CourtListener 10640515•People v. Sanchez CA2/4
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Filed 7/24/25 P. v. Sanchez CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B331266
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. KA122270)
v.
RAYMOND G. SANCHEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
David C. Brougham, Judge. Reversed in part and Affirmed in part.
Heather Monasky, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General,
Steven D. Matthews, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and
Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Pretending to have a gun, defendant Raymond G. Sanchez carjacked
two victims. A jury convicted Sanchez of one count of carjacking and two
counts of kidnapping in the commission of carjacking. On appeal, Sanchez
contends that his carjacking conviction must be reversed because it is a lesser
included offense of kidnapping during the commission of carjacking. He
further contends the trial court erred in responding to the jury’s note during
deliberations and by failing to instruct on mistake of fact. The Attorney
General concedes, and we agree, that the carjacking conviction must be
reversed. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. Prosecution’s Evidence
German Jaramillo worked as a driver for a company that transports
people to medical appointments. On October 12, 2019, at approximately
10:30 a.m., Jaramillo was driving Jesus Macias to a dialysis appointment in
West Covina. Macias was wheelchair-bound and secured in the rear of the
vehicle.
Jaramillo stopped at the intersection of Sunset Avenue and Merced
Avenue in West Covina. Sanchez, walking across the street in a zigzag
manner, approached the vehicle from a nearby gas station. Sanchez quickly
opened the vehicle’s door and hopped in the front passenger seat. Once
inside, Sanchez told Jaramillo, “Drive or I will shoot you.” Jaramillo did not
speak English well, but he understood what Sanchez said. Jaramillo saw
what he believed to be a firearm pointed at him from inside a bag Sanchez
held. Sanchez looked “very aggressive” and Jaramillo felt his and Macias’s
lives were being threatened.
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Because Jaramillo believed Sanchez would shoot him, he drove across
the street to the emergency area of a hospital and jumped out of the vehicle.
Before exiting, Jaramillo saw Macias through the rearview mirror and he
looked scared. Sanchez then exited the passenger side of the vehicle, ran
around the front, and climbed into the driver’s seat. Sanchez drove the
vehicle quickly in a zigzagging pattern into the street and stopped in a
courthouse parking lot. Jaramillo reached the courthouse parking lot a few
minutes later and Sanchez was nowhere in sight. The police arrived at the
lot at the same time as Jaramillo.
Jaramillo approached West Covina Police Officer Abel Hernandez, who
was part of the police dispatch, and identified himself as the driver of the
carjacked vehicle. Jaramillo and Macias appeared “physically shaken” and
scared. West Covina Police Officer Brenden Keim, also part of the police
dispatch, saw Sanchez walking in the middle of the street and arrested him.
II. Defense Evidence
Sanchez testified in his own defense as follows: The morning of the
incident, Sanchez went to the emergency room (ER) because he was not
feeling well and was hearing voices. He wanted to make sure he had proper
medication. He had been awake for two consecutive nights and had ingested
methamphetamine the previous night. Before Sanchez was able to receive
care, a security guard in the ER made him leave the hospital.
After leaving, Sanchez waited on a bench at a bus stop. There was a
gas station across the street. Every so often, Sanchez would ask people at the
gas station for the time. When Sanchez asked a man parked at the gas
station for the time, the man told him “to shut the fuck up and turn [his] face
[to] look the other way.” The man also brandished a gun. Scared, Sanchez
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started walking into the street, away from the gas station. He began
knocking on cars, looking for help.
When Sanchez approached Jaramillo’s vehicle, he heard the door
unlock. Believing Jaramillo was offering assistance, Sanchez entered the
vehicle. Sanchez asked Jaramillo for help and to drive him to the police
station. He told Jaramillo a man with a gun was going to shoot him and
might shoot Jaramillo also. Jaramillo ended up exiting the vehicle and
Sanchez got into the driver’s seat so he could drive to the police station.
Sanchez arrived at the courthouse parking lot, believing it to be the police
station. He then told Macias, who remained in the backseat of the vehicle,
“Don’t worry, I’m going to get help.”
Sanchez exited the vehicle and began knocking on the courthouse doors
and windows. He then made contact with an approaching police officer
(presumably Officer Keim). Sanchez told the officer that there was “a family
in the car parked in the police station,” and that “they need your help.” He
also told the officer he took the vehicle because a man was trying to shoot
him. At the time of the incident, Sanchez was under the influence of
methamphetamine, marijuana, heroin, and alcohol.
III. Rebuttal Evidence
In rebuttal, Officer Keim testified that Sanchez did not attempt to
speak with him. Instead, Sanchez was trying to cross the street when Officer
Keim arrested him. After his arrest, Sanchez told Officer Keim that God had
directed him to take Jaramillo’s vehicle. As Sanchez approached the vehicle,
he noticed a driver in the front seat. Because the driver looked intimidating,
Sanchez “had a white plastic bag, and he put his hand in it to make it look
like he had a firearm.” He then told Jaramillo to get out of the vehicle or he
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was “going to fuckin’ kill him.” Jaramillo exited the vehicle. Sanchez got into
the vehicle and noticed a passenger in the backseat. He told the passenger
he was not going to harm him and then drove to the police station. When he
arrived at the police station, Sanchez exited the vehicle. Sanchez never
mentioned being threatened by a man with a gun.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A jury found Sanchez guilty of one count of carjacking Jaramillo (Pen.
Code, § 215, subd. (a), count 1),1 and two counts of kidnapping during the
commission of carjacking (§ 209.5, subd. (a), count 2 [Jaramillo] & count 3
[Macias]). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true two strike
priors. The court sentenced Sanchez to 25 years to life in state prison.
Sanchez timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Carjacking Conviction
Sanchez contends, and the Attorney General concedes, the carjacking
conviction on count 1 should be reversed because carjacking is a lesser
included offense of kidnapping during the commission of carjacking, the
offense of conviction on counts 2 and 3. We agree.
“When a defendant is found guilty of both a greater and a necessarily
lesser included offense rising out of the same act or course of conduct, and the
evidence supports the verdict on the greater offense, that conviction is
controlling, and the conviction of the lesser offense must be reversed.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.
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[Citations.]” (People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 736.) Carjacking is a
lesser included offense of kidnapping during the commission of carjacking.
(People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 898; People v. Contreras (1997) 55
Cal.App.4th 760, 765.) Moreover, all three counts in this case arose out of the
same course of conduct, and Sanchez does not challenge his kidnapping
during the commission of carjacking convictions. Therefore, we reverse the
carjacking conviction in count 1.2
II. The Trial Court’s Response to The Jury’s Note During Deliberations
Sanchez contends the trial court’s response to a jury note, advising
them to continue deliberating, “was not responsive to the jury’s questions” in
violation of section 1138.
A. Relevant Proceedings Below
On April 25, 2023, at 2:05 p.m., the jury began deliberations. The jury
stopped deliberating less than two hours later, at 4:00 p.m. When it resumed
the following morning, at 9:30 a.m., the jury sent the trial court the following
note: “If the jury cannot come to a unanimous decision what do we put on the
verdict form? Are we a hung jury or do we need to keep deliberating? We
were able to come to a unanimous decision on one count but not on the other
two.” At a hearing outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel argued
that the note indicated the jury was hung. Therefore, the trial court should
declare a mistrial. The court responded that if the jury stated “they’re hung
. . . I’ll go from there, but they haven’t [said] that.” The court noted it was
early in deliberations and this was “a significant case for both sides.”
2 Resentencing is not required as the trial court stayed imposition of the
sentence on count 1 pursuant to section 654.
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In the presence of the jury, the court stated that “apparently [the jury]
reached a verdict on one and [the jury was still] deliberating on the other
two.” The court responded that the “short answer would be yes, you are to
continue deliberating.” The court reminded the jury that if, at any point, a
juror “believe[d] that any issues . . . could be resolved by either read back by
the court reporter [of the] trial transcript or by the court providing further
instruction in the law, [the jury could] write that on a note and send that to
[the court].” The court encouraged the jury to continue deliberating. The
juror foreperson indicated that he (or she or they) did not know if the jury
could come to a unanimous decision. The court stated, “Well, let’s see. I’m
going to ask you . . . to go back and resume your deliberations and
discussions. And, again, you can always inform me of any bumps in the
road.” The court cautioned it was “early in the case” and “we want to make
sure that you folks are able to have all the discussions you need.”
A few minutes after resuming deliberations, the jury requested a read
back of Sanchez’s statement to police on the day of the incident and asked the
trial court about the distance required for kidnapping. Shortly thereafter,
the jury returned a verdict on all three counts.
B. Analysis
Section 1138 requires the trial court to give jurors any desired
information on any point of law arising in the case and “imposes a
‘mandatory’ duty to clear up any instructional confusion expressed by the
jury.” (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1212.) But “[t]his does not
mean the court must always elaborate on the standard instructions. Where
the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the court has
discretion under section 1138 to determine what additional explanations are
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sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request for information.” (People v. Beardslee
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 97.) The court “should decide as to each jury question
whether further explanation is desirable, or whether it should merely
reiterate the instructions already given.” (Ibid.) We review for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Hodges (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 531, 539.)
The Attorney General contends that Sanchez forfeited this claim of
error by failing to object to the trial court’s response or to suggest additional
clarifying language. We disagree. Before the trial court instructed the jury
to continue deliberating, defense counsel argued that the jury was hung and
asked the court to declare a mistrial. In moving for a mistrial, defense
counsel preserved the issue on appeal. (People v. Kageler (1973) 32
Cal.App.3d 738, 746; see also People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 383.)
But we reject Sanchez’s claim of error on the merits.3 The jury’s
questions did not pertain to a specific jury instruction. Instead, the jury was
asking the court whether jurors qualified as a “hung jury” or “needed to keep
deliberating.” The court’s instruction to continue deliberating was responsive
to that inquiry. Given its directive, it was not necessary for the trial court at
that point to advise the jury on how to complete the verdict form if they could
not reach a unanimous decision after further deliberations. We conclude the
court did not abuse its discretion in responding to the jury note.
To the extent Sanchez argues the trial court’s response to the note was
coercive, again, we disagree. In analyzing a claim of coercion, the relevant
3 On appeal, Sanchez contends the trial court violated section 1138 in
responding to the jury note, not that the court violated section 1140 by
having the jury continue deliberations. Therefore, we find any reliance by
Sanchez on cases addressing the application of section 1140 misplaced. We
also note Sanchez fails to indicate in his briefing to this court that this cited
authority addresses a separate and distinct section of the Penal Code than
the one at issue in this appeal.
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inquiry is whether the trial court’s comments “impose[d] such pressure on
jurors to reach a verdict” that “the accuracy and integrity of the jury’s stated
conclusion” cannot be assured. (People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 850,
disapproved on another point in People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 163.)
Here, the court’s response to the jury note imposed no pressure on the
jury. The court did not “either express or imply to the jurors that they must
reach a unanimous verdict, or a particular outcome.” (People v. Brooks (2017)
3 Cal.5th 1, 89; Peoples v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 783 [court’s
comments to jury were not coercive].) The court did not “exert pressure on
any juror, nor did it express any exasperation about the jury’s deliberations.”
(People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 734, 770.) The court simply asked the
jury to deliberate further. This request was reasonable, given that the jury
only had been deliberating for less than two hours. “Directing further
deliberations” was a proper “‘“‘means of enabling the jurors to enhance their
understanding of the case.’”’” (People v. Whaley (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 968,
980.) Thus, we conclude the court’s response to the jury’s note was not
coercive and find no error.
III. Mistake of Fact Instruction
Sanchez argues the trial court’s failure to instruct on mistake of fact
was prejudicial error. We disagree. We conclude Sanchez was not entitled to
such an instruction. Moreover, any error in failing to instruct was harmless.
At trial, Sanchez made a written request for the court to provide
particular jury instructions, including one on mistake of fact. Specifically,
Sanchez requested the court give the general intent mistake of fact
instruction. The court gave two of Sanchez’s requested instructions—on
necessity and duress—but did not give the mistake of fact instruction.
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Sanchez did not object to, or argue against, the omission. The Attorney
General does not argue that Sanchez forfeited the issue of instructional error
on appeal. Thus, we elect to reach the merits of the claim. (People v. Fox
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 826, 830, fn. 4.)4
A trial court is required to give a particular jury instruction only when
there is substantial evidence to support it. (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th
680, 705.) We review a claim of instructional error de novo. (People v.
Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.)
A “mistake of fact claim . . . is often described as a ‘defense’ to the
charge. (See, e.g., People v. Hanna (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 455, 462.) But the
term is somewhat misleading, because mistake of fact is, generally speaking,
‘not a true affirmative defense.’ ([People v. Lawson (2013)] 215 Cal.App.4th
[108], 118 [(Lawson)].) It is, rather, an assertion by the defendant that a
particular factual error in his perception of the world led him to lack the
mens rea required for the crime. (See § 26, par. Three [persons are not
capable of committing crimes if they ‘committed the act . . . under an
ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent’]; Lawson,
[supra,] at p. 111 [‘The mistake-of-fact defense operates to negate the
requisite criminal intent or mens rea element of the crime’]; People v.
Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 996–998 [same conclusion with respect to
similar ‘defense’ of accident]; . . .)” (People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933,
940, fn. omitted (Hendrix).) Mistake of fact “‘requires, at a minimum, an
4 Because the offenses with which Sanchez was charged are specific, not
general, intent crimes, there was no basis in law for the general intent
mistake of fact instruction Sanchez requested. Nonetheless, we construe
Sanchez’s claim of error on appeal as extending to an appropriate mistake of
fact instruction. Here, this means the specific intent mistake of law
instruction.
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actual belief “in the existence of circumstances, which, if true, would make
the act with which the person is charged an innocent act . . . .”’ [Citations.]”
(People v. Givan (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 335, 343.) For general intent crimes,
the mistaken belief must be both actual and reasonable, while specific intent
crimes—such as carjacking and kidnapping in the commission of carjacking—
“require only an actual mistaken belief.” (People v. Givan, supra, at p. 343.)
In Hendrix, supra, 13 Cal.5th at page 940, our Supreme Court
illustrated the application of mistake of fact to a specific intent crime: “Say a
defendant is charged for theft of a box of oranges. [Citation.] He claims he
mistakenly thought the oranges were his. If the defendant indeed believed
the oranges were his, it is necessarily true that he did not intend to steal
them from someone else. His mistake of fact claim, then, is simply one
particular way of saying he lacked the mens rea required for theft.
[Citation.] In this way mistake of fact operates as a kind of failure-of-proof
defense, reflecting a defendant’s attempt to suggest the prosecution failed in
its burden to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted
with the criminal intent required for the offense.” Thus, “saying a defendant
established a mistake-of-fact defense is the equivalent of saying the People
failed to prove defendant acted with the requisite intent.” (People v.
Middleton (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 749, 767.)
Applying this doctrine to the case at hand, we first look to the
underlying crime of carjacking to determine the requisite mental state for
kidnapping during the commission of carjacking.5 (People v. Contreras (1997)
55 Cal.App.4th 760, 765 [Section 209.5, kidnapping during the commission of
5 In discussing the mistake of fact instruction, neither party discussed
the requisite mental state required to commit carjacking or kidnapping
during the commission of carjacking.
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a carjacking, requires proof of a completed carjacking].) To be convicted of
carjacking, the defendant must intend to deprive the other person of
possession of the vehicle either temporarily or permanently. (People v.
Vargas (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 456, 460, citing section 215, subd. (a)). Thus, to
find error in the court’s failure to give the mistake of fact instruction, we
must find substantial evidence that Sanchez’s alleged mistake of fact would
negate this intent.
On appeal, Sanchez contends his mistake was that he “believed
Jaramillo consented to help him by unlocking the [vehicle’s] door.” Based on
our review of the record of conviction, however, harboring this mistaken
belief would not negate his intent to deprive Jaramillo of his vehicle, either
temporarily or permanently. (See People v. Givan, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at
p. 345 [“a mistake of fact jury instruction is not appropriate where the
defendant’s mistaken belief does not negate an element of the crime”].)
Therefore, we conclude Sanchez’s asserted mistake of fact did not justify the
instruction.
Alternatively, we find any error in failing to instruct on mistake of fact
to be harmless. In deciding whether instructional error was prejudicial, we
apply People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, to determine whether it is
reasonably probable that the outcome would have been different in the
absence of the error. (Hendrix, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 942.) As a general
matter, this test applies to “‘“incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly
omitted instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional error.”’”
(People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955.)6
6 In contrast, the stricter test for federal constitutional error under
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 would govern if the instructional
error had relieved the prosecution of its burden of proving an element of the
crime. (See Hendrix, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 943.)
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Here, Sanchez testified that he came upon Jaramillo’s vehicle after
fleeing a man who threatened him with a firearm. According to Sanchez,
Jaramillo offered to help by unlocking the vehicle’s door. Sanchez asked
Jaramillo to drive him to the police station because someone was trying to
shoot him and might shoot Jaramillo also. But in his testimony, Sanchez
never explained why Jaramillo exited the vehicle before arriving at the police
station and why he then got into the driver’s seat and drove away in the
vehicle.
Moreover, the balance of the evidence introduced at trial refutes
Sanchez’s testimony. Jaramillo testified that Sanchez forcibly entered his
vehicle, pointed what Jaramillo believed to be a firearm at him, and then
ordered Jaramillo to drive or be shot. Jaramillo abandoned his vehicle after a
short distance out of fear. Officer Hernandez corroborated this testimony by
testifying that Jaramillo told him he was carjacked, and that both Jaramillo
and Macias were visibly upset after the incident. Officer Keim further
corroborated Jaramillo’s testimony by testifying Sanchez stated upon his
arrest that God directed him to take Jaramillo’s vehicle. Sanchez also
admitted that he pretended to have a firearm and ordered Jaramillo out of
the vehicle under threat of death. Sanchez said nothing about another man
threatening him with a gun.
Accordingly, we conclude there is no reasonable probability that
Sanchez would have obtained a more favorable outcome but for the alleged
instructional error.
//
//
//
//
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//
DISPOSITION
We reverse the carjacking conviction on count 1. The judgment is
otherwise affirmed.
The trial court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect
the reversal of the conviction on count 1 and to forward a certified copy of the
amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
GARCIA UHRIG, J.*
WE CONCUR:
COLLINS, Acting P. J.
MORI, J.
*Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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