People v. Pena CA2/5

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Filed 8/1/25 P. v. Pena CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B332780

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. MA039645)

DANIEL ANTHONY PENA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lisa M. Strassner, Judge. Affirmed.
Cynthia L. Barnes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Shezad H. Thakor, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted defendant and appellant Daniel Pena
(defendant) of second degree robbery and five counts of assault
with an assault rifle. The trial court sentenced him to 40-plus
years in prison. Years later, defendant sought resentencing
pursuant to Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 81), which made defendant-favorable amendments to Penal
Code section 1385, and Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Senate Bill 567), which amended Penal Code section 1170
to require lower term sentencing for youthful offenders unless
contrary to the interests of justice. The trial court reduced
defendant’s sentence to 29 years and four months in prison. We
are asked to decide whether this was an abuse of discretion
because the court should have reduced defendant’s sentence
further—by dismissing a Three Strikes law prior conviction or by
imposing a lower term sentence because of defendant’s relatively
young age at the time of the crimes of conviction.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Defendant’s Conviction and Original Sentencing
Early one evening in August 2007, Derrick S. was working
on an automobile parked on Larkin Avenue in the City of
Palmdale. With him were his twin brother Darrion S. and three
friends: Justine T., Joesph J., and Deon J. They were all
teenagers; Justine was the youngest at age 13 and Joseph was
the oldest at 18 years.
Defendant—then age 22—was driving in the area of Larkin
Avenue and Christian Josue Bercian (Bercian) was his passenger.
Defendant drove up to Derrick and the others and asked him if
he “bang[ed].” Derrick said no, and defendant pointed an AK-47
rifle at him and others in the group, warning them not to make

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any “fast moves.” At defendant’s instruction, Derrick then
emptied his pockets, producing a flashlight and some quarters.
When defendant asked what else he had, Derrick gave him a
stack of compact disks from the vehicle he had been working on.
When Bercian asked if they should “smoke ‘em,” defendant
replied “no” and drove away.
Later that same evening, the police detained defendant and
recovered an AK-47 that he had attempted to hide. All five
victims identified defendant and Bercian at a field show-up as
the men who accosted them, and defendant and Bercian were
arrested.
The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged
defendant and Bercian with robbing Derrick S. (Pen. Code,1
§ 211) and five counts of assault with an assault weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(3)). The information alleged that all of the charged
crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B) & (C)), that a principal used a firearm in
the commission of the robbery (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) & (e)(1)),
and that a principal was armed with an assault weapon in the
commission of the assaults (§ 12022, subd. (a)(2)). In addition,
the information alleged defendant had sustained a 2004
conviction for an attempted carjacking (§§ 215, subd. (a), 664),
which qualified both as a prior “strike” conviction under the
Three Strikes law and as a prior serious felony conviction.
A trial jury found defendant guilty as charged and found
true all the alleged gang and firearm enhancements. A probation
report prepared in advance of defendant’s sentencing hearing

1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.

3
enumerated several aggravating factors in the commission of the
offenses of conviction: (1) “The crime involved [the] threat of great
bodily harm[,] disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness or
callousness”; (2) “[D]efendant was armed with a weapon at the
time of the commission of the crime”; (3) “The victims were
particularly vulnerable”; (4) “The crime involved multiple
victims”; (5) “The planning with which the crime was carried out
indicated premeditation”; and (6) “[D]efendant has served prior
prison terms.” The report identified no mitigating factors.
Defendant admitted sustaining the attempted carjacking
conviction alleged as a prior “strike” crime and the trial court
sentenced him to 46 years and eight months in prison. With the
exception of one of the assault convictions (count 4), the court
imposed an upper term sentence for each conviction. On direct
appeal, a different panel of this court corrected a sentencing
error, reducing defendant’s aggregate sentence to 45 years in
prison, but otherwise affirmed the judgment.

B. Defendant’s Resentencing
In 2022, defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in this court and a different panel of this court issued an
order to show cause returnable in the trial court. We opined that
a prior grant of habeas corpus relief for defendant in the trial
court reopened the finality of his criminal judgment for purposes
of retroactive application of ameliorative legislation.
Back in the trial court, defendant filed a resentencing
memorandum arguing the trial court should dismiss, pursuant to
Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333),
the jury’s gang enhancement true findings and the related
firearm enhancements. In addition, defendant argued Senate

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Bill 81 required dismissal of his prior “strike” conviction and,
regardless, the trial court should dismiss that “strike” pursuant
to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
Finally, defendant maintained Senate Bill 567 mandated a lower
term sentence on each conviction due to his young age at the time
he committed the crimes. In support of his resentencing request,
defendant submitted a number of documents attesting to his
efforts at rehabilitation while in prison.
The District Attorney conceded Assembly Bill 333 required
dismissal of the gang and related firearm enhancements, but he
argued there should be no further reductions in defendant’s
sentence (and maintained the court should again impose upper
term sentences based on defendant’s criminal history). The
District Attorney provided the court with a certified criminal
history printout for defendant and materials concerning
defendant’s conduct while incarcerated and his assessed risk to
the public if paroled.
The criminal history record reveals defendant committed
vandalism as a juvenile, attempted carjacking in 2004 (at age 19),
and possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11377, subd. (a)) in 2006 while on parole from the carjacking
sentence. Shortly after being released from prison for the parole
violation, defendant committed the robbery and assault crimes at
issue in this appeal.
Prison rule violation reports provided by the prosecution
detailed defendant’s participation in three assaults on other
inmates since his original sentencing. In 2012, defendant joined
40 other inmates in charging through a line of eight to ten
correctional officers to attack four other inmates. In 2019,
defendant and two inmates attacked another inmate. And in

5
February 2023, just three months before he filed his resentencing
memorandum, defendant and his cellmate refused to comply with
correctional officer orders and engaged in a fistfight with two
other inmates. A “Comprehensive Risk Assessment” performed
by the Forensic Assessment Division of the Board of Parole
Hearings stated defendant “continued to show signs of behavioral
instability” notwithstanding his “increased involvement in
prosocial activities” and assessed he would present a “[h]igh risk
for violence” if released.
Defendant’s resentencing hearing was held in July 2023.2
The trial court stated for the record that it had reviewed and
considered all of the resentencing submissions filed by the
parties, and the court heard argument from counsel. With the
People’s concurrence, the court dismissed the gang enhancements
(and related firearm enhancements), which reduced defendant’s
sentence to a total term of 29 years and four months in prison.
This sentence was comprised of: 24 years, or an upper term
sentence of 12 years doubled in light of defendant’s prior “strike,”
for the assault with an assault weapon conviction pertaining to
Derrick; five years and four months, or one-third the middle
term, doubled, for the assault with an assault weapon conviction
pertaining to Darrion; 24 years for the remaining assault with an
assault weapon convictions—to run concurrent with the 24-year
sentence for assaulting Derrick; and two years for the robbery
conviction, stayed pursuant to section 654.
In explaining the sentence imposed and its decision to
reject the defense arguments for a further reduced sentence, the

2
The judge presiding was not the same judge that originally
sentenced defendant.

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trial court stated it viewed defendant as a “danger to public
safety.” The court believed defendant’s “rehabilitative efforts”
while in prison “were insufficient to deter [him] from
committing . . . additional violent offenses” against other inmates.
The court was also troubled by the circumstances of the offenses
of conviction, observing that defendant “was armed not with a
revolver or semi-automatic handgun, but with a fully functional
and loaded . . . assault rifle. He chose to drive the streets of
Lancaster. He found four children ages 13, 16, 16, and 17 in a
residential neighborhood. After locating those victims,
he . . . pointed the military-grade assault rifle at the children and
directed one of them to empty his pockets. [¶] . . . [¶] When
[defendant] discovered the child did not have anything of
significance[,] . . . [he f]orc[ed] the 16-year-old to bring CDs from
another person’s car over to [defendant] at gunpoint.” When
specifically considering defendant’s argument for a lower term
sentence (rather than an upper term sentence), the court
observed the law permitted it to consider defendant’s prior
convictions as an aggravating factor even in the absence of a jury
finding or a stipulation by the defendant.

II. DISCUSSION
The trial court did not err in concluding defendant was not
entitled to a further reduction in sentence pursuant to Senate
Bill 81 or Senate Bill 567. As a result of the reductions in
sentence the trial court did make, the only available means of
further reducing defendant’s sentence as he requested would
have been to dismiss defendant’s prior “strike” conviction or to
impose a lower-term sentence (rather than an upper-term
sentence) for the assault with an assault weapon convictions.

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The trial court’s refusal to do the former was not an abuse of
discretion because the trial court reasonably found, in light of the
offenses of conviction, defendant’s criminal history and violent
behavior in prison, and defendant’s assessed risk of committing
future offenses, that dismissing the prior strike crime would
endanger public safety. The trial court’s refusal to do the latter,
because defendant’s criminal history outweighed his age at the
time of the offenses in this case, was not an abuse of discretion.

A. The Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Dismiss
Defendant’s Prior Strike Conviction
As amended by Senate Bill 81, section 1385, subdivision (c),
currently provides in relevant part: “(1) Notwithstanding any
other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the
furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that
enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute. [¶] (2) In
exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall
consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the
defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in
subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one
or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.
‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the
dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or
other serious danger to others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1)-(2).) Among
the mitigating circumstances in the subparagraphs that follow
are these: “(C) The application of an enhancement could result in
a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement
shall be dismissed. [¶] . . . [¶] (H) The enhancement is based on

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a prior conviction that is over five years old.” (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2).)
We assume only for argument’s sake (though consistent
with “much” of Senate Bill 81’s legislative history (People v.
Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 243 & fn.3)) that the just-
quoted provisions bear on a trial court’s discretionary decision of
whether to dismiss a prior “strike” crime. Even so, the trial court
did not err because its conclusion that dismissing defendant’s
prior “strike” crime would endanger public safety within the
meaning of section 1385, subdivision (c) finds ample support in
the record. (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029 [“if the
court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety,
the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will
generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement”], italics
added.) Before committing the offenses in this case, defendant
committed an attempted carjacking, a drug offense while on
parole, and vandalism as a juvenile. Shortly after being released
from the prison sentence for defendant’s attempted carjacking,
defendant committed the crimes in this case involving the use of
a military-style assault rifle to rob and assault minors. Then,
while serving time for his current convictions, defendant
repeatedly committed violent acts against other inmates—the
most recent of which occurred mere months before he filed his
resentencing memorandum. Furthermore, the Forensic
Assessment Division of the Board of Parole Hearings found
defendant “continued to show signs of behavioral instability” and,

9
despite some improvement in his behavior, presented a “[h]igh
risk for violence.”3

B. The Trial Court’s Refusal to Impose a Lower Term
Sentence Was Not an Abuse of Discretion
Before Senate Bill 567’s passage, section 1170, subdivision
(b), permitted sentencing courts to impose determinate sentences
comprised of either the lower, middle, or upper terms.
Sentencing courts had broad discretion to impose any of the three
terms and could make factual findings on aggravating or
mitigating circumstances as described in California Rules of
Court, rules 4.421 and 4.423.
Senate Bill 567 was designed to create a “presumption of
sentencing . . . not to exceed the middle terms, unless there are
circumstances in aggravation of a crime that justify the
imposition of the upper term.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen.
Floor Analyses, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) Sept. 8, 2021, p. 4; Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of
Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) April 8, 2021, p. 3 [“SB
567 creates a presumption of sentencing . . . not to exceed the
middle terms, unless there are circumstances in aggravation of a
crime that justify the imposition of the upper term”].) In its

3
Insofar as defendant continues to press the argument that
the trial court abused its discretion in declining to dismiss his
prior strike conviction even independent of the more defendant-
favorable amendments made by Senate Bill 81 (i.e., pursuant to
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 and
People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367), the argument
obviously fails in light of these same facts.

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current form as amended by Senate Bill 567, section 1170
provides that “the court shall order imposition of the lower term
if [¶] . . . [¶] [t]he person is a youth or was a youth as defined
under subdivision (b) of Section 1016.7 at the time of the
commission of the offense,” unless “the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances” and
“imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests
of justice.”4 (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B).)
The only mitigating factor identified by the trial court at
the resentencing hearing, or by defendant in his appellate
briefing, is his relatively youthful age (22) when committing the
robbery and assaults. On the other side of the ledger, the trial
court considered defendant’s crimes committed at an even
younger age, including attempted carjacking, as an aggravating
factor.5 (See generally § 1170, subd. (b)(3) [“Notwithstanding
paragraphs (1) and (2), the court may consider the defendant’s
prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified
record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a
jury”].) In our judgment, the trial court’s weighing of these
factors and its decision to impose upper term, rather than lower
term, sentences was not an abuse of discretion. The trial court
reasonably determined that imposing a lower or middle term
sentence merely because defendant was 22 at the time of his most

4
Section 1016.7 defines a youth” as “any person under 26
years of age on the date the offense was committed.” (§ 1016.7,
subd. (b).)
5
The defense argued during the hearing, without opposition,
that the court’s consideration of aggravating factors was limited
to defendant’s prior convictions.

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recent convictions would not be in the interests of justice
considering the nature and number of his prior crimes committed
at an even younger age.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.
We concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

MOOR, J.

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