CourtListener 10626882•People v. Negron CA4/3
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Filed 7/10/25 P. v. Negron CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063296
v. (Super. Ct. No. 22CF3694)
CRISTIAN JOVANY NEGRON, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Michael J. Cassidy, Judge. Affirmed.
Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Christine Y. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
* * *
In 2023, a jury convicted Cristian Jovany Negron (Negron) of
forcible rape (Penal Code,1 § 261, subd. (a)(2); count 1), sodomy by force
(§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(A); count 2), forcible oral copulation (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A);
count 3), and domestic battery with corporal injury (§ 273.5, subd. (a);
count 4). The trial court sentenced Negron to the low term of three years on
count one, the low term of three years on count two to run consecutively to
count one, the low term of three years on count three to run concurrently to
count one, and the low term of two years on count four to run consecutively to
count one.
On appeal, Negron contends there was insufficient evidence to
convict him of forcible rape. He claims the victim willingly engaged in vaginal
sexual intercourse and, therefore, consented. Alternatively, he complains the
trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence because it could not impose a
full term on count four as that sentence was subordinate to count one.
We find no merit to Negron’s positions and, therefore, affirm his
convictions and sentence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The victim was a 30-year-old woman who shared three children
with Negron. She met Negron when she was 14 and he was 16. They were in
a romantic relationship from the time she turned 15 until July 2022.
Although they broke up at various times throughout their relationship, they
always remained sexually active.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
In February 2022, the victim told Negron she did not want to be
with him anymore. Although they were no longer together, they remained
sexually active. The victim testified they had sex whenever she “asked for it
or he asked for it . . . .” One night during that month, the victim had a night
out with friends. This upset Negron because she was not answering her
phone, returned home late, and was intoxicated. They argued and Negron hit
her in the face.
Throughout the course of their relationship, it was not uncommon
for them to have “emotional and aggressive sex.” They used sex to resolve
issues. It was a source “of release, stress, anger, [and] happiness.” Even when
the victim did not want to have sex with Negron, she would do it to appease
him, and he would do the same. The victim stated they were both sexually
aggressive and occasionally engaged in anal sex. At times, she would scream
and say “‘[i]t hurts.’” Sometimes they would role play where she would be
submissive, and Negron was allowed to do whatever he wanted to her.
Negron testified and explained that their aggressive sex involved
hitting each other, choking each other, having anal sex, name calling, and
demeaning each other. The victim told Negron that she liked it when she felt
pain. When she was submissive during sex, she did whatever he wanted her
to do. She told him she enjoyed it.
In September 2022, the victim started dating someone else;
Negron became jealous and controlling when he found out. From September
through December, the month of the incident, Negron would often question
the victim about people she was seeing. He would question her so frequently
that she would sometimes have sex with him just to calm him down.
Negron told the victim he had access to her social media accounts
and knew about all her sexual partners. He wanted to make sure he could
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check up on her and verify she was not seeing other men. She told him to
stop, that she just wanted to coparent with him, that she was afraid of him,
and had been afraid of him since the time he hit her.
In the days leading up to the incident, Negron threatened to take
the kids away from her because she was not “a fit mother,” and she “was
sexually active and could have exposed [their children] to an STD.” She was
afraid he was actually going to do it because he told her he had a lawyer and
had everything set up.
On the day of the incident, the victim brought their kids to
Negron’s apartment to visit him. He told her to bring the outfits she wore for
other men, but she told him, “‘this is rape.”’ She responded that way because
she knew he would make her have sex even though she did not want to have
sex with him.
When the victim went inside Negron’s apartment, they sat in the
living room while the kids watched television. Negron started asking her
questions about her other partners. He was agitated and breathing heavily as
he spoke to her.
The victim tried to leave because she felt uncomfortable. She took
the kids and walked out, but Negron ran after her and grabbed one of their
children. When they were back inside the apartment, Negron continued
questioning the victim and said he wanted her to stop seeing other men.
Negron threatened to “expose” the victim at her job. He told her to go to the
bedroom, and she complied. The victim knew he wanted her to go to the
bedroom for sex because “[e]very time [they] went to [that] room, it was going
to be for sex.”
When they were in the bedroom, Negron told the victim she “was
going to get it today” and she “was going to get what [she] wanted, what [she]
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deserved.” The victim told Negron to stop and that she did not want to have
sex with him.
Negron then forced the victim to orally copulate him. She cried
and asked why he was doing this; Negron responded: “Do you not understand
that there’s consequences . . . [for the] fucked up shit you do”? Despite her
saying not to, he forced her to have anal sex with him. She was crying and
“kept screaming and complaining that [she] was hurting and he needed to
stop.”
Negron told her, “You’re gonna get raped all the time, you know
that right”? Negron sodomized the victim until she defecated. When he
stopped, the victim ran to the restroom to clean herself. Negron followed her
and said they “weren’t done.” The victim did not ask if she had a choice to
return to the bedroom. She “understood [they] weren’t done and [she] went to
the room.” They then had vaginal intercourse. She did not cry or scream like
she did prior to going to the bathroom. The victim was on top and faked an
orgasm “[b]ecause [she] just wanted to finish.” Negron then finished.
When the victim left, she called the domestic violence hotline, but
no one answered. She then called 911. When the police arrived, the victim
and the officer conducted a covert call with Negron. The victim asked Negron
why he raped her, and he responded, “It’s your fault you don’t learn.”
According to Negron, it was an “unspoken rule” between the two
of them that if one told the other to go to the bedroom, they were going to give
in and “just let whatever happen happened [sic].” He stated it was normal for
them to use words like “rape” and “force” during sex. Negron did not believe
he was raping her because they had sex “exactly like that, the same events,
the exact same word over and over again, and she would always tell [him] she
liked it.”
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DISCUSSION
I.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FORCIBLE RAPE CONVICTION
Negron argues the victim “consented to the vaginal sex by
returning to the bedroom with [him] without opposition, voluntarily taking
the ‘top’ position, and ultimately faking an orgasm to end the sexual
encounter before leaving with her children unimpeded.” We are not
persuaded.
“Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished [as relevant
here,] [¶] . . . [¶] . . . against a person’s will by means of force, violence,
duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the
person or another.” (§ 261, subd. (a)(2).) “‘[A]gainst one’s will’ means ‘without
the consent of the alleged victim.’” (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 634,
fn. 10.) “‘[C]onsent’ means positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to
an exercise of free will. The person must act freely and voluntarily and have
knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction involved.” (§ 261.6,
subd. (a).)
‘“In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the
question we ask is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”’” (People v.
Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1175.) “Conflicts and even testimony which is
subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it
is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility
of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination
depends.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403, disapproved on other
6
grounds by Barnett v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 890, 901.) “We resolve
neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial
evidence.” (Maury, at p. 403.)
Here, there is ample evidence from which a rational trier of fact
could conclude the victim did not consent to vaginal intercourse. In the time
leading up to the incident, Negron was becoming increasingly jealous and
controlling of the victim. He also physically assaulted her and threatened to
“expose” her at work. In the days leading up to the incident, Negron
threatened to take the kids away from the victim claiming she was an unfit
mother.
His behavior culminated in the incident when he told the victim
she “was going to get . . . what [she] deserved.” Negron forced the victim to
engage in oral copulation and anal sex—as to which there is no dispute the
victim did not consent. Moreover, during the unconsented oral and anal sex,
Negron told the victim he was going to rape her “all the time.” When the
victim ran to the restroom, Negron came in and told her they “weren’t done.”
After the incident, Negron told the victim it was her fault he raped her.
The victim’s return to the bedroom, after Negron sexually and
violently assaulted her, does not amount to consent. Nor does the fact that
she was in the top position during sexual intercourse. Based on the
circumstances, these were not acts of the victim’s own free will, but, at most,
decisions to submit to Negron’s sexual demands and assault. “[A] victim’s
mere submission to an act does not amount to ‘actual consent.’” (People v.
Oliver (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1095.) “[A] victim’s decision to submit to
an attacker’s sexual demands out of fear [or under duress] is not consent
[citations] because the decision is not freely and voluntarily made [citation].”
(People v. Giardino (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 454, 460, fn. 3.) A victim, who had
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just been sexually assaulted need not make any attempts to resist further
sexual assault or “communicate their lack of consent.” (People v. Ireland
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 328, 338.)
II.
THERE WAS NO SENTENCING ERROR
Alternatively, Negron contends the trial court erred in
“impos[ing] a full consecutive term on count four . . . .” He argues the trial
court was limited to imposing a “one-third the midterm” sentence on count
four. We disagree.
When sentencing a defendant who was convicted of multiple
felonies to consecutive sentences, a trial court generally must follow
section 1170.1. That section provides the default “formula for determining
consecutive terms of imprisonment for persons convicted of two or more
felonies.” (People v. Pelayo (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 115, 123 (Pelayo).) The
court designates one conviction to represent the “principal term,” and the
remainder are designated the “subordinate terms.” (Ibid.) The court
sentences the defendant on the principal term to a low, middle, or upper term
for the respective crime. (§ 1170.1, subd. (a).) The court then sentences the
defendant on the subordinate terms. Subordinate terms are limited to one-
third of the middle term of imprisonment prescribed for each remaining
felony conviction. (Ibid.)
A court need not abide by the sentencing structure of section
1170.1 when sentencing a defendant who has been convicted of certain sex
offenses. Section 667.6 provides an alternative sentencing structure when a
defendant has been convicted of, as relevant here, forcible rape, forcible oral
copulation, and forcible sodomy. (§ 667.6, subd. (e)(1), (4) & (7).) “The
Legislature enacted section 667.6 in 1979 to significantly increase prison
8
terms for persons convicted of certain violent sex offenses.” (Pelayo, supra,
69 Cal.App.4th at p. 123.) Spousal abuse (count 4) in violation of
section 273.5, subdivision (a), is not a section 667.6 offense.
When sentencing an offender convicted of section 667.6 sexual
offenses, “[i]n lieu of the term provided in Section 1170.1, a full, separate, and
consecutive term may be imposed for each violation . . . .” “If the term is
imposed consecutively pursuant to this subdivision, it shall be served
consecutively to any other term of imprisonment . . . . The term shall not be
included in any determination pursuant to Section 1170.1.” (§ 667.6,
subd. (c).) The court also has discretion to run a sentence on a section 667.6
offense concurrent to another section 667.6 sentence. (People v. Catarino
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 748, 753 [court has “discretion to run the terms
concurrently”].) Section 667.6, subdivision (c) “was intended to provide, in the
context of violent sex offenders, a discretionary sentencing alternative to the
standard consecutive sentencing formula in section 1170.1.” (People v. Jones
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 595 (Jones).)
When a defendant stands convicted of section 667.6 offenses as
well as a non-section 667.6 offense (here, the spousal abuse conviction), the
court has a choice to make at sentencing. It can proceed under section 667.6
and “impose a full, consecutive sentence [for each sexual offense] or, instead,
it may apply the standard consecutive sentencing formula in section 1170.1
[for each sexual offense and the spousal abuse conviction].” (Jones, supra,
46 Cal.3d at p. 593.)
If the trial court “elect[s] to treat all the sex offenses under
section 667.6, subdivision (c), the [nonsex offenses must be] analyzed
independently under sections . . . 1170.1.” (People v. Price (1984)
151 Cal.App.3d 803, 817.) “The computations under sections 1170.1 and
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667.6, subdivision (c) are to be done separately; the total of the section 667.6
computation would then be added to the section 1170.1 total.” (People v.
Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 346.)
Here, the trial court sentenced Negron on the section 667.6
sexual offenses pursuant to that sentencing structure. This represented a
sentence of three years on count one (forcible rape), three years on count two
to run consecutively to count one (sodomy), and three years on count three to
run concurrently to count one (forcible oral copulation). This represented a
total prison term of six years on the section 667.6 offenses.
For the spousal abuse conviction, the trial court, as it was
required to, followed section 1170.1. Because there was only one
section 1170.1 offense, it was designated the principal term, and the court
sentenced Negron to a low term of two years. Per the sentencing procedures
in section 667.6, the court appropriately ran this sentence consecutively to
the section 667.6 sentences. (§ 667.6, subd. (c) [section 667.6 offenses are
“served consecutively to any other term of imprisonment”].) In this situation,
there are no subordinate terms and no obligation to impose a “one-third the
midterm” sentence on count four as Negron contends.
Negron counters that the record demonstrates the trial court
sentenced him on all counts pursuant to the sentencing structure of
section 1170.1. He contends the court designated count one “as the base term
and counts two, three, and four as the subordinate terms.” However, since the
court imposed full-term sentences on each count, as opposed to one-third the
mid-term, it is apparent the court did not designate count one as the
principal term pursuant to the sentencing structure of section 1170.1.
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DISPOSITION
We affirm Negron’s convictions and sentence.
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DELANEY, J.
GOODING, J.
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