CourtListener 10638718•In re M.M. CA2/4
Full text
Filed 7/21/25 In re M.M. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re M.M., Person Coming B342197
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, 21CCJP03827
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Tara Newman, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
J.M. (mother) appeals an order terminating her parental
rights with respect to her youngest child, M.M. Her sole
contention is that reversal is required because the juvenile court
and the Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) failed to comply with the initial inquiry
requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901
et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law. We reject this
argument and affirm the order.
DISCUSSION1
I. Governing Principles and Standard of Review
“ICWA[2] reflects a congressional determination to protect
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum federal
standards that a state court . . . must follow before removing an
Indian child from his or her family.” (In re Austin J. (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 870, 881, disapproved of on other grounds by In re
Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1152, fn. 18 (Dezi C.).) In general,
both ICWA and the Welfare and Institutions Code define an
“Indian child” as “any unmarried person who is under age
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion (Cal. Stds.
Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) and limit our discussion of the facts to those
needed to resolve the issue presented on appeal. (People v.
Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851 [unpublished opinion
merely reviewing correctness of juvenile court’s decision “does not
merit extensive factual or legal statement” (fn. omitted)].)
2 The Legislature incorporated ICWA’s requirements into
California law in 2006. (In re Abbigail A. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83,
91.)
2
eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological
child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); Welf.
& Inst. Code,3 § 224.1, subd. (b)(1).)
The juvenile court and the Department have “an
affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child for
whom a petition under Section 300 . . . may be or has been filed,
is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) This
continuing duty can be divided into three phases: the initial duty
to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the duty to provide
formal ICWA notice. (See In re J.C. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 70,
77–78.) The phase at issue here is the initial duty to inquire.
The Department’s duty of inquiry “begins . . . when [it is]
first contacted regarding a child . . . and upon . . . [its] first
contact with the child or the child’s family, including extended
family members . . . .” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) “Inquiry includes,
but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian,
Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an
interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or
neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child . . . .”
(Id., subd. (b)(2).) For purposes of section 224.2, and subject to an
exception inapplicable here, section 224.1, subdivision (c)(1)
defines “ ‘[e]xtended family member’ ” as “a person who has
reached 18 years of age and who is the . . . child’s grandparent,
aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law,
niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.”
“Despite its broad terms, section 224.2, subdivision (b) does
not require inquiry with every adult living extended family
3 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.
3
member.” (In re H.B. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 711, 720 (H.B.).)
The statute “is not intended to obligate county welfare
departments to search for possible Indian ancestry without
regard to cost or other considerations. Rather, it is intended to
ensure social workers ‘ask an added question of extended family
members whom [they] often already are investigating in their
usual course of work.’ ” (Ibid.) Consequently, in reviewing the
adequacy an ICWA inquiry, “the focus of the court’s analysis
should not be on the number of individuals interviewed, but on
whether the agency’s . . . inquiry has yielded reliable information
about a child’s possible tribal affiliation.” (In re Ezequiel G.
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1009 (Ezequiel G.), disapproved on
other grounds by Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1152, fn. 18.4)
Reversal is therefore not “require[d] . . . in all cases in which
every possible extended family member has not been asked about
the child’s Indian ancestry.” (Dezi C., at p. 1140.)
We review the trial court’s ICWA’s findings “under a hybrid
substantial evidence/abuse of discretion standard, reviewing for
substantial evidence whether there is reason to know a child is
an Indian child, and for abuse of discretion a juvenile court’s
finding that an agency exercised due diligence and conducted a
‘proper and adequate’ ICWA inquiry.” (Ezequiel G., supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at pp. 995−996.)
4 In her reply brief, mother relies on Dezi C., supra, 16
Cal.5th 1112, to challenge the sufficiency of the Department’s
inquiry. Dezi C. is inapposite. There, the parties agreed that the
Department’s inquiry was inadequate. (Dezi C., at p. 1141.) Our
Supreme Court therefore declined to treat that case as an
“occasion to decide what constitutes an adequate and proper
inquiry necessary to satisfy section 224.2.” (Ibid.)
4
II. Analysis
While investigating M.M.’s potential Indian ancestry
through his maternal lineage,5 the Department asked mother
multiple times whether she had any Indian ancestry. Each
time—and consistent with her ICWA-020 form—mother denied
having such ancestry. Further, when interviewed by the
Department in June 2023, mother related that M.M.’s maternal
great-grandmother was deceased, that she had never met any of
her maternal aunts, and that she did not have those aunts’
contact information.
The Department took steps to speak with four extended
maternal relatives about M.M.’s possible Indian ancestry. In
June 2023, the Department successfully contacted M.M.’s
maternal cousin, A.B., with whom M.M. was placed from April 3
to June 30, 2023. A.B. “stated she does not have any knowledge
or belief that her family has any . . . Indian ancestry” and
suggested that the Department follow-up with her father, D.B.
The Department then spoke with D.B., who denied having Indian
ancestry. It also tried to contact mother’s half-siblings, L.D. and
S.G., by phone and by text message, but could not reach them.
Despite these efforts, mother maintains that the
Department did not conduct an adequate inquiry into M.M.’s
possible Indian ancestry, as it did not interview M.M.’s maternal
5 Mother does not dispute the adequacy of the Department’s
efforts to ascertain whether M.M. had any Indian ancestry
through his paternal lineage.
5
grandmother, L.B., or his maternal cousin, J.B.6 For the reasons
discussed below, we disagree.
The record only references maternal grandmother L.B. in
two contexts. First, it states that in November 2007, the
Department received a referral alleging one of mother’s other
children was at risk of abuse because maternal grandmother’s
companion had assaulted mother, causing injuries requiring
emergency room treatment. Second, the record shows that, when
asked about her social history, mother reported moving with her
parents from Pasadena, California, to Seattle, Washington, when
she was two years old. Maternal grandmother eventually left
maternal grandfather, as he was abusive toward her. Mother
remained in maternal grandfather’s care until, due to his abuse,
she ran away to live with maternal grandmother.
Neither mother nor any of M.M.’s other maternal relatives
involved in this dependency case indicated that they or any other
family members were in contact with maternal grandmother
while the case was open.7 Nor did they provide the Department
with maternal grandmother’s contact information. Under these
circumstances, the Department was not required to interview
maternal grandmother to satisfy its duty of inquiry. While the
Department should “follow up on leads provided by the
parents[ ]” and other relatives with whom it is in contact, it
cannot be “aske[d] . . . to interview individuals for whom no
6 While not entirely clear, the record appears to reflect that
J.B. is M.M.’s maternal cousin, rather than his maternal second
cousin.
7 Although not definitive, there is some evidence suggesting
that maternal grandmother may have been deceased when this
case arose in August 2021.
6
contact information has been provided.” (In re Q.M. (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 1068, 1082.) “Requiring the Department to track
down information about extended family members beyond that
offered by participants in the proceedings would impose an undue
burden on the Department and necessarily reduce the resources
it has to otherwise protect the welfare of dependent children.”
(H.B., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 720.)8
We acknowledge that, unlike maternal grandmother, the
Department had contact with maternal cousin J.B. twice in
February 2024. Nonetheless, we discern no error in its failure to
interview her as part of its ICWA inquiry.
The parties do not dispute that J.B. and maternal cousin
A.B. are siblings who share maternal uncle D.B. as their father.
As noted above, the Department interviewed A.B., who stated
that her family did not have Indian ancestry, and recommended
that the Department follow-up with her father—not her sibling—
for more information. D.B. also denied having Indian ancestry.
The record does not reflect that J.B. may have known more about
the family’s ancestry than her sibling or father did.
Accordingly, on the record before us, we are not persuaded
that the Department would have obtained from J.B. additional,
reliable information regarding M.M.’s potential Indian ancestry.
(See In re Ezequiel G., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 1009; see also
H.B., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 721.) We thus reject mother’s
assertion that the Department’s inquiry was deficient because it
did not ask J.B. about M.M.’s Indian ancestry.
We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion
by finding the Department’s efforts were adequate to discharge
8 In light of our conclusion on this issue, the Department’s
motion to submit additional evidence on appeal is denied.
7
its duty of initial inquiry, and that reversal is not required based
on its failure to interview maternal grandmother or maternal
cousin J.B.
DISPOSITION
The November 19, 2024 order terminating parental rights
is affirmed.
TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P.J.
COLLINS, J.
8
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.