CourtListener 10646332•People v. Johnson CA2/5
Full text
Filed 8/1/25 P. v. Johnson CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B337321
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. MA028813)
RONNIE EDWARD JOHNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Charlaine F. Olmedo, Judge. Affirmed.
Victor J. Morse, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Idan Ivri,
Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Many years after his special circumstance murder
conviction, defendant and appellant Ronnie Edward Johnson
(defendant) filed a Penal Code section 1172.6 (former Penal Code
section 1170.95) petition for resentencing.1 Before holding an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied his request to appoint
an expert to testify regarding potential contamination of DNA
samples. We consider whether this was error and whether
reversal is required because the trial court may have considered,
in denying defendant’s petition, a prior appellate opinion’s
summary of certain evidence at trial.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Offense Conduct and Police Investigation
Charles Trice (Charles) was 72 years old in 2003. He lived
in Littlerock, California. His daughter, Patricia Trice (Patricia),
came to his home to visit one evening in October 2003, but
Charles’s car was not there and the gates were open, so Patricia
assumed he had gone out. Patricia left to spend the night with
her mother, who lived nearby.
When Patricia returned to Charles’s house the next
morning, his car still was not there and she noticed his television
was on “extremely loud.” She looked inside and saw Charles
lying on the floor with duct tape around his ankles and wrists.
She called 911. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy Richard
Engels arrived and discovered Charles was dead.
Sergeant Shannon Laren of the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department was assigned to investigate the case.
1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.
2
There were no signs of forced entry. Sergeant Laren observed
bloody footprints and a plastic bag with blood on it near Charles’s
body. One of the rear pockets on Charles’s pants, where Patricia
testified Charles normally carried a wallet, had been torn off.
Charles’s car was found in the “open desert.” Part of the
front passenger seat was burned. Defendant lived about a mile
from the site where the car was found.
A deputy medical examiner from the Los Angeles County
Coroner’s Office, Dr. Jeffrey Gutstadt, concluded Charles suffered
blunt force traumatic injury to his head consistent with being
struck with the butt of a handgun. Among other things, Charles
also suffered injuries to his neck “consistent with enough
pressure being applied to the neck to cause death.” Dr. Gutstadt
opined that Charles died of asphyxia due to the neck compression
with blunt force trauma to the head as a contributing factor.
A couple months after the murder, defendant drove to Big
Bear with Jesse Scott (Jesse). According to Jesse, defendant
confided in him during this trip that defendant and Jesse’s
brother, Ernest Scott (Ernest), were at Charles’s home on the
night of his murder. Defendant told Jesse the murder was a
“contract killing” arranged by a man named Shane to obtain life
insurance proceeds.2 Defendant said that he and Ernest knocked
on Charles’s door ostensibly to buy marijuana, defendant hit
Charles multiple times, defendant or Ernest put duct tape over
Charles’s mouth to stop him from making noise, and at some
point, Ernest told defendant they should kill Charles because he
2
Jesse testified Shane was Charles’s son or step-son.
Patricia testified she has no biological siblings and Charles did
not consider Shane a son.
3
could identify them. Defendant also told Jesse that he and
Ernest took marijuana and a gun from Charles’s house. A few
months later, after an armed person climbed onto the roof of the
home Jesse shared with other family members, Jesse called
Sergeant Laren and revealed this conversation he and defendant
had on the way to Big Bear (the sergeant recorded the phone
call).3
Anton James (Anton), who was married to Ernest’s sister,
had been in a car with defendant and Ernest about a week before
Charles was killed. While in the car together, Anton heard
defendant and Ernest talking about robbing Charles.4 Around
the same time, defendant and Ernest asked to borrow a roll of
duct tape from Anton’s father, Hassen James (Hassen). He gave
them the duct tape, but they did not return it.
B. Criminal Proceedings and Further Investigation
Investigators searched defendant’s home after he was
arrested for Charles’s murder. No physical evidence linking
defendant to the crime was found.
3
Jesse testified at defendant’s later criminal trial, and his
testimony was consistent in most respects with what he said
during the earlier recorded phone call. There were some
inconsistencies, however, including about what defendant and
Ernest took from Charles’s house and who first suggested killing
Charles.
4
Anton’s mother, Diane White, was the subject of a search
warrant. One of the issues defendant raised on direct appeal was
the trial court’s preclusion of evidence tending to show her
involvement in Charles’s murder. (People v. Johnson (July 10,
2008, B197179) [nonpub. opn.].)
4
Criminalist Kari Yoshida (Yoshida) compared DNA found
on the duct tape used to bind Charles to DNA obtained from
defendant. The DNA profiles were a probabilistic match. As we
later discuss in more detail, however, Yoshida was cross-
examined at trial regarding potential contamination of the DNA
samples.
After defendant’s preliminary hearing in November 2004,
Sergeant Laren arranged for him to be seated on a bench next to
Ernest with a recording device hidden nearby. (Ernest was tried
separately.) A recording of the conversation between defendant
and Ernest was played at trial.5 Defendant asked Ernest
whether Jesse planned to testify at trial, and Ernest said his
private investigator believed Jesse wanted “nothin[g] to do with
it.” Defendant said he was “gonna be real with” Ernest and told
him that when he “and [Jesse] went to Big Bear, [defendant]
mentioned somethin’ about that, but [he] didn’t mention nothin’
about [Ernest].” Defendant later told Ernest that if “by some
kind of miracle” defendant “g[o]t outta this,” “[a]ll hell gonna
break . . . loose.” He said there was someone in court “to see who
got on the stand” and that person was “just waitin’ on [defendant]
to give a word.”
5
The Attorney General’s request for judicial notice of the
transcripts of this recording and Jesse’s call to Sergeant Laren,
People’s Exhibit Nos. 47 and 49, is granted. (Evid. Code, §§ 452,
subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)) On our own motion, we take judicial
notice of the redacted audio recordings, People’s Exhibit Nos. 48
and 50, that were played at trial.
5
Before defendant’s jury trial, and following an in camera
discussion with defense counsel, the trial court ordered the
prosecution to “turn over to the defense the lab error rates that
have been kept in connection with Kari Yoshida from the time of
her employment with the Sheriff’s Department . . . .” The
prosecution clarified the trial court was referring to what the
prosecution called “unexpected results.” Defendant’s attorney
acknowledged the prosecution had already produced “all the
validation studies regarding the Sheriff’s lab as far as the
certification of the lab and as far as the policies and procedures
that are set in place to [e]nsure that there is no contamination of
any DNA results.” The prosecution disclosed two unexpected
results involving Yoshida since she started working in the
Sheriff’s lab, but the trial court ultimately excluded these as
irrelevant.
In the course of her trial testimony regarding her analysis
of the duct tape samples, Yoshida testified that the pieces of duct
tape used on Charles’s ankles and wrists were stored in separate
boxes. She sent these samples to another part of the laboratory
to be dusted for fingerprints before she checked for DNA, and the
boxes were switched when the samples came back to her.
Yoshida documented this in her report, but she testified it did not
interfere with her testing. And though Yoshida acknowledged
the mix-up could have resulted in contamination, DNA would
only have been transferred from one piece of duct tape found at
the crime scene to another. There was no indication that the
fingerprint analyst who switched the boxes had any contact with
the reference samples of defendant’s DNA. Nonetheless, Yoshida
acknowledged Sergeant Laren was “very disappointed” when she
told him about the error.
6
Yoshida also testified she would have preferred to swab the
duct tape for DNA while other members of the laboratory looked
for fingerprints because, among other things, dusting for prints
could move DNA from one part of the tape to another. However,
it was “common practice for chemical to do their fingerprint
analysis before [Yoshida and her colleagues] g[o]t [a sample].”
Yoshida additionally testified she tested samples from the
crime scene at the same time that she tested reference samples
containing defendant’s DNA, though she took care not to have
more than one test tube open at a time. Yoshida acknowledged
this practice was not consistent with protocols established by the
manufacturer of one of the kits used in the DNA extraction. The
manufacturer and other authorities instead recommended
evidence samples and reference samples be extracted at separate
times to reduce the risk of cross-contamination, and Yoshida
testified this was a “good recommendation” that her laboratory
later adopted. Yoshida testified, however, that she extracted
DNA in this case consistent with her laboratory’s protocols in
2005, which were in line with standards established by the FBI
and a professional association.
C. Conviction and Sentencing
As relevant for our purposes, defendant and Ernest were
charged with murder; associated robbery-murder and burglary-
murder special circumstances were alleged. (§§ 187, subd. (a),
190.2, subd. (a)(17).) Defendant’s trial jury was instructed,
among other things, on felony murder liability. The jury found
defendant guilty of first degree murder and found true the
robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances. The
trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison without the
7
possibility of parole and the judgment was affirmed on appeal.
(People v. Johnson (July 10, 2008, B197179) [nonpub. opn.]
(Johnson I).)
D. Petition for Resentencing
Defendant filed a petition for resentencing in 2019. The
trial court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing in
2021, reasoning the special circumstance findings made him
ineligible for relief as a matter of law and, in the alternative,
defendant was one of the actual killers or a direct aider and
abettor. This court reversed because the jury’s special
circumstance findings were made before our Supreme Court
clarified the meaning of “major participant” and “reckless
indifference to human life” in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th
788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 and because
weighing of the evidence is not permitted at the prima facie
stage. (People v. Johnson (Feb. 7, 2022, B310328) [nonpub.
opn.].) The trial court was directed to issue an order to show
cause and hold an evidentiary hearing on remand. (Ibid.)
Prior to the evidentiary hearing, defendant filed a discovery
motion requesting, among other things, Yoshida’s “[d]esk
[n]otes/[l]ab [n]otes,” including proficiency testing and quality
control reports, protocols and manuals, and data “necessary to
recreate the . . . analysis.” The trial court directed the parties to
informally work with each other regarding discovery, and
defendant subsequently applied to the trial court to appoint a
DNA expert “to review . . . Yoshida’s desk notes and conclusions.”
Defendant explained “the appointment would be limited to a
review of the protocol used by both . . . Yoshida and the
fingerprinting expert. That is, contamination of the tape by
8
removing the tape from each box . . . since the tapes were
switched . . . upon the return for DNA testing after the
fingerprinting.” Defendant emphasized he did not seek to “re-
test[ ]” the duct tape, but rather to present evidence regarding
“the weight” Yoshida’s analysis “should be given (if any) due to
the testing protocol itself.” The trial court denied defendant’s
request to appoint a DNA expert.6
Defendant submitted a “trial brief” in advance of the
evidentiary hearing, summarizing the testimony at defendant’s
criminal trial and noting, among other things, that the audio
recording of the conversation between defendant and Ernest “was
not turned over to the defense” and “[c]ounsel was told that this
CD could not be found.”
At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court stated it had
“read the entire record of conviction.” The trial court “[r]eceived
into [e]vidence” a compact disc from the prosecution, which
6
The trial court did not set forth its reasoning in the denial
order, but it had explained its thinking at an earlier hearing,
remarking: “I’m not appointing a DNA expert. This is not a do-
over for trial, and you’re not here to prove [defendant’s] innocence
or whether or not there is newly discovered evidence or anything
like that. [¶] If you want to go that route, you can file a habeas.
The only thing at issue for an 1172.6 is—it’s already assumed
your client is guilty as far as being the one involved in the crime.
The only issue for an 1172.6 . . . is whether or not he could still be
convicted under a viable theory of murder liability. [¶] So the
only question is: What is his intent or were his actions as an
aider and abettor, not whether or not he was present at the
scene. That is presumed. [¶] So we’re not doing a do-over, and
I’m not appointing experts that aren’t solely focused on the issue
which is before this court in an 1172.6.”
9
included the clerk’s transcript and reporter’s transcript from
defendant’s trial, plus the Johnson I opinion. It did not include
the recording of Jesse’s call to Sergeant Laren or defendant’s
conversation with Ernest. Neither the prosecution nor defendant
presented any new evidence at the evidentiary hearing.
The trial court denied defendant’s petition for resentencing.
In making factual findings at the hearing, the court referred—
without objection—to Jesse’s recorded statements to Sergeant
Laren and defendant’s statements to Ernest. In its written order
denying the petition, the trial court concluded “the People proved,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was one of the actual
killers who, by his own words, was responsible for the blunt force
trauma to the victim’s head, which was a contributing factor in
the victim’s death. Alternatively, . . . defendant was a direct
aider and abettor who harbored express malice. Lastly and also
alternatively, . . . defendant was a major participant who acted
with reckless indifference to human life.”
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that because the prosecution did not
introduce in evidence the recording of Jesse’s call to Sergeant
Laren and defendant’s recorded hallway conversation with
Ernest, the trial court must have improperly relied on the Court
of Appeal’s summary of these statements in Johnson I. The trial
court was entitled to rely on these trial exhibits, however,
without formally re-admitting or taking judicial notice of them.
And even if we assume the trial court instead relied on the
factual summary in Johnson I, any error is harmless because the
summary in that opinion fairly reflects the substance of the
recorded statements.
10
Defendant further contends the trial court abused its
discretion in declining to appoint an expert to review the DNA
evidence. Any error, however, was harmless in light of the
strength of the (other) evidence against defendant.
A. The Trial Court’s Discussion of Recorded Statements
Admitted at Trial Does Not Warrant Reversal
At the evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on
the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under
California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019. The admission of evidence in the
hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except that the
court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior
hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including
witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially
noticed. The court may also consider the procedural history of
the case recited in any prior appellate opinion.” (§ 1172.6, subd.
(d)(3).)
Defendant contends that because the prosecution did not
move into evidence the recordings of Jesse’s call to Sergeant
Laren or defendant’s conversation with Ernest at the evidentiary
hearing, the trial court “apparently” “fill[ed] in gaps in the
evidence . . . by relying on the factual summary” in Johnson I.
Assuming for argument’s sake that defendant did not forfeit the
issue by failing to object to the trial court’s factual findings, the
argument still lacks merit and any error was harmless in any
event.
Section 1172.6 does not require the prosecution to present
or the trial court to re-admit or take judicial notice of trial
11
exhibits at the evidentiary hearing. To the contrary, “the court
may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing
or trial that is admissible under current law . . . .” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3).) Defendant’s observation that the statute includes
the phrases “[a]t the hearing” and “in the hearing”—supposedly
demonstrating the trial court may only consider evidence
presented at the hearing—disregards the context in which those
phrases are used that shows neither pertains to consideration of
exhibits previously admitted. Instead, the former refers to the
prosecution’s burden of proof (“At the hearing to determine
whether the petitioner is entitled to relief, the burden of proof
shall be on the prosecution”) and the latter refers to new evidence
(“The admission of evidence in the hearing shall be governed by
the Evidence Code, except that the court may consider evidence
previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law”). (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3), emphasis
added.)
Defendant argues that even if the trial court was
authorized to consider trial exhibits without re-admitting or
taking judicial notice of them, it did not actually consider the
recordings because they were not physically available. Defendant
emphasizes his attorney notified the trial court the prosecution
could not find the recording of the conversation between
defendant and Ernest. Both this recording and the recording of
Jesse’s call to Sergeant Laren were, however, in the court’s file
(as established by the materials now before us). There is
accordingly no basis to assume the trial court improperly relied
on Johnson I’s summary when the recordings were available.7
7
Although the trial court stated it “read” the record of
conviction, defendant does not challenge the trial court’s
12
But even if we assume the trial court improperly relied on
Johnson I’s summary of the recorded statements, any error would
still be harmless. A reviewing court confronted similar
circumstances in People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706,
which also involved a challenge to the denial of a section 1172.6
petition based on the trial court’s reliance on a prior appellate
opinion—though the trial court in that case expressly stated it
was relying on the prior appellate opinion. (Id. at 711-713.) The
Vance court emphasized the defendant “never claimed that [the]
opinion misrepresented or omitted any material part of the
record.” (Id. at 714.) The same is true here.
Defendant, though, contends harmless error analysis would
be inappropriate because the lower court did not “conduct[ ] the
review required by the statute at the evidentiary hearing.”
Defendant relies on People v. Gallardo (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
296, in which the trial court summarily denied a section 1172.6
petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage “following the
prosecution’s oral proffer that the jury instructions from [the
defendant’s] trial were based on a theory of direct aiding and
abetting attempted murder.” (Id. at 302.) The Court of Appeal
“recognize[d] an order denying a section 1172.6 petition may be
reviewable for harmless error,” but it declined to “perform the
trial court’s statutorily mandated task for the first time on
appeal” and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.
(Id. at 302-303.) Here, by contrast, even if we assume the trial
court improperly relied on the summary of the recording in this
potential reliance on redacted transcripts which, though not
included in the prosecution’s submission, were also included in
the trial court record.
13
court’s prior opinion, our finding that the error was harmless
does not involve any substitution of our judgment for that of the
trial court as to defendant’s eligibility for relief because the
summary is undisputedly accurate.
B. The Trial Court’s Denial of Defendant’s Request for
Appointment of a DNA Expert Does Not Warrant
Reversal
Defendant contends that the trial court was authorized
under Evidence Code section 730 to appoint an expert to review
the protocols Yoshida followed in her DNA analysis and that its
failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.8 Assuming Evidence
Code section 730 applies at an evidentiary hearing under section
1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), and further assuming the trial court
did not act within its discretion in declining to appoint an expert
to opine on an issue that was covered extensively in Yoshida’s
cross examination, there is still no prejudice.
Even if an expert had provided additional reasons to
question Yoshida’s determination that defendant left DNA on the
8
Evidence Code section 730 provides in pertinent part that,
“[w]hen it appears to the court, at any time before or during the
trial of an action, that expert evidence is or may be required by
the court or by any party to the action, the court on its own
motion or on motion of any party may appoint one or more
experts to investigate, to render a report as may be ordered by
the court, and to testify as an expert at the trial of the action
relative to the fact or matter as to which the expert evidence is or
may be required. The court may fix the compensation for these
services, if any, rendered by any person appointed under this
section, in addition to any service as a witness, at the amount as
seems reasonable to the court.”
14
duct tape, it is not reasonably probable the trial court would have
determined he is eligible for resentencing. The DNA evidence
was a relatively small part of the strong evidence the trial court
cited in support of its finding that defendant is guilty of murder
under current law. We shall elaborate in context of two of the
theories on which the trial court based its decision: that
defendant directly aided and abetted murder with intent to kill
and that he was a major participant in the robbery/burglary who
acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§ 189, subds.
(e)(2), (e)(3).)
Jesse’s trial testimony and recorded call to Sergeant Laren
establish defendant and Ernest went to Charles’s home to kill
him—or, in any case, they decided they had to kill Charles after
they had bound and beaten him because he knew them,
defendant personally beat Charles, he and Ernest were selected
for the job because they were the only people “tough enough” to
carry it out. Defendant was recorded acknowledging, in a general
manner, that he made self-incriminating statements to Jesse.
Anton and Hassen’s testimony establish defendant and Ernest
planned the robbery in advance and defendant obtained the duct
tape used to restrain Charles. And the medical examiner’s
testimony establishes the murder was not the result of a single or
sudden act.
Against this background, it is not reasonably probable the
trial court would have deemed the DNA evidence necessary to
find defendant ineligible for resentencing. Jesse’s testimony,
corroborated by defendant’s recorded statement, establishes
defendant and Ernest intended to kill Charles and (at a
minimum) defendant aided and abetted Ernest in doing so.
(People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 945 [affirming
15
denial of petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95
because the record established the defendant was convicted of
murder as an aider and abettor with intent to kill].)
The same evidence, combined with testimony from Anton,
Hassen, and the medical examiner, establishes defendant was a
major participant in the robbery/burglary who acted with
reckless indifference to human life. Although the provenance of
the gun used in this case is unclear, all of the other major
participation factors (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 705-
706) weigh strongly in favor of defendant’s status as a major
participant. Defendant helped plan what he described as a
“contract killing” that he and Ernest were engaged to perform, he
personally beat Charles, he either made or carried out a
suggestion to kill Charles in any case because he could identify
them as his assailants, and he left Charles bound and dead or
dying to be discovered the next morning. The same is true when
it comes to reckless indifference to human life; the facts strongly
establish the same regardless of the probative value of the DNA
evidence. (Id. at 706; accord People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th
867, 884-885.) There was no effort to minimize the risk of
violence—lethal violence was the express purpose of this
“contract killing.” Defendant was present at the scene of the
killing, personally beat Charles, and, rather than restraining
Ernest or aiding Charles, defendant either made or carried out
the suggestion that he and Ernest kill Charles to prevent him
from identifying them. In addition, although the precise duration
of the attack is not known, it was sufficiently prolonged that
Charles’s yelling prompted defendant and Ernest to cover his
mouth and turn up the television volume.
16
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
17
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.