People v. Hernandez CA4/1

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Filed 7/9/25 P. v. Hernandez CA4/1
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085995

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF2101116)

KEVIN ALFREDO HERNANDEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Charles J. Koosed, Judge. Affirmed; remanded with directions.
Ronda G. Norris, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski and Anastasia Sagorsky, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
After a verbal and physical altercation, Appellant Kevin Alfredo
Hernandez shot Jose R. A jury convicted Hernandez of second degree
murder. On appeal, he contends the prosecution failed to adequately prove
that he did not act upon sudden heat of passion. We reject this claim and
affirm the judgment.
Hernandez also contends, and the People concede, that a portion of the
probation report the trial court ordered stricken remains in the record. We
accept this concession and remand to the trial court with directions to ensure
that the appropriate portion of the report is stricken from the record.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the evening of March 13, 2021, Hernandez went to a hookah lounge
with his sister-in-law, Aaliyah, and her boyfriend, Jose. Sometime later, they
all went to a liquor store where they purchased bottles of liquor and cans of
Dust Off. The group returned to the hookah lounge parking lot where they
continued to drink, and Hernandez and Jose huffed Dust Off to get high.
While sitting in Aaliyah’s car, Hernandez and Jose started to argue.
When Jose misplaced the car keys, Hernandez called him a “dumb ass bitch.”
In response, Jose told Hernandez that one of Hernandez’s “homie[s] spit in
[his] face.” Hernandez did not know what Jose was referring to and pointed
out that the keys were next to Jose. During this exchange, Hernandez was
standing outside of the car while Jose sat in the backseat. Aaliyah then
realized that her car would not start, so Hernandez gave her his phone to call
for help. As Hernandez handed Aaliyah his phone, he felt a punch to the
nose. Hernandez fell to the ground, and Jose got on top of him. As Jose
“started trying to run” away, Hernandez called out to him and shot him three
times.

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Hernandez fled the scene to a nearby restaurant. The restaurant was
located approximately a five- to six-minute walk away from the hookah
lounge. He knocked on the door and asked to use the phone, claiming he had
an emergency and had lost his phone. The restaurant employee allowed him
to enter and use the phone. The employee noted that Hernandez had nice
clothes on with a little bit of blood on the front of his shirt. The employee
overheard Hernandez’s conversation asking someone to pick him up and
asked him to wait outside. A different restaurant employee flagged down a
police officer who was responding to the call from the scene at the hookah
lounge parking lot. She told the police officer she had “just left work and
there was a male standing outside” with “blood on him asking for a ride.”
While Hernandez was waiting outside the restaurant, the police
arrived. When Hernandez saw the police officers, he dropped his fanny pack,
with the gun inside, into the bushes. The police officers detained Hernandez
and placed him inside the patrol vehicle. Hernandez had blood around his
nose, but did not request medical care or have any visible injuries.
Meanwhile, Jose was pronounced dead in the hookah lounge parking lot.
At the police station, detectives interviewed Hernandez. The video of
the interview was played for the jury. Initially, Hernandez told police he and
Aaliyah went to the hookah lounge where he planned to sell ecstasy pills.
While there, he was robbed. During the ensuing altercation, the assailant
choked him until he lost consciousness. The next thing he remembered was
waking up on the floor, “fighting and fighting, and then the shots” going off,
and everyone running. Hernandez claimed he did not know the person who
robbed, hit and choked him.

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After the detective told Hernandez that his story was not supported
by video surveillance or witnesses, he provided a different version of events.
Hernandez admitted he had not been truthful and explained that he went to
the hookah bar with Aaliyah and Jose. He claimed Jose “kept calling
[him] . . . a bitch.” When Jose misplaced the keys, they traded more insults
until Jose punched Hernandez in the face.
After Hernandez fell to the ground, Jose got on top of him and started

choking him.1 He tried to free himself but could not “wiggle out.” Hernandez
carried a loaded gun in his fanny pack and, while they were struggling, he
saw his gun on the ground. Jose and Hernandez were “tossing and turning
for that . . . gun.” As Jose “started trying to run,” Hernandez grabbed the gun
and “shot him.” He told police that he shot Jose, “[o]n purpose . . . [a]fter [he]
had already gotten choked and [his] nose was bleeding, and [he] didn’t know
what else to do.”
The autopsy performed on Jose showed two gunshot wounds to his
“right neck, and . . . right chest.” A forensic pathologist testified that the
absence of gunpowder on Jose’s skin was consistent with having been shot
from a distance. The pathologist concluded that Jose’s cause of death was
“multiple gunshot wounds.”

DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Hernandez contends there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find
that he committed second degree murder, rather than the lesser included
offense of voluntary manslaughter. Specifically, he argues that the People

1 The alleged choking was not seen by any eyewitnesses or surveillance
cameras.
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failed to disprove that he acted in the heat of passion in response to sufficient
provocation. We conclude substantial evidence supports the jury’s implicit
finding that Hernandez did not kill Jose under provocation that would have
caused a person of average disposition to act rashly and without due
deliberation.

1. Applicable Legal Principles

Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice

aforethought. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)2.) “[S]econd degree murder . . .
is ‘the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought but
without the additional elements, such as willfulness, premeditation, and
deliberation, that would support a conviction of first degree murder.’ ”
(People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507; see §§ 187, subd. (a) & 189.)
“ ‘A defendant who commits an intentional and unlawful killing but who
lacks malice is guilty of . . . voluntary manslaughter.’ ” (People v.
Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 153 (Breverman), citing § 192.)
Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder. (People v.
Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 197 [“Lesser included offenses of first degree
premeditated murder include second degree murder, voluntary
manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter”]; Breverman, at p. 154.)
An intent to unlawfully kill generally constitutes malice. (§ 188.)
But a defendant who unlawfully kills in the “heat of passion” lacks malice
and is guilty of voluntary manslaughter. (§ 192, subd. (a); see People v.
Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 109–110.) Provocation distinguishes this form
of manslaughter from murder. (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192,
1225 (Rangel).)

2 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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“ ‘To be adequate, the provocation must be one that would cause an
emotion so intense that an ordinary person would simply react, without
reflection. . . . [T]he anger or other passion must be so strong that the
defendant’s reaction bypassed his thought process to such an extent that
judgment could not and did not intervene.’ ” (Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at
p. 1225.) “ ‘The provocative conduct may be physical or verbal, and it may
comprise a single incident or numerous incidents over a period of time.’ ”
(People v. Wright (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1481 (Wright).) “The passion
aroused can be anger, rage, or any violent, intense, highly wrought
or enthusiastic emotion, except revenge.” (Ibid.) “[I]f sufficient time has
elapsed for the passions of an ordinarily reasonable person to cool, the killing
is murder, not manslaughter.” (Rangel, at p. 1225, internal quotation marks
omitted.)
Heat of passion can reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter when,
“at the time of the killing, defendant’s reason was (1) actually obscured as a
result of a strong passion; (2) the passion was provoked by the victim’s
conduct; and (3) the provocation was sufficient to cause an ordinary person
of average disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection,
and from this passion rather than from due deliberation or reflection.”
(Wright, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1481; accord, People v. Carasi (2008) 44
Cal.4th 1263, 1306 (Carasi).) Accordingly, “both subjectively felt heat of
passion and objectively reasonable provocation are needed to negate malice
and reduce a murder to” voluntary manslaughter. (Wright, at p. 1481.)
Whether a defendant killed with malice aforethought (constituting murder)
or killed in the heat of passion (constituting voluntary manslaughter) is a
factual matter for the jury to decide. (Id. at p. 1482.)

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On review for sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we
must “ ‘examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment
to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier
of fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People
v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 657–658.) We will not reverse a
conviction unless there is no hypothesis upon which sufficient substantial
evidence exists to support it. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) We
must “presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier
could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Jones (1990) 51
Cal.3d 294, 314.) “The same standard applies when the conviction rests
primarily on circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978,
1053; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396 [“An appellate court must
accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the
circumstantial evidence”].) “Given this deferential standard of review, a
‘defendant bears an enormous burden in claiming there is insufficient
evidence’ to support a conviction.” (People v. Wear (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th
1007, 1020.)

2. Analysis

There was substantial evidence at trial from which the jury could
reasonably determine that Hernandez did not kill Jose in the heat of passion
because of legally sufficient provocation. First, “[i]f enough time passed
between the provocation and the killing for a person of average disposition
to ‘cool off’ and regain his or her clear reasoning and judgment, then the
killing is not reduced to voluntary manslaughter on this basis.” (CALCRIM
No. 570; Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1225.) Hernandez told police officers
that after the physical altercation, Jose “started trying to run,” “started

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turning,” and “was trying to get away” when Hernandez called out to him
and shot him three times. Although Hernandez claims he had “intense
emotions” after Jose beat him up, there was sufficient time for Jose to walk
away from Hernandez to such a distance that he had no gunpowder residue
on his body. Specifically, there was time for Jose to move away, and for
Hernandez to locate the gun and stand up. Hernandez then called out to Jose
before shooting him. (See People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 706 [attack
after confrontation dissipated was not sufficient provocation].) From these
circumstances, the jury reasonably could infer that “any passions that may
have been aroused upon first [being hit] had cooled so that the killing became
an act of revenge or punishment.” (People v. Fenenbock (1996) 46
Cal.App.4th 1688, 1704; see People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1144
[passion for revenge will not reduce murder to manslaughter]; People v.
Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 863 [jury could have concluded that during the
time it took to run 178 feet, defendant considered his options].)
Second, even assuming Hernandez felt subjectively provoked, evidence
of the required objective component did not compel a finding in Hernandez’s
favor. (See People v. Padilla (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 675, 679 [subjective
evidence of provocation alone “cannot as a matter of law negate malice so as
to mitigate murder to voluntary manslaughter”].) Jose’s provocative conduct
consisted of insults, rehashing a prior incident allegedly involving
Hernandez’s friend, and punching Hernandez in the face. While a jury could
conclude such behavior was difficult to tolerate, a jury could also reasonably
conclude that such conduct would not naturally arouse judgment-clouding
passion in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person, particularly when
Jose had stopped hitting Hernandez and had already walked away when
Hernandez fired the gun. (See Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 950 [“This

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passion must be a [v]iolent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion”
(internal quotation marks omitted)].)
The People presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could
conclude that the passions of an ordinarily reasonable person in Hernandez’s
circumstances would have cooled before the killing, and that such a person
also would not have reacted rashly without due deliberation. Accordingly,
we will not disturb the jury’s verdict finding Hernandez guilty of murder on
sufficiency of the evidence grounds.

B. Probation Report

Hernandez contends, and the People concede, that although the trial
court ordered a portion of the probation report stricken from the record, it
nonetheless remains in the record. Specifically, the court ordered lines 11
through 16 on page 6 of the probation report be stricken because “that person
did not testify . . . and . . . it would be inappropriate to leave that in there as
if they did or were impeached.” Accordingly, we remand this matter to the
superior court with instructions to strike lines 11 through 16 on page 6 of the
probation officer’s amended sentencing recommendation.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed and the matter is remanded to the superior
court with instructions to implement the order striking lines 11 through 16
on page 6 of the amended probation report.
DATO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, J.

RUBIN, J.

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