CourtListener 10636888•People v. Phillips CA2/2
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Filed 7/18/25 P. v. Phillips CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B337621
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA019645)
v.
NATHAN PHILLIPS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Richard H. Kirschner, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Michael H. Casey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Susan
Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorneys General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy
S. Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________________
Appellant Nathan Phillips appeals an order denying a
resentencing hearing after the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified him as a person serving an invalid
sentence. (Pen. Code,1 § 1172.75.) The superior court struck a one-
year prior prison term enhancement—previously imposed under section
667.5, former subdivision (b) and stayed—but rejected appellant’s
request to conduct a full resentencing. Based on the recently issued
People v. Rhodius (June 26, 2025, S283169) ___Cal.5th___ [2025 Cal.
Lexis 3531] (Rhodius), we conclude that appellant is entitled to a
hearing at which he is resentenced under section 1172.75.
Appellant further notes that his current abstract of judgment is
erroneous in that it contains reference to a previously reversed
conviction for possession of a deadly weapon (former § 12020, subd. (a)),
and respondent concedes this point. Upon remand, the abstract of
judgment is to be corrected.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1995, a jury convicted appellant of possession of a controlled
substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a); count 1), two counts
of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a); counts 2 & 4), possession
of a deadly weapon (§ 12020, subd. (a)2; count 5), and first-degree
burglary (§ 459; count 8). Allegations that appellant had suffered two
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 “[F]ormer section 12020 (Stats. 2008, ch. 699, § 18, p. 4834),
prohibiting possession of a wide variety of weapons, was repealed and
recodified in a nonsubstantive reorganization which divided former
section 12020 into new numbered sections. (Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 4,
operative Jan. 1, 2012; see §§ 16000 [Deadly Weapons Recodification
Act of 2010], 16005 [‘Nothing in the Deadly Weapons Recodification Act
of 2010 is intended to substantively change the law relating to deadly
weapons’].)” (People v. Brown (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 451, 454, fn. 1.)
The parties to this appeal continue to refer to former section 12020 and,
for clarity, we also refer to former section 12020 in this opinion.
2
prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)) constituting “strikes”
(§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d), 667, subds. (b)–(i)) were found true, as was
an allegation that he had served one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd.
(b)). The trial court sentenced appellant to 135 years to life in state
prison, consisting of 25 years to life on count 1, plus five years each for
both section 667, subdivision (a)(1) enhancements, and consecutive
terms of 25 years to life for each of the remaining counts. The court
imposed and stayed the prior prison term enhancement.
In 1997, this division reversed the conviction for possession of a
deadly weapon and remanded the matter to the trial court to exercise
its discretion to dismiss appellant’s strikes pursuant to People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). (People v.
Phillips (Apr. 17, 1997, B095163) [nonpub. opn.].) The judgment was
affirmed in all other respects. Although the body of the opinion was
clear that only the single count for possession of a deadly weapon was
reversed, the disposition erroneously identified the charge as “count 4”
rather than count 5.
Upon remand, in August 1997, the trial court denied appellant’s
Romero motion, but modified the total sentence by running each
remaining subordinate count concurrently, leaving appellant with a 35
year to life sentence, which included the two five-year prior serious
felony enhancements.3 In doing so, however, and apparently confused
by the appellate disposition, the trial court purported to “reverse” count
4, which was for receiving stolen property, rather than count 5, for
possession of a deadly weapon. This change was reflected in the
abstract of judgment issued in September 1997, in which counts 2, 5,
and 8 (and not 4) were run concurrently to count 1.
3 In a second appeal, appellant challenged the denial of his
Romero motion. This division affirmed the judgment in People v.
Phillips (Sept. 3, 1998, B117213) (nonpub. opn.).
3
In 2022, the CDCR notified the superior court that appellant’s
sentence contained a section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement
rendered invalid under section 1172.75. After initially declining to
modify appellant’s sentence, the superior court set aside its initial
ruling and ordered defense counsel to file a motion for recall and
resentencing. Appellant, through counsel, filed a motion requesting
that the invalid one-year prior prison term enhancement be struck.
The motion also argued that appellant was entitled to a full
resentencing hearing and that, at the hearing, the trial court should,
among other things, strike appellant’s two five-year section 667,
subdivision (a)(1) enhancements and dismiss one of appellant’s prior
“strikes” pursuant to Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497.
In May 2024, the superior court heard appellant’s motion. The
court struck the prior prison term enhancement but declined to conduct
a full resentencing hearing. The court issued an amended abstract of
judgment that contained no prior prison term enhancement but
continued to incorrectly reference a conviction on count 5, for
possession of a deadly weapon, rather than count 4, for receiving stolen
property. This error was not brought to the court’s attention by the
defense or the prosecution, either before or after the hearing.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the order denying a
resentencing hearing.
DISCUSSION
I. Appellant is entitled to a resentencing hearing under
section 1172.75.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying a full
resentencing hearing under section 1172.75. We agree.
With the enactment of Senate Bill No. 136 (effective Jan. 1,
2020), the Legislature amended subdivision (b) of section 667.5 to
impose a one-year enhancement only for each prior term served for
conviction of a sexually violent offense. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.)
Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature made the change retroactive,
4
declaring that “[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to
January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for
any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense . . . is legally invalid.” (Former § 1171.1, subd. (a), added by
Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3, now § 1172.75, subd. (a).)
At the time the superior court ruled on the matter at issue in this
appeal, there was a split of authority on the question of whether a full
resentencing hearing was required when a prior prison term
enhancement, rendered invalid by section 1172.75, had been originally
imposed and stayed, as opposed to imposed and executed. (Rhodius,
supra, ___Cal.5th at p. ___ [2025 Cal. Lexis 3531, [at pp. 7–8].)
Rhodius resolved the issue, finding “that section 1172.75(a) is most
naturally read to mean that a covered enhancement is invalid if it was
‘imposed’ before January 1, 2020, not just if it was ‘imposed and
executed.’ ” (Rhodius, [at p. 18].) Rhodius further explained that the
legislative history indicated no intent to distinguish between
defendants whose enhancements were imposed and executed versus
those where they were imposed and stayed. (Id. [at p. 26].) The
Supreme Court concluded that the “retroactive invalidation of the
previously imposed enhancements in turn mandates resentencing
under section 1172.75, according to the procedures set forth therein.”
(Id. [at p. 28].)
The superior court in this matter, in striking the previously
stayed one-year prior prison term enhancement, did not conduct a full
resentencing under the procedures of section 1172.75. Subdivision (c)
of section 1172.75, provides that, upon determination of an invalid
enhancement, the superior court “shall recall the sentence and
resentence the defendant.” Subdivision (d), in turn, sets outs
procedures for the resentencing, including: that resentencing “shall
result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of
the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by
clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would
5
endanger public safety” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1)); that the court “shall
apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion
so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing” (id., subd. (d)(2)); that the court “may consider
postconviction factors” (id., subd. (d)(3)); that rules relating to
imposition of a middle or upper term must be followed (id., subd.
(d)(4)); and that counsel shall be appointed (id., subd. (d)(5)).
As the superior court denied a resentencing hearing, these
procedures were not complied with in this case. Accordingly, we
reverse the superior court’s order and remand for the superior court to
conduct a full resentencing hearing under section 1172.75.
II. Upon remand, appellant’s abstract of judgment should be
corrected.
As noted above, due to a series of errors over the years,
appellant’s current abstract of judgment shows a conviction on count 5,
for possession of a deadly weapon, rather than count 4, for receiving
stolen property.
Appellant and respondent agree that the error should be
corrected. Because the matter is being remanded for a full
resentencing hearing under section 1172.75 in which the superior court
will consider a number of factors relating to sentencing, from an
efficiency standpoint, the superior court is in the best position to correct
the abstract of judgment. Accordingly, following remand, in addition to
conducting the resentencing hearing, the superior court shall correct
the abstract of judgment as warranted.4
4 In his reply brief, appellant argues for the first time that, in
correcting the abstract of judgment by eliminating count 5, count 4
should not be reinstated. As this argument has not previously been
raised in the superior court (and was not raised here until the reply
brief), we decline to address it. Although consideration of the issue
may be proper by construing the claim as one brought under a petition
6
DISPOSITION
The superior court’s order of May 10, 2024, to the extent it denies
a full resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, is reversed. The
order striking the previously imposed and stayed section 667.5,
subdivision (b) enhancement is affirmed. Upon remand, the superior
court shall resentence appellant under section 1172.75, according to the
procedures set forth therein. In addition, the superior must correct the
abstract of judgment as appropriate, including by eliminating the
previously reversed conviction on count 5 for possession of a deadly
weapon. We express no view as to how the superior court should
exercise its sentencing discretion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
RICHARDSON, J.
for writ of habeas corpus, “[a] higher court ‘has discretion to deny
without prejudice a habeas corpus petition that was not filed first in a
proper lower court.’ ” (Robinson v. Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, 895.)
“The superior court that rendered the judgment is best equipped to
consider the claim in the first instance, to hold an evidentiary hearing
when necessary, and to grant relief if appropriate.” (Ibid.) Appellant
may properly raise the issue in the superior court in the first instance.
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