CourtListener 10631811•People v. Serna CA2/5
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Filed 7/11/25 P. v. Serna CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B337235
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA358871)
v.
GABRIEL SERNA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Alison S. Matsumoto, Judge. Affirmed and
remanded with directions.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H.
Chung, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
In 2011, Gabriel Serna pleaded no contest to attempted
murder. (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a) & 664.) Serna admitted
that he personally used a handgun in commission of the offense.
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced Serna to 23 years
four months in prison.
In 2022, Serna filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to
section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6). The trial court found that Serna
failed to demonstrate he was prima facie eligible for relief
because he was the shooter and acted with express malice.
On appeal, Serna contends that the trial court erred, in
violation of his constitutional rights, by denying his petition
based on uncontroverted evidence presented at the preliminary
hearing showing he was the actual perpetrator of the attempted
murder.
We affirm the trial court’s order, but remand the matter to
the trial court with directions to consider an amended petition
should Serna seek to file one within 30 days of the issuance of the
remittitur.
DISCUSSION
At the time of Serna’s plea, a defendant could be convicted
under the theory that the defendant aided and abetted a crime of
which attempted murder was a natural and probable
consequence. (See People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 161
[discussing natural and probable consequences liability
generally]; see also § 31.) It was not necessary to prove that the
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
defendant intended that the attempted murder be committed or
even that the defendant subjectively foresaw that attempted
murder could result. (See Chiu, at pp. 161–162.)
In 2019, the Legislature, through Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) (Senate Bill 1437),
amended section 188 to eliminate the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as it applies to murder and to require,
with certain exceptions under the felony-murder rule, that a
defendant act with malice to be convicted of murder. (§ 188,
subd. (a)(3).)
In 2021, through Senate Bill No. 775 (2020–2021 Reg.
Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551) (Senate Bill 775), the Legislature
clarified that the amendments made by Senate Bill 1437 were
also intended to apply to attempted murder. Senate Bill 775 also
amended former section 1170.95 to permit persons convicted by
plea agreement of attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine to file a petition with the
sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be resentenced.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
Under section 1172.6, a defendant convicted by plea of
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine must attest to the following: “(1) A complaint,
information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that
allowed the prosecution to proceed under [a natural and probable
consequences theory of attempted murder]. . . . [¶] (2) The
petitioner was convicted of . . . attempted murder . . . following
. . . a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have
been convicted of . . . attempted murder. [¶] (3) The petitioner
could not presently be convicted of . . . attempted murder because
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of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1,
2019.” (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)(1)–(a)(3), (b)(1).)
After a facially sufficient petition is filed, the trial court
determines whether the petitioner is prima facie eligible for
relief. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) “The record
of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie
inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish
petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly
meritless. . . . [¶] While the trial court may look at the record of
conviction after the appointment of counsel to determine whether
a petitioner has made a prima facie case for section [1172.6]
relief, the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited. . . .
‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on
credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary
hearing.’ ” (Id. at p. 971.) If the petitioner makes a prima facie
showing of eligibility, the trial court must issue an order to show
cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. (People v. Curiel (2023)
15 Cal.5th 433, 460.) We review de novo a trial court’s
determination of whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
In the opening brief, Serna contends that the trial court
engaged in impermissible fact-finding by relying on the
preliminary hearing transcript to deny his section 1172.6 petition
at the prima facie stage. After briefing concluded in this case,
our Supreme Court resolved a split in the Courts of Appeal
regarding this issue and foreclosed Serna’s contention. In People
v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 569 (Patton), the Supreme Court
held that a trial court may “reference the record of conviction
[which includes the preliminary hearing transcript] . . . to
‘ “ ‘refut[e]’ ” ’ [citation] conclusory allegations in furtherance of
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its statutorily required screening function at that juncture of a
section 1172.6 proceeding” without engaging in impermissible
fact-finding, and may conclude, based upon its review, that the
petitioner has failed to make a prima facie showing of eligibility.
Accordingly, the trial court’s review of the preliminary hearing
transcript in this case to make its determination that Serna was
ineligible for relief was not error.
We need not address Serna’s additional argument that the
trial court erred by admitting hearsay contained in the
preliminary hearing transcript, because Serna failed to object in
the trial court on hearsay grounds, thus forfeiting the challenge
on this appeal. (People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706, 714
[failure to object to the trial court’s reliance on inadmissible
evidence to deny a section 1172.6 petition forfeits the issue on
appeal].)
Although Serna has not shown error in connection with the
trial court’s denial of his original 1172.6 petition, following the
Supreme Court’s directive to the Court of Appeal in Patton, in an
abundance of caution we will remand the matter to the trial court
with directions to consider an amended petition should Serna
seek to file one within 30 days of the issuance of the remittitur.
(Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 569–570; People v. Glass (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 922.)
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DISPOSITION
We remand the matter to the trial court with directions to
consider an amended petition should Serna seek to file one within
30 days of the issuance of the remittitur. We otherwise affirm
the trial court’s order denying Serna’s petition for resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
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