People v. Thomas CA2/4

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Filed 7/16/25 P. v. Thomas CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B336886

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A637193
v.

KELSEY AUGUSTA THOMAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Sean D. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R.
Maline, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant Kelsey Augusta Thomas appeals
the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under
Penal Code section 1172.6.1 Thomas argues the trial court erred
by denying his resentencing petition at the prima facie stage
after concluding the record of conviction demonstrates he is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We reject Thomas’s
contention. The jury instructions, read in conjunction with the
prosecution’s closing argument, demonstrate as a matter of law
that Thomas was prosecuted and convicted as the actual killer in
the charged homicide. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order
denying him relief.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On direct appeal, the Court of Appeal set forth the
following statement of facts:2

[Thomas’s] former girlfriend, Beronica
McFarland, testified she had worked for [Thomas] as
a prostitute, soliciting customers on the corner of
Figueroa Street and 104th Place. Approximately 11
p.m. on June 2, 1986, [Thomas] and McFarland went
to this location and McFarland stood on the

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 We rely on this information as background only. We base
our assessment as to whether Thomas is entitled to relief under
section 1172.6 on our independent review of the record of
conviction. (See People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 222,
fn. 2.)

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northwest corner near a bus stop while [Thomas]
watched her from the southwest corner.
Earlier that night, [Thomas] had told
McFarland he needed money and planned to rob
someone but did not say who. McFarland testified
she knew [Thomas] “was going to do it because that’s
just the way he is.”
When McFarland attracted her first customer,
they agreed on a price and, as was her practice,
McFarland told him to park his automobile down the
street. McFarland entered the vehicle, received $25,
and began having sex with her customer. While she
did so, [Thomas] walked within two feet of the
vehicle, proceeded halfway up the block, again
walked past the vehicle and returned to the
southwest corner, which was McFarland’s signal to
finish. McFarland finished and returned to the
northwest corner.
McFarland’s next customer was the victim,
David Anderson. Anderson and McFarland had a
brief conversation through the open passenger-side
window of Anderson’s white Camaro, during which
Anderson said he wanted a “date” and displayed a
“wad of money” two or three inches thick. McFarland
directed him to park his vehicle down the street.
McFarland entered the automobile; Anderson
gave her $25, and they began having sex. Within two
or three minutes, [Thomas] approached, displayed a
gun, and told the victim “he had a .357 and it was a
robbery.” [Thomas] ordered Anderson out of the
vehicle, reached into the victim’s pocket and removed
his money, and then directed Anderson to walk
toward the corner. As Anderson was walking,

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[Thomas] shot him three times. McFarland had not
known [Thomas] was going to rob Anderson.
[Thomas] told McFarland to enter the driver’s
seat of the Camaro and start the vehicle. McFarland
complied, although she did not know how to drive.
When [Thomas] ordered McFarland to “drive,” she
told him she did not want to. [Thomas] repeated his
command to drive, and McFarland complied,
receiving assistance from [Thomas] in placing the
automobile in gear and negotiating turns.
As [Thomas] and McFarland left the scene of
the shooting, they were followed by a Cadillac. The
Cadillac continued to follow as McFarland and
[Thomas] made numerous turns and ceased only
when [Thomas] began shooting at the vehicle.
McFarland asked [Thomas] why he shot the
victim, and [Thomas] replied he wanted no witnesses.
[Thomas] and McFarland parked the Camaro a
few blocks from the motel where they were staying.
Using a napkin, [Thomas] attempted to wipe any
fingerprints off the vehicle, and they walked to the
motel. [Thomas] told McFarland to pack their
belongings while [Thomas] telephoned his sister,
Marie. Marie arrived and took [Thomas] and
McFarland back to Marie’s apartment, where
[Thomas] counted the money he had taken from the
victim.
Approximately two weeks later, McFarland
contacted the police.
Sheila Rasco, Anderson’s girlfriend, testified
that on June 2, 1986, Anderson borrowed her white
Camaro. He had with him a roll of money
approximately two inches across, which he had

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obtained by selling drugs. Rasco recovered her
automobile from the police following Anderson's
death.
Approximately 2 a.m. on June 3, 1986, police
found Anderson lying on the sidewalk near the corner
of Figueroa Street and 104th Place. No money was
found on Anderson’s body or in the area. Anderson
died of a gunshot wound to the head and had suffered
a second wound in the thigh, both of which had been
inflicted either by a .38 caliber or .357 caliber
firearm. One bullet was recovered from Anderson’s
body, a second was found in Anderson’s clothes, and
bullet holes were found in a residence at the scene of
the shooting.
Rasco’s white Camaro was found near the
intersection of Raymond Street and 73rd Street.
With the exception of $10, the vehicle contained no
money.
Pei Cho Tung, the manager of a motel located
on Vermont Avenue near 74th Street, testified
[Thomas] and McFarland had lived at the motel from
May 10, 1986, until sometime in June 1986.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1988, a jury convicted Thomas of first degree murder
(§ 187), robbery (§ 211), and found true the special circumstance
that Thomas committed the murder during the commission of a
robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)). The jury also found true
allegations that Thomas used a firearm in the commission of the
murder and robbery. (§ 12022.5.) The trial court sentenced
Thomas to life without the possibility of parole for the special
circumstance murder, enhanced by two years for personal use of

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a firearm, and stayed sentencing on the robbery. A different
panel of this court affirmed the judgment on direct appeal.
(People v. Thomas (Dec. 18, 1989, B035981) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2023, Thomas filed pro per a section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing on his murder conviction, and the trial court
appointed counsel to represent him. The prosecution filed a
response, along with the jury instructions from Thomas’s trial.
In its response, the prosecution argued the instructions
demonstrated Thomas was prosecuted and convicted of murder
as the actual killer of Anderson. As such, he was ineligible for
section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. In reply, Thomas argued
any conclusion that he was ineligible for relief as the actual killer
would require judicial factfinding, impermissible at the prima
facie stage.
In February 2024, the trial court held Thomas had not
shown prima facie eligibility for relief and therefore denied his
petition. The court noted that the jury was instructed on felony
murder, not on a theory of liability that required a finding of
malice. But the jury instructions did not instruct on aiding and
abetting liability and demonstrated as a matter of law that
Thomas was convicted of felony murder as the actual killer. That
is, the only viable path to conviction under the law as instructed
required the jury to find Thomas was Anderson’s actual killer.
Thomas timely appealed.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

In 2018, the Legislature, through Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), amended section 188 to
eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a
basis for murder liability. Subject to certain exceptions under the
felony murder rule, section 188, subdivision (a)(3) now requires

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that a defendant act with malice to be convicted of murder. 3
Senate Bill No. 1437 also amended section 189 to narrow the
scope of the felony murder rule. As amended, section 189,
subdivision (e) now permits, in relevant part, a felony murder
conviction based on the commission of an enumerated felony in
which a death occurs if one of the following is proven:

(1) The person was the actual killer.
(2) The person was not the actual killer, but,
with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the
first degree.
(3) The person was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision
(d) of Section 190.2.
In addition, Senate Bill No. 1437 added section 1172.6,
“which provides a procedure for defendants convicted of murder
to seek resentencing if they are able to establish they could not be
convicted of murder under the amendments to section 188 and
189 effective January 1, 2019.” (People v. Williams (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1244, 1250 [citing Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §. 4].)
Under section 1172.6, a defendant convicted of felony
murder may file a petition to vacate the conviction and be
resentenced on any remaining counts. To set forth a prima

3 In 2021, through Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2021, ch. 551), the Legislature clarified that the
amendments made by Senate Bill No. 1437 were also intended to
apply to attempted murder and manslaughter. (People v. Hin
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 441.)

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facie case for relief, the defendant must show: “(1) A complaint,
information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner
that allowed the prosecution to proceed under [an imputed-malice
theory of murder liability] . . . . [¶] (2) The petitioner
was convicted of murder . . . following a trial . . . at which
the petitioner could have been convicted of murder . . . . [and ¶]
(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted
of murder . . . [under current law].” (§ 1172.6, subds. (a).)
Once a facially sufficient petition attesting to the above
criteria is filed, the trial court must determine whether the
petitioner is prima facie eligible for relief. (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) If the trial court determines that the
petitioner is so eligible, it must issue an order to show cause and
hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) At that
hearing, the prosecution bears the burden “to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder” under
current law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)

DISCUSSION

We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6
petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45, 52 (Harden).) In conducting this review, we
review the record of conviction as a whole. (See Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971 [“The record of conviction will necessarily
inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6],
allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit
from those that are clearly meritless”].) Applying this standard,
we conclude the trial court did not err in finding Thomas’s record
of conviction demonstrates he is ineligible as a matter of law for
section 1172.6 relief.

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Here, the record of conviction, viewed as a whole,
demonstrates as a matter of law that Thomas was prosecuted and
convicted of murder under the theory that he was the actual
killer. At trial, the court instructed the jury on felony murder
doctrine as a basis for finding murder liability but did not
instruct on aiding and abetting liability. Moreover, the
prosecution’s closing argument makes clear that the only theory
of liability presented to the jury to consider was that Thomas was
guilty of felony murder as the actual killer of Anderson during a
robbery. Specifically, during closing argument, the prosecution
stated: “If you are committing a felony and you kill somebody
while you are committing that felony, you are guilty of first
degree murder. And it does not matter if that killing is
intentional, unintentional, purely accidental, whatever.” The
prosecution then stated Thomas personally used a firearm while
committing the murder. In support of this theory, the
prosecution pointed to evidence adduced at trial indicating
Thomas shot the victim.
The jury instructions, viewed in conjunction with the
prosecution’s closing argument, demonstrate as a matter of law
that Thomas was convicted of felony murder under the theory
that he was the actual killer. (§ 189, subd. (e)(1).) As set forth
above, this theory of liability remains valid under sections 188
and 189, as amended. (§ 189, subd. (e).) Thus, the trial court did
not err in concluding the record of conviction demonstrates as a
matter of law that Thomas is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief.
(See People v. Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 64, 88-90 [imposing
death penalty on defendant convicted of felony murder as actual
killer does not violate the Eighth Amendment limits on executing
felony murderers].)

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In so concluding, we find unpersuasive Thomas’s argument
that on appeal we are unable to consider the content of the
prosecution’s closing argument. Closing arguments are, of
course, part of the record of conviction in section 1172.6
proceedings. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13.)
Courts therefore may rely on them, as we do here, in assessing
whether a petitioner is prima facie ineligible for section 1172.6
relief.
Finally, Thomas’s reliance on People v. Lee (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1164 (Lee) in urging he has made a prima facie case
for resentencing eligibility notwithstanding the prosecution’s
closing argument is misplaced. In Lee, Division One of our court
held that a defendant’s murder conviction under the provocative
act doctrine did not render him ineligible for resentencing under
section 1172.6 as a matter of law. There, Lee was tried, and the
jury instructed, on murder based “solely on the malicious
provocative acts of his confederates in the underlying robbery,
without any finding as to [his] mental state.” (Lee at pp. 1169,
1188.) In closing, the prosecution argued Lee was guilty of
murder based on his own commission of a provocative act, a
theory of liability that remains valid under sections 188 and 189.
(Lee at p. 1188.) The court concluded that, despite the legal
validity of the prosecution’s closing argument, the jury
instructions permitted the jury to convict Lee of murder under a
now-invalid, imputed-malice theory. (Ibid.) Thus, the record
before the court did not demonstrate ineligibility for section
1172.6 relief as a matter of law. (Lee at p. 1188.) The court
therefore remanded the case for the trial court to issue an order
to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing (unless waived)
under section 1172.6, subdivisions (d)(1) and (3).

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Lee is inapposite to this case. Notwithstanding the
prosecution’s argument in closing, the instructions in Lee allowed
the jury to impute malice to a confederate and, based on that
imputation, convict Lee of murder. Here, by contrast, the jury
instructions contain no aiding and abetting instructions, and in
no way suggest there were any individuals other than Thomas,
acting alone, involved in the commission of the charged murder.
Nor did the prosecution’s closing argument suggest Thomas acted
with any confederates. Rather, consistent with the jury
instructions, the prosecution’s sole theory of murder liability in
closing was that Thomas was the sole and actual killer.4

4 In their briefs, the parties raise arguments concerning the
applicability of Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 45 and whether
that case was correctly decided. Because we resolve this appeal
narrowly based only on our review of Thomas’s record of
conviction, we need not address whether the legal principles
articulated in Harden apply here.

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DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court’s order denying Thomas section
1172.6 relief.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

GARCIA UHRIG, J.*
We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

MORI, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article IV, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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