People v. Bridges CA2/3

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Filed 8/5/25 P. v. Bridges CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B337333

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA240172)
v.

THOMAS BRIDGES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert H. Derham, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Marc A. Kohm, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Thomas Bridges participated in an armed robbery during
which his accomplice shot and killed a security guard. A jury
convicted Bridges of first degree murder with a true finding on a
special circumstance allegation that he committed the murder
during a robbery. Thereafter, he petitioned for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.6,1 which limited accomplice
liability for murder. After an evidentiary hearing under that
section, the trial court denied Bridges’s petition, finding that he
was a major participant in the felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. Bridges now appeals the trial court’s
order denying his petition. Because sufficient evidence supports
the trial court’s order, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. The robbery and murder
Bridges was tried with Claudell Hatter, Rollin Denem, and
Wardell Joe for robbery and murder.2 Based on our review of the
trial transcripts, we find the opinion affirming as modified
Bridges’s judgment of conviction on direct appeal (People v.
Bridges et al. (Jan. 30, 2006, B176263) [nonpub. opn.]) to be an
accurate summary of evidence admitted at the joint trial. We
therefore quote its recitation of the background, with additions
noted in brackets. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see People v. Lewis

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

2 Jesse Singleton and Reginald Howard were tried together
before separate juries.

2
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972 [appellate opinion is generally part of
record of conviction in § 1172.6 proceedings].)
“1. The prosecution’s evidence.
“a. Overview.
“On November 3, 1998 [at about 11:00 a.m.], appellants
Bridges, Denem, Hatter and Joe, assisted by Reginald Howard,
Jesse Singleton, Amar Mobley and Tiasha Croslin, committed an
armed robbery at the Big Saver Foods Market near Slauson and
Compton Avenues in Los Angeles. Six of the eight robbers
belonged to the 69 East Coast Crips. Bridges belonged to a
related gang, West Covina Neighborhood Crips, and Croslin,
Bridges’s girlfriend, formerly belonged to a gang in San Diego. In
the course of the robbery, Howard shot and killed the security
guard, Juan Hernandez. The robbers also took Hernandez’s gun.
Bridges robbed a cashier at gunpoint, obtaining money and food
stamps which were divided at Hatter’s home after the robbery.
Leonard Jackson, a gang associate of the robbers, arrived at
Hatter’s home just as the robbers returned from the crime scene.
Jackson shared in the proceeds of the robbery.
“Appellants were charged with first degree murder and
robbery of Hernandez in counts one and two, and robbery of the
cashier in count three.
“Croslin and Jackson testified against appellants at trial.
Before detailing their testimony, we summarize the testimony of
the eyewitnesses and the investigation of the offense.
“b. Eyewitness testimony.
“Gilbert Davis lived down the street from B[ig] Saver Foods
Market. On November 3, 1998, Davis saw a Buick Regal, an
Oldsmobile Cutlass and a Pontiac Trans Am in front of his home

3
and became suspicious. From the porch of his home, Davis saw
four males enter the market. Davis and some of his friends
walked toward the market. The driver of the Cutlass, who was
alone in the car, looked straight ahead. Davis returned home and
called 911. Davis then saw someone ‘hop in[to] the Cutlass, then
they took off.’
[Jesus Molina was working at the market. Bridges and
possibly a second man asked him where the soft drinks were. A
minute or less later, Molina heard what he thought was a balloon
popping from the front of the market, where the security guard
usually positioned himself. Sixty to 90 seconds later, Molina
heard a gunshot from the front of the store. Molina, a customer,
and the customer’s child fled out the back.]
[Jose Lopez was working near the rear of the market when
he noticed three men pass by repeatedly. Suspicious, Lopez went
upstairs to get a better view, but he lost sight of them. Lopez
then heard a gunshot. He went downstairs and saw a man
pointing a gun at Marissa Ayon, a cashier at the market. Lopez
said that the man was “threatening the girl” and there were
customers with a child nearby. Lopez told the customers to flee
through the back of the market.]
“Market employee Carlos Guzman saw three males looking
around the store. One of the males[, Denem,] wore a hat and had
long curly hair. He had a handgun and ordered everyone to get
down, then pointed the gun at the ceiling and fired one shot.
[One to two other individuals were in front of the cash registers.]
Guzman heard another shot about thirty seconds later.
“[ ] Ayon [ ] saw the security guard struggling with two
males. [A third man held a gun nearby.] After Ayon heard a
shot, one of the males ran from the market. Ayon ran to the

4
manager’s office but the manager [and bookkeeper] locked the
door before she could enter. An armed male [told Ayon to ‘Get
your ass over here’] and took Ayon at gunpoint from the door of
the office to the cash registers and forced her to empty the
contents of two registers into a plastic bag. [Ayon could see
Hernandez on the ground.]
“c. Investigation.
“The crime went unsolved for two years until Jackson, who
was serving a 17-year federal drug term, wrote a letter to the
U.S. Attorney in December of 2000 offering to assist in the
investigation of this case in the hope of obtaining a reduction of
his term. In March of 2001, Los Angeles Police Detective Joseph
Martinez interviewed Jackson at a federal correctional facility in
Victorville. Jackson identified photographs of six of the
participants in the robbery and offered the name of the seventh,
Denem.
“In April of 2001, Detective Martinez showed photographic
lineups to the market employees. Jose Molina identified
Singleton and Bridges; Jose Lopez identified Howard; Haydee
Penate and Carlos Guzman identified Singleton. Ayon, the
cashier, failed to identify anyone in the photographic lineups.
However, toward the close of Ayon’s trial testimony, she indicated
that, after looking at Bridges, he appeared similar to the
individual who directed her at gunpoint to empty the cash
registers.
“On May 30, 2001, Detective Martinez re-interviewed
Davis, the witness who lived down the street from the market, at
Men’s Central Jail. [Fn. omitted.] Davis identified Hatter and
Croslin in photographic lineups and at trial as the individuals he

5
had seen in the Regal outside the market and identified Joe as
the driver of the Cutlass.
“In May of 2001, Martinez interviewed Croslin who was in
federal custody in Connecticut in connection with a 1999 bank
robbery conviction for which Croslin had been sentenced to a
term of five years and three months. Croslin admitted her role in
the Big Saver Food case and identified the participants. Croslin
initially faced a term of life without the possibility of parole for
her involvement in the robbery. However, Croslin pleaded no
contest to one count of voluntary manslaughter and two counts of
robbery in exchange for a prison term of 12 years and her
truthful testimony in this case.
“d. Croslin’s testimony.
“At trial, Croslin testified that in November of 1998, she
lived with Bridges on 68th Street in Los Angeles. Jackson lived
in the house in front of them. Through Bridges, Croslin met
Hatter and Denem, both of whom were members of the 69th
Street Crips. Hatter’s nickname was Doughboy and Denem’s
nickname was [ ] Baby Doughboy, indicating the two had a close
relationship.
“On the morning of November 3, 1998, Bridges and Croslin
drove separately from their home to Hatter’s home on 84th Street
where all four appellants, plus Singleton, Howard and Mobley,
began to discuss a robbery. During the trial, Croslin specifically
identified appellants Hatter, Bridges, Denem and Joe. Croslin
also identified Singleton, Howard and Mobley, who were brought
into the courtroom for that purpose. Hatter said he needed
money to get a car out of impound. When the conversation
ended, Bridges told Croslin to get into a Regal with Hatter.
Hatter drove the Regal to the B[ig] Saver Foods Market. Croslin

6
understood they were going to commit a robbery. After Hatter
and Croslin entered the market, Hatter said, ‘This is where we’re
going to hit.’ Croslin was surprised because there was no bank in
the market. Hatter and Croslin made a purchase, then left the
store. They drove past a Cutlass driven by Joe and a Trans[ ]Am
driven by Mobley parked on 58th Street. Shortly thereafter,
Hatter and Croslin drove past the market and saw individuals
running from it.
“After the robbery, the entire crime team returned to
Hatter’s residence. Howard was pacing and repeatedly said, in a
scared manner, ‘I [shot him].’ Bridges and Hatter loudly urged
Howard to calm down. They divided the money and food stamps
obtained in the robbery and gave some food stamps to Jackson,
who was wanted by his parole officer. After the property had
been divided, everyone left.
“Croslin did not learn of the death of the security guard
until later when she saw the news on television. When Bridges
returned home that evening, Croslin confronted him. Bridges
told her, ‘Howard was tussling with the security guard and shot
him.’ Bridges indicated his role was to get the money from the
safe in the office with Denem or Singleton, and Howard’s job was
to distract the security guard. Bridges said Denem wore a
disguise of a hat and a curly wig and that Hatter’s purpose in
driving along 58th Street was to indicate to the others it was
okay to rob the market. [Bridges showed Croslin food stamps and
money from the robbery. He told her that the security guard’s
gun was taken, but he did not say who took it.]
“Croslin was arrested two days after the robbery and
remained in custody on a federal bank robbery charge until the
time of her testimony in this case.

7
“e. Jackson’s testimony.
“Jackson was serving 17 years in federal custody for a
conviction of distribution of cocaine he suffered in October of
2000. Jackson also had a prior conviction of robbery in 1991. In
1998, Jackson associated with Hatter, Denem, Joe and Bridges.
They all were members of the 69 East Coast Crips except Bridges
who was a member of the West Covina Neighborhood Crips.
They all frequented Hatter’s home on 84th Street or Jackson’s
home on 68th Street. Jackson sold the Cutlass involved in this
case to Joe.
“On November 3, 1998, Jackson was at Hatter’s home when
Hatter, Bridges, Denem, Joe, Howard, Singleton, Mobley and
Croslin quickly exited cars and entered the house. Denem had a
hat and a wig. Once inside, they argued. Hatter asked where the
money was and Bridges said they only got food stamps. Bridges
said they would have gotten more if Howard was not ‘so trigger
happy.’ Howard was ‘jumping around real jittery like, real
nervous.’ They divided food stamps among themselves and gave
Jackson some. When they saw a news report[ ] of the robbery,
Bridges and Denem said police sketches of the suspects did not
look like them. While they watched the news, Denem laughed
because the sketches depicted him as having long hair. Hatter
told Singleton to get rid of the Trans Am.
“Two days after the robbery, Jackson was arrested for
violating parole. Jackson has been in federal custody since
March of 2000. He contacted the United States Attorney’s office
about cooperating in this case in December of 2000 and was
interviewed by Detective Martinez in March of 2001.
Approximately five months after that interview, Bridges and
Jackson were incarcerated together in Victorville. Bridges told

8
Jackson that detectives had spoken to him about the Big Saver
Foods robbery. Bridges then began to relate details of the crime
to Jackson. Bridges said Hatter and Croslin entered the store
first to ‘check the move out[.]’ Bridges said he and Denem
intended to force the manager to open the safe at the back of the
store but the manager locked himself in a room. Bridges heard a
shot, then ran with Denem to the front of the market and saw
that Howard and Singleton already had fled. Bridges then took
food stamps from the cash register. Bridges said Howard had a
.45 caliber handgun.” (People v. Bridges et al., supra, B176263.)
II. Verdict and sentence
In 2004, a jury convicted Bridges of special circumstance
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17); count 1) and of
second degree robbery (§ 211; counts 2 [Hernandez] & 3 [Ayon])
with true findings on principal gun use (§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (d)
& (e)(1)) and gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) allegations.3 That same
year, the trial court sentenced Bridges on count 1 to life without
parole plus 25 years to life for the gun enhancement. The trial
court imposed concurrent sentences on counts 2 and 3.
III. Postconviction petition for resentencing
In 2023, Bridges petitioned for resentencing under section
1172.6. After receiving briefing, the trial court held an
evidentiary hearing on March 25, 2024.
At the outset of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court
stated it had read the petition, the parties’ briefs, and the trial
and court transcripts, which it admitted into evidence. The

3 The jury found the gang allegations true as to counts 1 and
3 only.

9
parties did not introduce any new or additional evidence.4 After
hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial court found that Bridges
heard a gunshot, which would suggest that either “someone got
shot or got shot at.” Continuing with the robbery after hearing
the gunshot was “extremely important” to the trial court to
determining the reckless indifference prong of the analysis. The
trial court found this case “extremely analogous” to People v.
Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015 (Owens), where the defendant
and accomplices entered a credit union, the defendant used a gun
to control customers and employees to facilitate the robbery, the
defendant heard shots fired by an accomplice, and the defendant
ran from the credit union, passing the victim’s body. Finally, the
trial court considered Bridges’s age of 20 years when he
committed the crime, but found no evidence that his youth was a
mitigating factor.
Accordingly, the trial court denied the motion. This appeal
followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill No. 1437 and standard of review
To the end of ensuring a person’s sentence is commensurate
with the person’s individual criminal culpability, Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) and
subsequent related legislation limited accomplice liability under
the felony-murder rule, eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as it relates to murder, and eliminated
convictions for murder based on a theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in

4 Bridges submitted a “declaration of facts,” but the trial
court did not consider it.

10
a crime. (See generally People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981,
986; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959; People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843.) As relevant here,
Senate Bill 1437 amended the felony-murder rule by adding
section 189, subdivision (e), which provides that a participant in
the perpetration of qualifying felonies is liable for felony murder
only if the person (1) was the actual killer, (2) was not the actual
killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a direct aider and
abettor, or (3) the person was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life, as described in section 190.2, subdivision (d). (Gentile, at
p. 842.)
Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedure, codified at
section 1172.6, for a person convicted of murder under the former
law to be resentenced if the person could no longer be convicted of
those crimes under the current law. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 959; People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.)
A defendant commences that procedure by filing a petition
containing a declaration that, among other things, the defendant
could not presently be convicted of murder under the current law.
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.)
If a petition establishes a prima facie case for relief, the
trial court must appoint counsel if requested, issue an order to
show cause, and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the parties
may offer new or additional evidence and the trial court sits as an
independent factfinder to determine beyond a reasonable doubt
whether the defendant is guilty of murder under a valid theory.
(§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3), (c), & (d)(1); People v. Garrison (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 735, 745.)

11
On appeal, we review the trial court’s findings after a
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), evidentiary hearing for
substantial evidence. (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
276, 298; accord, People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575,
591.) Under that standard of review we “ ‘ “examine the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a
rational trier of fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a
reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (Clements, at p. 298.) We presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact that can be
reasonably deduced from the evidence. (Owens, supra, 78
Cal.App.5th at p. 1022.) We do not resolve credibility issues or
evidentiary conflicts. (Ibid.) Substantial evidence includes
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn
from that evidence. (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.)
Before we may set aside a trial court’s order, it must be clear that
“ ‘ “upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support [it].” ’ ” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th
327, 357.)
II. Banks/Clark factors
The trial court found that Bridges was a major participant
in a felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life
under current law, and therefore he was not entitled to
resentencing under Senate Bill 1437. This area of law has its
genesis in two United States Supreme Court cases: Enmund v.
Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 and Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S.
137. Enmund held that the death penalty could not
constitutionally be imposed on an armed robbery getaway driver
who was a minor participant in the crime, was not present when

12
the murder was committed, and had no intent to kill. (Enmund,
at pp. 798, 801.)
In contrast, Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at page 139,
did not preclude imposing the death penalty for two defendants,
brothers, who had helped their father and his cellmate—both
convicted murderers—escape from prison. The defendants gave
them guns, and the group later kidnapped a family of four. The
defendants then stood by while their father debated whether to
kill the family and proceeded to shoot the family, including a
toddler and a teenager. (Id. at pp. 139–141.) The court held that
the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit imposing the death
penalty on a nonkiller who lacked the intent to kill, but whose
“participation [in the crime] is major and whose mental state is
one of reckless indifference to the value of human life.” (Id. at
p. 152; see also id. at pp. 157–158.)
Years later, in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788
(Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), our
Supreme Court addressed Enmund and Tison and substantially
clarified the “major participant” and “reckless indifference to
human life” requirements. Banks, at page 794, considered “under
what circumstances an accomplice who lacks the intent to kill
may qualify as a major participant.” The court listed various
factors that should be considered in making that determination:
“What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal
enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the
defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? What
awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by
the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or
conduct of the other participants? Was the defendant present at
the scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the

13
actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a
particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after
lethal force was used?” (Id. at p. 803, fn. omitted.)
The court then turned its attention to “reckless indifference
to human life” in Clark. Reckless indifference to human life is
“ ‘implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to
carry a grave risk of death.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 616.)
It “encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in
killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not
specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.”
(Id. at p. 617.) Recklessness has both a subjective and an
objective component. (Ibid.) Subjectively, the defendant must
consciously disregard risks known to him. Objectively,
recklessness is determined by “what ‘a law-abiding person would
observe in the actor’s situation,’ ” that is, whether defendant’s
conduct “ ‘involved a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person in the actor’s situation would
observe.’ ” (Ibid.)
Clark listed factors to consider when determining whether
reckless indifference existed: “Did the defendant use or know
that a gun would be used during the felony? How many weapons
were ultimately used? Was the defendant physically present at
the crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to restrain the
crime or aid the victim? What was the duration of the interaction
between the perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What
was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her confederate’s
propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What
efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of violence
during the felony?” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677
(Scoggins) [summarizing Clark factors].)

14
In evaluating the sufficiency of evidence to support a trial
court’s finding that the Banks/Clark factors are established, no
one factor “ ‘is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) Rather, we
evaluate the factors under the totality of the circumstances to
determine a petitioner’s place on the culpability spectrum.
(Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 675.) Thus, “[w]here a defendant
is not the actual killer or an aider and abettor with intent to kill,
Senate Bill No. 1437 tasks us to distinguish between defendants
who participate in a violent felony posing only the foreseeable
risk of death inherent in any such crime (who are not liable for
deaths that may occur during its commission) from those who
knowingly engage in criminal activities known to carry a grave
risk of death (who are liable).” (People v. Emanuel (2025) 17
Cal.5th 867, 889 (Emanuel).)
III. Sufficiency of the evidence Bridges was a major participant
in the felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life
Bridges concedes he was a major participant in the
robberies. He instead argues that there is insufficient evidence
he acted with reckless indifference to human life. Cognizant that
the Banks and Clark factors overlap, we therefore focus our
analysis on that prong of the inquiry. (See generally Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615 [significant overlap exists between
factors establishing two prongs].)
A. Bridges’s use of and knowledge that guns would be
used
Bridges was armed with a gun, and at least two of his
accomplices, Denem and the actual killer, were armed with guns.

15
The evidence further establishes a reasonable inference that
Bridges knew his accomplices were armed, as the robbery was
carefully planned. Moreover, not only did the robbers possess
guns, but they used them: Denem fired his gun at the ceiling, the
actual killer shot Hernandez, and Bridges forced Ayon to open
the cash register at gunpoint.
While the mere fact a robbery involved a gun is insufficient
by itself to support a finding of reckless indifference to human life
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617), the presence of at least three
lethal weapons and that they were violently used are factors
relevant to the required mens rea and weigh in favor of the trial
court’s finding, even if they are not dispositive. (See generally
Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 682 [anyone who plans or
participates in armed robbery anticipates lethal violence might
be used, given that one in 200 armed robberies results in death,
even though that alone does not establish reckless indifference to
human life]; see, e.g., People v. Bradley (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th
1022, 1033 [personally wielding gun during robbery reflects
reckless indifference to human life]; People v. Bascomb (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 1077, 1089 [defendant enabled murder by using gun
to keep victims at bay during bank robbery].)
B. Bridges’s efforts to minimize risks of violence
The evidence about this factor is nuanced. There was
evidence suggesting that the robbery plan did not include using
lethal force. (Compare People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244,
1281–1282 [defendant acted with reckless indifference to human
life where he instructed fellow gang members carrying out
carjackings to shoot resisting victims].) When the robbers
regrouped at the house after the robbery, Howard was pacing
back and forth, scared, repeating, “ ‘I shot him.’ ” There was a

16
“lot of arguing,” and people told Howard to calm down and to
shut up. Also, Jackson testified that after the men learned
someone had died, they were “just saying it was messed up.”
Bridges was unhappy that Howard shot Hernandez, saying that
they would have gotten more money had Howard not been
“trigger happy.” Thus, the robbers’ reactions, including Bridges’s,
to the murder were ones of upset that it precluded them from
getting more money. While callous, their reaction to Hernandez’s
murder shows that lethal force was unplanned.
However, other evidence shows that Bridges and his
accomplices planned the robbery in a way that greatly heightened
the risk of violence. They planned the armed robbery for a time,
late morning, when customers would certainly be shopping, and
at a place, a market, where shoppers would be present and
multiple employees would be working. (Compare with Emanuel,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 887 [defendant minimized risk of violence
where crime occurred at 3:00 p.m. on residential street adjacent
to a park where witnesses might be present to observe, and
robbery plan did not include using weapons]; Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at pp. 621–622 [plan to rob closed store minimized risk of
violence]; Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677 [defendant’s plan to
beat victim and steal his money did not involve use of weapons].)
Bridges and his accomplices had multiple guns, planned to
use them, committed the robbery in an enclosed space where
exits might not be apparent or available, and planned to force the
manager to open the safe. Significantly, Bridges told Croslin that
Howard was supposed to distract the security guard; therefore,
they planned to somehow engage the armed Hernandez, a plan
clearly fraught with the potential for violence. Bridges also
planned to force the manager to open the safe, but the manager

17
escaped into the office and locked the door before Bridges could
catch him. Bridges therefore planned to restrain the manager,
inferentially at gunpoint, but only the manager’s quick action
prevented Bridges from putting his plan into action. Also
significant is that Bridges walked around the market and, it is
reasonable to infer, saw that multiple employees, customers
(including children), and the armed Hernandez were present.
(See, e.g., Owens, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 1024 [bank robbery
posed high risk of violence because it occurred during business
hours with 20 people present and robbers were armed]; People v.
Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1, 10 [defendant did not plan
robbery of store for an off-peak time to minimize chance of violent
conflict].) A plan to have armed men enter a potentially busy
market guarded by an armed security guard is one designed to
heighten, not minimize, the risk of violence. Thus,
notwithstanding evidence that the original plan did not include
shooting Hernandez, this factor weighs in favor of a reckless
indifference finding.
C. Bridges’s presence at crime scene and opportunity to
restrain crime
Where there is no evidence lethal force was part of the
agreed-upon plan, absence from the scene “may significantly
diminish culpability for death.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 803, fn. 5.) Thus, under some circumstances, a defendant’s
absence from the murder scene or inability to restrain the
accomplice can weigh against a reckless indifference finding.
(See, e.g., Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 672, 679 [where
defendant was not at murder scene, but was at nearby gas
station, and there was no evidence plan involved use of weapons,
reckless indifference finding not supported]; People v. Ramirez

18
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 989 [defendant lacked meaningful
opportunity to intervene when he and shooter were on opposite
sides of victim’s car, and attempted carjacking was quickly
executed]; In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 452 [defendant
present during robbery but not “ ‘close enough’ ” to restrain
shooter].)
Here, unlike the defendants in Scoggins and Clark who
were not in the same building when the shootings happened,
Bridges was in the market and, inferentially, nearby, when
Denem fired the first gunshot into the ceiling. Undoubtably,
Bridges heard that first gunshot. According to witnesses, 30 to
90 seconds elapsed from that first gunshot to the second gunshot
that killed Hernandez. Also, Bridges told Croslin the evening of
the shooting that Howard had tussled with Hernandez and shot
him. Although Bridges’s statement does not clearly establish he
saw his accomplices fighting with Hernandez as opposed to being
told about it, the statement nonetheless supports an inference
that Bridges saw Howard fighting with Hernandez and therefore
was present when Hernandez was shot.
In any event, what happened here is similar to the events
in In re McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999. In that case,
McDowell and an accomplice planned to rob a drug dealer. (Id. at
p. 1005.) McDowell entered the victim/drug dealer’s home with a
knife, and his accomplice entered shortly after with a gun, which
he pointed at the drug dealer and two others in the house. When
the drug dealer denied having anything, the accomplice fired a
warning shot into the floor. The victim taunted the accomplice to
kill him, but the victim’s companion asked the accomplice not to
hurt them. A struggle broke out, McDowell was knocked to the
ground, and the accomplice shot and killed the victim. A witness

19
estimated that only a few seconds elapsed between the first and
second gunshots. (Ibid.)
In discussing whether McDowell took steps to prevent the
violence, the court observed that McDowell saw his accomplice
fire a warning shot, a sure indication of the accomplice’s
willingness to engage in lethal violence. (In re McDowell, supra,
55 Cal.App.5th at p. 1014.) Then, when the victim taunted the
accomplice to shoot him, McDowell remained silent, even as the
victim’s companions intervened, verbally and physically. (Ibid.)
The court found that McDowell had a “brief but critical
opportunity” to say or do something to deescalate the situation,
but he did nothing. (Ibid.)
Similarly here, Bridges heard that first shot. As the trial
court said, Bridges then knew that either a gun had been
discharged or someone had been shot. Either way, that first
gunshot unmistakably indicated Bridges’s accomplice’s
willingness to use lethal violence. (See, e.g., In re McDowell,
supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 1014; Owens, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1024 [accomplice’s proclivity for violence became evident
during robbery when he shot a victim immediately on entering
bank].) Although Bridges had a brief amount of time (30 to 90
seconds according to witnesses) to deescalate the violence, there
is no evidence he did anything, like call out to his accomplices to
stop, tell people in the store to leave, or even leave himself, which
could suggest a disavowal of further violence. (See generally
Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619 [proximity to murder and
events leading to it “may be particularly significant where, as in
Tison, the murder is a culmination or a foreseeable result of
several intermediate steps”]; see, e.g., Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th
at p. 891 [when victim resisted, defendant said, “ ‘let’s go,’ ”

20
evidencing intent to abandon plan rather than resort to greater
violence].) Instead, Bridges used the opportunity to point a gun
at Ayon and to make her empty multiple cash registers, all while
Hernandez lay dying nearby.
Thus, while the events may have unfolded rapidly, there is
evidence that Bridges had a meaningful opportunity to tamp
down greater violence. (See generally Emanuel, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 892 [where crime unfolds quickly, failing to restrain
cohort may not weigh in favor of reckless indifference finding
unless there is some evidence defendant had meaningful
opportunity to restrain cohort].) A meaningful opportunity
“requires some awareness of the risk of impending lethal violence
and time to react.” (Ibid.) As in McDowell, the warning shot
fired by Denem provided Bridges with notice of impending
violence and a brief but meaningful opportunity to restrain his
cohort. Sufficient evidence shows that Bridges did not avail
himself of that opportunity. This factor therefore weighs in favor
of the trial court’s reckless indifference finding.
D. Duration of crime and interaction between
perpetrators and victims
Generally, the longer a crime lasts, the opportunity for
violence increases, especially when victims are held at gunpoint
or restrained for prolonged periods. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 620.) “A lengthy interaction between perpetrators and victims
of a felony may increase the risk of resistance, conflict, and
violence.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 886.) In this case, it
is unclear how long the robbery lasted. But it was of some
duration because the robbers cased the market, tried to restrain
the manager, fought with Hernandez, and forced Ayon to empty
multiple cash registers.

21
As for Bridges’s interaction with the victims, he forced
Ayon at gunpoint to open the cash register. Pointing a gun
directly at a victim is an implicit threat to shoot the victim.
(People v. Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245, 273.) Therefore,
although it is unclear how long the events lasted, it was enough
time for Bridges to case the store, pursue the manager, and
restrain at gunpoint Ayon. This factor, especially given the
restraint of victims at gunpoint, therefore weighs in favor of the
trial court’s finding.
E. Bridges’s knowledge of his confederate’s propensity for
violence or likelihood of using lethal force
There is no evidence Bridges knew before going into the
store that any of his accomplices had a propensity for violence,
other than that the participants were gang members. However,
mere comembership in a gang does not by itself establish
knowledge of a propensity for violence. (See, e.g., In re Miller
(2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 960, 976 [although defendant and killer
belonged to same gang and had committed follow-home robberies
together, no evidence they had participated in shootings, murder,
or attempted murder].)
Even so, once the robbers were in the market, one of them
fired a gunshot into the ceiling near the front of the store.
Although this could have been a warning shot to customers and
employees to get down, it was an extremely reckless and violent
act. On hearing the gunshot, Bridges should have been alerted to
his accomplice’s willingness to commit a violent act, if not a
propensity for it. (See, e.g., Owens, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1024 [accomplice’s propensity for violence became “evident”
during robbery when accomplice fired gun]; see People v. Nieber
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 458, 479 [although Nieber did not know

22
about cohorts’ likelihood of killing, “he was aware they brought a
weapon, which they were using”].) Yet, there is no evidence
Bridges then tried to tamp down the violence or leave the market;
instead, he forced Ayon at gunpoint to open the cash register.
This factor therefore supports the reckless indifference finding.
F. Postshooting conduct
Whether a defendant’s postshooting conduct shows a
reckless indifference to human life “is not satisfied by evidence
that the defendant was generally indifferent to the fact that
someone has been killed; it requires evidence that, at the time of
the shooting, the defendant acted with indifference toward the
grave risk that someone could be killed. Though the former may
be evidence of the latter, it is insufficient, standing alone, to
support murder liability.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 895.)
Here, there was evidence that Bridges was indifferent to
the risk that someone could be killed during the robbery. Not
only did Bridges fail to aid Hernandez, Bridges seized the
opportunity of Hernandez’s disablement to force Ayon at
gunpoint to open the cash registers. In response, Bridges
suggests that he did not see Hernandez or did not know that he
was seriously wounded. However, Bridges heard the gunshots.
And Ayon could see Hernandez. It is therefore reasonable to
infer that Bridges could also see the bleeding Hernandez. Yet,
Bridges did not help Hernandez, and he prevented Ayon from
helping him by holding her at gunpoint. (Compare with
Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 894 [defendant took no action to
interfere with victim’s ability to receive aid].) Such callous
behavior supports the reckless indifference finding. (See, e.g., In
re Parrish (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 539, 544 [reckless indifference
shown by failure to aid or comfort victim]; People v. Douglas,

23
supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 10 [petitioner “displayed no interest
in moderating violence or in aiding his bloody and suffering
victim,” and instead picked his pocket].)
G. Bridges’s youth
Bridges, who was 20 years old when he committed the
crimes, contends that the trial court refused to consider his youth
as a mitigating factor because he was not a juvenile. (See
generally People v. Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 987
[defendant’s youth is relevant factor to consider in Banks/Clark
analysis]; In re Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 454 [same].)
This contention is incorrect.
At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court said it was
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Bridges was a major
participant in the robberies who acted with reckless indifference
to human life. It then added, “That doesn’t end the inquiry. The
defendant was 20 years of age at the time of this offense,
although he was not a juvenile. However, there is no indication,
and there is absolutely no evidence that the defendant’s youth
was mitigating in this area, that the planning and participation
was evident. There was no peer pressure, there was no indicia
that you played such a part that it would degenerate from the
defendant’s being a major participant, or acting with reckless
indifference to human life.”
To the extent Bridges argues that the trial court believed
that only a defendant’s juvenile status can be a mitigating factor,
that is not what the trial court said. The trial court simply
observed that, at 20 years of age, Bridges was not a juvenile (a
person under 18 years old). Further, even though Bridges was
not a juvenile, the trial court found that his youthful age was
relevant. Even so, there was no evidence about how, if at all, his

24
age or background played a role in his behavior that day.
(Compare with People v. Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546, 550, 562
[evidence that 15-year-old defendant was especially vulnerable to
outside pressures showed he lacked requisite mens rea].) The
record therefore shows that the trial court understood that
Bridges’s youth was a relevant factor and considered it, but found
there was no evidence it contributed to his actions.
H. The totality of the circumstances
In evaluating the sufficiency of this evidence to support the
trial court’s finding, we are mindful that no one Clark factor “ ‘is
necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.’ ” (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) Rather, we evaluate the factors
under the totality of the circumstances to determine Bridges’s
place on the culpability spectrum. (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 675.) Here, Bridges knew guns would be used, he planned to
use a gun to force the manager to open the safe, he planned to
have his accomplice distract an armed security guard, he failed to
tamp down the violence after hearing Denem’s first gunshot, he
forced Ayon at gunpoint to open the cash registers as Hernandez
lay dying, and he callously disregarded Hernandez and prevented
Ayon from helping him. Thus, notwithstanding evidence that the
robbery plan did not include using lethal violence, the totality of
the circumstances supports the trial court’s reckless indifference
finding.

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DISPOSITION
The order denying Thomas Bridges’s Penal Code section
1172.6 petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

EGERTON, J.

ADAMS, J.

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