CourtListener 10649774•People v. Macias CA4/1
Full text
Filed 8/7/25 P. v. Macias CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered
published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule
8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084280
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD298622)
JESUS MANUEL MACIAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Daniel B. Goldstein, Judge. Affirmed.
Lara Gressley, under the appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jesus Manuel Macias appeals from a judgment of conviction after a
jury found him guilty on one count of robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.) His
appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386
U.S. 738 (Anders) and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), which
raised no arguable issues but asked us to independently review the record for
reversible error. We granted Macias an opportunity to file a supplemental
brief on his own behalf, but he did not do so. After reviewing the entire
record (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 119), we find no arguable
appellate issues and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2023, Macias scuffled with two plainclothes loss prevention
officers (LPOs) outside of the department store where they worked. While
inside the store, one of the LPOs observed Macias concealing the store’s
clothing in the backpack he was carrying and on his person. As Macias was
about to leave the store with the merchandise, the LPOs stood outside the
front door to confront him.
After Macias stepped outside, the LPOs identified themselves as such
and told him they needed to speak with him about the “unpaid merchandise.”
Macias, who appeared to be talking on the phone when he exited the store,
ignored the LPOs. As they attempted to “get him off his cell phone” and
detain him, Macias punched one of them twice in the head. Macias punched
him two more times and spat on him after the LPOs took him to the ground.
They were able to subdue him, handcuff him, and take him back into the
store. The police responded shortly thereafter.
2
Macias was charged with a single count of robbery under an Estes1
theory. A jury convicted him of robbery in October 2023. Roughly six months
later, the court imposed a six-year prison term comprised of the middle term
of three years doubled for a strike prior (Pen. Code, §§ 213, subd. (a)(2), &
1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).
To investigate a claim of juror misconduct to support a motion for a
new trial, in January 2024 Macias moved to unseal the jurors’ names and
contact information, which are sealed as a matter of course after a verdict
is reached (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (a)(2)). According to a declaration
from Macias’s trial counsel, after the verdict was read and the jury was
discharged, jurors described being deadlocked nine-to-three in favor of
acquittal before they reconsidered video evidence of the scuffle between
Macias and the LPOs. The attorney declared, “two jurors . . . explained that
the jury reached its decision by considering whether Mr. Macias acted in
lawful self-defense. They determined that Mr. Macias did not meet the ‘three
elements’ for self-defense, and that conclusion contributed to their guilty
verdict.” Because no self-defense instruction was given—Macias did not ask
for it—he believed their consideration of this theory indicated juror
misconduct and rendered the verdict unlawful.
The court denied Macias’s motion in April 2024 after concluding that
any ensuing motion for a new trial would have to be based on evidence
showing how the jury reached its decision, which a court is precluded from
considering. (See Evid. Code, § 1150, subd. (a) [“No evidence is admissible
1 People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23. “What sets an Estes robbery
apart from a standard robbery is that force or fear is used not in the
acquisition of the property, but in the escape.” (People v. Robins (2020) 44
Cal.App.5th 413, 419, fn. omitted.) “The typical case starts with a shoplifting
and turns into a robbery when the thief is confronted by a LPO, and the thief
assaults the LPO in an attempt to get away.” (Ibid.)
3
to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a
juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or
concerning the mental processes by which it was determined”].)
DISCUSSION
Appointed counsel filed a brief summarizing the factual record and
proceedings in the trial court. Macias presents no argument for reversal
but asks us to independently review the record in accordance with Wende,
supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738. Counsel identified
the following issues that might arguably support the appeal: (1) whether
the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on self-defense;
and (2) prejudicially erred by denying Macias’s motion to unseal juror
information.
Our review of the entire record, including the issues identified by
appellate counsel, has identified no reasonably arguable appellate issue.
We briefly discuss the two possible issues identified by counsel.
The first possibility can be dispensed with in short order because
“[s]elf-defense, is not, of course, a recognized defense to a charge of robbery.”
(People v. Costa (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 310, 316.) Even if it were, when a
defendant does not rely on a defense, “a sua sponte instructional duty arises
‘only if . . . there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the
defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.’ ” (People
v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157.) Based solely on testimony from
one of the LPOs that muggings were common near the store, Macias urged
the jury to infer that he punched the LPO because he thought they were
trying to take his phone, not because he was trying to escape with the store’s
property. His theory, however, did not support a finding of self-defense,
which would require a reasonable belief that he was “in imminent danger of
4
suffering bodily injury.” (CALCRIM No. 3470.) Our independent review of
the record failed to identify any evidence tending to establish these facts.
Regarding Macias’s motion to unseal juror information, “[a]ny person
may petition the court for access to these records” upon a “prima facie
showing of good cause.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (b).) “This showing
must ‘ “support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred, that
diligent efforts were made to contact the jurors through other means, and
that further investigation is necessary to provide the court with adequate
information to rule on a motion for new trial.” ‘ “ (People v. Munoz (2019) 31
Cal.App.5th 143, 165 (Munoz).) Even were we to assume that Macias could
work around the evidentiary bar of Evidence Code section 1150—which we
agree with the trial court would likely be an insurmountable hurdle—his
counsel’s declaration failed to establish diligence in attempting to contact
jurors on his own during the two-and-a-half months between learning of the
perceived misconduct and filing his motion. Accordingly, the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying it. (Munoz, at p. 165 [abuse of discretion
standard applies].)
Competent counsel has represented Macias on this appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, Acting P. J.
DO, J.
5
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.