential substance use history,” Knight “declined to comment.” The department
determined Knight posed a high risk of reoffending and recommended the trial court deny
probation and impose a split sentence of eight months in “local prison” followed by three
years on mandatory supervision. The department further recommended the terms of
mandatory supervision include the following: “[D]o not possess or consume controlled
substances or drug paraphernalia; submit to chemical testing for controlled substances;
participate in rehabilitative programming as recommended by a validated needs
assessment tool and directed to by [p]robation.”
At sentencing, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Knight
on two years of formal probation. Included in the various terms and conditions of her
probation was an order that Knight serve 210 days in county jail. After she was released
2
from jail, the terms of Knight’s probation also included condition No. 4, from a
standardized probation check-the-box form, which required Knight to “enter into and
continue such education, psychological, psychiatric, drug, alcohol, or other rehabilitation
program as ordered by the court by probation.” (Interlineation in original.) The final
sentence of probation condition No. 4 read: “Such program shall consist of: _______.”
This portion of the form was left blank.
The trial court expressed its “belief” that Knight had a drug addiction: “[T]he
court is aware that [Knight] was not convicted of any charges relevant to drugs, but there
were facts that were admitted in this case that indicated that there were drugs present at
the scene and information that supports the Court’s belief that [Knight] does suffer from
an addiction.” Accordingly, the terms of Knight’s probation also required her to submit
to testing for drugs and narcotics and prohibited her from possessing and/or using any
controlled substance and/or drug paraphernalia without a valid prescription.
Knight’s notice of appeal was lodged in this court on July 10, 2024. Knight filed
her opening brief on April 21, 2025, and the appeal was fully briefed on May 27, 2025.
DISCUSSION
Knight maintains that the probation condition requiring her to participate in
“education, psychological, psychiatric, drug, alcohol, or other rehabilitation program” as
directed by the probation officer violates separation of powers by impermissibly
delegating judicial authority. We agree.
3
A. Forfeiture and Waiver
The People argue Knight forfeited her challenge to the treatment condition
because she failed to object to it in the trial court. Knight, however, raises only a facial
constitutional challenge, which “may be considered for the first time on appeal because it
does not depend on the underlying factual record.” (People v. Smith (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 897, 901.)
The People also contend that Knight affirmatively waived her right to challenge
the probation condition. We disagree. To be valid, a waiver must be voluntary,
intelligent, and knowing. (Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 482.) This requires
actual knowledge of the rights being waived. (People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th
1653, 1662.) Here, Knight’s statement in mitigation was filed several days before the
conditions of probation were imposed. Knight’s assent was to terms of probation ordered
“by the court” or recommended by the department. Such language is consistent with the
language as it appears on the standardized form identifying conditions of probation. That
form, however, was modified to indicate Knight would have to comply with the terms of
condition No. 4 “as ordered by probation.” Not only is that not what she agreed to in her
mitigation statement, probation cannot issue orders—that is the exclusive province of the
court. Accordingly, on this record, we find no waiver.
B. Delegation of Duty
Article III, section 3 of the California Constitution states: “The powers of state
government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of
one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.”
“ ‘The correct principle deducible from the better-reasoned cases dealing with the
separation of powers seem to be that even the primary function of any of the three
departments may be exercised by any other governmental department or agency so long
as (1) the exercise thereof is incidental or subsidiary to a function or power otherwise
properly exercised by such department or agency, and (2) the department to which the
4
function so exercised is primary retains some sort of ultimate control over its exercise, as
by court review in the case of the exercise of a power judicial in nature.’ ” (In re
Danielle W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1236.)
Section 1203.1 “gives trial courts broad discretion to determine whether to grant
an eligible defendant probation, and if so, what terms of probation will promote
rehabilitation and protect public safety.” (People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 498.) The
broad discretion conferred on trial courts to formulate terms and conditions of probation
“is not boundless; the authority is wholly statutory, and the statute furnishes and limits
the measure of authority which the court may exercise.” (People v. Cervantes (1984)
154 Cal.App.3d 353, 356, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v.
DiMora (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1549.) “[N]o statutory provision sanction[s] a
delegation of unlimited discretion to a probation officer” to implement or interpret
probationary terms. (Cervantes, at p. 358.) “[T]hese determinations are essentially
judicial functions.” (Ibid.)
As part of these duties, “probation officers may be given ‘wide discretion to
enforce court-ordered conditions’ ” but cannot “create conditions not expressly
authorized by the court.” (People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358.) “There
are many understandable considerations of efficiency and practicality that make it
reasonable to leave to the probation department the amplification and refinement of a
[probation condition]. The court may leave to the discretion of the probation officer the
specification of the many details that invariably are necessary to implement the terms of
probation. However, the court’s order cannot be entirely open-ended. It is for the court
to determine the nature of the prohibition placed on a defendant as a condition of
probation.” (Id. at pp. 1358-1359.)
5
Where a trial court unequivocally imposes a requirement to attend a specific kind
of program but leaves the selection of which program to a probation officer, such
delegations are permissible. (See People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 307-309.)
“The trial court is poorly equipped to micromanage selection of a program, both because
it lacks the ability to remain apprised of currently available programs and, more
fundamentally, because entry into a particular program may depend on mercurial
questions of timing and availability.” (Id. at p. 308.) A court may not, however,
“completely delegate the setting of [an adult probation] condition to the probation
department.” (In re D.N. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 202, 209, fn. 4.)
Thus, it is clear that a “probation officer may properly specify the details
necessary to effectuate the court’s probation conditions, [but] it is the court’s duty to
determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer.” (People v. Smith
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902.)
Here, the trial court ordered Knight to “enter into and continue such education,
psychological, psychiatric, drug, alcohol, or other rehabilitation program as ordered by
the court by probation.” (Interlineation in original.) This provision appears to give the
probation officer untethered discretion to determine whether Knight will participate in
such a program. It does so because the trial court failed to fill in the blank or otherwise
direct the type of program(s) Knight was to complete. Importantly, someone also
modified the standardized form to suggest the department has the authority to issue
orders related to the conditions of Knight’s probation. It does not. Had the standardized
form been left unchanged and the trial court directed the types of programs for
completion, this condition would not run afoul of the separation of powers doctrine.
(People v. Penoli, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 307-309.) This is an unconstitutional
delegation of power.
6
DISPOSITION
The authorization for the probation officer to determine whether to prescribe
“education, psychological, psychiatric, drug, alcohol, or other rehabilitation program” is
reversed. The matter is remanded with directions for the trial court to either strike
mandatory supervision condition No. 4 or to revise that condition in conformity with the
guidance provided in the opinion. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
EARL, P. J.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
7
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.