People v. La Reyes CA2/1

CourtListener 10631812CalctappJul 11, 2025

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Filed 7/11/25 P. v. La Reyes CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B341972

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA114692)
v.

PASTOR OQUELI LA REYES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Rosa M. Fregoso, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Matthew Cargal and Matthew Cargal for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan and Stefanie Yee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
Defendant Pastor Oqueli La Reyes appeals from the
judgment after his conviction under Vehicle Code1 section 23153,
subdivision (a) for driving under the influence of an alcoholic
beverage “concurrently” with committing any act forbidden by
law, which proximately caused injury, and the accompanying
true finding on the great bodily injury enhancement. Defendant’s
sole argument on appeal is that the evidence was insufficient to
prove he committed an illegal act—not yielding to a pedestrian in
a crosswalk. We conclude substantial evidence supports the
conviction and affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was accused of striking pedestrian Leslie
Stevenson with his truck while intoxicated. The following
evidence was presented at trial.
On June 11, 2023, at approximately 9:45 p.m., Genaro
Serrano Hernandez was stopped at a red light at Fair Oaks
Avenue and Tremont Street in Pasadena. The weather was
drizzling. Asked if he had any visibility issues, Serrano
Hernandez testified, “Not much.”
Serrano Hernandez saw a red truck on Tremont Street
starting to turn left onto Fair Oaks Avenue. He also saw two
people crossing the avenue, one of whom was in a wheelchair.
The people were in the path of the turning truck, and Serrano
Hernandez realized the truck was not stopping. Serrano
Hernandez estimated the truck was driving between three and
five miles per hour.

1 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Vehicle Code.

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Serrano Hernandez honked his horn to alert the truck, and
the truck “stopped a little, and [the truck driver] turned but he
hit the person” in the wheelchair. The person in the wheelchair
fell and her face hit the ground. Serrano Hernandez saw blood on
the ground. The truck driver then stopped and rolled down his
window. He said to Serrano Hernandez that he had the green
light. Serrano Hernandez agreed but told the driver there were
people crossing the street.
Karina T., Serrano Hernandez’s 16-year-old daughter, was
in the car with him. She saw a woman in a wheelchair crossing
the street, with another woman pushing the wheelchair. She saw
a truck hit the woman in the wheelchair with enough force to “tilt
the lady over.” The woman was bleeding from the side of her
head.
Karina T. said the truck had a green light but the sign
indicating pedestrians could cross the street also was
illuminated. She said it was “really hard to see that day since it
was dark and it was also sprinkling.” Before the accident, the
truck was “going at a normal rate,” but when Serrano Hernandez
honked, Karina T. saw the truck “slow[ ] down a little bit.”
Leslie Stevenson, the victim, was in a wheelchair at the
time of the incident, with her roommate Zephra Shephaard
pushing the wheelchair. They moved into the crosswalk when
the crossing signal indicated they could proceed. Stevenson
described the area as “pretty lit up” with street lamps and lights
from buildings.
As they crossed the street, Stevenson saw “a light flash
from the side.” She turned her head and saw a truck
approaching. Stevenson estimated the truck was moving at 25 to

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30 miles per hour, although the driver slammed on the brakes
before hitting her.
The next thing she remembered “was waking up down the
lane.” She was face down in a pool of blood. Her left side felt like
“fire” and she realized she had broken her hip. She was in
“excruciating pain.” Her nose also was fractured. Her broken hip
required surgery and multiple days in the hospital and
rehabilitation center. Since the accident she also suffered
headaches, blurred vision, and light sensitivity.
Charles Tucker, an officer with the Pasadena Police
Department, arrived at the scene of the incident and saw
Stevenson being placed into an ambulance. He saw blood on the
ground. At trial, he identified in photographs the crosswalk
where the incident took place. Tucker said the weather was
drizzly and the lighting at the intersection was functioning.
Tucker noted that at the intersection where the incident
took place, pedestrians crossing at the crosswalk would have the
right of way over vehicles turning left. He further noted the
crosswalk was a marked crosswalk, meaning there were painted
lines delineating where pedestrians should cross.
One of the people at the scene identified himself to Tucker
as the driver of the red Ford F-150 truck that struck Stevenson.
At trial, Tucker identified defendant as the person who identified
himself as the driver of the vehicle. The jury viewed body camera
footage of defendant speaking with Tucker in Spanish at the
scene, and Tucker at trial translated defendant’s statements for
the jury. According to Tucker’s translation, defendant at first
denied hitting Stevenson, but shortly thereafter admitted that he
had hit her.

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As Tucker spoke with defendant, he smelled alcohol and
noticed defendant’s eyes were red and watery and his speech was
slurred. Tucker asked defendant if he had been drinking, and
defendant said he had drunk two Bud Light beers. Tucker then
drove defendant to a police department property and conducted a
field sobriety test. Defendant’s performance in the sobriety test
was consistent with someone impaired by alcohol. Defendant’s
blood was drawn, and his blood alcohol level was determined to
be 0.21 percent. A criminalist opined a person with that blood
alcohol level “would be impaired to operate a motor vehicle
safely.”
Swapnil Shah, an orthopedic trauma surgeon, treated
Stevenson following the incident, and testified she suffered a
broken hip. The damage to the hip indicated a “high energy left
hip fracture,” consistent with an automobile striking Stevenson.
Kenia Urbina, a friend of defendant’s, testified for the
defense. Urbina was with defendant at a park for several hours
before the incident and testified she did not observe him drink
any alcohol. She also was two cars behind him at the time of the
incident, although she did not see the incident itself. She noted
defendant had a green light when he turned left.
Hector Chavez, an acquaintance of defendant’s, also
testified for the defense. Chavez was at the park with defendant
before the incident, and like Urbina did not observe him drink
any alcohol. Also like Urbina, Chavez was several cars behind
defendant at the time of the incident, but did not see the incident
itself. Chavez said he could not see well because it was dark and
raining. Chavez saw defendant make a left turn, then stop, then
pull over. Chavez went over to him and asked what had

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happened. Defendant “said that someone hit him, a car. And
then he said that he hit a person.”
Defendant testified. Prior to the accident he was at a park,
and he denied drinking alcohol at the park or before going to the
park. Defendant said he was lying when he told Officer Tucker
he had drunk two beers that day. He told Tucker he had been
drinking “[b]ecause he was pressuring me” and defendant was
“nervous.”
Defendant testified that he made a left turn on a green
light and suddenly saw a woman on the ground along with a
wheelchair. He did not feel his vehicle impact anything and
did not think he had hit the woman. He had been driving at a
normal speed and had not seen anyone as he turned because it
was rainy and dark. Asked at trial if he hit Stevenson, he said, “I
don’t know.”
Defendant testified he told Tucker “that I would never do
that in my life to drive drunk.” At trial, he admitted he had been
arrested in 2008 and 2012 for driving under the influence of
alcohol.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
An information charged defendant with driving under the
influence of an alcoholic beverage causing injury (§ 23153,
subd. (a)). The information further alleged an enhancement for
personal infliction of great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7,
subd. (a)).
The jury found defendant guilty and the enhancement
allegations true. The trial court sentenced the defendant to the
low term of 16 months with an additional three years for the
bodily injury enhancement, for a total of four years four months.
The court awarded credits and stayed all fines and fees.

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Defendant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant argues the evidence was insufficient
to convict him under section 23153, subdivision (a).
“ ‘To assess the evidence’s sufficiency, we review the whole
record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime or special
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The record
must disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict—i.e.,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such
that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution
and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.
[Citation.] “Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to
justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for
it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine
the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts
upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve
neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look
for substantial evidence. [Citation.]” [Citation.] A reversal
for insufficient evidence “is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that
upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support’ ” the jury’s verdict.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142.)
Section 23153, subdivision (a) provides, “It is unlawful for a
person, while under the influence of any alcoholic beverage, to
drive a vehicle and concurrently do any act forbidden by law, or
neglect any duty imposed by law in driving the vehicle, which act

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or neglect proximately causes bodily injury to any person other
than the driver.”
In the instant case, the trial court instructed the jury that
to establish a violation of section 23153, subdivision (a), the
prosecution had to prove (1) defendant drove a vehicle, (2) while
under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, and (3) while
driving under the influence, he committed an illegal act, (4)
causing bodily injury to another person. (See CALCRIM No.
2100.) As noted above, on appeal, defendant only challenges
whether the evidence was sufficient to establish an unlawful act
while driving under the influence.
The prosecution alleged defendant’s “act forbidden by law”
(§ 23153, subd. (a)) was failure to yield to a pedestrian under
section 21950. Section 21950 provides, in relevant part, “The
driver of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to a pedestrian
crossing the roadway within any marked crosswalk or within any
unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, except as otherwise
provided in this chapter.” (§ 21950, subd. (a).) The statute
further provides, “The driver of a vehicle approaching a
pedestrian within any marked or unmarked crosswalk shall
exercise all due care and shall reduce the speed of the vehicle or
take any other action relating to the operation of the vehicle as
necessary to safeguard the safety of the pedestrian.” (Id., subd.
(c).)
The statute notes, however, “This section does not relieve a
pedestrian from the duty of using due care for their safety. No
pedestrian may suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and
walk or run into the path of a vehicle that is so close as to
constitute an immediate hazard. No pedestrian may
unnecessarily stop or delay traffic while in a marked or

8
unmarked crosswalk.” (§ 21950, subd. (b).) Nonetheless,
“Subdivision (b) does not relieve a driver of a vehicle from the
duty of exercising due care for the safety of any pedestrian within
any marked crosswalk or within any unmarked crosswalk at an
intersection.” (Id., subd. (d).)
Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to establish
he did not use due care when approaching the crosswalk, nor was
there any evidence that Stevenson or Shephaard, the person
pushing Stevenson’s wheelchair, exercised due care for their own
safety as specified under section 21950, subdivision (b).
Defendant contends the evidence shows he had a green light and
drove at an appropriate speed as he turned, and given the dark
and rainy conditions it was difficult to see Stevenson. He further
argues, “[T]he testimony presented regarding the collision is
vague and incomplete as to the full details,” which “leaves
substantial reasonable doubt as to whether [defendant] violated
section 21950.”
We disagree. Karina T. and Stevenson testified Stevenson
moved into the crosswalk when the pedestrian signal indicated
Stevenson could do so, thus establishing Stevenson and her
companion exercised due care for their safety. Regardless,
section 21950, subdivision (d) makes clear a pedestrian’s
carelessness “does not relieve a driver of a vehicle from the duty
of exercising due care for the safety of any pedestrian.” Further,
multiple witnesses saw defendant’s truck strike Stevenson, and
defendant himself admitted to Tucker that he had done so. This
evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant failed to yield
to a pedestrian who was appropriately using a crosswalk. We fail
to see how the darkness or rain excuse defendant’s conduct, but
assuming arguendo those conditions, if they existed, would

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excuse him, other witnesses testified the intersection had
sufficient light and the rain did not significantly impair visibility.
The jury was free to accept those witnesses’ version of events over
defendant’s recollection. Also undercutting defendant’s assertion
that he exercised due care was the criminalist’s testimony that
defendant’s blood alcohol level was high enough to impair his
ability to operate a vehicle safely.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

WEINGART, J.

M. KIM, J.

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