People v. Yim CA1/5

CourtListener 10648868CalctappAug 6, 2025

Full text

Filed 8/6/25 P. v. Yim CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
No. A170588
v.
ROBERT DAVID YIM, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. H52579)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Robert David Yim appeals from the trial court’s order taking
no action on his request for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section
1172.1.1 We affirm.
BACKGROUND2
On November 14, 2013, an amended information charged Yim with one
count of murder (§ 187, subd. (a); first count) and three counts of willful,
deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd.
(a); second–fourth counts). As to the first count, the amended information
alleged that Yim personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and
caused great bodily injury and death. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) As to the other

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Because the facts of the crimes themselves have no bearing on the

issue raised in this appeal, we omit them.
1
three counts, it alleged that Yim personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm. (§ 12022.53, subd. (c).)
After trial, the jury acquitted Yim of first degree murder but found him
guilty of second degree murder. As to the murder conviction, the jury found
true the allegation that Yim personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm and caused great bodily injury and death. The jury also found Yim
guilty on the other three counts of attempted murder but found that he did
not commit them “willfully, deliberately and with premeditation.” It did,
however, find true the allegation that Yim personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm as to all three attempted murder convictions.
In March 2014, the trial court sentenced Yim to an aggregate prison
term of 127 years to life. That sentence consisted of 15 years to life for second
degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and 25 years to life on the firearm discharge
and great bodily injury and death enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) plus
consecutive determinate terms of nine years for each attempted murder
conviction (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)) and 20 years for each firearm
discharge enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)).
Yim appealed. This court reduced his “sentence as to the determinate
terms for two of the attempted murder convictions and their related
enhancements” but affirmed in all other respects. (People v. Yim (June 15,
2015, A141404) [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, the trial court modified Yim’s
sentence in accordance with our decision and sentenced him to an aggregate
prison term of 87 years to life.
On January 30, 2024, Yim filed a “Request for Recall of Sentence and
Resentencing Pursuant to Assembly Bill 600 and Penal Code Section 1172.1.”
(Block capitalization omitted, title capitalization added.) On March 26, 2024,
the trial court issued a written order stating that as to Yim’s “submissions,” it

2
“TAKES NO ACTION. (Pen Code, § 1172.1, subd[s]. (a)(1), (5) [listing the
resentencing factors], (c) [‘A defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking
relief from the court under this section. If a defendant requests consideration
for relief under this section, the court is not required to respond.’].)” The
order also “otherwise” dismissed Yim’s “request for lack of jurisdiction,” citing
“People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 337 [(Picklesimer)] [inapplicable
exceptions notwithstanding, trial courts are not authorized to consider or rule
on post-judgment motions unrelated to any matters then pending in the
court].”
Yim appealed from the March 26, 2024 order.
DISCUSSION
Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) provides that “[w]hen a defendant,
upon conviction for a felony offense, has been committed . . ., the court may,
on its own motion, within 120 days of the date of commitment or at any time
if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are
subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law . . . recall the
sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant
in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced . . . .”
However, “[a] defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from
the court under this section. If a defendant requests consideration for relief
under this section, the court is not required to respond.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (c).)
As a threshold matter, the parties disagree over the appealability of the
trial court’s order declining to grant relief under section 1172.1. According to
Yim, the court erred in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his
request. He contends that this error affected his substantial rights and that
the court’s order is therefore appealable. The People counter that the court’s
order, even if erroneous, did not affect Yim’s substantial rights and is

3
therefore not appealable. We, however, need not decide whether the order is
appealable because even if it is not, we would exercise our discretion to “treat
a failed appeal as a petition for a writ of mandate . . . .” (Quintanar v. County
of Riverside (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1226, 1232.)
Turning to the merits, it is clear from the trial court’s order that it
understood it had discretion to recall Yim’s sentence and resentence him
under section 1172.1, subdivision (a) but chose not to exercise that discretion
in accordance with subdivision (c). Indeed, the order expressly cited both
subdivisions (a) and (c) and even quoted the language of subdivision (c) in
support of its decision to “TAKE[ ] NO ACTION.”
That the trial court’s order also “otherwise” dismissed Yim’s “request
for lack of jurisdiction” does not suggest otherwise. First, the use of the word
“otherwise” indicates that this is, at most, an alternative ground for denying
relief. Second, the citation to Picklesimer establishes that the court was
simply holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Yim’s request as a
postjudgment motion. (See Picklesimer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 337 [“ ‘[t]here
is no statutory authority for a trial court to entertain a postjudgment motion
that is unrelated to any proceeding then pending before the court’ ”].)
Finally, even if this language in the order created some ambiguity, it is not
enough to overcome the presumption that the court knew and “ ‘ “applied the
correct statutory and case law in the exercise of its official duties . . . .” ’ ”
(People v. Johnson & Johnson (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 295, 325.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

4
CHOU, J.

WE CONCUR.

SIMONS, ACTING P. J.
BURNS, J.

A170588/ People v. Yim

5

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.