CourtListener 10641505•People v. Talley CA2/7
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Filed 7/25/25 P. v. Talley CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B338924
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA035466)
v.
ALONZO TREVON TALLEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Kelly Michelle Kelley, Judge. Affirmed in part and
dismissed in part.
Nancy Gaynor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal;
Alonzo Trevon Talley, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Alonzo Trevon Talley appeals from orders denying his
various motions and petitions for resentencing, a new trial, and
dismissal of his convictions. We appointed counsel to represent
Talley on appeal. After reviewing the record, counsel for Talley
filed a brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216 that did not identify any arguable issues. After
independently reviewing the record and the contentions in
Talley’s supplemental brief, we have not identified any either.
We affirm the order denying one of Talley’s motions and dismiss
the remainder of the appeal as taken from nonappealable orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We described the factual background of this case in Talley’s
direct appeal. (See People v. Talley (June 5, 2001, B142108)
[nonpub. opn.].) Talley lived with Vicketta Phillips, her two-year-
old son Tyrone, and her nine-year-old daughter Ranesha. On
December 21, 1997, while Vicketta was at work, Talley sent
Ranesha to buy candy. When Ranesha returned home, Tyrone
was lying on his bed and in pain. Talley told Ranesha that he hit
Tryone for drinking water from the toilet. Talley took Tyrone
into the master bedroom and closed the door. Later, Talley came
out of the bedroom and told Ranesha that Tyrone was not
breathing.
Ranesha called her mother and attempted cardiopulmonary
resuscitation on Tyrone. Paramedics arrived and took Tryone to
the hospital, where he underwent surgery. The surgeon found
Tyrone’s liver was split, his spleen was torn, and his abdominal
cavity was full of blood. Tyrone died from his injuries. An
autopsy showed Tyrone also had a swollen brain, bleeding around
his optic nerve and brain, three rib fractures, and bruises on his
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lungs, abdomen, lower back, forehead, cheek, and rib cage. The
doctor who did the autopsy opined Tyrone bled to death as a
result of blunt force trauma to his upper abdomen and head.
The People charged Talley with murder (Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a)),1 willfully inflicting upon a child cruel or inhuman
corporal punishment or an injury resulting in a traumatic
condition (§ 273d, subd. (a)), and assaulting a child under eight
years of age by means of force likely to produce great bodily
injury and resulting in the child’s death (§ 273ab). The jury was
unable reach a verdict on the murder charge, but convicted Talley
on the two remaining counts and found he personally inflicted
great bodily injury on Tyrone. The trial court declared a mistrial
on the murder charge and dismissed it in the interest of justice.
The court sentenced Talley to 25 years to life. We modified the
judgment to include a $10,000 parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45)
but otherwise affirmed. (People v. Talley, supra, B142108.)
On March 12, 2024 Talley, representing himself, filed
motions in the superior court seeking to vacate his convictions or
sentence under section 1473.7, subdivision (a). Talley also filed a
request to recall his sentence and for resentencing under the
Racial Justice Act (§ 745), a motion for discovery under sections
1054.1, 1054.5, and 1054.9, a motion to dismiss for discriminatory
prosecution, and a petition for writ of mandate. Talley asked the
court, among other things, to “inquire into the legality of the
egregious due process violation” committed by the District
Attorney and to set aside his sentence because of changes in the
law and the discovery of new evidence that (according to Talley)
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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called into question the testimony of the forensic pathologist who
testified at trial.
On May 10, 2024 the superior court denied, or took no
action on, Talley’s motions. The court stated that “a judge may
recall and resentence a defendant on the court’s own motion, or
upon request from the Secretary of the [Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation], the Board of Parole Hearings,
the county correctional administrator, the district attorney, or
the Attorney General. Pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.1,
subdivision (c), ‘a defendant is not entitled to file a petition
seeking relief from the court under this section. If a defendant
requests consideration for relief under this section, the court is
not required to respond.’ Accordingly, the court will take no
further action on defendant’s petition pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.1.” The court also ruled: “The instant petition
presents several claims raised and rejected in a prior habeas
petition . . . . Such successive claims constitute an abuse of the
writ of habeas corpus.” The court denied Talley’s motion under
the Racial Justice Act for failure to make a prima facie showing,
but granted a request by the public defender, who began
representing Talley on April 18, 2024 on his Racial Justice Act
claim, to file a supplemental motion on behalf of the Talley “if
counsel chooses to do so.” Talley timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
As stated, we appointed counsel to represent Talley in this
appeal. After reviewing the record, counsel did not identify any
arguable issues and indicated “[t]his court should determine
appealability.” On June 20, 2025 counsel advised Talley that she
was filing a brief stating she was unable to find any arguable
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issues and that Talley could personally submit a letter brief
stating any contentions he wanted the court to consider. Counsel
also sent Talley the copy of the opening brief and the record on
appeal.
On June 23, 2025 we received a five-page supplemental
brief from Talley that included 235 pages of loosely organized
exhibits consisting of partial medical records, trial testimony,
previously filed motions and exhibits, text of state bills, and
studies showing minorities are incarcerated at higher rates than
other individuals. In his supplemental brief Talley again argues
that he is entitled to a new trial and that this court should
“inquire into the legality of the egregious due process violation
that was committed by the Los Angeles County District
Attorney’s office in that it failed to provide exculpatory material.”
Talley also attached a form petition for writ of mandate
challenging the superior court’s order denying his claim under
the Racial Justice Act and the superior court’s decision not to
take action on his motion for resentencing. The first issue,
however, is whether the orders Talley purports to appeal from
are appealable. (See People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629,
634 [“As we must, we first consider whether we have jurisdiction
to decide this appeal.”]; People v. Wright (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d
490, 492 [“We must first decide whether there is in existence an
appealable order.”].)
“The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not
appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is
expressly made appealable by statute.” (People v. Loper (2015)
60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159.) The superior court’s decision not to rule
on Talley’s request for resentencing is not appealable. As the
court explained in People v. Faustinos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th
5
687, a “defendant is not entitled to file a section 1172.1 petition
[or] to receive a ruling if he nevertheless files one. It follows that
an appeal from an order acting on his petition (whether couched
as a denial, dismissal, or any other statement that the court is
not acting) does not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. We
lack the authority to rule on the merits of appeals from orders
filed in response to a defendant’s attempt to seek resentencing
under section 1172.1.” (Faustinos, at p. 696.) Similarly, an order
denying a petition for writ of mandate or habeas corpus,
including a petition under the Racial Justice Act, is not
appealable. (People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 1000,
fn. 5; People v. Hodges (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 186, 188; People v.
Gallardo (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 971, 983.) Nor is an order
denying a motion for a new trial. (People v. Ault (2004)
33 Cal.4th 1250, 1261; People v. Ashford University, LLC (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 485, 502, fn. 4.) Thus, we must dismiss the
appeals from these orders. (See People v. Baltazar (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 334, 342; People v. Fuimaono (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 132, 135.)
An order denying a motion under section 1473.7,
subdivision (a), which was one of the motions Talley filed, is
appealable. (See § 1473.7, subd. (f).) Talley, however, is not
eligible for relief under section 1473.7, subdivision (a), because he
is still in custody. (See People v. Rodriguez (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th
301, 305 [“[s]ection 1473.7 permits individuals who are no longer
in custody to move to vacate a conviction or sentence”]; People v.
DeJesus (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1132 [“to be eligible for
relief pursuant to section 1473.7, [the defendant] cannot be in
custody”]; People v. Cruz-Lopez (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 212, 221
[to obtain relief under section 1473.7, “the individual cannot be in
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custody or under restraint”].) Therefore, the superior court did
not err in denying Talley’s motion under section 1473.7,
subdivision (a).
Neither Talley nor his appellate counsel has identified a
cognizable legal issue. Our independent review has not identified
one either. (See People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 231-232; see also People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 118-
119; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Talley’s motion under section 1473.7,
subdivision (a), is affirmed. The appeal is otherwise dismissed.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.
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