People v. Dominguez CA4/1

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Filed 7/21/25 P. v. Dominguez CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083869

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD268952 )

JULIAN DOMINGUEZ

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
David J. Danielsen, Judge. Affirmed.
Alex Kreit, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Eric A. Swenson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General and Heather M.
Clark, Deputy Attorney General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Julian Dominguez appeals from an order denying him resentencing

under Penal Code section 1172.75.1 He contends he is entitled to a full
resentencing under that law because at the time of his hearing on section
1172.75 relief, his judgment included two invalid section 667.5, former
subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancements. We hold Dominguez is not
entitled to resentencing as this court struck the two prior prison
enhancements in May 2020, before section 1172.75’s effective date, and thus
his judgment did not include them. We affirm the order.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
In 2017, a jury convicted Dominguez of robbery (§ 211) and found true
allegations that he committed the offense for the benefit of, at the direction
of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).
Dominguez admitted he served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, former subd.
(b)), had one prior serious felony conviction (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7,
subd. (c)), and had one strike prior conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12,
668). That same year, the court sentenced him to a 16-year determinate
prison term: a five-year upper term for the robbery doubled to 10 years based
on the strike prior, a consecutive five-year term for the serious felony prior,
and a consecutive one-year term for one of the prison priors. The court
stayed the term for the other prison prior and stayed the 10-year term for the
gang enhancement.
In December 2018, this court vacated Dominguez’s sentence and
remanded the matter “for resentencing to permit the court to fully exercise its
discretion” with respect to imposition of the section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The facts of Dominguez’s conviction are not material to the issues
presented in this appeal.
2
gang enhancement, as well as to decide whether to strike the serious felony
prior. (People v. Dominguez (Dec. 20, 2018, D072771) [nonpub. opn.].)
In April 2019, the trial court resentenced Dominguez to a 15-year term,
staying both one-year terms on Dominguez’s prior prison convictions.
Dominguez again challenged his sentence on grounds the prison prior
enhancements should have been stricken in light of new law, Senate Bill No.
136. (People v. Arteaga (May 20, 2020, D075828) [nonpub. opn.].) In May
2020, this court held that prison priors such as those alleged against
Dominguez no longer qualified for the one-year enhancement originally
contained in section 667.5, former subdivision (b). (Ibid.) We agreed with the
parties’ concession that the law applied to Dominguez. (Ibid.) Our
disposition thus stated: “The sentence is modified to strike the prison prior
enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) alleged as to each defendant.” (Ibid.) We
directed the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment as to each
defendant to reflect the changes and to forward an amended abstract of
judgment to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR). (Ibid.)
In October 2021, the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3; see People v. Monroe (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 393, 397.) Effective January 1, 2022, the enactment added
section 1171.1 (Monroe, at p. 397), which was later renumbered as section
1172.75.
In or about 2023, the CDCR identified Dominguez as a person currently
serving a prison term that includes a potentially legally invalid enhancement
under section 667.5, former subdivision (b). In August 2023, the trial court
tentatively ruled Dominguez did not qualify for relief. It found his sentence

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“is not enhanced by an eligible prison prior pursuant to . . . [section] 667.5,
[subdivision] (b) . . . .”
Dominguez’s matter was heard in February 2024. The trial court
observed that this court in May 2020 had ordered “both prison priors be
stricken since they represented an unauthorized sentence in light of the
passage of [Senate Bill No.] 136.” It continued: “[T]his court has either
previously complied with that order or if it hasn’t is required to comply with
that order. The court does order at this time both prison priors stricken and
directs that, if necessary, an amended abstract be forwarded to the CDCR
forthwith. [¶] [Dominguez’s] current petition . . . is based on Senate Bill
[No.] 483, which made the changes implemented by Senate Bill [No.] 136
retroactive. And since [Dominguez] has no prison priors as a part of the
judgment on this case at this time, the petition is denied.” In an addendum
to its minute order, the court stated that it “ha[d] not previously acted upon”
this court’s order, so it ordered the prior convictions stricken and directed

that an amended abstract of judgment be forwarded to the CDCR.3
Dominguez filed this appeal.

3 The addendum reads in full: “This case involves [two] prison priors,
one imposed and another imposed but stayed upon re-sentencing on [April 15,
2019]. On appeal, the [Court of Appeal] ordered on [May 20, 2020,] that both
prison priors be stricken since they represent an unauthorized sentence in
light of [Senate Bill No.] 136. Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136
amended section 667.5 by limiting the enhancement to only prior prison
terms served for sexually violent offenses. Enhancements based on prior
prison terms served for other offenses became legally invalid. [¶] This court
has not previously acted upon the [May 2020] order. Now, the court orders
the prison priors stricken and directs an amended abstract be forwarded to
CDCR forthwith. [¶] The current petition of defendant is based upon Senate
Bill No. 483 which made the changes implemented by Senate Bill [No.] 136
retroactive. Since the defendant has no prison priors as a part of the
judgment on this case, the petition is denied.”
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DISCUSSION
I. The Law
“Before 2019, . . . section 667.5, subdivision (b) . . . instructed trial
courts to ‘impose a one-year term for each prior separate prison term or
county jail term’ served for a felony, with an exception not applicable here for
a five-year period of freedom from custody and felony offenses. [Citations.]
[¶] In 2019, in an effort to reduce the societal and fiscal burdens of
incarceration, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg.
Sess.) . . . which amended section 667.5[, subdivision] (b) to eliminate prior-
prison-term enhancements for all prior crimes except for ‘sexually violent
offense[s] as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code.’ [Citation.] In 2021, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) made this change retroactive. It enacted . . . section 1171.1 [citation],
later renumbered without substantive change as . . . section 1172.75 . . .
[citation], which declares: ‘Any sentence enhancement that was imposed
prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except
for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code is legally invalid.’ (§ 1172.75, subd. (a) . . . .)” (People v.
Rhodius (2025) ___ Cal.5th ____, ____ [2025 WL 1763117, at pp. *1–2]
(Rhodius).)
“A defendant serving a term for a judgment that includes a now-
invalid enhancement is entitled to resentencing. [Citation.] To facilitate the
process, the statute directs [CDCR] to ‘identify those persons in their custody
currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement
described in subdivision (a).’ [Citation.] Upon receiving that information, the
sentencing court must ‘review the judgment and verify that the current

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judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a).’
[Citation.] ‘If the court determines that the current judgment includes an
enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall the sentence
and resentence the defendant.’ ” (Rhodius, supra, ___ Cal.5th at p. ___ [2025
WL 1763117, at p. *2].)
“[T]he procedures for recall and resentencing under section 1172.75 are
mandatory where they apply.” (Rhodius, supra, ___ Cal.5th at p. ___ [2025
WL 1763117, at p. *9].) That is, the statute, if applicable, “requires full
resentencing, not simply striking the now-invalidated priors.” (Id. at p. ___
[2025 WL 1763117, at p. *9, fn. 3.)
II. This Court Struck Dominguez’s Prison Prior Enhancements in May 2020;
His Judgment No Longer Includes the Now-Invalid Enhancements
Dominguez contends the issue presented is whether section 1172.75’s
resentencing provisions apply to a defendant, like himself, whose judgment
includes stayed prison prior enhancements. He acknowledges that this court
in May 2020 “held that [his] prison priors be stricken” as well as directed the
trial court to amend the abstract of judgment and forward it to CDCR. But,
pointing to the trial court’s February 2024 orders, Dominguez asserts the
correction to his abstract “never happened,” and thus, he argues, when
section 1172.75 took effect in January 2022, he was still currently serving a
term that included now-invalid prison term enhancements. According to
Dominguez, it was not until February 2024 that the trial court ordered the
priors be stricken and a new abstract of judgment forwarded to the CDCR.
The question framed by Dominguez has been answered by the
California Supreme Court in Rhodius, supra, ___ Cal.5th ___ [2025 WL
1763117]. “[S]ection 1172.75 entitles a defendant to resentencing if the
underlying judgment includes a prior-prison-term enhancement that was

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imposed before January 1, 2020, regardless of whether the enhancement was
then executed or instead stayed.” (Id. at p. ___ [2025 WL 1763117, at p. *1].)
But Dominguez’s appeal turns on a different question: the effect of this
court’s May 2020 disposition, in which we modified Dominguez’s sentence to
strike the section 667.5, former subdivision (b) prior prison enhancements.
This court possesses the authority to modify Dominguez’s judgment. Under
section 1260, an appellate court “may reverse, affirm, or modify a judgment
or order appealed from, or reduce the degree of the offense or attempted
offense or the punishment imposed.” (See also People v. Waqa (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 565, 585.) And, when a court “strikes [a sentencing]
enhancement, it’s as if the fact of the enhancement never existed—it will not
remain on the defendant’s criminal record nor will it affect them in any
potential future resentencing.” (People v. Flores (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 368,

383; People v. Barboza (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 955, 965.)4 This court’s May
2020 disposition substantively changed Dominguez’s judgment to strike, and
thereby eliminate, his prior prison term enhancements before the January 1,
2022 effective date of section 1172.75. At the time of the 2024 hearing on
Dominguez’s request for section 1172.75 relief, his judgment did not include a
section 667.5, former subdivision (b) enhancement for the trial court to strike.
That the trial court neglected to correct Dominguez’s abstract of
judgment or forward it to CDCR immediately after our May 2020 disposition
is immaterial. “An abstract of judgment is not the judgment of conviction”
and “may not add to or modify the judgment . . . .” (People v. Mitchell (2001)
26 Cal.4th 181, 185; People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855.)

4 “If, however, a judge strikes the punishment only, the fact of the
enhancement will remain in the defendant’s criminal record, but the
enhancement cannot be used to ‘add any punishment’ in the current case.”
(People v. Flores, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 383.)
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We thus hold the trial court correctly determined that Dominguez was
not “ ‘currently serving a term for a judgment that includes’ ” a sentencing
enhancement described in section 1172.75, subdivision (a) (Rhodius, supra,
___ Cal.5th at p. ___ [2025 WL 1763117, at p. *1]), and properly denied his
request for a full resentencing.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, J.

KELETY, J.

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