People v. Hernandez CA2/6

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Filed 7/11/25 P. v. Hernandez CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B337629
(Super. Ct. No. 2022019194)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

ISMAEL BRAVO
HERNANDEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

Ismael Bravo Hernandez appeals a judgment following his
guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance while armed
with a firearm, a felony. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd.
(a).) Prior to his plea, the trial court denied his two motions to
suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5) to exclude items police
seized in a probation search of a vehicle. We conclude the trial
court did not err. We affirm.
FACTS
In July 2022, Alex Morales, a sheriff’s detective, pulled over
a Toyota Avalon because the windows on the vehicle were
illegally tinted. Christopher G. was the driver and another man
was a passenger in the front seat. Hernandez was in the back
seat.
Morales knew Hernandez and knew he was on probation
with “search terms” and had outstanding “warrants.” Hernandez
was “immediately detained,” handcuffed, arrested for the
“misdemeanor warrants,” and handed over to Detective Estrada.
Morales conducted a probation search of the vehicle. He
saw there was a backpack near the front passenger seat
floorboard of the car. Hernandez told Estrada that there was a
gun in the backpack in the vehicle. Morales searched the
backpack and found a gun, “personal documentation with Ismael
Hernandez’s name on it,” and a cylinder containing
methamphetamine.
Morales believed Hernandez was able to place the backpack
in the front seat area from his back seat of the car. He said,
“[Y]ou can reach around and grab the backpack from the back
seat.”
The People filed a felony complaint alleging Hernandez
committed the unlawful transfer of a firearm (Pen. Code,
§ 27545) (count 1); was carrying a concealed firearm (id., § 25400,
subd. (a)(3)) (count 2); was in possession of a controlled
substance, methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377,
subd. (a)) (count 3); and was in possession of a controlled
substance with a firearm (id., § 11370.1, subd. (a)) (count 4).
Hernandez pled not guilty.
Hernandez filed a Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to
exclude the backpack and the items found in it, claiming they
were the product of an unlawful search. The trial court held a
preliminary hearing. Morales testified that he discovered a gun

2
and drugs in a backpack during a probation search and he
believed Hernandez could have placed the backpack in the car’s
front floorboard while he was sitting in the back seat of the car.
The vehicle was “a normal size sedan.” “[I]t’s not that far to
reach across.”
The trial court held Hernandez to answer and denied his
Penal Code section 1538.5 motion. It found there was a valid
stop and a valid detention because the police officer knew
Hernandez was on probation. It ruled the probation search fell
within the permissible scope of a search under People v. Schmitz
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 909.
On September 5, 2023, Hernandez filed a renewed motion
to suppress pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision
(i). He claimed the police had no reasonable suspicion to believe
the backpack belonged to him and the search was unreasonable.
The People opposed the motion relying, in part, on People v.
Schmitz, supra, 55 Cal.4th 909.
The trial court denied the motion. After Hernandez pled
guilty to count 4, the court placed him on “two years formal
probation.”
DISCUSSION
The Probation Search
Hernandez contends the probation search of the car
violated his Fourth Amendment rights and the trial court erred
by denying his suppression motions. We disagree.
We defer to the trial court’s findings, “express or implied,”
supported by substantial evidence, but we independently review
whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. (People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1041.)

3
“When executing a parole or probation search, the
searching officer may look into closed containers that he or she
reasonably believes are in the complete or joint control of the
parolee or probationer.” (People v. Baker (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th
1152, 1159.) “A probationer explicitly agrees to being placed on
probation” and is “subject to a search clause” that he or she “has
explicitly consented to.” (People v. Schmitz, supra, 55 Cal.4th at
p. 920.)
Our Supreme Court held, “[A]n officer conducting a search
of a vehicle’s passenger compartment based on a passenger’s
parole status may search items of personal property if the officer
reasonably believes that the parolee owns the items or has the
ability to exert control over them.” (People v. Schmitz, supra, 55
Cal.4th at p. 930.) The search may extend beyond the
defendant’s “person and the seat he or she occupies.” (Id. at
p. 926.) It may extend to areas of the passenger compartment
where the officer “reasonably expects that [the defendant] could
have stowed personal belongings or discarded items when aware
of police activity.” (Ibid.) “Within these limits, the officer need
not articulate specific facts indicating that the parolee has
actually placed property or contraband in a particular location in
the passenger compartment before searching that area.” (Ibid.)
“[A] standard five-passenger automobile generally affords
ready access to areas in both the front and the back seats.”
(People v. Schmitz, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 925.) This is
“particularly significant” because “parolees have a heightened
incentive to conceal or quickly dispose of incriminating evidence.”
(Ibid.) Imposing “an artificially narrow rule” that allows them to
“frustrate a valid parole search simply by sitting in the front seat

4
of the car and placing or discarding his belongings in the back”
defeats the “goals of parole.” (Id. at p. 926.)
In Schmitz, a police officer, “aware that the front seat
passenger was on parole, searched the backseat of defendant’s
car and recovered drugs and drug paraphernalia from a chips
bag.” (People v. Schmitz, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 913.) The court
held it was “objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that
the parolee was able to reach back and conceal contraband inside
the chips bag.” (Id. at p. 931.) The search was lawful.
These holdings involving parole searches also apply to
probation searches of vehicles. (People v. Maxwell (2020) 58
Cal.App.5th 546, 556.)
Here Morales conducted a probation search of the vehicle
and discovered the gun and drugs in a backpack on the front
passenger floorboard.
Hernandez claims that because he was in the back seat and
the backpack was near the front passenger area, the police could
only search the rear seat. But such a restriction on a probation
vehicle search is not authorized by Schmitz. Detective Morales
showed Hernandez was able to place the backpack there from the
back seat. He said, “[Y]ou can reach around and grab the
backpack from the back seat.” There was nothing to prevent
Hernandez from placing it there because this was a “normal size
sedan” and “it’s not that far to reach across.”
As in Schmitz, this standard sedan gave Hernandez “ready
access to areas in both the front and the back seats.” (People v.
Schmitz, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 925.) Because it was “objectively
reasonable for the officer to believe” Hernandez was able to place
the backpack in the front floorboard area, the search was lawful.
(Id. at p. 931.)

5
Hernandez cites People v. Baker, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th
1152, but that case is distinguishable. There a police officer
conducted a parole search because the male car driver was on
parole. The officer found drugs in a purse belonging to the
defendant female passenger. The court held the officer had no
reasonable suspicion that the female defendant’s purse belonged
to the male driver who was subject to the parole search. The
female defendant was not on parole. Here, by contrast,
Hernandez was on probation, the backpack was not an item for a
different gender, and he had the ability to place the backpack in
the front area consistent with Schmitz.
Hernandez cites Claypool v. Superior Court (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 1092, but that case is distinguishable. There the
court held the back seat passenger could not have placed a gun in
a locked glove box without assistance from two people in the front
seat, one of whom had the keys to the box. The court noted this
case was different from Schmitz where the “parolee himself was
able to reach back and secrete contraband in the items.”
(Claypool, at p. 1098.)
Hernandez claims Schmitz “[s]hould [b]e [r]econsidered.”
But we are bound by it. (Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
We have reviewed Hernandez’s remaining contentions and
we conclude he has not shown grounds for reversal.

6
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:

YEGAN, J.

CODY, J.

7
David M. Hirsch, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Ava R. Stralla, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Ana R. Duarte and Kenneth C. Byrne, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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