CourtListener 10644609•Reynolds v. Bacon CA2/1
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Filed 7/30/25 Reynolds v. Bacon CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
DON J. REYNOLDS et al., B339599
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV22155)
v.
JAMES V. BACON, SR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jessica A. Uzcategui, Judge. Affirmed.
Fisher Law Corporation and David S. Fisher for Defendant
and Appellant.
Scali Rasmussen, Jeffrey W. Erdman and Julie S. Pearson
for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
_____________________
Defendant and appellant James V. Bacon, Sr. appeals from
the trial court’s order awarding $17,217.50 in discovery sanctions
in favor of plaintiffs and respondents Nancy L. Reynolds, Don J.
Reynolds, and Stephen W. Bacon.1 The parties are engaged in
litigation over control of the family business, the Allen Gwynn
Chevrolet dealership (AG Chevy or the dealership). The
plaintiffs subpoenaed AG Chevy’s insurer, New York Marine and
General Insurance Company (NY Marine), for documents relating
to a claim AG Chevy filed for an alleged theft at the dealership
involving family members. Both NY Marine and James resisted
the subpoena, and the trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to
compel. In a separate discovery dispute, the court granted the
plaintiffs’ motion to compel James to provide further responses to
interrogatories. In both cases, the trial court ordered James to
pay sanctions to the plaintiffs as the prevailing parties.
James contends the trial court erred by awarding sanctions
on the NY Marine subpoena because the plaintiffs’ motion to
compel was untimely. He also argues the amount of both
sanctions awards was excessive and punitive. We find no abuse
of discretion and affirm.
1 The parties are all members of the same family, and in
order to avoid confusion, we refer to them by their first names.
We intend no disrespect. Both sides sued each other in separate
cases that have subsequently been consolidated. We refer to
Nancy, Don, and Stephen as the plaintiffs because they sued
James before he sued them.
2
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Because the only issue in this case is the sanctions award,2
we limit our discussion of the facts to the two discovery disputes.
A. The Interrogatories
On September 30, 2021, the trial court granted in part the
plaintiffs’ motion to compel James to provide further responses to
the plaintiffs’ interrogatories but denied the plaintiffs’ request for
sanctions on the ground that James’s opposition was
substantially justified. James submitted further responses to the
interrogatories, but the plaintiffs remained unsatisfied and filed
a second motion to compel. They sought $15,109.50 in sanctions,
as well as evidentiary sanctions against James for failing to
comply with the order to provide further responses.
The court appointed a referee to adjudicate this and other
discovery disputes. The referee recommended that the trial court
grant the motion in part and award the plaintiffs a reduced
amount of $11,000 in monetary sanctions, but deny evidentiary
sanctions with an admonishment “that further failure to comply
likely will result in evidentiary sanctions.”
B. The NY Marine Subpoena
On December 17, 2021, the plaintiffs served a subpoena on
NY Marine seeking the production of business records pertaining
to a claim AG Chevy filed for a loss based on employee theft.
James, acting “for himself alone,” filed objections to the
subpoena. On January 18, 2022, NY Marine filed its own
objections, largely parroting the objections made by James.
2 James’s reply brief makes clear that he challenges “only
the award of sanctions against [James] and his counsel.”
3
After a meet and confer with NY Marine led to the
production of only a few documents, on March 28, 2022, the
plaintiffs filed a motion to compel NY Marine to produce
additional documents. The plaintiffs also sought $9,217.50 in
sanctions from James and his attorney on the grounds that they
had misused the discovery process by instructing NY Marine not
to comply with the subpoena, and that they had improperly filed
objections to the subpoena rather than filing a motion to quash or
for a protective order as was statutorily required.
NY Marine did not oppose the motion to compel. James
filed an opposition arguing that the motion was defective in
several ways, including that it was not timely filed.
The referee recommended that the court grant the motion
to compel and award a reduced amount of $6,217.50 in sanctions
against James and his attorney. The referee reasoned that
James “lacked standing to object to the [third] party subpoena,”
and “controlling authority” made clear that James could
challenge the third-party subpoena only by “a motion to quash or
[for a] protective order,” which he had not filed. By simply filing
objections instead of a motion, and by encouraging NY Marine
not to comply with the subpoena, James “wrongfully interfered
with the discovery process.”
C. Trial Court Order
On June 25, 2024, the trial court issued an order
addressing eight discovery disputes, including those described
above. The court stated that it had “read and considered” the
referee’s recommendations and, as to both of the motions to
compel at issue here, the court granted the motions “for the
reasons set forth in the [r]ecommendation.” The court also
imposed sanctions in the amount the referee recommended.
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DISCUSSION
A. Background and Standard of Review
The trial court “may impose [monetary] sanctions against
anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery
process.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030.)3 In the case of a motion
to compel the production of documents in response to a subpoena
on a nonparty, “the court may in its discretion award the amount
of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the
motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the
motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial
justification or that one or more of the requirements of the
subpoena was oppressive.” (§ 1987.2, subd. (a).) With regard to
interrogatories served on a party, “[t]he court shall impose a
monetary sanction . . . against any party, person, or attorney who
unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to
interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the
sanction acted with substantial justification or that other
circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”
(§ 2030.290, subd. (c).)
“A court may direct a special reference to a discovery
referee to resolve the parties’ discovery disputes. (§ 639.) If the
trial court orders the reference without the parties’ consent, ‘[t]he
referee’s factual findings are advisory recommendations only;
they are not binding unless the trial court adopts them.’ ” (Lopez
v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 566, 588.) Nevertheless, “[i]n its review, the court
should give the referee’s findings ‘ “great weight” ’ and focus on
3 Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
5
the parties’ objections to those findings.” (Id. at p. 589.) We
review orders regarding discovery for abuse of discretion
(Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare REIT,
Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 789), including orders based on
the trial court’s decision to accept the referee’s recommendation.
(Lopez, supra, at p. 588.) “The test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial court’s decision exceeded the bounds of reason.”
(Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC, supra, at p. 789.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Finding James’s
Subpoena-related Conduct Justified Sanctions
The trial court ordered James and his attorney to pay
sanctions in connection with the plaintiffs’ motion to compel NY
Marine based on the referee’s finding that James wrongfully
interfered with the discovery process. The referee concluded that
James failed to follow “the appropriate course of action” when he
filed objections to the subpoena rather than filing a motion to
quash or for a protective order, and that he lacked standing to
object to a subpoena directed to a third party. In addition, the
referee concluded that James’s attorney improperly advised NY
Marine not to comply with the subpoena and to object to it.
James argues this was error because the plaintiffs’ motion
to compel was untimely filed, and the court lacked jurisdiction to
grant it. This argument misses the point. The court ordered
James and his counsel to pay sanctions not because they were
wrong about the timeliness of the motion to compel, but because
they interfered with the discovery process through improper
means and attempted to assert rights that belonged to NY
Marine and not to James.
James is correct that there is a strict 60-day deadline for
filing a motion to compel a nonparty to respond to a subpoena for
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the production of documents (see § 2025.480, subd. (b)), and that
courts have held that the clock begins to run when the nonparty
serves objections to the subpoena. (E.g., Board of Registered
Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1032.)
But this strict deadline is part of a statutory scheme designed
specifically for the protection of nonparties. “ ‘ “While all
discovery devices are available against a party, only deposition
subpoenas can be directed to a nonparty. . . . [¶] The distinction
between parties and nonparties reflects the notion that, by
engaging in litigation, the parties should be subject to the full
panoply of discovery devices, while nonparty witnesses should be
somewhat protected from the burdensome demands of
litigation.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1033, italics omitted, quoting Monarch
Healthcare v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1290.)
Because of the 60-day deadline, a nonparty “may comply (or not)
with the subpoena, and it can be confident that its obligations
under the subpoena will be swiftly addressed and adjudicated.”
(Board of Registered Nursing, supra, at p. 1033.) The
requirement that parties assert any objections to a subpoena
duces tecum on a nonparty via a motion to quash or for a
protective order, rather than simply serving objections, similarly
ensures that nonparties’ obligations will be swiftly addressed and
adjudicated. (See § 1987.1, subd. (a).)
Thus, the party aggrieved by the plaintiffs’ late filing of the
motion to compel was NY Marine. Yet NY Marine did not oppose
the motion and thus waived any untimeliness objection. James
contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the motion to
compel because it was filed after the 60-day deadline. Although
some courts have described discovery deadlines as “jurisdictional”
(e.g., Weinstein v. Blumberg (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 316, 322,
7
fn. 3), they are not “ ‘jurisdictional’ in the fundamental sense.”
(Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)
“When a court has fundamental jurisdiction, but acts in excess of
its jurisdiction, its act or judgment is merely voidable,” not void.
(People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th
653, 661.) Here, NY Marine (the subpoenaed party) did not claim
the order was void, and the trial court did not lack authority to
sanction James and his counsel for interfering with NY Marine’s
production of documents pursuant to the subpoena.
To the extent James had complaints about NY Marine’s
production of the requested documents, his remedy was to file a
motion to quash or for a protective order. It was not to encourage
a nonparty to flout the subpoena, or to assert objections belonging
to NY Marine and not to him. For example, in his objections to
the subpoena, James claimed that “[t]he production of the
requested documents would cause . . . undue burden and
expense,” and that “[t]he production of the requested documents
would include thousands of terabytes of electronically stored
information, the cost of which to produce is unduly burdensome”
(capitalization omitted) even though the subpoena did not require
James to pay any expense or produce any documents, electronic
or otherwise.
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
adopting the referee’s recommendation for sanctions against
James and his attorney with respect to the NY Marine motion to
compel.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in the
Amount of the Sanctions Award
James argues the trial court abused its discretion by
awarding an excessive amount of sanctions. He claims that the
8
plaintiffs’ attorneys failed to document the hours they spent on
their motions to compel with sufficient specificity, and that they
sought compensation for work they had not yet performed as of
the time their supporting declarations were submitted. For
example, in a declaration in support of sanctions on the motion to
compel further responses to interrogatories, an attorney stated
that she “expended greater than 18.8 hours at the rate of $390
per hour ($7,332 total) performing legal research for, drafting
meet and confer correspondence for, and drafting this [m]otion to
[c]ompel, its supporting separate statement, and this supporting
declaration,” and that other attorneys “expended at least 3.5
hours” or “at least 2.0 hours” reviewing and editing the motion.
(Italics added.) The same attorney declared that she
“anticipate[d] expending” 10 additional hours on future work
related to the motion, namely eight additional hours “reviewing
[James]’s anticipated opposition brief . . . and drafting reply
papers” and two hours “preparing and appearing for oral
argument on the [m]otion” (italics added). The plaintiffs’
attorneys provided similar declarations regarding their work on
the motion to compel NY Marine.
James forfeited these arguments by failing to present them
to the trial court, or in this case, both the referee and the trial
court. In his opposition to the motion to compel NY Marine,
James made six separate arguments against the motion to
compel and requested sanctions for himself, but he did not call
into question the amount of work the plaintiffs’ attorneys
performed and expected to still perform or their documentation of
it. In his opposition to the motion to compel further responses to
interrogatories, James alleged that the amount the plaintiffs
requested in sanctions was “excessive” and “punitive” because the
9
work “could [have been] done more economically by a junior
associate,” but once again, he did not question the amount of
work the plaintiffs’ attorneys actually performed or how they
documented it. As a result, neither the referee nor the trial court
had an opportunity to review the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ claims in
light of James’s arguments. (See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1287, 1293 [“The purpose of [the forfeiture] rule is to encourage
parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that
they may be corrected”].)
Even if we were to excuse this forfeiture, James’s claim
would nevertheless fail because he has failed to show the trial
court abused its discretion. “[V]erified time statements of . . .
attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the
absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.”
(Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University
(2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) Even now, James has
presented no evidence or argument suggesting the plaintiffs’
attorneys’ declarations are incorrect. Nor is there any
requirement for attorneys to do more than provide a declaration
“setting forth the reasonable hourly rate, the number of hours
worked and the tasks performed.” (Concepcion v. Amscan
Holdings, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1324.) Finally, we
see nothing wrong here in awarding reimbursement for work the
attorneys had not yet done at the time of their declarations. This
case is not like Tucker v. Pacific Bell Mobile Services (2010) 186
Cal.App.4th 1548, where the court reversed an award of
sanctions for attorney fees in conducting a future deposition. (Id.
at pp. 1562-1564.) In the instant case, the attorneys filed their
declarations together with their motions to compel, and they
estimated the amount of additional work they would need to
10
perform in preparing a reply to James’s opposition and attending
the hearing on the motion. By the time the referee made his
recommendation, and the trial court accepted it, the work had
been done. If James believed the plaintiffs’ attorneys had
overestimated the amount of work required, he could have
challenged it. We see no need or legal justification for requiring
attorneys seeking sanctions to file successive declarations
updating the amount of work they performed at each step.
D. Plaintiffs’ Request for Appellate Sanctions is Denied
While this appeal was pending, the plaintiffs filed a motion
in this court for sanctions. We deny the motion because,
although we find no merit in James’s arguments, we do not agree
with the plaintiffs that “the appeal was frivolous or taken solely
for delay.” (§ 907; accord, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
In their motion, the plaintiffs allege a great deal of
misconduct and frivolous argument by James in prior
proceedings both in this court and in the trial court. But the
statute allows us to sanction a party only if the current appeal
was frivolous or filed in bad faith.4 The Supreme Court has held
that an appeal is frivolous “when it indisputably has no merit—
when any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is
totally and completely without merit.” (In re Marriage of
Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650.) The court cautioned against
applying this standard too broadly “so as to avoid a serious
4 For this reason, we deny plaintiffs’ request for judicial
notice as to its exhibits A through H, which concern proceedings
other than those specifically before us in this appeal. Exhibit I to
the plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice is the notice of appeal in
this case. As to that exhibit, we deny the request as moot
because the clerk’s transcript already includes that document.
11
chilling effect on the assertion of litigants’ rights on appeal.
Counsel and their clients have a right to present issues that are
arguably correct, even if it is extremely unlikely that they will
win on appeal. An appeal that is simply without merit is not by
definition frivolous and should not incur sanctions. Counsel
should not be deterred from filing such appeals out of a fear of
reprisals.” (Ibid.)
The current appeal is not frivolous under this standard. In
particular, James is correct that the plaintiffs were untimely in
filing their motion to compel NY Marine. While we do not agree
with his argument that the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to
sanction him, or that the amount of sanctions was erroneous, we
cannot conclude that any reasonable attorney would agree that
the appeal is completely without merit. (See Anders v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 738, 744 [87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493] [an
appeal is not frivolous if “any of the legal points [are] arguable on
their merits”].)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order imposing discovery sanctions is
affirmed. Plaintiffs are awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. M. KIM, J.
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