People v. Gonzalez CA2/1

CourtListener 10626869CalctappJul 10, 2025

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Filed 7/10/25 P. v. Gonzalez CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B339780

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA504553)
v.

ANGEL ALFREDO VELASQUEZ
GONZALEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Karla D. Kerlin, Judge. Sentence vacated and
remanded with directions.
Law Offices of Andy Miri and Andy Miri for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Seth P. McCutcheon and Lindsay Boyd,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it
“raise[s] no substantial issues of law or fact.” (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.)
A jury found Angel Alfredo Velasquez Gonzalez
(Velasquez)1 guilty of five counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy
with a child under 10 by a person 18 or older (Pen. Code,2 § 288.7,
subd. (a)), four counts against one victim (D.V.), and one count
against another (S.P.). The punishment for a violation of section
288.7, subdivision (a), is 25 years to life in state prison.
The district attorney filed a sentencing memorandum,
urging the trial court to impose a sentence of 125 years to life: a
consecutive term of 25 years to life for each of the five counts
under section 288.7, subdivision (a). In support of the request for
consecutive terms, the district attorney cited section 667.6,
subdivision (d)(1), which provides: “A full, separate, and
consecutive term shall be imposed for each violation of an offense
specified in subdivision (e) if the crimes involve separate victims
or involve the same victim on separate occasions.” The district
attorney asserted that the trial court was “bound by law to
impose full, separate, and consecutive sentences for all counts”
because “[c]ounts 1 through 4 involve conduct against the same
victim on separate occasions” and “[c]ount 5 involves the same
conduct [against] a separate victim,” within the meaning of
section 667.6, subdivision (d)(1).
In his sentencing memorandum, Velasquez asked the court
to sentence him to 25 years to life on count 1 and run the terms

1 We will refer to appellant as “Velasquez,” the surname he

requested the trial court use in referring to him.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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on the other four counts concurrently. He argued a sentence of
125 years to life would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
At the sentencing hearing, Velasquez admitted four factors
in aggravation under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421, that
were alleged in the information. In accord with the district
attorney’s recommendation in the sentencing memorandum, the
trial court sentenced Velasquez to 125 years to life in state
prison, stating that it imposed consecutive terms pursuant to
section 667.6, subdivision (d). Neither side presented argument
at the hearing.
Velasquez appeals from the judgment, seeking
resentencing with directions that the trial court impose a
sentence not exceeding 50 years to life (i.e., 25 years to life for one
of the four counts involving D.V., plus 25 years to life for the
count involving S.P.). He contends the trial court erred in
imposing consecutive terms on all counts involving D.V. In his
appellate briefing, he did not dispute the trial court’s conclusion
that section 667.6, subdivision (d), applied to his crimes. Rather,
he argued: (1) section 667.6, subdivision (d)(2), required the court
to “consider whether, between the commission of one sex crime
and another, the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to
reflect upon the defendant’s actions and nevertheless resumed
sexually assaultive behavior,” and the court did not expressly
state that it did so; (2) a court should not be permitted to
sentence a 21-year-old (Velasquez’s age at sentencing) to a
“virtual life without parole” sentence;3 and (3) the sentence is
unconstitutional because it constitutes cruel and unusual

3 Velasquez stipulated at trial that he was between 18 and

20 years old when the crimes were alleged to have occurred.

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punishment. In the respondent’s brief, the Attorney General
argued the trial court properly imposed consecutive terms under
section 667.6, subdivision (d), and the sentence did not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.
Pursuant to Government Code section 68081, we requested
the parties file supplemental briefing, addressing the following
issues: “Does Penal Code section 667.6 apply to a violation of
Penal Code section 288.7? If the answer is no, is remand for
resentencing required in this case for the trial court to exercise
its discretion as to whether to impose concurrent or consecutive
terms?” We asked these questions because section 667.6
expressly states that it applies to “an offense specified in
subdivision (e),” and Velasquez’s offense—a violation of section
288.7—is not included in subdivision (e) of section 667.6.
(§ 667.6, subds. (a)-(d)(1) & (e).)
The Attorney General filed supplemental briefing;
Velasquez did not. The Attorney General conceded in the letter
brief that the matter must be remanded for resentencing because
“section 667.6, subdivision (d)’s mandatory consecutive
sentencing provision is inapplicable” to a violation of section
288.7, and “the trial court had discretion whether to impose
concurrent or consecutive terms.”
We agree with the Attorney General’s current position.
The trial court indicated at the sentencing hearing that
consecutive terms on all five counts were mandatory under
section 667.6, subdivision (d), and it stated on the record that it
sentenced Velasquez in accordance with this statutory provision.
Because section 667.6 is inapplicable here by its express terms,
and no other statute mandates imposition of five consecutive
terms for the offenses at issue here, resentencing is required so

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the court may exercise its discretion as to whether to impose
concurrent or consecutive terms. Based on our resolution of the
appeal in this manner, we need not address the contentions
Velasquez raised in his appellate briefing in support of his
request for a resentencing hearing.

DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for
resentencing consistent with this opinion. In all other respects,
the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

M. KIM, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.

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