CourtListener 10632648•In re S.J. CA2/5
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Filed 7/14/25 In re S.J. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re S.J., a Person Coming B340821
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. 24CCJP02707A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
T.J.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Charles Q. Clay, III, Judge. Affirmed.
Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
The juvenile court exerted dependency jurisdiction over a
five-year-old girl who was, at the time, under a temporary legal
guardianship established in a probate proceeding. The girl’s
father appeals, asserting that the juvenile court erred in not
giving proper notice of the dependency proceedings to (1) the
conservator for the girl’s mother, (2) the attorney for the girl in
the probate guardianship proceeding, and (3) the probate court
overseeing that guardianship proceeding. Because father lacks
standing to assert some of these notice defects and because all of
the defects are harmless, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The family
S.J. was born to T.J. (father) and S.B. (mother) in July
2019.
B. Mental health issues and domestic violence
Both father and mother have significant mental health
issues. Father suffers from bipolar disorder and schizophrenia.
2
Mother suffers from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder,
auditory hallucinations and has had suicidal ideation.
Father and mother also have a history of engaging in
domestic violence with one another.
C. Conservatorship over mother
In July 2023, the probate court appointed maternal
grandfather as a conservator over mother. In July 2024, the
court appointed maternal aunt, E.B., as mother’s conservator.
D. Temporary legal guardianship over S.J.
In July 2023, the probate court appointed a different
maternal aunt, S.W., as the temporary legal guardian over S.J.
However, in the summer of 2024, S.W. indicated that she would
not be able to continue the guardianship because mother, while
receiving financial aid to pay for S.J.’s care, was not regularly
forwarding that aid to S.W.; mother also started to feel that she
and S.W. did not get along and mother preferred that maternal
aunt E.B. serve as S.J.’s new guardian.
II. Procedural Background
In light of the imminent termination of the temporary legal
guardianship of S.J., the Los Angeles Department of Children
and Family Services (the Department) on August 27, 2024, filed a
petition asking the juvenile court to exert dependency jurisdiction
over S.J. based on (1) father and mother’s “history of engaging in
violent altercations,” which places S.J. at substantial risk of
serious physical harm (thereby warranting the exercise of
dependency jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)1); (2) mother’s “mental and
emotional problems,” which place S.J. at substantial risk of
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
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serious physical harm (thereby warranting jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivision (b)); and (3) father’s “mental and
emotional problems,” which place S.J. at substantial risk of
serious physical harm (thereby warranting jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivision (b)).
Mother and father appeared at the initial detention hearing
and the juvenile court appointed them counsel. The court also
appointed dependency counsel for S.J. The Department
interviewed maternal aunt E.B. and the attorney representing
S.J. in the guardianship proceeding during its investigation, and
summarized those interviews in its reports submitted to the
juvenile court. At no point did anyone object to the Department’s
or the juvenile court’s failure to give notice of the proceedings to
maternal aunt E.B., to S.J.’s attorney in the guardianship
proceeding, or to the probate court overseeing the guardianship
proceeding.
After providing mother and father advance notice, the
juvenile court held the combined jurisdictional and dispositional
hearing on September 17, 2024, which mother and father
attended alongside their appointed counsel. After entertaining
argument from counsel, the court sustained the allegation
regarding the parents’ domestic violence under subdivision (b) of
section 300 as well as the allegations regarding each parent’s
mental and emotional problems. The court ordered reunification
services for father and mother.
Father filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Because a parent’s “interest . . . in the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his children is a compelling one,
ranked among the most basic of civil rights,” a parent may not be
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deprived of that interest unless she is accorded due process. (In
re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 688-689 (B.G.).) Due process
entitles a parent to “adequate notice and an opportunity to be
heard” at each step of a dependency proceeding. (Ibid.; In re Mia
M. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 792, 807-808.) Here, father does not
argue that his due process rights were not honored because he
does not dispute that he received adequate notice of the
dependency proceedings in this case as well as the opportunity to
be heard in the proceedings through his appointed counsel.
Instead, he argues that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and
dispositional orders must nevertheless be vacated because the
Department failed to give adequate notice of the proceedings to
(1) maternal aunt, E.B., in her role as mother’s conservator, (2)
S.J.’s attorney from the guardianship proceeding, and (3) the
probate court presiding over that guardianship proceeding.2
I. Failure to Provide Notice to Mother’s Conservator
We reject father’s claim that the Department’s failure to
give mother’s conservator, maternal aunt E.B., notice of the
dependency proceedings warrants reversal of the jurisdictional
and dispositional orders, and do so for two reasons.
First, father lacks standing to assert that claim. We review
questions of standing de novo. (Sirott v. Superior Court (2022) 78
2 The Department filed a motion to dismiss certain “portions
of father’s appeal,” on the ground that father lacks standing to
assert any lack of notice to mother’s conservator and S.J.’s
attorney in the guardianship proceeding. Because we do not
generally dismiss arguments in an appeal, we deny the
Department’s motion. (See Deck v. Developers Investment Co.,
Inc. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 808, 828-829 [partial dismissal is
appropriate only if the resulting partial appeal is from severable
portions of a judgment].)
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Cal.App.5th 371, 380.) Only a party whose “rights or interests
are injuriously affected by [a] decision in an immediate and
substantial way” may appeal that decision. (In re K.C. (2011) 52
Cal.4th 231, 236.) As a general matter, one parent in a
dependency proceeding does not have standing to appeal orders
that are erroneous solely as to the other parent unless the
parents’ interests interweave—that is, when the error as to the
non-appealing parent adversely affects the appealing parent. (In
re Desiree M. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 329, 333 (Desiree M.); In re
Caitlin B. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1193-1194.) Defects in
notice as to one parent generally do not interweave, and thus one
parent lacks standing to contest defects in notice to the other
parent. (Desiree M., at pp. 333-334 [mother lacks standing to
contest adequacy of notice to children]; Caitlin B., at pp. 1193-
1194 [mother lacks standing to contest adequacy of notice to
natural father of child]; cf. In re DeJohn B. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th
100, 102, 110 (DeJohn B.) [father may obtain reversal of order
terminating parental rights due to lack of notice to mother, when
mother contests notice on appeal and is entitled to reversal of
that order, reasoning that leaving termination intact as to only
father is not in the best interests of the children]; In re J.R.
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 569, 581-583 [same, when mother is not
able to raise issue due to her total lack of notice of the
proceedings].) Because mother in this case did have notice of the
proceedings, participated through counsel, and elected not to
appeal, father does not have standing to contest any defects in
notice as to mother’s conservator.
Second, any error in failing to provide notice to E.B., in her
role as mother’s conservator, was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Although a parent “for whom a conservator has been
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appointed” “shall appear” in court proceedings “by . . . [that]
conservator” (Code Civ. Proc., § 372, subd. (a)(1)), the failure to
order the conservator to appear “is a statutory error or ‘mere
irregularity,’” which does not “violate [the parent’s] due process
rights,” and is evaluated for harmlessness. (In re A.C. (2008) 166
Cal.App.4th 146, 154, 159 (A.C.); see also In re N.J. (2024) 104
Cal.App.5th 96, 118 (N.J.).) Even if we apply the more stringent
test for harmlessness by asking whether the absence of notice to
E.B. was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (N.J., at p. 118),
we conclude it was because the Department interviewed E.B. and
included her statements in the report that the juvenile court
considered, and there is no basis to conclude that “the result of
the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing would have been” any
different had proper notice been given to E.B. (In re Daniel S.
(2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 903, 914.)
Father responds that any defect in notice is structural error
that warrants reversal regardless of harmlessness, but this
argument is refuted by the case law. In In re Christopher L.
(2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063, our Supreme Court held that few errors
qualified as “structural” in the juvenile dependency context, and
could so qualify only if (1) the error undermined an interest other
than accuracy of the result, (2) the effect of the error is too hard
to measure or (3) the error invariably results in fundamental
unfairness. (Id. at pp. 1075, 1077.) Christopher L. did not
disturb earlier precedent that drew a line between cases in which
notice was defective (and which do not treat those defects as
structural error) and cases in which there was absolutely “no
attempt” to notify a parent who was entitled to notice (and which
treat the absolute failure to attempt to notify as structural error).
(In re Daniel F. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 701, 715-716 [where
7
agency makes “little to no effort” to provide notice; harmless error
analysis applied]; In re R.L. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 125, 145-146; cf.
In re Jasmine G. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1115-1116 [where
agency makes “no attempt” to provide notice to a parent, error is
structural and reversible per se without examination of whether
error was harmless]; DeJohn B., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at pp.
108-110 [same]; B.G., supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 689 [“total absence of
notice in any form cannot comport with the requirements of due
process”].) Because the juvenile court’s failure to give notice to
mother’s conservator on the facts of this case does not further an
interest independent of accuracy, does not defy measurement,
does not invariably result in fundamental unfairness, and would
otherwise be classified as a potential harmless error under pre-
existing precedent, we reject father’s argument that the error
here is structural.
Father further responds that this case is akin to N.J.,
supra, 104 Cal.App.5th 96, but the court in N.J. applied a
harmless error analysis and concluded that the Department’s
failure to notify the mother’s conservator—who was also the
child’s aunt whom the mother had designated to care for the child
and who could provide “further information”—was prejudicial
because it resulted in the termination of mother’s parental rights
through a placement that sidestepped the aunt’s entitlement to
relative placement (id. at p. 118); N.J. is factually inapt.
II. Failure to Provide Notice to S.J.’s Attorney in the
Guardianship Proceeding
We reject father’s claim that the Department’s failure to
give S.J.’s attorney in the guardianship proceeding notice of the
dependency proceedings warrants reversal of the jurisdictional
and dispositional orders, and do so for three reasons.
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First, father lacks standing to assert that claim as well.
(Desiree M., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 333-334 [parent lacks
standing to assert statutory notice right held by child].)
Second, father forfeited that claim by failing to object at
any point to the lack of notice to S.J.’s attorney in the probate
proceeding.3 (E.g., People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 521, fn.
12 (Abilez) [denial of notice resulting in alleged due process
violation is forfeited for failure to object]; In re S.B. (2004) 32
Cal.4th 1287, 1293 (S.B.), superseded by statute on other grounds
as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 962.)
Third, any error in failing to provide notice to S.J.’s
attorney in the probate proceeding was harmless. Father argues
that “counsel representing the child” is entitled to notice of a
dependency petition (§ 290.2, subd. (a)(9)), but it is unclear that
this provision applies to counsel representing the child in
proceedings other than the dependency proceeding (see § 291,
subd. (a)(8) [after initial hearing, notice shall be given to all
“attorney[s] of record”]). Even if we assume the statute reaches
S.J.’s appointed counsel in the guardianship proceeding (rather
than the counsel she was appointed to represent her interests in
the dependency proceeding) and accordingly conclude that the
Department did not comply with this statutory notice
requirement, any failure to give notice was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt because the Department interviewed S.J.’s
appointed guardianship counsel, included that counsel’s
3 Although father also did not object to the lack of notice to
mother’s conservator, that challenge is not subject to forfeiture
because the juvenile court had a sua sponte duty to order
mother’s conservator to appear. (A.C., supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at
p. 155.)
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statements in its reports, and the juvenile court considered those
statements. There is no basis to conclude that the result of the
jurisdictional or dispositional hearing would be any different had
counsel received formal notice because there is no reason to
believe that notice or further participation would have affected
the factual basis supporting the allegations warranting exertion
of jurisdiction, affected the court’s removal order, or affected the
content of the case plan for either parent.
III. Failure to Provide Notice to the Probate Court
Presiding Over the Guardianship Proceeding
We finally reject father’s claim that the Department’s
failure to give the probate court presiding over S.J.’s
guardianship proceeding notice of the dependency proceedings
warrants reversal of the jurisdictional and dispositional orders,
and do so for two reasons.
First, father forfeited that claim as well by failing to object
at any point to the lack of notice to the probate court. (Abilez,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 521, fn. 12; S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p.
1293.)
Second, although a probate court that “appointed” a legal
“guardian” for a child is entitled to notice of a dependency
petition (§§ 290.1, subd. (a)(11), 290.2, subd. (a)(11)), the
Department’s failure to provide notice to the probate court was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The juvenile court was
aware of the guardianship and had before it the guardianship
paperwork; indeed, the impending end of the guardianship is
what prompted the Department’s filing of the dependency
petition. There is no basis to conclude that the result of the
jurisdictional or dispositional proceeding would be any different
had the probate court that was about to end the legal
10
guardianship received formal notice of the dependency
proceeding.
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P.J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
BAKER
_________________________, J.
MOOR
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