People v. Malfavon CA4/3

CourtListener 10626847CalctappJul 10, 2025

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Filed 7/10/25 P. v. Malfavon CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G064045

v. (Super. Ct. No. 00CF2652)

JASON MICHAEL MALFAVON, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Andre Manssourian, Judge. Affirmed.
Kristen Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
A jury convicted defendant Jason Michael Malfavon of second
degree murder. He filed a resentencing petition under Penal Code section
1172.6, which the trial court dismissed.1 On appeal, his appointed counsel
filed a no-issue brief, requesting that we independently review the record for
error under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). We have
exercised our discretion to review the record but have found no arguable
issues. Thus, we affirm the court’s postjudgment order.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2001, a jury found Malfavon guilty of one count of second
degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), and one count of assault on a child with
force likely to produce great bodily injury resulting in death (§ 273ab).
Malfavon was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life on the
assault count. His sentence on the murder count was stayed.
Malfavon filed a resentencing petition under section 1172.6 in
December 2023, and was later appointed counsel. The trial court dismissed
his petition following a prima facie hearing. It found “[a] review of the record
of conviction, including the instructions presented to the jury at trial, makes
clear there was no felony murder doctrine or natural and probable
consequences theory upon which the jury could have convicted [Malfavon].
[Malfavon] was determined to be the actual killer. Therefore, [Malfavon]
would still be guilty of Murder under currently valid law.”
Malfavon appealed. His counsel then filed a no-issue brief
requesting independent review the record under Delgadillo. Specifically, his

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal

Code.

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counsel asked us to review whether Malfavon was ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
In September 2024, this Court issued an order granting Malfavon
30 days to file a supplemental brief. The order stated his appeal could be
dismissed if he failed to do so. Malfavon did not file a brief.
DISCUSSION
“Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill
1437 ‘to amend the . . . natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it
relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person
who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.’ [Citation.] In addition . . . Senate Bill 1437 added
section 1170.95 [(now section 1172.6)], which provides a procedure for
convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended to
retroactively seek relief.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959.)
The trial court reviews a section 1172.6 petition to determine
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case. “If the petition and
record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for
relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698, 708.)
On an appeal from a dismissal of a section 1172.6 petition, if
appointed counsel finds no arguable issues to pursue, (1) counsel should file a
brief stating that determination with a factual summary of the petition’s
denial, and (2) the court should notify the defendant of his or her right to file
a supplemental brief and that the appeal may be dismissed if no such brief is
filed within 30 days. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 231–232.) If the
defendant files a supplemental brief, the appellate court must evaluate the

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arguments made therein and issue a written opinion. (Id. at p. 232.) If no
supplemental brief is filed, as is the case here, the appellate court has
discretion to dismiss the appeal or review the record independently. (Ibid.)
In the interests of justice, we have exercised our discretion to
independently review the record. We find there are no arguable issues, and
Malfavon is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. The
record shows the jury convicted Malfavon as the actual killer and not under a
natural and probable consequences or any other imputed liability theory. (See
People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710 [“Senate Bill 1437 relief is
unavailable if the defendant was . . . the actual killer”].)
First, the jury was instructed on deliberate and premeditated
murder, unpremeditated murder of the second degree, manslaughter, and
involuntary manslaughter. No instructions were given that would have
allowed the jury to convict Malfavon of any of these crimes based on imputed
malice. Specifically, the jury was not instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, aiding and abetting, or felony murder. Rather, based
on the jury instructions given, to convict Malfavon of second degree murder
the jury had to find he personally “intended unlawfully to kill a human
being.”
Second, the jury also convicted Malfavon of assault on a child
with force likely to produce great bodily injury resulting in death. This count
involved the same victim as the murder count. To convict on the assault
charge, the jury had to find that Malfavon “committed an assault upon the
[victim],” “[t]he assault was committed by means of force that to a reasonable
person would be likely to produce great bodily injury,” and “[t]he assault
resulted in the death of the [victim].” Thus, to convict Malfavon of the assault
count, the jury had to find Malfavon had actually engaged in the action that

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killed the victim. In other words, Malfavon directly caused the victim’s death.
The victim’s death was not caused by another perpetrator whose malice could
then be imputed to Malfavon.
Based on the above, the record conclusively shows Malfavon was
convicted as the actual killer and is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
(People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710.) As such, the trial court did not
err by denying Malfavon’s section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage.
DISPOSITION
The court’s postjudgment order is affirmed.

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, J.

SCOTT, J.

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