CourtListener 10638788•People v. Hernandez CA4/1
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Filed 7/22/25 P. v. Hernandez CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083444
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN255040)
ALVARO HERNANDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Runston G. Maino, Judge. Conditionally affirmed and remanded with
directions.
Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Daniel Rogers, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and James M. Toohey
and Elizabeth M. Kuchar, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Alvaro Hernandez is currently incarcerated after pleading guilty to two
counts of attempted murder. He appeals from an order denying his petition
for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.61 at the prima facie stage.
He contends he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a matter of law.
During the pendency of this appeal, the California Supreme court decided
People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 (Patton), and under it we conditionally
affirm the order denying Hernandez’s resentencing petition and remand the
matter to the superior court with directions to consider any “additional facts”
if Hernandez seeks to supplement his petition within 30 days of our remand.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are summarized from the preliminary hearing
transcript, which served as the stipulated factual basis for Hernandez’s plea
agreement. In March 2008, Hernandez, a criminal street gang member, shot
S.T. and R.G., both of whom associated with a rival gang. The entire incident
was captured on surveillance video, which showed that a single individual
committed the shooting. R.G. sustained a wound to his back, and S.T. was
shot multiple times.
A detective testified he subsequently interviewed Hernandez, who
stated he was at a park with M.V. when he learned an altercation had
occurred with members of the rival gang. M.V. drove him to the altercation
site. Hernandez said that once there, “I did what I did,” clarifying, “I went up
to some dudes and fucking shot ‘em.” Hernandez said M.V. did not know
1 References to statutes are to the Penal Code. Effective June 30, 2022,
former section 1170.95 was renumbered to section 1172.6, with no change in
text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
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about the shooting beforehand. The detective testified, “[Hernandez] also
indicated that he did not even think that [M.V.] knew about the gun that
[Hernandez] had on him.”
In August 2009, Hernandez pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted
murder, and admitted that he personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm “during the commission of [each] offense” (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) and
that he committed the offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang.
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)
The court sentenced Hernandez to a stipulated term of 39 years in state
prison.
Postjudgment Proceedings
On direct appeal, Hernandez’s counsel filed a brief under People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. (People v. Hernandez (June 25, 2010, D056400)
[nonpub. opn.].) This court affirmed his conviction.
In March 2023, Hernandez filed a form petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. He checked boxes stating that: (1) an information was filed
against him that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony
murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on his
participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine; (2) he was convicted of attempted murder
after accepting a plea; and (3) he could not presently be convicted of
attempted murder because of subsequent changes made to sections 188 and
189. The trial court appointed counsel to represent Hernandez.
The People in their initial response to the petition argued Hernandez
had failed to establish a prima facie case for relief because his record of
conviction showed he was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. The
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People attached to their response copies of the information, the change of
plea form, the court minutes, the abstract of judgment, and the transcript of
the preliminary hearing.
Hernandez’s counsel in reply argued Hernandez had met his burden of
production and made a prima facie showing that he was eligible for section
1172.6 relief.
At the prima facie hearing, Hernandez’s counsel requested the court
grant him an evidentiary hearing so he could present additional evidence:
“Although the preliminary hearing transcript served as part of the factual
basis for the plea, it does not . . . serve to dispute what Mr. Hernandez
asserted in filing his petition. We’re asking the court to grant him an
evidentiary hearing. He does have additional arguments and evidence he
would like the court to consider if we get to that stage.”
The trial court stated it had read the parties’ briefs and reviewed
Hernandez’s record of conviction. It denied the petition based on
Hernandez’s plea, the preliminary hearing transcript, and Hernandez’s
admission that he was the shooter. It concluded Hernandez was ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law.
DISCUSSION
Hernandez contends the court should have granted his petition at the
prima facie stage, and he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under section
1172.6, subdivision (d). Specifically, he asserts the court engaged in
impermissible factfinding by relying on facts from the preliminary hearing
transcript to deny his petition.
A. Applicable Law
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which abolished liability for murder based on the
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natural and probable consequences doctrine or imputed malice predicated
solely on one’s participation in a crime. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4; People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).) Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.) clarified that resentencing relief under what is now section 1172.6
extends to persons convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter. (Stats.
2021, ch. 551, §§ 1, subd. (a), 2; People v. Birdsall (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 859,
865, fn. 18.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also created a procedure for persons convicted of
qualifying offenses under the former homicide laws to seek resentencing if
they could no longer be convicted under the amended law. (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 959.) As relevant here, a petitioner convicted of voluntary
manslaughter or attempted murder initiates the resentencing process by
filing a petition averring (1) a charging document “was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of . . .
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine”; (2) “[t]he petitioner was convicted of . . .
attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer
in lieu of a trial”; and (3) “[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of
murder or attempted murder” following changes to sections 188 or 189.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)
At the prima facie review stage, a petitioner’s factual allegations
“should be accepted as true, and the court should not make credibility
determinations or engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or
the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 974.) But “ ‘if the
record [of conviction], including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts
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refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in
making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Id. at p.
971.)
When, as here, “the petitioner’s conviction resulted from a guilty plea
rather than a trial, the record of conviction includes the facts ‘the defendant
admitted as the factual basis for a guilty plea.’ ” (People v. Gaillard (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211-1212, quoting People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th
120.) It also includes the petitioner’s “express admissions at the plea
colloquy.” (People v. Fisher (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1029.)
As the Supreme Court decided Patton after the parties had completed
briefing in this case, we sought supplemental briefing regarding the impact of
both that case and People v. Glass (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 922 on the issues
here. In Patton, the petitioner pleaded no contest to attempted murder and
admitted he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in the crime’s
commission. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 557; § 12022.53, subd. (c).) The
petitioner sought resentencing under section 1172.6 by submitting a
checkbox-form petition. (Patton, at p. 559.) The People in response argued
the preliminary hearing testimony showed he was the sole participant, and
was convicted as the direct perpetrator of the attempted murder. (Patton, at
pp. 559-560.) The petitioner offered no reply. (Ibid.) The trial court relied on
the unrebutted preliminary hearing transcript to deny relief at the prima
facie review stage, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. (Id. at p. 560.)
Patton held a trial court conducting a prima facie review could rely on
“unchallenged, relief-foreclosing facts” from a preliminary hearing transcript
to refute the petition’s “conclusory, checkbox allegations.” (Patton, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 564.) “[A] section 1172.6 petitioner who, despite having access
to counsel upon submission of a facially sufficient petition, offers only
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conclusory allegations of entitlement to relief, in response to a record of
conviction that demonstrates the petitioner’s conviction was under a still-
valid theory, has not . . . made a prima facie showing.” (Id. at p. 565.)
As a result, when the record of conviction shows relief under section
1172.6 is unavailable at the prima facie stage—whether it be a preliminary
hearing as in Patton or sworn statements in a guilty plea form or a plea
hearing—petitioners “have the burden of coming forward with nonconclusory
allegations to alert the prosecution and the court to what issues an
evidentiary hearing would entail.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 567.)
Patton concluded the petitioner offered only conclusory allegations in
response to such a record, thus he failed to satisfy his burden to make a
prima facie case for relief. (Id. at p. 569.)
Even so, “out of an abundance of caution,” Patton remanded the case to
the trial court to allow the petitioner, within 30 days of remand, to plead
“additional facts” in support of his “amended petition.” (Patton, supra, 17
Cal.5th at pp. 569-570, citing § 1172.6, subd. (c) [petitioner has 30 days to
reply to the People’s response to a facially valid petition].)
In People v. Glass, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th 922, the defendant pleaded
guilty to attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter, admitting he
personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense. (Id. at p. 925.)
The court denied his petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 at the
prima facie stage based on his sworn statements in the plea form. (Glass, at
p. 928.) On appeal, this court concluded the defendant had failed to include
in his reply to the People’s response any facts supporting his conclusory
allegation that his convictions were based on a natural and probable
consequences theory. Nonetheless, we followed Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th
549, conditionally affirmed the court’s order, and, “out of an abundance of
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caution,” remanded the matter to allow the defendant to plead additional
facts to supplement his petition. (Glass, supra, at pp. 929-930.)
B. Analysis
Similarly, here, Hernandez did not include any facts in his reply to the
People’s response to his section 1172.6 petition to support his conclusory
allegation his convictions were based on a natural and probable consequences
theory. Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th 549 supports our conclusion that
Hernandez is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief. Yet it also prompts us to
give Hernandez an opportunity to plead “additional facts” to rebut the record
of conviction. Hernandez requests this same opportunity if we conditionally
affirm. As he did not have the benefit of Patton’s guidance during the prima
facie stage before the trial court, we grant Hernandez’s request.
DISPOSITION
We remand this matter to the superior court with directions to consider
any “additional facts” if Hernandez, within 30 days of remand, seeks to
supplement his petition. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 570.) We otherwise
conditionally affirm the order denying his resentencing petition.
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, J.
DO, J.
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