CourtListener 10643699•People v. Bibi CA2/1
Full text
Filed 7/29/25 P. v. Bibi CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B336245
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA488149)
v.
SARAH BIBI,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, H. Clay Jacke II, Judge. Affirmed.
Mary Jo Strnad, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and
Christopher G. Sanchez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
____________________________
A jury convicted defendant Sarah Bibi of one count of first
degree burglary and acquitted her of forcible lewd act on a child
under age 14.1 The punishment for first degree burglary is a
term of imprisonment of two, four, or six years. Bibi and her trial
counsel waived Bibi’s right to a jury trial on the three
aggravating factors that the prosecution alleged justified
imposition of the upper term six-year sentence. At a court trial,
the trial court found all three aggravating factors true beyond a
reasonable doubt, selected the six-year upper term prison
sentence, and doubled the prison sentence to 12 years pursuant
to the “Three Strikes” law.2
On appeal, Bibi argues the trial court’s selection of the
upper term sentence violated section 1170, subdivision (b). In
particular, she claims (1) the court did not determine expressly
whether a departure from section 1170, subdivision (b)(1)’s
middle term presumption was justified; (2) subdivision (b)(2)
did not permit the trial court to be the factfinder on the
aggravating circumstances because the court was not the
factfinder as to the charged substantive offenses; and (3) the
court failed to apply subdivision (b)(6)’s presumption that the
lower term must be imposed if the defendant experienced certain
1 The parties agree that Bibi is a transgender woman and
both parties use the pronouns she/her to refer to Bibi in their
briefing. For those reasons, we refer to Bibi using female
pronouns.
2 (See People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 370–371
[noting that the Three Strikes law is codified in Pen. Code, § 667,
subds. (b)–(i) & § 1170.12].) Undesignated statutory citations are
to the Penal Code.
2
trauma that was a contributing factor in the commission of the
burglary.
We reject Bibi’s claims of error. First, Bibi does not
demonstrate the court had to use certain language to explain its
decision to impose the upper term. Second, the plain language of
section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) belies Bibi’s assertion the court
was barred from trying the aggravating factors because the court
was not the factfinder as to the underlying offenses. Lastly,
because Bibi does not claim to have made an initial showing to
the trial court that the sexual violence she allegedly experienced
was a contributing factor in the commission of the burglary,
subdivision (b)(6) did not require the court to impose the lower
term. We thus affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
We summarize only those facts pertinent to our disposition
of this appeal.
3 We derive our description of the trial court proceedings
and of the evidence presented below in part from admissions
made by the parties in their appellate briefing. (See Williams v.
Superior Court (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 666, 674 [“ ‘An express
concession or assertion in a brief is frequently treated as an
admission of a legal or factual point, controlling in the disposition
of the case.’ ”]; Artal v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275,
fn. 2 [“ ‘[B]riefs and argument . . . are reliable indications of a
party’s position on the facts as well as the law, and a reviewing
court may make use of statements therein as admissions against
the party.’ ”].)
3
1. The first amended information
The People filed a first amended information charging Bibi
with one count of forcible lewd act on a child under age 14, in
violation of section 288, subdivision (b)(1) (count 1); and one
count of first degree burglary with person present, in violation of
section 459 (count 2). The People alleged the following three
aggravating factors: (1) the offenses involved great violence,
great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts
disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, and callousness,
within the meaning of California Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(1);4 (2) the victim was “particularly vulnerable” for
the purpose of rule 4.421(a)(3); and (3) Bibi served a prior term in
prison or jail within the meaning of rule 4.421(b)(3). The People
further averred Bibi suffered a prior serious felony conviction for
the purpose of section 667, subdivision (a)(1) and a prior serious
or violent felony conviction for the purpose of the Three Strikes
law.
2. The People’s trial evidence
On a morning in June 2020, M.M., a 13-year-old girl, was
alone at an apartment she shared with her mother, M.U. M.M.
heard someone knock on the door to the apartment. After M.M.
opened the door partway, Bibi entered the apartment. In her
opening brief, Bibi acknowledges that at trial, the prosecution
presented a surveillance video depicting Bibi “stopping at
[M.U.’s] apartment[ ] and then entering [it].”5
4 All further rule references are to the California Rules of
Court.
5 The video is not in the record before us.
4
Bibi pushed M.M. onto a sofa located approximately 20 feet
from the door. As M.M. kicked and screamed, Bibi removed
M.M.’s pajama pants and rubbed M.M.’s inner thigh. While M.M.
was on the sofa, she realized Bibi was “naked from the waist
down” and M.M. saw Bibi’s nonerect penis. M.M. did not recall
seeing Bibi remove her own pants.
Bibi ultimately backed off M.M. and walked into M.U.’s
room. M.M. put on her pants, went to the kitchen, and
telephoned emergency services. The trial court admitted into
evidence an exhibit that M.M. identified as a recording of her call
to emergency services.6 At some point, Bibi entered the kitchen
and grabbed M.M.’s house keys off the counter. M.M. grabbed
the keys back from Bibi.
Law enforcement officers later arrived and arrested Bibi.
M.M. was taken to a hospital for a forensic examination.
Investigators discovered Bibi’s DNA on a swab taken from M.M.’s
right breast. Several days after the incident, M.U. found a pair of
men’s underwear in the apartment that did not belong to M.M. or
M.U.
3. Bibi’s trial evidence
Bibi took the stand in her own defense. Bibi was born a
male in Uganda. When Bibi was 17, bystanders discovered that
Bibi was gay upon observing her leave a club with a male
romantic partner. Bibi had to leave Uganda shortly after these
bystanders discovered her homosexuality. Bibi came to the
United States in 2013. Because Bibi has undergone hormone
therapy, her penis cannot become erect.
6 The recording is not in the record before us.
5
Bibi claimed to have no memory of the offenses alleged by
the prosecution. Bibi asserted she took several narcotics prior to
the incident.
Bibi has never been attracted to young people. Bibi has
never had a sexual encounter with a woman. A clinical
psychologist who specializes in nonbinary transgender adults
testified at trial that the probability that Bibi would engage in
sexual activity with a female was zero.
4. The jury’s verdicts on counts 1 and 2
A jury acquitted Bibi of forcible lewd act upon a child under
age 14 as charged in count 1 and found her not guilty of the
lesser offenses of lewd act upon a child under age 14 and
attempted forcible lewd act upon a child under age 14. The jury
found Bibi guilty of first degree burglary as charged in count 2.
5. The court trial on the aggravating factors and Bibi’s
prior conviction, the sentencing hearing, and Bibi’s
notice of appeal
As we explain in greater detail in our Discussion, part B.1,
post, as the jury was deliberating on counts 1 and 2, Bibi waived
her right to a jury trial on the aggravating factors alleged in the
first amended information. On October 20, 2023, the trial court
held a court trial on the aggravating factors and on whether Bibi
had suffered a prior conviction for the purposes of section 667,
subdivision (a)(1) and the Three Strikes law, and sentenced Bibi.
The court found the People had proven beyond a reasonable
doubt Bibi had been convicted and sentenced for attempted first
degree burglary, meaning that Bibi suffered a prior strike under
the Three Strikes law and a prior serious felony conviction for the
purposes of the five-year enhancement provided in section 667,
6
subdivision (a)(1). (See § 667, subd. (a)(1) [“A person convicted of
a serious felony who previously has been convicted of a serious
felony . . . shall receive, in addition to the sentence imposed by
the court for the present offense, a five-year enhancement for
each such prior conviction on charges brought and tried
separately.”].)
The trial court found “all three factors in aggravation
[alleged by the People] true beyond a reasonable doubt.”
In connection with the aggravating factor provided in
rule 4.421(a)(1), the court remarked, “[As to this rule,] which
includes threats of great bodily harm, high degree of cruelty, and
viciousness and callousness, the court finds beyond a reasonable
doubt based upon the testimony adduced at trial as well as the
exhibits and the video that the—entering, the way in which the
defendant entered and then what transpired with the thirteen
year old inside, although it did not amount to a conviction, the—
the physical nature of what I will call an attack in this court’s
mind was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and I would find
that factor to be true.”
Regarding the aggravating factor alleged under
rule 4.421(a)(3), the court stated, “The victim was particularly
vulnerable. This young lady was thirteen years of age at the
time, expecting either a neighbor or service personnel to come
back—when I say service, I mean to service equipment—or her
mother returning from work. What happened instead was that
the defendant showed up, forced her way in. [¶] The 911 call
spoke volumes as to how terrified that young woman was. It was
a very high pitched, a very rapid pace and barely comprehensible,
but it left the impression in this court’s mind certainly beyond all
7
doubt that this young lady was terrified out of her mind and was
scared to death.”
The trial court found the People proved beyond a
reasonable doubt the third aggravating factor that Bibi had
served a prior prison term for the purposes of rule 4.421(b)(3).
Turning to sentencing, the trial court explained that for
Bibi’s conviction for “first degree burglary with person
present, . . . . [the l]ow term is 2 years, mid term is 4[, and t]he
high term or the aggravated term is 6 years.” In selecting the
upper term, the court stated, “The court, based upon the threat
of—[rule] 4.421(a)(1)—the threat of great bodily harm and also
[rule] 4.421(a)(3) find[s] that those aggravate the sentence. And
so instead of the what I call the presumptive mid term, the court
would impose the high term in state prison. And that would be
6 years.”
The court struck the section 667, subdivision (a)(1) five-
year enhancement in the interest of justice. The court doubled
the six-year prison term for the burglary conviction pursuant to
the Three Strikes law, thereby imposing an aggregate 12-year
prison term.
On December 19, 2023, Bibi timely appealed from the
judgment.
APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Applicable Law
As relevant here, section 461 states: “Burglary is
punishable as follows: [¶] . . . Burglary in the first degree: by
imprisonment in the state prison for two, four, or six years.”
(§ 461.)
8
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) provides: “When a
judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute
specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound
discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the
middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).”
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).)
In turn, section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) states: “The court
may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when
there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify
the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle
term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been
stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial. Except where evidence supporting an aggravating
circumstance is admissible to prove or defend against the charged
offense or enhancement at trial, or it is otherwise authorized by
law, upon request of a defendant, trial on the circumstances in
aggravation alleged in the indictment or information shall be
bifurcated from the trial of charges and enhancements. The jury
shall not be informed of the bifurcated allegations until there has
been a conviction of a felony offense.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
“Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2) [of subdivision (b)
of section 1170], the court may consider the defendant’s prior
convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record
of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.”
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).)
In addition, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) requires the
trial court to impose the lower term sentence in certain cases.
(See People v. Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 765
(Knowles).) Subdivision (b)(6) provides: “[U]nless the court finds
9
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances [such] that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order
imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense: [¶] (A) The
person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood
trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation,
or sexual violence. [¶] (B) The person is a youth or was a
youth . . . at the time of the commission of the offense. [¶]
(C) Prior to the instant offense, or at the time of the commission
of the offense, the person is or was a victim of intimate partner
violence or human trafficking.” (See § 1170, subd. (b)(6); see also
Knowles, at p. 765 [noting the word “such” should be bracketed
into the statute as shown above]; People v. Fredrickson (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 984, 986–987 (Fredrickson) [same].)
B. Standards of Review
“We review discretionary sentencing decisions for abuse of
discretion. [Citation.] A court abuses its sentencing discretion
when it acts arbitrarily and capriciously, relies on improper
matter in reaching its decision, or is unaware of the scope of its
discretion so that it does not exercise informed discretion at all.
[Citation.] Exercises of sentencing discretion must be ‘consistent
with the letter and spirit of the law.’ [Citation.] ‘ “[A]ll exercises
of legal discretion must be grounded in reasoned judgment and
guided by legal principles and policies appropriate to the
particular matter at issue.” ’ [Citation.]” (Knowles, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 764–765.)
Under the abuse of discretion standard, “a trial
court’s . . . conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.” (See In re
White (2020) 9 Cal.5th 455, 470.) An issue of statutory
10
construction is a question of law. (See Zubarau v. City of
Palmdale (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 289, 305.)
Regardless of the applicable standard of review, “the
judgment challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the
appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.” (See
People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573; see also
Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020)
50 Cal.App.5th 467, 554–555 [“ ‘Even when our review on appeal
“is de novo, it is limited to issues which have been adequately
raised and supported in [the appellant’s opening] brief. . . .” ’
[Citation.]” . . . “ ‘It is the appellant who bears the burden of
overcoming th[e] presumption [that an appealed judgment or
order is correct].’ ”].) To overcome the presumption of
correctness, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with
cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the
record. (See People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793
[“ ‘[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of
authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a
particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it
without consideration.’ ”]; People v. Flint (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th
983, 1006, fn. 17 (Flint) [noting that an appellate court may
“ ‘decline to consider any factual assertion unsupported by record
citation at the point where it is asserted[,]’ ” and that “ ‘[a]n
appellate court “will not develop the appellants’ arguments for
them” ’ ”].)
11
DISCUSSION
A. Bibi Does Not Show the Trial Court Erred By Failing
To Explain Adequately Its Findings on the
Aggravating Sentencing Factors
Regarding the trial court’s obligation to articulate its
reasoning for selecting the lower, middle, or upper term sentence,
section 1170, subdivision (b)(5) requires the court to “set forth on
the record the facts and reasons for choosing the sentence
imposed.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(5).) Similarly, rule 4.420(i) provides,
“The reasons for selecting one of the three authorized terms of
imprisonment referred to in section 1170[ subdivision, ](b) must
be stated orally on the record” (rule 4.420(i)), and section 1170,
subdivision (c) requires “[t]he court [to] state the reasons for its
sentence choice on the record at the time of sentencing” (§ 1170,
subd. (c)).
As we noted in our Factual and Procedural Background,
part 5, ante, the trial court found “the threat of great bodily
harm” for purposes of rule 4.421(a)(1) and the particular
vulnerability of the victim under rule 4.421(a)(3) “aggravate the
sentence.” Immediately thereafter, the court stated, “And so
instead of the . . . presumptive mid term, the court would impose
the high term in state prison.” (See Factual & Procedural
Background, part 5, ante.)
Bibi contends the trial court erred by failing to “separately
determine whether or not a departure from the middle term and
imposition of the upper term is justified in this case.” (Italics
added.) Bibi does not argue, let alone direct us to any authority
demonstrating, that the trial court had to employ any particular
verbiage to explain why it imposed the upper term. The court’s
above remarks make clear that it found the noted aggravating
12
circumstances justified imposition of the high term. We thus
reject this claim of error. (See People v. Evans (2011) 200
Cal.App.4th 735, 756, fn. 12 [noting that a reviewing court may
reject an argument for which a party fails to offer adequate
support].)7
B. Section 1170, Subdivision (b)(2) Does Not Prohibit a
Trial Court From Being the Factfinder on
Aggravating Factors Where the Court Was Not the
Factfinder on the Substantive Offenses
Bibi argues in her opening brief that the trial court violated
section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) by acting as the trier of fact as to
the three aggravating factors alleged by the prosecution.
Arguably, Bibi failed to preserve this objection for appeal.
(Discussion, part B.1, post.) We nonetheless exercise our
discretion to reach the merits of this argument. (Ibid.) We
conclude the statute did not bar the court from trying the
aggravating factors even though it did not act as the factfinder
vis-à-vis the substantive offenses. (Discussion, part B.2, post).
7 Although the trial court did not explain why it omitted
the third aggravating factor alleged by the People (i.e., the prior
prison term under rule 4.421(b)(3)) from its list of aggravating
factors warranting imposition of the upper term, the court may
have declined to rely upon that factor because it had concluded
Bibi’s prior attempted burglary conviction triggered enhancement
of her sentence under the Three Strikes law. (See § 1170,
subd. (b)(5) [“The court may not impose an upper term by using
the fact of any enhancement upon which sentence is imposed
under any provision of law.”].) In any event, Bibi does not
contend the court erred in failing to clarify why it did not rely
upon this aggravating factor in selecting the upper term.
13
We, however, conclude Bibi forfeited other arguments by raising
them for the first time in her reply brief, including her contention
that her jury trial waiver did not authorize the court to try the
facts underlying the aggravating factors. (Discussion, part B.3,
post.)
1. Although Bibi arguably forfeited her contention
that section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) barred the
trial court from trying the aggravating factors,
we exercise our discretion to address that issue
While the jury was deliberating, the trial court and the
prosecutor asked Bibi and her trial counsel whether they waived
Bibi’s right to a jury trial on the three alleged aggravating
circumstances and the prior conviction allegations. Bibi and her
counsel explicitly waived her right to a jury trial on those issues.
At the subsequent court trial, the court found the three
aggravating factors true and concluded Bibi suffered a prior
conviction for attempted first degree burglary. (Factual &
Procedural Background, part 5, ante.) On appeal, the parties
agree Bibi’s trial counsel did not challenge the court’s authority
to conduct the court trial on the aggravating factors.
The Attorney General asserts Bibi forfeited her contention
section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) barred the trial court from trying
the aggravating factors. (See also People v. Leonard (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 465, 481–482 [“ ‘ “ ‘No procedural principle is
more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right,’ or a
right of any other sort, ‘may be forfeited in criminal as well as
civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right
before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.’ ” ’ ”].) Bibi
counters, inter alia, that “review is warranted . . . to forestall
future litigation of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
14
for . . . failing to object to judicial factfinding at sentencing.”
Given Bibi’s potential claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel and the fact the Attorney General had the opportunity to
brief this issue of statutory interpretation, we elect to address
her claim without deciding whether she failed to preserve it
for appellate review. (See People v. Walts (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 127, 140 [holding that a reviewing court may
address a forfeited claim to “forestall a subsequent proceeding
involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel”].)
2. Bibi’s interpretation of section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2) is inconsistent with the
statute’s plain language and is not compelled
by the doctrine of constitutional avoidance
To recap, section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) provides in part:
“The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term
only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime
that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding
the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances
have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
Bibi argues this statutory text is “subject to two distinct
interpretations”: (1) “[T]he Legislature could have meant to
retain the trial court’s authority to decide aggravating factors
separately from a jury’s finding of guilt”; or (2) “the Legislature
could have meant to allow the trial court to determine the truth
of aggravating factors only when the defendant’s guilt has been
determined at a court trial.” Bibi asks us to adopt the latter
construction because the former is not “protective of the
prerogative of the jury to decide the facts and of a defendant’s
15
right to a jury determination of the facts . . . .” Specifically, she
argues that if a trial court were permitted to act as the factfinder
vis-à-vis the aggravating factors in a bench trial held after a jury
has determined the defendant’s guilt, then the court may render
a finding that is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict.
“In interpreting a statute, ‘[t]he fundamental rule is to
ascertain the Legislature’s intent in order to give effect to the
purpose of the law.’ [Citation.] ‘We first examine the words of
the statute and try to give effect to the usual, ordinary import of
the language while not rendering any language surplusage. . . .’
[Citation.]” (Dignity Health v. Local Initiative Health Care
Authority of Los Angeles County (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 144, 154
(Dignity Health).)
Regarding the statutory text, Bibi appears to argue the
term “court trial” in section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) can be read to
refer exclusively to a proceeding in which the trial court serves as
a factfinder on all issues, that is, both as to the charged offenses
and the aggravating sentencing factors. In effect, Bibi asks us to
insert the following bracketed and italicized text into
subsection (b)(2) of section 1170: “The court may impose a
sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term
and the facts underlying those circumstances have been . . . found
true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the
judge in a court trial [in which the trial judge had also served as
the factfinder on the underlying charges].” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2),
italicized text added.) Bibi does not explain why this court—as
opposed to the Legislature—has authority to rewrite the statute
in the way she proposes. (See Lewis v. Clarke (2003)
16
108 Cal.App.4th 563, 567 [“We cannot insert what has been
omitted [from a statute], omit what has been inserted, or rewrite
the statute to conform to a presumed intention that is not
expressed.”].)
In addition, Bibi’s construction of “court trial” is undercut
by the well-established proposition that a trial court may, with
the consent of the defendant, bifurcate proceedings such that the
jury tries the defendant’s guilt and the court thereafter conducts
a “ ‘court trial’ ” on prior conviction allegations. (See, e.g., People
v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 356 & fn. 1, 365.) Because the
statutory text is not reasonably susceptible to Bibi’s
interpretation, we reject it. (Dignity Health, supra,
44 Cal.App.5th at p. 154 [holding that a statutory term “ ‘must be
given a reasonable and commonsense interpretation’ ”].)8
Notwithstanding the express language of the statute, Bibi
argues that if we do not accept her interpretation of
subdivision (b)(2) of section 1170, we would be “open[ing] the
door” for the trial court to make findings that conflict with the
jury’s findings. (Boldface omitted.) In support of this contention,
Bibi argues that permitting a court to render a finding on an
aggravating factor that is inconsistent with a jury’s verdict would
violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. She
8 Because we conclude the statutory text is not reasonably
susceptible to Bibi’s interpretation, we do not address the
Attorney General’s argument that the provision’s legislative
history forecloses Bibi’s argument. (See People v. Watie (2002)
100 Cal.App.4th 866, 884 [“ ‘When the words [of a statute] are
clear and unambiguous, there is no need for statutory
construction or resort to other indicia of legislative intent, such as
legislative history.’ ”].)
17
also claims the trial court in this case may have violated her
Sixth Amendment right because there is an “inherent conflict”
between the court’s finding that the burglary involved a “threat
of great bodily harm or other acts disclosing a high degree of
cruelty, viciousness, or callousness” under rule 4.421(a)(1) and
the jury’s acquittal of Bibi on count 1 for forcible lewd act on a
child. (Rule 4.421(a)(1).) She thus invokes “the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance, which provides that ‘a statute should
not be construed to violate the Constitution “ ‘ “if any other
possible construction remains available.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Chavez
Zepeda v. Superior Court (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 65, 75 (Chavez
Zepeda).)
Assuming arguendo that a court would violate a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial if it made an
aggravating factor finding that contradicted a jury’s verdict, and
that Bibi’s extratextual construction of the statute “ ‘ ‘ “ ‘remains
available” ’ ” ’ ” for the purposes of the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance (see Chavez Zepeda, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 75),
the doctrine does not support Bibi’s interpretation.9
First, as to the alleged inconsistency between the trial
court’s finding of the aggravating factor identified in
rule 4.421(a)(1) and the jury’s acquittal of Bibi on the lewd act
charge, Bibi acknowledges, “Due to the sanctity of the jury
deliberations, it cannot be known why the jury acquitted [Bibi].”
She postulates, “The jury might have found that [Bibi] was
incapable of sexual gratification when the victim is female” or
9 We observe that Bibi does not cite any authority to
support her claim the Sixth Amendment bars a trial court from
rendering an aggravating factor finding that is inconsistent with
a jury’s verdict.
18
“the jury could have found the young [victim’s] description of the
attack not credible and so convicted [Bibi] based only on those
acts confirmed by video or corroborated by law enforcement.”
Bibi also posits that if the jury acquitted Bibi on the ground that
M.M. had “fabricated the physical attack,” then “it is difficult to
see how this burglary . . . can be considered particularly vicious”
to warrant a true finding under rule 4.421(a)(1). She further
argues that by finding that Bibi did in fact “physical[ly] attack”
M.M., the court made a ruling contrary to a finding the jury may
have rendered, that is, that M.M. falsely claimed Bibi attacked
her.
First, Bibi’s reasoning to support her claim of Sixth
Amendment error is speculative. She relies upon a finding the
jury “could have,” but did not necessarily, make in acquitting her.
She also acknowledges “the defense had argued” at trial that Bibi
“was incapable of sexual gratification when the victim is
female . . . .” Indeed, at the court trial, Bibi’s counsel below
represented (1) “the only argument that was made by counsel
from the defense [as to the section 288 lewd act charge] was
sexual intent,” and (2) the defense “submitted as to all the other
facts” relevant to that offense. (Italics added.) Further, in
determining whether the prosecution proved the aggravating
circumstance in rule 4.421(a)(1), the court stated it was “not
considering” the section 288 charge for lewd act upon a child
because Bibi “was acquitted of” that offense. In sum, Bibi has not
shown a violation of her Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
Second, Bibi suggests unless we adopt her proposed
construction of section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), the statute will
“invite” trial courts to make findings that contradict the jury’s
findings. The text of section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) does not
19
purport to authorize a trial court to make a finding on an
aggravating factor that contradicts a jury’s verdict. (See § 1170,
subd. (b)(2).) It simply allows the court to determine aggravating
factors at a court trial. (See ibid.) Therefore, we are not
persuaded that “constitutional violations” will result from our
rejection of Bibi’s interpretation of the statute.
In sum, we reject Bibi’s contention that section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2) barred the trial court from holding a court trial
on the aggravating factors because her interpretation is
(1) unsupported by the statutory text, and (2) not compelled by
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.
3. Bibi forfeited arguments she first raised in her
reply brief
In Discussion, part B.2, ante, we rejected an argument Bibi
raised in her opening brief, to wit, under the proper
interpretation of section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), “the trial court
[may] determine the truth of aggravating factors only when the
defendant’s guilt has been determined at a court trial.” In her
reply brief, Bibi argues for the first time that her “waiver of the
right to have a jury decide ‘the aggravating circumstance[s]’ . . .
d[id] not include a waiver of [her] right” to “have the underlying
factual allegations decided by a jury . . . .” Put differently, Bibi
asks us to “distinguish[ ] between the ‘facts’ upon which an
aggravating factor allegation rests,” which she claims should
have been decided by the jury, “and the trial court’s discretionary
sentencing choices based on properly found facts.”10
10 Recall that section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) permits a
trial court to “impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only
when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that
20
By withholding this contention from her opening brief, Bibi
deprived the Attorney General of an opportunity to respond to
it.11 We thus do not address Bibi’s belated argument and express
no opinion on it. (People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628,
642–643 (Taylor) [concluding that a defendant had forfeited a
contention by raising it for the first time in a reply brief].)12
justify” that sentencing decision “and the facts underlying those
circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have
been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or
by the judge in a court trial.” (See § 1170, subd. (b)(2), italics
added.)
11 In her reply, Bibi cites page 18 of the respondent’s brief
for the proposition the Attorney General “argues that the final
phrase of section 1170, subdivision (b)[(2)], means that a
defendant who waives a jury trial on the aggravating
circumstance[s] necessarily also waives the right to have the
underlying factual allegations decided by a jury, even at a jury
trial.” That argument is absent from page 18 of the respondent’s
brief. Although the Attorney General argues elsewhere that Bibi
“waived her right to a jury trial and agreed to have the court
adjudicate the aggravating circumstances at a bench hearing,”
the Attorney General did not anticipate Bibi would distinguish
between aggravating circumstances and the facts underlying
those circumstances.
12 We note our high court recently declined to resolve
whether section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) draws a distinction
between the “circumstances in aggravation” upon which a trial
court may rely in imposing the upper term and “the facts
underlying those circumstances” that must be found true beyond
a reasonable doubt. (See fn. 10, ante [noting that these two
potentially disparate terms appear in the statutory text]; People
v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 770 [observing that “[t]he text of
[the statute] itself ‘arguably allows for [this] distinction to be
21
Bibi also claims for the first time in her reply that her
interpretation of section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) is the only one
that is “consistent with the other provisions of section 1170[ and]
promotes the legislative goal[ ] of equality in sentencing . . . .”
Bibi has forfeited these belated arguments as well. (Taylor,
supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 642–643.)
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err By Failing To Consider
Whether Bibi Was Entitled to Section 1170,
Subdivision (b)(6)’s Lower Term Presumption
Because She Has Not Demonstrated She Made an
Initial Showing Below That the Sexual Violence She
Claims To Have Experienced Was a Contributing
Factor in the Commission of the Burglary
As relevant here, “section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) creates a
presumption that the court should impose the low term ‘if any of
the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the
offense: [¶] (A) The [defendant] has experienced psychological,
physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to,
drawn,” but electing not to “tak[e] a position on the issue”].) We
further note that Bibi filed her opening brief five months after
the Supreme Court issued its decision in Lynch and thus could
have raised in her opening brief the issue our high court
identified. (See Lynch, at p. 730 [issued on Aug. 1, 2024].) The
potential ambiguity identified in Lynch pertains only to the
newly minted argument Bibi raises in her reply, and not to her
assertion the statutory term “court trial” refers only to a
proceeding in which the trial court was the factfinder as to the
underlying charges and the aggravating factors. (See Discussion,
part B.2, ante [describing this argument that Bibi raised in her
opening brief].)
22
abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence. . . .’ ” (Knowles,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 765, quoting § 1170, subds. (b)(6) &
(b)(6)(A).) “This presumption may be overcome if the court ‘finds
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances [such] that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice.’ [Citation.]” (Knowles, at
p. 765, quoting § 1170, subd. (b)(6).)
Bibi contends, “The trial court failed to credit [Bibi’s]
history of sexual trauma as a mitigating factor, [which] requir[ed]
a lower term sentence pursuant to newly added section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6).” (Boldface omitted.) Specifically, Bibi argues
her counsel presented to the trial court a psychiatric report and
Bibi’s asylum application, both of which Bibi claims show she had
suffered “severe psychological trauma and sexual violence.”
(Boldface omitted.) Bibi argues on appeal this evidence
establishes she “was born a male in Uganda, a country where
homosexuality is widely condemned as evil”; in April 2012, “a
mob violently attacked her and her partner Moses, suspecting
them to be in a homosexual relationship,” and, thereafter, her
father “disowned her[, h]er village elders formally expelled her
from her village[, and s]he received telephone threats from
strangers and friends alike”; in March 2013, Ugandan police
dragged Bibi from her home, beat her, and placed her in a cell
where inmates tortured and raped her repeatedly; and Bibi
“continues to suffer both physical and psychological effects
resulting from this trauma.” According to Bibi, this evidence
triggered the lower term presumption under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6)(A), and “the record does not reflect that the
trial court considered the lower term presumpt[ion] nor that it
23
conducted a weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors”
required to overcome that presumption.
“[I]n reviewing a trial court’s failure to expressly apply” the
“lower term presumption” provided in section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6), an appellate court determines whether the
presumption “has been ‘trigger[ed]’ by an ‘initial showing’ of the
applicability of the statute.” (See Fredrickson, supra,
90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 991, 994.) “[A]n initial showing has been
made when the record and/or arguments are sufficient to put a
trial court on notice that [a mitigating circumstance identified in
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)] may have been a contributing
factor in commission of the underlying offense.” (See Fredrickson,
at p. 994, italics added.) Absent “such an initial showing, . . .
there is no basis for [an appellate] court to conclude the trial
court’s failure to expressly consider the lower term presumption”
constitutes an abuse of discretion. (See id. at pp. 987–988,
994.)13 Indeed, our Division has previously recognized, “As made
13 Although the defendant in Fredrickson invoked
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(B)’s lower term presumption for
crimes in which the perpetrator’s “ ‘youth was “a contributing
factor” ’ ” (see Fredrickson, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 986–
987), the Court of Appeal indicated the “initial showing”
requirement applies to all three mitigating circumstances in
subdivision (b)(6). (See Fredrickson, at p. 994, fn. 8 [stating that
§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)’s lower term presumption applies only if an
“initial showing” of the circumstances specified in the statute has
been made]; Fredrickson, at p. 993, fn. 7 [finding the presence of
a mitigating circumstance identified in subd. (b)(6) does not
trigger the presumption unless it was “a contributing factor” vis-
à-vis the crime because “the Legislature opted to require a
finding of causation as to all of the circumstances in” the
provision, italics added].)
24
plain by the statutory text, the mere fact a defendant . . . has
suffered past trauma is insufficient—[it] . . . must be ‘a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense’ for the low
term presumption to apply.” (See Knowles, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 765, quoting § 1170, subd. (b)(6).)
At no point in Bibi’s briefing does she direct us to any
evidence or argument that placed the trial court on notice the
sexual violence Bibi claimed to have experienced “may have been
a contributing factor in commission of the underlying offense,”
here, the burglary. (See Fredrickson, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at
p. 994.) Rather, Bibi asserts, without any supporting analysis or
record citation, that the “[d]efense presented evidence that
established a proper nexus between [Bibi’s] traumatic past and
the current offense.” Furthermore, Bibi acknowledges her
counsel did not file a sentencing memorandum invoking the lower
term presumption, and the reporter’s transcript reveals that
neither the parties nor the trial court discussed the presumption
at the sentencing hearing. Instead, the trial court appears to
have found the hardships Bibi faced in her country of origin
supported its decision to strike the five-year enhancement
authorized by section 667, subdivision (a)(1). Accordingly, Bibi
does not show the court abused its discretion in failing to
consider whether section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)’s lower term
presumption applied to Bibi’s sentencing. (See Knowles, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 765 [stating “[t]he burden is on the party
challenging the sentencing decision to show that the court abused
its discretion”]; Flint, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1006, fn. 17
[noting that a reviewing court “ ‘ “will not develop the appellants’
arguments for them” ’ ”].)
25
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.
26
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.