CourtListener 10649773•People v. Smith CA2/2
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Filed 8/7/25 P. v. Smith CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B339012
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. No. XSCTA139840)
ROBERT LATRELL SMITH,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Connie R. Quinones, Judge. Affirmed.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H. Chung,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Robert Latrell Smith (defendant) appeals the
order of the superior court summarily denying his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 at the prima facie
stage without ordering an evidentiary hearing (id., subd. (c)).1 We
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant and Dwayne Moore were members of a criminal
street gang affiliated with the Bloods. On April 12, 2016, Moore
was shot while in the Nickerson Gardens housing project in Los
Angeles.
Shortly after 9:00 a.m. the following day, there was a
shooting near the intersection of Anzac Avenue and Century
Boulevard in Los Angeles. The location is less than a seven-
minute drive from Nickerson Gardens and is within territory
claimed by another criminal street gang, a known enemy of
defendant’s gang.
While no one was seriously injured in the April 13, 2016
shooting, at least three vehicles—two of which were occupied—
were damaged by gunfire. The driver of one of the occupied
vehicles, David M., was injured by shattered glass. Also at the
scene was a gang member and apparent target of the attack,
O.J.S., and Sylvia B., a bystander.
Based on these events, defendant and his codefendant
Kenneth Beaver were each charged with committing attempted
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
We refer to the statute only by its current number for clarity and
convenience.
2
premeditated murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)) and
shooting at two occupied motor vehicles (§ 246). The amended
felony complaint further alleged defendant’s and Beaver’s crimes
were gang-related (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C) & (4)) and that a
principal personally and intentionally used and discharged a
firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (e)(1)). Defendant was
additionally charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and alleged to have suffered a prior strike
(§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)).
Preliminary hearing testimony from law enforcement
officers was as follows: At approximately 9:02 a.m. on April 13,
2016, a surveillance camera in the area of Nickerson Gardens
recorded two men getting into a white Camaro with paper dealer
plates. One wore a red sweater and got into the driver’s seat. The
other, wearing a black top and black pants, got into the
passenger’s seat. The Camaro drove off.
Thereafter, a white Camaro with paper plates was on
Anzac Avenue between 102nd Street and Century Boulevard. The
car drove off and it was seen again at Century Boulevard.
Surveillance cameras in the area recorded the Camaro circling
the block. Shooting from the car’s location was heard.
Sylvia B., who was walking in the area, described to police
the shooter was a Black male with short dreadlocks, wearing a
white shirt with dark pants. She saw him get out of the
passenger side of the Camaro. She was close enough to notice an
Oreo cookie fall from his lap when he did. After the shooting, he
got back in the passenger seat and the car drove off.
David M. described the shooter to police as a Black male
wearing a white shirt and dark pants. David M. also spoke to a
detective who recalled David M. describing the shooter as a Black
3
male with short dreadlocks wearing a gray hoodie. Though the
officer recalled David M. not knowing which side of the Camaro
the shooter used (“all [David M.] saw was flashes and he was just
trying to get out of there”), the detective “th[ought]” David M.
said the shooter used the driver’s door.
The detective also showed David M. a photographic lineup
containing defendant’s photograph. After going back and forth
between two photos, David M. chose defendant’s photo as most
resembling the shooter.
About 9:18 a.m., 16 minutes after the Camaro was recorded
leaving the area, a surveillance camera recorded it returning to
Nickerson Gardens. A few minutes after that, a patrol officer
encountered defendant and Beaver walking in the area and made
contact with them. The officer noted that defendant was wearing
a black shirt and black pants and Beaver was wearing a red shirt
and black pants. They were allowed to leave.
When police saw the Camaro again, they initiated a traffic
stop. Beaver was in the driver’s seat, and another man named
Williams was in the passenger seat. Beaver was arrested, booked,
and photographed. Beaver admitted driving the Camaro earlier
that morning with defendant as the passenger.
Beaver and defendant each pled no contest to attempted
murder after the trial court struck the allegation that it was
willful, deliberate, and premeditated. Defendant further admitted
the gang enhancement and prior strike. The trial court sentenced
him to 16 years in prison.
In May 2023, defendant filed, pro se, a petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The trial court
appointed counsel.
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The People failed to file a written opposition to defendant’s
petition. Defense counsel filed a brief contending this was a
concession of merit such that defendant was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing. He also contended the checkbox petition
entitled defendant to an evidentiary hearing. Counsel did not
argue the facts of defendant’s case in his brief.
The trial court held a hearing on whether a prima facie
showing had been made. The trial court admonished the People
for their failure to file a brief, but did not deem their failure a
concession. The People argued “the entire record shows that
[defendant is] the shooter.” Defense counsel responded the court
was prohibited from engaging in any factual determinations
without first holding an evidentiary hearing, and defendant’s
checkbox petition was sufficient to satisfy his prima facie burden.
He added, “the court cannot make [a] factual determination just
on a prelim,” even if counsel stipulated to it as the basis for the
defendant’s plea. But he did not argue the facts of defendant’s
case nor alert the prosecution or the court to what issues an
evidentiary hearing would entail.
Based on its own review of the preliminary hearing
transcript, the court concluded the theory on which the
prosecution proceeded was that defendant was the actual shooter
and therefore ineligible for section 1172.6 resentencing as a
matter of law.
Defendant timely appealed.
Defendant’s opening brief raised the issues trial counsel
pressed below: whether the trial court was obligated to hold an
evidentiary hearing based solely on defendant’s checkbox
petition; and whether, as a general matter, the trial court could
consider the preliminary hearing transcript in determining
5
whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, even given trial counsel’s
stipulation to the transcript as a basis for the plea. Counsel also
argued defendant never admitted being the actual perpetrator.
He argued the trial court improperly relied on section 872,
subdivision (b) testimony at the prima facie hearing, because it
would be inadmissible at an evidentiary hearing under section
1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). And, he argued the facts disclosed by
the preliminary hearing transcript would have supported a
theory of attempted murder other than that defendant was the
actual shooter such as accomplice liability in order to address the
possibility that the jury might be left with a reasonable doubt as
to the identity of the actual shooter.
After defendant filed his opening brief, our Supreme Court
issued its decision in People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549
(Patton). This foreclosed trial counsel’s arguments below and the
primary arguments now raised on appeal. Specifically, Patton
authorizes trial courts to consider a petitioner’s record of
conviction to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie case of eligibility for section 1172.6 resentencing, including
the preliminary hearing transcript. (Patton, at p. 568.) Patton
further holds that “petitioners confronting a record of conviction
that demonstrates relief is unavailable have the burden of
coming forward with nonconclusory allegations to alert the
prosecution and the court to what issues an evidentiary hearing
would entail.” (Id. at p. 567.)
On reply, appellate counsel acknowledged Patton and
requested, should we be inclined to affirm, that defendant have
the opportunity to submit an amended petition. The court in
Patton afforded the same opportunity to the defendant in that
case. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 570.)
6
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable law and standard of review
As relevant here, section 1172.6 provides an avenue for
persons convicted of attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine to be resentenced to the target
offense underlying their conviction. (See § 1172.6, subds. (a), (e).)
“[T]he path to resentencing under section 1172.6 involves
three stages. It begins with a facially valid petition that entitles
petitioner to counsel, continues with asking whether petitioner
has made a prima facie case for relief, and, if so, proceeds to an
evidentiary hearing on the ultimate question of whether
petitioner should be resentenced.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 562.)
Because defendant’s petition was denied after he was
appointed counsel but without an evidentiary hearing, we are
concerned here only with the second, or prima facie, stage.
A trial court may deny a petition at the prima facie stage
“‘“if the record, including the court’s own documents, ‘contain[s]
facts refuting the allegations made in the petition.’”’” (Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 563.) The record of conviction a court may
consider includes a preliminary hearing transcript preceding a
guilty plea.2 (Patton, at p. 568.) “[P]etitioners confronting a record
2 A trial court’s ability to rely on the preliminary hearing
transcript at the prima facie stage is not limited or qualified by
the Supreme Court or by the Legislature. Although the
Legislature bars from the third, or evidentiary hearing, stage,
hearsay testimony that is admissible only under section 872,
subdivision (b) (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3)), the Patton court expressly
7
of conviction that demonstrates relief is unavailable have the
burden of coming forward with nonconclusory allegations to alert
the prosecution and the court to what issues an evidentiary
hearing would entail.” (Id. at p. 567.) “[S]hould a trial court
encounter a material fact dispute, the court may not resolve that
dispute at the prima facie stage and should instead grant
petitioner an evidentiary hearing, assuming relief is not
otherwise foreclosed.” (Ibid.) “A dispute regarding the basis of a
conviction might arise if, for instance, a petitioner points to
specific facts that identify someone else as the direct perpetrator.
[T]his may come from the record itself. But absent specific facts,
no such dispute arises . . . from mere latent speculative
possibilities; that is, a hypothetical alternate direct perpetrator
cannot be conjured from thin air or a legal conclusion.” (Ibid.)
“We independently review a trial court’s determination on
whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing.” (People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
II. Analysis
Our review on appeal is limited to the record below.
Defense counsel relied on a theory, now invalidated, that
defendant’s bare petition entitled him to an evidentiary hearing.
No alternative theory of prima facie sufficiency was included. The
People filed no response to the petition.
A. Section 872, subdivision (b) evidence
Defendant contends, and the People agree, a trial court
may not rely on evidence admitted at a preliminary hearing
under section 872, subdivision (b) in performing its prima facie
left open whether such evidence could be considered at the prima
facie stage. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 557, fn. 2.)
8
section 1172.6 inquiry. In support of this conclusion, defendant
cites People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 988 and
footnote 9, disapproved on another ground in Patton, supra, 17
Cal.5th at page 569. The People also observe that the Court of
Appeal decision reviewed in Patton avoided using section 872,
subdivision (b) evidence in denying a petition at the prima facie
stage. (People v. Patton (Feb. 22, 2023, B320352) [at fn. 2], review
granted June 28, 2023, S279670, see sub. opn. 17 Cal.5th 549.)
We need not reach this issue because it was not raised
below. (See People v. Ingram (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1242, 1264.)
While a court can choose to consider such an issue for the first
time on appeal, it may not do so when the issue involves the
admission or exclusion of evidence. (People v. Williams (1998) 17
Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6.) We reject defendant’s argument he had
no occasion to raise an objection to consideration of specific
evidence because there was no evidentiary hearing. If it was error
for the trial court to consider section 872, subdivision (b)
testimony at the section 1172.6, subdivision (c) prima facie
hearing, the time to assert the objection was at that hearing.3
3 Even if defendant had not forfeited the issue by failing to
raise it below, we would find no error in the trial court’s reliance
on section 872, subdivision (b) testimony in determining
defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to
resentencing. As Patton makes clear, the prima facie stage is
distinct from the evidentiary hearing stage. (See Patton, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 562.) Its purpose is to frame the issues, not
resolve an evidentiary dispute. (Id. at p. 569.) Whereas the
Legislature expressly excluded section 872, subdivision (b)
testimony from consideration at the latter, it made no such
provision for the former. This omission bears particular weight in
the context of relevant judicial interpretation of section 1172.6
9
B. Defendant failed to meet his burden at the
prima facie stage
Defendant is not entitled to relief as a matter of law if the
record of conviction shows he was the actual shooter. (People v.
Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th 549.) For the reasons that follow, the
record of conviction so shows. Because defendant failed to
controvert this showing with specific facts, we affirm.
First, the record shows Beaver and defendant were in the
Camaro at the scene of the shooting. Beaver admitted to driving
with defendant as his passenger and the attire of the men seen
on surveillance video entering the Camaro matched the attire
Beaver and defendant were wearing when encountered by a
patrol officer shortly after the shooting. Beaver and defendant
were away from Nickerson Gardens for just 16 minutes, and the
driving time from Nickerson Gardens to the crime scene and back
was between 12 and 14 minutes, leaving just two to four minutes
to park near the scene, circle the block, park again, get out of the
car, fire off between 13 and 15 rounds, and get back in the car.
The record further shows that, of Beaver and defendant,
only defendant had dreadlocks at the time of the shooting.
Finally, the record shows the shooter had dreadlocks. Both
eyewitnesses who observed the shooter described him as having
dreadlocks. One witness identified defendant as the shooter from
a photo lineup. While defendant argues this identification was
“weak[],” we are not concerned with the strength of the evidence
at this juncture. We are concerned only with whether it is
controverted by the petitioner’s nonconclusory factual allegations.
(see, e.g., People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952) and its
subsequent amendments (see, e.g., Stats. 2021, ch. 551, §§ 1,
subd. (d), 2).
10
(See Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 567 & fn. 10.) Defendant
offered none.
On this record, defendant failed to carry his burden of proof
for a prima facie case for the reasons set forth above.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
CHAVEZ, J.
I concur:
LUI, P. J.
11
People v. Smith
B339012
RICHARDSON, J., Concurring.
I concur in the judgment of affirmance only. I write
separately to address defendant’s request, made in his reply brief
and at oral argument before this court, that we expressly
authorize him to file an amended petition should we affirm the
judgment.
Defendant’s request is based on our Supreme Court’s
decision in People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, issued after
defendant filed his opening brief on appeal. Patton foreclosed the
primary arguments defendant made here and below that his bare
checkbox petition entitled him to an evidentiary hearing. The
Patton court rejected Court of Appeal authority on which
defendant relied, affirming the lower courts’ determinations that
Patton was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing based on his
checkbox petition where the record of conviction refuted his rote
allegations of eligibility for resentencing. (Id. at p. 564.)
Nevertheless, the court expressly authorized Patton to file an
amended petition “out of an abundance of caution” to give him an
opportunity to allege specific facts that might warrant an
evidentiary hearing. (Id. at pp. 569–570.) While I do not believe it
is necessarily required in every case, I believe that the presence
of an accomplice at the scene of the shooting justifies the same
express authorization in this case. (Id. at p. 567.)
RICHARDSON, J.
1
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