DeGeorge v. Taffae CA2/2

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Filed 7/31/25 DeGeorge v. Taffae CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

MARCO DeGEORGE et al., B333181

Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23SMCP00177)
v.

PETER TAFFAE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark A. Young, Judge. Affirmed.

Barrington Legal, Eamon Jafari and Jacob R. Gould for
Defendant and Appellant.

Andrew P. Holland, Cynthia C. Mullen and Jenna W.
Logoluso for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
__________________________
Peter Taffae appeals from the trial court’s judgment
confirming an arbitration award to Marco and Kim DeGeorge
arising from mutual breaches of an earlier settlement agreement.
Taffae argues the trial court erred in confirming the award
because the arbitrator exceeded his powers. We disagree, and we
affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
Peter Taffae lives next door to Marco and Kim DeGeorge2
and their children in Santa Monica, California. Taffae and the
DeGeorges do not get along, and between 2017 and 2019, they
litigated various tort claims against each other. In February
2019, they signed a Settlement Agreement to resolve that
litigation. The Settlement Agreement included a mutual Stay-
away Agreement in which Taffae and the DeGeorges essentially
promised to leave each other alone. The Stay-away Agreement
provided for liquidated damages of $5,000 “if any Party breaches
the terms of [the Stay-away] Agreement.” The DeGeorges and
Taffae agreed to arbitrate any disputes arising out of the Stay-
away Agreement, and agreed “the prevailing Party shall be
awarded reasonable arbitration fees, attorney’s fees and costs not
to exceed $100,000.”
On February 2, 2020, Taffae and the DeGeorges were
separately preparing to host guests for the Super Bowl. Taffae lit

1 These facts are drawn from the factual findings in the
arbitrator’s amended arbitration award, which we accept as true.
(See Richey v. AutoNation, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 909, 916
(Richey).)

2 We refer to Marco DeGeorge as Mr. DeGeorge and Kim
DeGeorge as Mrs. DeGeorge. We refer to both individuals
together as “the DeGeorges.”

2
a smoker barbeque in his backyard, and the DeGeorges noticed
smoke and some embers coming into their yard. Mr. DeGeorge
had a short conversation with Taffae about the smoke and
embers, but the issue was not resolved. The DeGeorges brought
their children inside their home and called the Santa Monica Fire
Department. Fire personnel responded, spoke with
Mr. DeGeorge, and “apparently decided there was no imminent
fire danger.” They left, and “the DeGeorges then contacted the
[Santa Monica] [P]olice [D]epartment.” The police responded.
“After one or both of the DeGeorges discussed the situation with
a responding police officer, the officer left without taking any
action.”
Later that day, the DeGeorges played music at a volume
Taffae wrongly considered to be unreasonably loud. Taffae
recorded videos of the DeGeorges and their family and guests
from his residence or from across the street.
Approximately one year later, around April 23, 2021,
Mrs. DeGeorge was walking in the neighborhood with her
children and some friends. Taffae followed them for several
blocks and apparently recorded them on a cell phone, “despite
their attempt to take evasive measures.”
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Taffae initiated arbitration proceedings on April 22, 2021.
In January 2022, Taffae filed a first amended complaint naming
Mr. DeGeorge and Mrs. DeGeorge as “Respondents.” Taffae
alleged “Respondent” violated the Settlement Agreement
because: “Either M[arco] DeGeorge or K[im] DeGeorge, acting
jointly or in their individual capacity called the Santa Monica
Fire Department and/or the Santa Monica Police Department
(government agencies), knowing there was no emergency or

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threat of imminent bodily harm, and without seeking to resolve
the issue informally through The Party’s respective counsel
during a 10-business day window after the issue was identified in
writing by counsel for the complaining party, as is required under
the terms of the Settlement Agreement.” He alleged that conduct
violated clause 1(j) of the Stay-away Agreement.
The following month, the DeGeorges served Taffae with an
offer to compromise pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 998.3 The pertinent terms were: “Taffae . . . and [the
DeGeorges] each dismiss the arbitration with prejudice, with no
payment (damages, costs, or fees) due to any party. In exchange
for these mutual dismissals, the parties will also enter into a
mutual release of all known and unknown claims and damages
up and through dismissal of the arbitration. The Mutual Stay-
Away Agreement . . . will remain in full force and effect.” Taffae
did not accept the offer.
The DeGeorges unsuccessfully demurred to the first
amended complaint. Thereafter, in April 2022, Mr. DeGeorge and
Mrs. DeGeorge filed separate answers to the first amended
complaint. Mr. DeGeorge alleged several affirmative defenses
and two counterclaims, specifically, that Taffae breached the
Stay-away Agreement by “(1) making or pretending to make
recordings of the DeGeorge property, family, and guests on
February 2, 2020, and (2) stalking Kim DeGeorge in Santa
Monica on April 23, 2021.” Mrs. DeGeorge’s answer asserted
several affirmative defenses but no counterclaims.
The arbitration was held on several days in September
2022 and October 2022. The arbitrator heard testimony from

3 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.

4
Taffae, the DeGeorges, and several witnesses. In the initial
arbitration award dated January 3, 2023, the arbitrator
determined Taffae had shown the DeGeorges violated the Stay-
away Agreement by “calling the police out to the residences” on
February 2, 2020. He rejected Taffae’s claims regarding other
purported breaches by the DeGeorges on that date, including:
(1) calling the fire department; (2) “playing unreasonably loud
music”; and (3) making “misrepresentations [to] the fire and
police department[s].” The arbitrator also considered the
DeGeorges’ claims Taffae breached the Stay-away Agreement on
February 2, 2020, and April 23, 2021, by stalking. He concluded
no breach occurred on February 2, but that Taffae committed a
breach when he followed and recorded Mrs. DeGeorge and her
children and friends on April 23. Ultimately, he “award[ed]
Mr. Taffae $5,000 on his claims against the DeGeorges, and the
DeGeorges $5,000 on their claims against Mr. Taffae. As a result
of the equal, offsetting amounts, neither party shall pay the other
any amount.” The arbitrator further concluded the parties would
bear their own fees and costs because neither party prevailed.
A week later, the DeGeorges moved to correct the award as
to fees and costs. They argued because Taffae did not accept their
February 2022 offer to compromise and did not obtain a more
favorable judgment or award from the arbitration, he should pay
their post-offer costs and attorney fees under section 998.4 After
receiving briefing from the parties, the arbitrator decided to
amend the award to provide for fees and costs pursuant to section
998. He issued an amended arbitration award on March 16, 2023.

4 Attorney fees are available as post-offer costs under
section 998 when, as here, the underlying contract authorizes
fees. (Scott Co. v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1112–1113.)

5
The factual findings were unchanged from the original award,
but it added an award of $100,000 to the DeGeorges for their
attorney fees and costs.
On April 3, 2023, the DeGeorges petitioned the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County to confirm the award. Taffae
opposed confirmation and requested the court vacate the award
or correct it to determine he was the prevailing party. The court
rejected Taffae’s challenges and granted the DeGeorges’ petition
to confirm. Judgment was entered on July 28, 2023. (See
§§ 904.1, subd. (a)(1), 1287.4.) Taffae timely appealed. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rules 1.10(a), 8.104(a)(1)(B).)
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Confirming the
Arbitration Award
Courts may vacate an arbitration award if one of several
statutory grounds is satisfied. (See § 1286.2, subd. (a).) Taffae
argues this award should have been vacated because “the
arbitrator[] . . . ‘exceeded [his] powers.’ ” (Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362, 366 (Advanced
Micro).) We disagree.
A. Principles Governing Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards
“When parties contract to resolve their disputes by private
arbitration, their agreement ordinarily contemplates that the
arbitrator will have the power to decide any question of contract
interpretation, historical fact or general law necessary, in the
arbitrator’s understanding of the case, to reach a decision.”
(Gueyffier v. Ann Summers, Ltd. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1179, 1184
(Gueyffier); see also Advanced Micro, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 372
[“it is for the arbitrators to determine what issues are ‘necessary’

6
to the ultimate decision”].) But those broad powers necessarily
“ ‘derive from, and are limited by, the agreement to arbitrate.’ ”
(Gueyffier, at p. 1185.) If an arbitrator makes an award “ ‘in
excess of those powers,’ ” a court may correct or vacate it. (Ibid.;
see §§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(4), 1286.6, subd. (b).) “[H]owever, this
provision does not supply the court with a broad warrant to
vacate awards the court disagrees with or believes are
erroneous.” (Gueyffier, at p. 1184.)
“An arbitrator has exceeded his or her powers if the
arbitrator ‘strayed beyond the scope of the parties’ agreement by
resolving issues the parties did not agree to arbitrate’ [citation],
ordered an unauthorized remedy [citation], or resolved non-
arbitral issues [citation].” (City of Richmond v. Service Employees
Internat. Union, Local 1021 (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 663, 669–670;
see also California Union Square L.P. v. Saks & Co. LLC (2020)
50 Cal.App.5th 340, 348 [“Arbitrators may exceed their powers
when they act in a manner that is not authorized by the
arbitration agreement.”].) To “determin[e] whether an arbitrator
exceeded his or her powers, we look to the parties’ arbitration
agreement to see if and how it limited the arbitrator’s authority.”
(California Union, at p. 349.) Because “an agreement to arbitrate
is a contractual matter, . . . a party cannot be required to
arbitrate an issue or grievance it has not agreed would be subject
to arbitration.” (Pacific Crown Distributors v. Brotherhood of
Teamsters (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1138, 1143.)
We “ ‘conduct[] a de novo review, independently of the trial
court, of the question whether the arbitrator exceeded the
authority granted him by the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.’ ”
(Ajida Techs. v. Roose Instruments (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 534,
541 (Ajida).) “In undertaking our review, however, ‘we must draw

7
every reasonable inference to support the award.’ ” (Ibid.)
Moreover, we look “ ‘to whether the award is drawn from the
agreement as the arbitrator interpreted it or derives from some
extrinsic source. . . . [W]here an arbitrator is authorized to
determine remedies for contract violations, “courts have no
authority to disagree with his honest judgment in that
respect. . . . [A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably
construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of
his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious
error does not suffice to overturn his decision.” ’ ” (Greenspan v.
LADT, LLC (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1447 (Greenspan); see
also Advanced Micro, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 381 [“The award
must be related in a rational manner to the breach (as expressly
or impliedly found by the arbitrator).”].)
B. Taffae Has Not Shown the Arbitrator Exceeded
His Powers
Taffae argues “the Arbitrator acted beyond his jurisdiction
by issuing an award on a non-existent counterclaim that was
never submitted for arbitration and by improperly merging
separate contract breaches into a single liability determination.”
We reject his arguments, and we agree with the trial court the
arbitrator did not exceed his powers.
The DeGeorges and Taffae agreed to arbitrate issues
arising from the Stay-away Agreement, including breaches
thereof, and the arbitrator considered and decided each breach
allegedly committed by either party to the Stay-away Agreement
that was presented to him for resolution. Although the arbitrator
found one breach by the DeGeorges and one breach by Taffae,
neither party owed damages because the $5,000 liquidated
damages per breach offset each other. Although neither party

8
prevailed at the arbitration, the arbitrator nevertheless awarded
fees and costs to the DeGeorges because Taffae had rejected their
earlier section 998 offer to compromise and he did not obtain a
more favorable award from the arbitration.
We now explain why none of Taffae’s challenges to the
arbitrator’s award is persuasive.
i. The Arbitrator Did Not Adjudicate an
Unsubmitted Claim
Taffae argues the arbitrator exceeded his powers because
the “$5,000 award to Mrs. DeGeorge was not based on any
pleaded claim or evidence presented.” We disagree. The award
was plainly made for Taffae’s breach of the Stay-away Agreement
on April 23, 2021, when he stalked Mrs. DeGeorge in Santa
Monica. That issue was squarely before the arbitrator.
Mr. DeGeorge made a counterclaim for that breach in his answer
to the first amended complaint. In addition, Mrs. DeGeorge’s
answer pled an affirmative defense that Taffae’s claims were
“barred by an offset for the breaches of the Settlement Agreement
by Taffae.” Taffae “gave no credible explanation for his behavior”
that day. Taffae was thus “on notice that [he] could be found
liable on [that] claim.” (Greenspan, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1449.)
Taffae’s reply brief asserts he “was never notified that a
counterclaim by Mrs. DeGeorge was at issue and therefore was
never provided a fair opportunity to defend.” To the extent he is
suggesting Mr. DeGeorge could not bring a claim for the April 23,
2021, breach, we do not agree. “ ‘ “[T]he essence of arbitration is
its freedom from the formality of ordinary judicial procedure.” ’ ”
(Greenspan¸ supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 1449.) These parties
agreed to arbitrate disputes arising from the Stay-away

9
Agreement and any alleged breaches thereof, and “ ‘ “they must
be content with [arbitration’s] informalities.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Mr. DeGeorge properly brought the issue of Taffae’s April 23,
2021, breach of the Stay-away Agreement before the arbitrator,
and the arbitrator did not exceed his powers in deciding it.
We also reject Taffae’s factual premise that the arbitrator
awarded $5,000 to Mrs. DeGeorge. Drawing “ ‘every reasonable
inference to support the award,’ ”5 we conclude the arbitrator
awarded “the DeGeorges $5,000.” Taffae’s assertion to the
contrary takes a single sentence in the four-page arbitration
award out of context. Most of the arbitration decision refers to
“the DeGeorges” together, save for when the factual actions of
one or the other individual are at issue. In light of that overall
context, we read the one sentence noting Taffae’s liability to
Mrs. DeGeorge simply as shorthand distinguishing the
arbitrator’s finding Taffae liable for stalking Mrs. DeGeorge in
April 2021 from his finding Taffae did not stalk the DeGeorges in
February 2020.6

5 See Ajida, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at page 541.

6 Moreover, the arbitrator’s treating “the DeGeorges” as one
party and Taffae as the other is entirely consistent with both the
Settlement Agreement and the Stay-away Agreement, which
likewise defined “the DeGeorges” as a “ ‘Party.’ ” Although
Taffae’s reply brief argues to the contrary, “ ‘any doubts as to the
meaning . . . of an arbitration agreement are for the arbitrator[]
and not the court to resolve.’ ” (Advanced Micro, supra, 9 Cal.4th
at p. 372.) Here, the text of the arbitrator’s award demonstrates
the arbitrator viewed “the DeGeorges” as one party, which is
consistent with the Settlement Agreement and the Stay-away
Agreement.

10
ii. The Arbitrator Did Not Inappropriately
Merge Separate Claims
Taffae’s first amended complaint alleged the DeGeorges
violated the Settlement Agreement by breaching clause 1(j) of the
Stay-away Agreement. Taffae claimed the violation occurred
when “[e]ither M[arco] DeGeorge or K[im] DeGeorge, acting
jointly or in their individual capacity called the Santa Monica
Fire Department and/or the Santa Monica Police Department
(government agencies), knowing there was no emergency or
threat of imminent bodily harm, and without seeking to resolve
the issue informally through The Party’s respective counsel
during a 10-business day window after the issue was identified in
writing by counsel for the complaining party, as is required under
the terms of the Settlement Agreement.” Taffae argues that he
asserted two separate breach of contract claims: one against
Mr. DeGeorge and one against Mrs. DeGeorge.
To the extent that is an accurate characterization of the
claims in the first amended complaint, the arbitrator
nevertheless reasonably analyzed Taffae’s claims the agreement
was breached by calls made to the Santa Monica Fire
Department and to the Santa Monica Police Department.7 He
determined no breach occurred with the call to the fire
department, but “[t]he DeGeorges violated the settlement
agreement when they summoned the police.” We reject Taffae’s
factual contention “the Arbitrator found both DeGeorges

7 The arbitrator also analyzed and rejected Taffae’s claims
that (1) “the DeGeorges made a number of misrepresentations in
the course of their dealings with the fire and police
department[s],” and (2) “the DeGeorges violated the agreement
by playing unreasonably loud music on Super Bowl Sunday.”

11
breached the Agreement.”8 On the contrary, the arbitrator found
one breach by “the DeGeorges” party in calling the police.To the
extent Taffae takes issue with that factual finding, we cannot
review it. (See Richey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 916 [“courts cannot
review arbitration awards for errors of fact or law”]; see also id.
at p. 917; Gueyffier, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1186 [“it was for the
arbitrator to find the facts, not for the superior court or this
court”].)
Because the arbitrator found one breach of the Stay-away
Agreement by the DeGeorges party, he duly awarded Taffae
$5,000 for that one breach as provided in the Stay-away
Agreement. (See Gueyffier, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1185 [“[t]he
arbitrator was empowered to interpret and apply the parties’
agreement to the facts he found to exist”].) That remedy was
rationally related to the Stay-away Agreement and was squarely
within the arbitrator’s power. (See Greenspan, supra,
185 Cal.App.4th at p. 1449 [“the remedy was rationally related to
the breach”]; Advanced Micro, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 381 [court
will vacate an arbitration award “only if . . . the award was based
on an extrinsic source”]; cf. Gueyffier, at p. 1185 [arbitrator

8 Likewise, there is no support in the record for Taffae’s
assertion the arbitrator “treat[ed] Mr. DeGeorge and
Mrs. DeGeorge as joint tortfeasors.” The Stay-away Agreement
expressly made “the DeGeorges” liable for liquidated damages for
any breaches committed by the DeGeorges. Taffae’s reliance on a
case discussing equitable indemnity is misplaced. (See Stop Loss
Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. Brown & Toland Medical Group (2006)
143 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1040 [“[i]t is well settled in California that
equitable indemnity is only available among tortfeasors who are
jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff’s injury” (italics
omitted)].)

12
exceeds his powers when he awards a remedy “ ‘expressly
forbidden by the arbitration agreement’ ”].)
iii. The Fee Award Was Appropriate
Taffae argues the arbitrator erred in awarding fees to the
DeGeorges. His brief acknowledges that claimed error “depends
entirely on the Arbitrator’s unauthorized creation and
adjudication of Mrs. DeGeorge’s non-existent claim.” Because we
have already explained the arbitrator did not create or adjudicate
a nonexistent claim, Taffae’s argument regarding fees necessarily
fails. And even if an error had been made, we could not vacate
the award on that ground.9 (See Heimlich v. Shivji (2019)
7 Cal.5th 350, 367 [“ordinary errors in ruling on costs are not
subject to correction, nor do they serve as a basis for vacating an
award”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to the
DeGeorges. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1)–(2).)

RICHARDSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

LUI, P. J. ASHMANN-GERST, J.

9 We also note California law supports the arbitrator’s focus
on whether Taffae “obtain[ed] a more favorable . . . award” than
the offer made by the DeGeorges. (§ 998, subd. (c)(1).)

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