In re I.H. CA5

CourtListener 10633846CalctappJul 16, 2025

Full text

Filed 7/15/25 In re I.H. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re I.H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.

STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY F089301
SERVICES AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. JVDP-22-000074)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. OPINION
A.S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Annette Rees,
Judge.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.

* Before Snauffer, Acting P. J., DeSantos, J. and Fain, J.†
† Judge of the Fresno Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Thomas Boze, County Counsel, and Sophia Ahmad, Deputy County Counsel;
Gordon-Creed, Kelley, Holl & Sugerman, Jeremy Sugerman and Anne H. Nguyen, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Appellant A.S. (mother) is the mother of I.H., who is the subject of this
dependency matter. Mother challenges the decision of the juvenile court terminating her
parental rights following a contested hearing considering a permanency plan for I.H.,
submitted by the Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency) under Welfare
and Institutions Code1 section 366.26. Mother contends the court’s refusal to approve
in-person visits with I.H. for the preparation of a bonding study calls into question the
court’s conclusion the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply in this
case. We affirm the decisions of the court terminating mother’s parental rights and
denying mother’s request for in-person visits with I.H. for the preparation of a bonding
study.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY
Following a hearing on a detention petition filed on October 9, 2020, a juvenile
court in Contra Costa County set a jurisdiction hearing and returned custody of
two-month-old I.H. to mother. The petition alleged I.H. came within the jurisdiction of
the court under relevant provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code after a domestic
violence incident between mother and J.H., her alleged father (father), occurred in her
presence. At this time, mother and I.H. were living with the maternal grandmother.
An amended juvenile dependency petition was filed on January 4, 2021, alleging
mother had at some point moved with I.H. from her mother’s home to the home of the
alleged paternal grandmother, despite a prior court order that stated I.H. should not be in

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise indicated.

2.
alleged father’s presence. The petition further alleged that on December 30, 2020,
mother punched alleged father in I.H.’s presence, and that I.H. fell out of a car seat she
was not properly secured into at the time. These events led to mother’s arrest. Following
a detention hearing held on January 6, 2021, I.H. was detained and placed into foster
care. Father’s status was also changed from alleged to presumed at this time.
On March 17, 2021, the juvenile court sustained the petition. On April 16, 2021,
the court ordered I.H. to be placed in foster care, ordered family reunification services be
provided to the parents, and gave the Contra Costa Employment and Human Services
Department (department) the authority to extend overnight visits to the parents. A
section 366.21, subdivision (e) six-month review hearing was set for October 1, 2021.
A status report prepared for the October 2021 review hearing recommended
returning physical custody of I.H. to mother, along with providing family maintenance
services. The report also recommended terminating father’s reunification services
because he had failed to engage in those services. Mother’s visitation during the
reporting period had progressed to a series of successful 10-day overnight visits,
culminating in a 30-day overnight visit that was still in progress when the report was
prepared. At the hearing held on October 1, 2021, the juvenile court adopted these
recommendations and set a section 364 review hearing for March 18, 2022.
Before the March 2022 review hearing, the department submitted a report in
January 2022, informing the juvenile court that mother had moved to Stanislaus County
with I.H., but was still engaging in services. Mother reported that she was employed and
living in her own apartment with I.H. However, the report also documented an incident
that occurred when mother went with I.H. to retrieve mail from the paternal
grandmother’s house in San Francisco that resulted in a physical altercation. According
to the report, father arrived at the home and tried to break up the fight that had erupted
between mother and a number of paternal relatives. Mother claimed to not know that

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father would be at the home when she arrived and vowed to take steps in the future to
avoid such interactions, including obtaining a restraining order against father.
At the review hearing held on March 18, 2022, the juvenile court found mother
resided in Stanislaus County and ordered the matter transferred to that county. On
April 1, 2022, during a transfer-in review hearing, the case was accepted by Stanislaus
County. At the time of the transfer, mother informed the court in Stanislaus County that
she would be temporarily relocating to Sacramento for 90 days because repairs were
being made to her apartment. The case worker assigned to this matter expressed some
concern over mother’s ability to comply with the case plan given this uncertainty in her
living arrangements. The court eventually set a section 364 review hearing for
September 13, 2022.
The status report prepared for the September 2022 review hearing noted mother
had failed to follow through with various things she was required to do in her case plan.
Specifically, mother had not obtained a dental appointment for I.H., had not transferred
Medi-Cal coverage from Contra Costa County to Stanislaus County, and had failed to
obtain a restraining order against father in Stanislaus County. Mother also made some
inconsistent statements about her participation in domestic violence services, some of
which appeared to be untrue. The report also referenced a number of incidents that
suggested mother and I.H. had been in contact with father while in Stanislaus County.
The juvenile court found on September 13, 2022, that mother’s participation in services
was minimal. After the matter was trailed to September 27, 2022, mother was
admonished by the court to stay in contact with the social worker and to “actively”
engage in services.
A report prepared for the October 2022 hearing described various interactions
mother had with a social worker that were concerning. Specifically, the social worker
was concerned that mother had not completed the case plan and had been involved in
additional incidents of domestic violence. Furthermore, the social worker reported he

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received a phone call from San Francisco Child Protective Services on October 11, 2022,
informing him that mother and father had been arrested for stealing alcohol from a large
retail store and that I.H. was with her parents when this incident occurred. Additional
information revealed mother was receiving benefits in another county, which called into
question whether mother had actually been employed as represented or was possibly
living somewhere else. The case was then again trailed to October 18, 2022.
At the hearing held on October 18, 2022, mother appeared by telephone. Mother
was then warned to appear in person later that same day with I.H., or a warrant would be
issued. Mother did not appear in court later that day, and the appropriate warrants were
issued. Mother also did not appear at a hearing held on November 17, 2022, which
considered the status of the outstanding warrants. The juvenile court found at that time
that placement of I.H. was no longer appropriate with mother. A minute order for an
additional hearing held on December 29, 2022, noted the earlier issued warrants were still
outstanding, but mother had allowed social workers to have contact with I.H. through a
video conference call.
Between October 2022 and March 2024, the whereabouts of mother and I.H. were
unknown. During this time, status reports continued to be submitted to the juvenile court
as required by statute, and review hearings were held. Mother appeared at each of these
hearings by telephone, and did not produce I.H to the court. A status report filed with the
court on September 20, 2023, indicated social workers were given the opportunity to
have video conference calls with I.H. on an approximately monthly basis.
On March 22, 2024, a section 387 jurisdiction and disposition petition was filed
seeking to place I.H. in foster care. The petition alleged that on March 20, 2024, a social
worker was able to have in-person contact with I.H. and took her into protective custody.
An order of detention was then entered on March 25, 2024. I.H. was then placed with a
nonrelative extended family caregiver previously cleared for placement, who was
referred to as mother’s godmother. This caregiver lived in San Francisco.

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On April 29, 2024, the juvenile court found good cause to continue the jurisdiction
and disposition hearing to May 21, 2024. In the same minute order granting the
continuance for the hearing, the court found visits with father would be detrimental and
suspended those visits. Mother was allowed to have supervised video visits with I.H.
going forward. The report prepared for the hearing provided a factual context for the
request for a continuance:

“[T]he [a]gency was informed by the relative caregiver[2] that [I.H.]
was taken from the babysitter[’s] residence on April l4, 2024 by … father
… and that she was ultimately returned to the babysitter. [The r]elative
[c]aregiver advised law enforcement had been notified and a report taken.
The relative caregiver expressed concerns for her safety and that of her own
child[,] stating she could no longer care for [I.H.] Given concerns for
[I.H.]’s safety and the possib[ility] of her being taken by the parent(s) from
the caregiver again, the [a]gency proceeded with urgently locating
alternative placement for [her]. [M]other, … having absconded with [I.H.]
for the past year (approx.), was also a factor in locating alternative
placement for [I.H.].

“On April 16, 2024[,] placement was located and arrangements were
made with an [a]gency social services assistant (SSA) to transport [I.H.]
from the relative placement in San Francisco to Stanislaus County on this
same date.

“Immediately upon arrival by the SSA in San Francisco to transport
[I.H.], the SSA’s vehicle was blocked in on all sides and [father] could be
observed vandalizing the relative caregiver’s vehicle. [Father] also
approached the county vehicle asking the SSA if she was the assigned
social worker. Multiple unknown individuals and vehicles were present at
the pickup address. [M]other … was also present at the home and was
believed to be yelling and screaming along with other individuals at the
home. The SSA described the situation as chaotic and that confusion
ensued. Law enforcement responded to the situation as the relative
caregiver and the SSA had contacted them. Law enforcement was able to
speak with the placement social worker, … who was on the phone with the
SSA throughout the ordeal.…

2 This appears to be a reference to mother’s godmother with whom I.H. had been
placed, and who was technically considered a “nonrelative extended family member.”

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“The following day on April l7, 2024[,] the former relative caregiver
advised the undersigned and placement social worker … that sometime
after [I.H.] was transported by the SSA[, father] had come to her home and
attempted to shoot at her home and/or at her causing her to be injured. Her
exact injuries were uncertain as well as the details of the events occurring
both on April 14[, 2024] when … father took [I.H.] from the baby sitter
[sic] and on April 16[, 2024,] when [I.H.] was moved from relative
placement. The undersigned faxed a request to the San Francisco Police
[D]epartment records department to obtain police reports in order to clarify
the details and timeline of events that had occurred.”3
Father was eventually arrested on April 18, 2024, for these incidents, and charged
with seven counts, including attempted murder and several weapons charges. At this
point, I.H. was removed from her placement in San Francisco, and was placed in a foster
home in Stanislaus County.
In July 2024, yet another hearing was continued after mother and father were
arrested for stealing liquor from a grocery store. The section 387 jurisdiction and
disposition hearing was finally held on August 20, 2024. The juvenile court found the
allegations in the section 387 petition to be true, and concluded that returning I.H. to the
physical custody of mother or father would create a substantial risk of detriment to her
physical and emotional well-being. The court then denied reunification services to
mother under section 361.5, subdivision (a), but allowed her to have supervised video or
phone visitation with I.H. Neither party filed a notice of an intent to file a writ petition.
A hearing to select a permanent plan was originally noticed for December 17,
2024. On October 28, 2024, the juvenile court denied mother’s request for a bonding
study, stating in the minute order that mother’s counsel could pursue such a study on his
own, but that in-person sessions with I.H. for the study would not be allowed. The
section 366.26 report prepared by the agency was filed with the court on December 5,

3 In fact, additional details of this event were provided in the disposition report
prepared in July 2024. Information suggests a more extensive gunfight with a series of
bullets being shot into an automobile in which mother and father were passengers.
Mother may have been injured by one of those bullets.

7.
2024. The court ultimately set a contested section 366.26 hearing in this case for
January 31, 2025.
At the beginning of the contested hearing, the juvenile court found there had been
compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The agency also submitted the
status reports and recommendation prepared in this matter to the court. Mother and the
maternal grandmother each testified on mother’s behalf, followed by father testifying on
his own behalf. At the end of the hearing, the court found I.H. adoptable and terminated
the parental rights of both mother and father.
ICWA Compliance
Early in these proceedings, mother and father filed documents stating they had no
knowledge of any “Indian” or Native American ancestry. After the case was transferred
to Stanislaus County, further inquiries were sent out to all identified maternal and
paternal relatives in April 2024. That same month, father reported “he had heard of
possible Native American [a]ncestry within his family but that he did not know in what
particular tribe.” As result of those inquires, the agency sent out letters of inquiry to three
Cherokee tribes and to the Blackfeet Nation. Letters were also sent out to the California
Department of Social Services, Office of Tribal Affairs, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
In June 2024, all three Cherokee tribes responded that I.H. was not considered an “Indian
Child” for purposes of ICWA. In July 2024, the agency received a response from the
Blackfeet tribe also stating I.H. was not an “Indian Child” under ICWA.
During the January 31, 2025 hearing, the juvenile court found the agency had
completed its investigation as required by section 224.2, and that “there is no reason to
know that [I.H.] is an Indian child,” and ICWA does not apply. Mother has not
challenged the adequacy of the agency’s compliance with ICWA in this appeal.

8.
DISCUSSION
This appeal has only been brought by mother, as father did not file a notice of
appeal with this court. Therefore, our focus is on the termination of mother’s parental
rights to I.H.
I. The Section 366.26 Hearing Terminating Mother’s Parental Rights
A. The Applicable Law and Standard of Review

“The sole purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is to select and implement
a permanent plan for the child after reunification efforts have failed. (In re
Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 304; see also § 366.26, subd. (b).) At that
stage, ‘the welfare agency’s focus shifts from monitoring the parents’
progress toward reunification to determining the appropriate placement
plan for the child.’ (In re Marilyn H., at p. 305.)” (In re J.D. (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 833, 851–852.)
Because the overriding concern is to protect the child, if the designated time period has
expired and the efforts to reunify the family have failed, a juvenile court must move
toward selecting and implementing a permanent plan for the child under section 366.26.
(Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1008–1009.) However, relevant to our
inquiry, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) provides an exception “where ‘[t]he
parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship.’ ” (In re J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 852.)
This is often referred to as the beneficial parent-child relationship exception.
The leading case defining this exception is In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614
(Caden C.). The Caden C. court stated there are three elements a parent has the burden to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence to justify the application of the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception: (1) “regular visitation and contact with the child,
taking into account the extent of visitation permitted”; (2) “that the child has a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment
implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship”; and

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(3) “terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced
against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Id. at pp. 632–633, 636.)
The first element of this test asks a court the “straightforward” question of whether
the parent visited consistently to “ ‘the extent permitted by court orders.’ ” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The focus of this element is on the best interest of the child
as opposed to punishing or rewarding parents for good behavior in maintaining contact.
(Ibid.)
The second element of the test asks “whether ‘the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The parent-child
relationship “may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the
portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect
of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Ibid.,
quoting In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.)

“If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of
a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that,” even considering
the benefits of a new adoptive home, termination would “harm[]” the child,
the court should not terminate parental rights. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27
Cal.App.4th at p. 575) That subtle, case-specific inquiry is what the statute
asks courts to perform: does the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive
home outweigh ‘the harm [the child] would experience from the loss of [a]
significant, positive, emotional relationship with [the parent?]’ ” (Autumn
H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
The juvenile court’s focus again should be on the child, and it “must remain mindful that
rarely do ‘[p]arent-child relationships’ conform to an entirely consistent pattern.” (Caden
C., at p. 632.)
Finally, when considering the third element, courts are required to ask “how the
child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be
like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) Potential negative effects from severing the relationship

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might include “emotional instability and preoccupation leading to acting out, difficulties
in school, insomnia, anxiety, or depression.” (Ibid.) In contrast, an adoptive home might
provide a new source of stability that alleviates “emotional instability and
preoccupation,” making the loss “not, at least on balance, detrimental.” (Ibid.) Under
this element, the court is again guided by the child’s best interest, but in a “specific way:
it decides whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the security and the
sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ ” (Ibid.)
Appellate courts review a juvenile court’s ruling on the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception using a “ ‘hybrid’ ” standard. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 639.) The substantial evidence standard applies to the first two elements of regular
visitation and the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship. (Id. at pp. 639–640.)
The court’s decision as to the third element—whether termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child—is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 640.)
“Review for abuse of discretion is subtly different, focused not primarily on the evidence
but the application of a legal standard. A court abuses its discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the
trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious,
or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)
The standard of review for a court’s determination that a parent did not meet his or
her burden to prove the beneficial parent-child relationship exception before terminating
parental rights is “whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the [parent] as a
matter of law.” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on other
grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) Specifically, the
question is “whether the [parent’s] evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’
and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination
that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (I.W., at p. 1528.)

11.
B. Application
After taking testimony and hearing oral arguments from the various parties in this
case, the juvenile court started by specifically finding I.H. adoptable. This finding has
not been challenged by mother in her appeal. The court then noted it was statutorily
bound to choose adoption as the permanent plan, unless one or both parents could
establish an exception applied under section 366.26.
Again, the exception mother has focused on is referred to as the beneficial
parent-child relationship, which requires a court to find there is a compelling reason to
conclude that terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the child. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B).) However, to make this finding, the juvenile court must find that not
only has the parent “maintained regular visitation and contact with the child,” but also
that “the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The Caden C. court phrased the test for determining whether the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies as follows:

“[W]e readily discern three elements the parent must prove to establish the
exception: (1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the
continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination
of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 631.)
When addressing the elements of the Caden C. test the juvenile court found there
had been “regular visitation and contact by [mother].” We believe substantial evidence
supports this finding. The court then moved on to the second element by stating:

“In terms of the relationship and whether or not the continuation of
that relationship would be of benefit to the child, we have to look at
whether that relationship is substantial and positive in regard to the parent.
We do look at the age of the child. [I.H.] is now four, and a portion of her
life spent with the parent. And most saliently here, whether the interaction
is positive or negative. [¶] … [¶]

12.
“[I.H.] has spent a significant portion of her life in [mother]’s care;
however, that was directly due to mother absconding with [I.H.] and
refusing to return her although ordered to do so by this Court.

“It was very clear from [mother’s video] contact with the social
worker at that time that she knew … she was violating this Court’s order,
acting contrary to that order, and very clearly refusing to return [I.H.] to
placement or to surrender herself to the Court. So I don’t find that mother’s
behavior has in all areas been positive as to [I.H.].”
The court stated it relied on the various status reports submitted into evidence
summarizing the conduct of mother during this dependency matter. In its recitation of the
findings, the court also addressed both the positive and negative impacts of mother’s
conduct. It is our belief upon a review of the record that substantial evidence also
supports the court’s finding against mother on this element.
When addressing the third element of the Caden C. test, the juvenile court noted
because both mother and father were willing to engage in high-risk behaviors and used
poor judgment, any benefit derived from continuing the relationship would have been
outweighed by the potential detriment posed to I.H.’s stability and safety in a new
adoptive home. Again, the court’s findings on this element are not reviewed for
substantial evidence but are instead reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) To overturn this finding, we would have to conclude the
court “ ‘ “ ‘ exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.) The record provided to this court
reflects mother’s repeated defiance of court orders, violent acts mother committed or
participated in with father while I.H. was present, and mother’s repeated false statements
made to the various social workers involved in this process. We therefore cannot
conclude the court made an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination based
on the evidence it considered.
The statutory exceptions stated in section 366.26 allow a court, “ ‘in exceptional
circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which remains

13.
adoption.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) Based on a full consideration of the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception stated in section 366.26, as further defined
in Caden C., we cannot conclude mother met her burden of proof in establishing this
exception.
II. The Necessity of a Bonding Study
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion “when it denied in person
contact between mother and [I.H.] for a bonding study.” In support of this contention,
mother cites Evidence Code section 730, which states in relevant part:

“When it appears to the court, at any time before or during the trial of an
action, that expert evidence is or may be required by the court or by any
party to the action, the court on its own motion or on motion of any party
may appoint one or more experts to investigate, to render a report as may
be ordered by the court, and to testify as an expert at the trial of the action
relative to the fact or matter as to which the expert evidence is or may be
required.”
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) states that parental rights shall be terminated
if a child is found to be adoptable, unless a compelling reason can establish termination
would be detrimental to the child. One way to establish such a compelling reason is to
show “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the
child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
Over the years courts have found that one way to assess the benefit of continuing the
parental relationship is to consider a bonding study. (See In re M.V. (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 1155.) “Bonding studies supply expert opinion about the psychological
importance to the child of the relationship with his or her parent(s) to assist the court in
determining whether ‘the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.’ ” (Id. at
p. 1179.) While the Caden C. court recently instructed juvenile courts to seriously
consider requests for bonding studies, where appropriate, there is no requirement a court
secure a bonding study before terminating parental rights. (M.V., at p. 1179, discussing
Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633, fn. 4.) The decision whether to order or require a

14.
bonding study is therefore subject to review using the abuse of discretion standard. (In re
Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1084.)
B. Application
Before denying mother any in-person contact with I.H. for the purpose of a
bonding study, the juvenile court referenced the fact that both parents had engaged in
“high-risk behaviors” and poor judgment, impacting I.H.’s well-being, best interests,
stability, and safety. The court then stated:

“I do want to address [mother’s counsel]’s argument that a bonding
study was not allowed. [Mother’s counsel] made a motion to have this
Court order a bonding study which was declined. However, of course,
[Mother’s counsel is] free to pursue that in his own—in his own client’s
behalf outside of a court order.

“The Court’s order was that I would not order in-person connection
between [I.H.] and … mother given the prior behavior of attempting to
remove her from placement in a violent manner such that [mother] even put
herself in danger doing so. Therefore it was not safe for [I.H.] to be in
person for a bonding study to be conducted in person; however, certainly
there are ways to have interviews and conduct a study outside of those
constraints.”
A bonding study was not expressly prohibited by the court. The court’s denial only
addressed the availability of in-person contact between mother and I.H. On appeal,
mother has not raised any other issues which would have prevented her from going
forward with a bonding study.
Based on our review of the record and the numerous incidents documenting the
efforts of both mother and father to defy the juvenile court orders and to engage in
dangerous conduct in I.H.’s presence, we cannot conclude the court abused its discretion
on this matter.
DISPOSITION
The orders declaring I.H. adoptable, terminating mother’s parental rights, and
denying in-person visits for the purpose of preparing a bonding study are affirmed.

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