People v. Miller CA1/5

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Filed 8/1/25 P. v. Miller CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
A171649
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. SCR5983311)
JARROD MILLER,
Defendant and Appellant.

In 2012, a jury convicted Jarrod Miller (appellant) of first degree
murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 and found true an allegation that he
personally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).2 The
jury also convicted appellant of burglary (§ 459) and found true an
enhancement that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). This
court affirmed the subsequent judgment. (People v. Miller (2014) 231
Cal.App.4th 1301.)

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The underlying facts are not relevant to our resolution of this appeal.

1
In 2024, appellant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section
1172.6 (former section 1170.95).3 The trial court appointed counsel and,
following briefing and a hearing, summarily denied the petition.
On appeal, appellant’s counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, and appellant filed a supplemental letter brief. We
“evaluate the specific arguments presented in that [supplemental] brief” (id.
at p. 232) and affirm.
Section 1172.6 provides that a murder conviction be vacated when the
petitioner was “convicted of . . . murder [pursuant to a] . . . theory under
which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime” and the petitioner “could not presently be convicted
of murder.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a) & (a)(3).) The jury in appellant’s case was
not instructed on the natural and probable consequences theory, felony
murder, or any other theory of imputed malice. The information did not
charge any codefendants and neither the information nor the jury
instructions referred to any accomplices. The jury was instructed on express
and implied malice, and the only theory of first degree murder was
premeditation and deliberation. The jury found true an allegation that, in
the commission of the murder, appellant personally used a firearm causing
death. The record of conviction conclusively establishes that the jury found
appellant acted with malice.
In his supplemental brief, appellant argues that at trial, the court
erroneously refused to instruct the jury on the heat of passion theory of
voluntary manslaughter, thereby “causing malice to be imputed.” Even
assuming the court erred in refusing the instruction, the resulting conviction

3 Section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6, without substantive

change, effective June 30, 2022. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

2
would be based not on imputed malice, but on the jury’s lack of awareness
that heat of passion serves to negate malice. (See People v. Rios (2000) 23
Cal.4th 450, 460 [“ ‘Generally, the intent to unlawfully kill constitutes malice.
[Citations.] “But a defendant who intentionally and unlawfully kills
[nonetheless] lacks malice . . . when [he] acts in a ‘sudden quarrel or heat of
passion . . . .’ ” ’ ”]; id. at p. 467 [“provocation and imperfect self-defense
negate the murder element of malice, and thus reduce an otherwise malicious
homicide from murder to the nonmalicious offense of voluntary
manslaughter”]; CALCRIM No. 570, italics added [“A killing that would
otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant
killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion”].) In
any event, the argument is not properly raised in a section 1172.6 petition.
“Section 1172.6 does not create a right to a second appeal, and [a petitioner]
cannot use it to resurrect a claim that should have been raised in [the]
. . . direct appeal.” (People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 865; see also
People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947 [“The mere filing of a section
1170.95 [now § 1172.6] petition does not afford the petitioner a new
opportunity to raise claims of trial error”].) A recent Supreme Court case
submitted by appellant as additional authority does not change our analysis.
Appellant fails to demonstrate error in the summary denial of his section
1172.6 petition.
DISPOSITION
The order denying appellant’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.

3
SIMONS, Acting P. J.

We concur.
BURNS, J.
CHOU, J.

(A171649)

4

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