People v. Grady CA4/1

CourtListener 10645598CalctappJul 31, 2025

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Filed 7/31/25 P. v. Grady CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083700

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD216913)

MARQUISE GRADY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Jeffrey F. Fraser, Judge. Affirmed.
Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Melissa A. Mandel, Seth M. Friedman
and Joseph C. Anagnos, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2010, defendant Marquise Grady and three codefendants were
charged with multiple offenses arising out of a gang-related shooting in a
local liquor store parking lot. Grady was convicted of one count of first degree
murder, three counts of premeditated attempted murder, one count of
conspiracy to commit murder, and one count of shooting at an occupied
vehicle. In 2023, Grady filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal

Code section 1172.6,1 claiming he could no longer be convicted of murder

or attempted murder because of recent changes to sections 188 and 189.2
The trial court summarily denied the petition, finding that Grady failed to
establish a prima facie case for relief.
We agree with the trial court that Grady’s conviction for conspiracy to
commit murder shows that Grady acted with express malice and an intent
to kill. So although the jury was instructed on the now-invalid natural and
probable consequences doctrine, the conspiracy conviction makes clear the
jurors did not rely on this theory in finding Grady guilty of murder and
attempted murder. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying relief.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Both parties refer to our earlier unpublished opinion on direct appeal—
People v. Grady (Feb. 14, 2012, D057450)—to provide some basic context,
understanding that we do not resolve any disputed facts in determining

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 These changes were primarily the result of Senate Bill No. 1437 in
2018 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) and Senate Bill No. 775 in 2021 (Stats. 2021,
ch. 551).
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whether Grady has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief.3
(See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971–972.) Evidence at trial showed that
two cars with a total of five occupants—four males and one female—at least
some of whom were associated with a particular street gang arrived in the
parking lot of a liquor store within minutes of each other. Three of the men,
one of whom was theorized to be Grady, disappeared behind a wall while
the remaining man and woman stayed with one of the vehicles, a red Geo.
Shortly thereafter, a third car with five male occupants associated with a
rival gang entered the parking lot and parked nearby. One of those men
went into the liquor store while the other four—the eventual victims—
remained inside the vehicle or clustered around it. The three men hidden
behind the wall emerged, at least some began shooting, and all then fled in
the red Geo with the man and woman. One victim was killed, another was
wounded, and the remaining two escaped injury. Ballistics evidence
indicated at least five shots were fired from two different weapons.

DISCUSSION

Grady contends the court erred in summarily denying his section
1172.6 petition without issuing an order to show cause because the record of
conviction does not conclusively establish he is ineligible for relief as a matter
of law. A trial court considering a section 1172.6 petition first determines if

3 Both parties have requested we take judicial notice of at least portions
of the appellate record in Grady’s direct appeal, and in the interest of
completeness we grant Grady’s request to notice the entire record. It is
well settled that in deciding whether the defendant has made a prima facie
showing under section 1172.6, the court may consider the entire record of
conviction. (See People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis); People v.
Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 106.) Although apparently not presented to
the trial court in this case, it would nonetheless be relevant in assessing
whether any theoretical error was prejudicial. (Lewis, at pp. 972–974.)
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the petition makes a prima facie showing that would entitle the petitioner to
relief. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In doing so, the court is permitted
to review the record of conviction to assess the petitioner’s claim of eligibility,
but it may not engage in factfinding, weigh the evidence, or exercise
discretion. (Id. at p. 972.) It must generally take the petitioner’s factual
allegations as true, but is not required to accept factual allegations refuted
by the record of conviction. (Id. at p. 971.)
In arguing that his petition asserts a prima facie claim, Grady relies
on the fact that the jury was instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a basis for finding him guilty of both first degree
murder and attempted murder. There is no dispute that Senate Bill No. 1437
and Senate Bill No. 775 made statutory changes to California’s murder laws
effectively eliminating the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a
theory of both murder and attempted murder. (See, e.g., People v. Nino
(2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 844, 850–851; People v. Henderson (2025) 110
Cal.App.5th 828, 835–836; People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1065.)
Thus, unless the record of conviction conclusively demonstrates that Grady
was not found guilty of either murder or attempted murder based on a theory
of natural and probable consequences, he is potentially eligible for relief
under section 1172.6.
There is no question Grady’s jury was instructed he could be guilty of
both murder and attempted murder based on a theory that (1) he committed
a lesser “target” crime, either shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (charged)
or assault with a firearm (uncharged), and (2) a murder and/or attempted
murder committed by a coparticipant were the natural and probable

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consequences of these lesser crimes.4 Moreover, the People do not dispute
that had the jury used this theory to convict Grady of murder or attempted
murder, those convictions would be invalid based on changes to the law made
by Senate Bill No. 1437 and Senate Bill No. 775. Instead, they argue that
other aspects of the verdict make clear the jurors did not rely on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. Specifically, they assert that because
the jury also convicted Grady of conspiracy to commit murder, this provided

an independent and fully sufficient basis for murder liability.5 And having
found that Grady conspired to commit murder with an express intent to kill,
the jury had no need to resort to any prohibited imputation of malice based
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

4 The jury was instructed on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine pursuant to CALCRIM Nos. 402 and 403. Jurors were told that
under certain circumstances, a defendant could be guilty of murder or
attempted murder based on having committed a different crime. There were
two possible applications of this theory in this case, based on whether the
jury found that Grady committed an underlying “target” crime, either the
charged crime of shooting at an occupied vehicle or the uncharged crime of
assault with a firearm. Once it concluded that Grady had committed a target
crime, he would also be guilty of murder or attempted murder if the jury
additionally found that (a) “during the commission of [the target crime], a co
participant in that crime committed the crime of Murder or attempt murder,”
and (b) “[u]nder all the circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant’s
position would have known that the commission of Murder or attempt
murder was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the
[target crime].”
5 The jury was instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 563 that in order
to establish Grady was guilty of a conspiracy to commit murder as charged,
the People had to prove: “1. The defendant intended to agree and did agree
with one or more of co participants . . . to intentionally and unlawfully kill;
[¶] 2. At the time of the agreement, the defendant and one or more of the
other alleged members of the conspiracy intended that one or more of them
would intentionally and unlawfully kill; [and] [¶] 3. The defendant or co
participants . . . committed at least one overt act . . . .”
5
We have previously addressed the effect of a conspiracy to commit
murder conviction on a defendant’s ability to state a prima facie claim for
relief under section 1172.6. In People v. Lovejoy (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860
(Lovejoy), the defendant Lovejoy was convicted of the attempted murder of
her ex-husband and a related conspiracy to murder him arising out of a plan
she agreed to with her then-current boyfriend. The plan called for the
boyfriend to lure the ex-husband to a remote location and shoot him.
Fortunately for the ex-husband, the shot wounded but did not kill him.
Lovejoy filed a petition for relief under section 1172.6, contending
that “ ‘the jury instructions on co-conspiracy liability permitted the jury to
find her guilty of attempted murder based upon the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.’ ” (Lovejoy, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 866
(Lovejoy).) But we rejected her argument, concluding that her posited
theory on how the jury might have relied on the natural and probable
consequences instructions was necessarily inconsistent with the verdict
finding Lovejoy guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, which included a
determination that Lovejoy intended to kill her ex-husband. We noted that
natural and probable consequences instructions are problematic in the
context of a conspiracy charge “only where a defendant is convicted of murder
or attempted murder based on a conspiracy to commit ‘a lesser crime that
resulted in murder.’ ” (Id. at p. 867, quoting People v. Beck and Cruz (2019)
8 Cal.5th 548, 645.) There was no possibility that Lovejoy merely intended
some lesser target offense, such that she was guilty of murder solely because
it was the natural and probable consequence of the target offense she
intended. (Lovejoy, at p. 868.) In Lovejoy, as in this case, the jury found
that murder was always the “target” offense. And absent a formal
withdrawal from the conspiracy—about which there were no instructions or

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evidence in this case—an agreement to murder continues to make defendants
criminally responsible for their coconspirators’ efforts to achieve that result
without any additional findings with regard to their actions or mental state
at the exact moment of the shooting. (Id. at p. 869.)
Grady does not address the implications of Lovejoy or Beck and Cruz.
Instead, he cites the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Curiel (2023) 15
Cal.5th 433 (Curiel) for the proposition that a finding of intent to kill, by
itself, does not make a defendant automatically ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6. (Curiel, at p. 463.) But as we explained in Lovejoy, the
circumstances of Curiel are readily distinguishable. (See Lovejoy, supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at p. 869, fn. 6.) In Curiel, the defendant was charged with
murder based on alternative theories of aiding and abetting—direct aiding
and abetting and aiding and abetting based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (Curiel, at p. 446.) The verdict did not specify which
theory the jury adopted. (Id. at p. 467.) In finding true a gang-murder
special circumstance, however, the jury necessarily found the defendant
intended to kill. (Id. at p. 447.) Yet the Supreme Court determined that
where the jury was permitted to find aiding and abetting liability for murder
based on the now-prohibited natural and probable consequences doctrine,
the abstract finding of intent to kill was not sufficient to demonstrate that
the defendant remained guilty of murder under current law. (Id. at p. 468.)
This case, in contrast, does not involve an abstract and untethered
finding of intent to kill. Rather, that finding was incorporated into an
independent theory of murder liability that remains valid under current law.
(See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 462 [“The Legislature sought to
limit murder liability to established theories that incorporated the requisite
intent”]; Lovejoy, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 867–868 [conspiracy to

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commit murder remains valid].) Where the defendant is convicted of the
murder and/or attempted murder of some or all of the same victims that were
the object of the conspiracy to commit murder, the conspiracy verdict with its
incorporated finding of intent to kill precludes even a theoretical possibility
that the defendant was found liable for murder or attempted murder based
on the now-invalid natural and probable consequences doctrine.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

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