People v. Doron CA4/1

CourtListener 10623695CalctappJul 7, 2025

Full text

Filed 7/7/25 P. v. Doron CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084487

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD280854)

KARL WILLIAM DORON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Howard H. Shore, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Lopas Law Group and Matthew A. Lopas for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley, Supervising Deputy Attorney General and Michael
D. Butera, Deputy Attorney General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Karl William Doron appeals from an order granting him Penal Code

section 1001.361 pretrial mental health diversion following this court’s

remand in his prior appeal, People v. Doron (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1.2 In
Doron, we held in accordance with People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618
(Frahs) and People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791 (Braden) that section
1001.36—which had been amended during the pendency of Doron’s appeal—
applied retroactively to Doron’s nonfinal judgment. (Doron, at pp. 4, 6-7.)
Because the superior court had not applied the statute’s new evidentiary
burdens, we “revers[ed] the [trial court’s] order denying Doron’s motion for
mental health diversion and remand[ed] the matter with directions that the
trial court conduct a new hearing to consider his application for mental
health diversion under section 1001.36 as amended by Senate Bill No. 1223.”
(Id. at pp. 10-11.) In granting diversion following remand, the trial court in
May 2024 recalled its previously imposed sentence under section 1172.1,
subdivision (a)(1), “maintain[ed]” Doron’s guilty plea, and stayed his
sentencing pending successful completion of mental health diversion.
In this appeal, Doron contends the court erred by maintaining the
judgment and his conviction despite granting section 1001.36 diversion; that
he should have been returned to a pre-plea position in compliance with our

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Doron had appealed from a judgment following his August 30, 2021
guilty plea to several counts of robbery, attempted robbery and firearm
allegations, for which he received a sentence of 10 years four months as
specified in our prior opinion. (People v. Doron, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p.
3.) Prior to his guilty plea, Doron unsuccessfully sought pretrial mental
health diversion. (Id. at pp. 4-5.) The order denying section 1001.36
diversion was the subject of his prior appeal.
2
directions on remand, a plain reading of section 1001.36, and Braden, supra,
14 Cal.5th 791. Doron asks us to direct the court to enter a new order
vacating his guilty plea, judgment and sentencing. The People concede that
the trial court should not have maintained Doron’s judgment and conviction
during his section 1001.36 diversion. They disagree, however, that Doron is
entitled to an unconditional reversal of his convictions so as to return him to
a pre-plea posture regardless of whether he successfully completes mental
health treatment required for diversion. The People ask this court to clarify
that our prior disposition conditionally reversed Doron’s conviction and
sentence such that they will be dismissed if he successfully completes
diversion and reinstated if he does not.
Our disposition reversing the order denying section 1001.36 diversion,
read in context with our adoption of Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th 618, constituted
a limited remand for the purpose of allowing the trial court to consider
Doron’s eligibility for diversion under the statute. Accordingly, Doron’s
judgment (his conviction by guilty plea and sentence) was conditionally
reversed for that purpose. The court found Doron met the section 1001.36
eligibility requirements and granted him diversion. However, because it also
“maintain[ed Doron’s] plea from August 20, 2021,” we direct the court in
accordance with Frahs to amend its order as indicated below and further
direct: “ ‘If [Doron] successfully completes diversion, then the court shall
dismiss the charges. However, if . . . [Doron] does not successfully complete
diversion, then his convictions and sentence shall be reinstated.’ ” (Frahs,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 640-641.)

3
DISCUSSION
On issuance of a remittitur, “ ‘the trial court’s jurisdiction with regard
to the “remitted action” is limited solely to the making of orders necessary to
carry the judgment into effect.’ ” (People v. Hargis (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 199,
204.) “ ‘The actual judgment is the one-paragraph disposition . . . found at
the end of the opinion.’ ” (Ducoing Management, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015)
234 Cal.App.4th 306, 312-313.) “The appellate court need not expressly
comment on every matter intended to be covered by the disposition. The
disposition is construed according to the wording of its directions, as read
with the appellate opinion as a whole.” (Id. at p. 313.) “ ‘[I]f a remittitur is
ambiguous, the trial court can interpret it in light of the law and the
appellate opinion to determine its duties.’ ” (Ayyad v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P.
(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 851, 863, fn. 7.) “Whether the trial court has
correctly interpreted an appellate opinion is an issue of law subject to de novo
review.” (Ducoing Management, Inc., at p. 313.) This court too looks to the
disposition’s directions in conjunction with the opinion as a whole. (Ibid.; see
also Ruegg & Ellsworth v. City of Berkeley (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 258, 264,
270.)
In Frahs, the California Supreme Court decided that section 1001.36
applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments, and did so in the case before it.
(Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 624, 640.) Following that conclusion, the court
addressed the proper remedy. (Id. at p. 637.) Frahs stated that when the
record affirmatively discloses a defendant appears to meet at least the first
threshold eligibility requirement for mental health diversion—that he or she
suffers from a qualifying mental disorder—the defendant is entitled to a
“limited remand for the trial court to decide whether he [or she] should
receive diversion under section 1001.36.” (Id. at pp. 624-625, 640.) In the

4
context of a jury conviction (id. at pp. 625-626), the Frahs court explained
that “by conditionally reversing defendant’s convictions and sentence for an
eligibility hearing under section 1001.36, the case would be restored to its
procedural posture before the jury verdict for purposes of evaluating
defendant’s eligibility for pretrial mental health diversion. [Citation.] At
that point, defendant faced a mere allegation of a prior serious felony
conviction, which is not enough to prohibit a suspended sentence or
diversion.” (Id. at pp. 639-640.)
Thus, in its disposition Frahs conditionally reversed the defendant’s
convictions and sentence, and instructed the trial court that if it found
defendant met the section 1001.36 eligibility requirements, “ ‘then the court
may grant diversion. If [defendant] successfully completes diversion, then
the court shall dismiss the charges. However, if the court determines that
[defendant] does not meet the criteria under section 1001.36, or if [defendant]
does not successfully complete diversion, then his convictions and sentence
shall be reinstated.’ ” (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 640-641.) It directed
the Court of Appeal to remand the cause to the trial court for proceedings
consistent with its opinion. (Id. at p. 641.)
In People v. Braden, the court addressed a question left unanswered by
Frahs—what was the latest point in criminal proceedings for a defendant to
request pretrial diversion—and held the request must be made before
attachment of jeopardy at trial or the entry of a plea, whichever occurs first.
(People v. Braden, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 799-802, 819, 824-825.) The
answer turned on section 1001.36’s definition of “pretrial diversion,” and the

5
meaning of the statute’s phrase “until adjudication.” (Id. at p. 801.)3 Braden
examined the statute’s text referring to pretrial diversion in the context of
the entire legislative scheme, as well as the Legislature’s use of the term in
other statutes, which had been long understood to refer to the period before
trial begins. (Id. at pp. 805-807.) The court observed that the statute
required the defendant to waive the right to a speedy trial, which indicated
the defendant’s consent to referral of his case should be tendered before the
commencement of trial. (Id. at pp. 807-808.) It also observed section 1001.36
contained no procedure for granting a mistrial or waiving double jeopardy,
suggesting the Legislature did not intend to authorize midtrial diversion.
(Id. at p. 808.) Further, the placement of section 1001.36 within the Penal
Code was consistent with the understanding of pretrial diversion to mean
that the case would be diverted out of the adjudicatory system before the
process of determining guilt by trial or plea begins. (Id. at p. 809.) The court
found its conclusions consistent with the legislative goals to apply the mental
health diversion program as broadly as possible, as it merely established
when eligible persons had to make a diversion request. (Id. at p. 817.)
“Requiring that a request be made before trial begins makes a diversion
request available for all who qualify. If diversion is deemed appropriate, a
grant saves pretrial expenditures, including those attendant on repeated
appearances and pretrial custody costs, as well as resources consumed by
trials. Encouraging resort to early mental health treatment can increase the
chances for therapeutic success and protect both the public and the defendant

3 Section 1001.36, subdivision (f)(1) provides: “As used in this chapter
. . . ‘Pretrial diversion’ means the postponement of prosecution, either
temporarily or permanently, at any point in the judicial process from the
point at which the accused is charged until adjudication, to allow the
defendant to undergo mental health treatment,” subject to specified
conditions.
6
from future burdens resulting from treatable mental health conditions.” (Id.
at p. 818.)
Braden rejected the defendant’s various arguments seeking a different
conclusion, including that the term “adjudication” meant the legal process of
resolving a dispute, and not a single point in the process. (Braden, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 810.) Adopting the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, Braden
explained that to interpret “until adjudication” to mean mid- or posttrial,
would conflict with the concept of pretrial diversion: “ ‘[I[t is understandable
why the Legislature used the term “until adjudication” rather than a phrase
such as “until trial.” Most adjudications occur by guilty plea, rather than
through trial, so defining “pretrial” using the term “until adjudication”
encompasses both a plea hearing and an adjudication by trial.’ ” (Ibid.)
Citing Braden’s holding as to the meaning of pretrial diversion, Doron
makes several arguments as to why the superior court erred by maintaining
his judgment and conviction despite its grant of pretrial mental health
diversion. Interspersed in these arguments is a claim that our disposition in
Doron, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th 1 was “not a conditional reversal” and that it
“place[d] the procedural posture of the case back to the original mental health
diversion hearing—preplea.”
Because the People concede—correctly—that the court should not have
maintained Doron’s guilty plea while at the same time ordering diversion, the
sole point we address is whether our disposition in Doron unconditionally or
conditionally reversed Doron’s judgment. Our reliance there on Frahs, supra,
9 Cal.5th 618 answers the question. Read in context with Frahs, which
expressly addressed what remedy was appropriate for a court applying
section 1001.36 to a defendant entitled to retroactive application of that
statute, Doron’s judgment (his conviction by guilty plea and sentence)

7
qualified for the sort of limited reversal procedure approved by Frahs.
(Frahs, at p. 641; People v. Laino (2004) 32 Cal.4th 878, 895 [“the general
California rule [is] that ‘ “A plea of guilty constitutes a conviction” ’ ”];
Estrada v. Public Employees’ Retirement System (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 870,
883 [“a plea of guilty . . . ‘is a “conclusive admission of guilt” [citation], and
constitutes a conviction “ ‘within the ordinary as well as the technical
meaning of the word’ ” ’ ”]; People v. Marroquin (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th Supp.
31 [“ ‘As the effect of a plea of guilty is to admit all of the elements of the
crime charged, [the defendant] stood convicted of the offense in the eyes of
the law’ ”].) Nothing in Braden, supra, 14 Cal.5th 791 changed that
procedural remedy, as Braden addressed an entirely different question about
the timeliness of a defendant’s diversion request.
Thus, we conditionally reversed and remanded Doron’s judgment for
the court to consider whether he was eligible for mental health diversion
under section 1001.36. The trial court did so and granted diversion. Under
Frahs, “ ‘If [Doron] successfully completes diversion, then the court shall
dismiss the charges. However, if . . . [Doron] does not successfully complete
diversion, then his convictions and sentence shall be reinstated.’ ” (Frahs,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 640-641.)

8
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded with directions that the court amend its May
13, 2024 minute order granting section 1001.36 pretrial mental health
diversion to eliminate the following paragraph: “The Court recalls the
previously imposed sentence from October 21, 2021, pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.1[, subdivision] (a)(1). The Court is maintaining the defendant’s
plea from August 30, 2021. Sentencing is stayed pending successful
completion of Mental Health Diversion.” The court is further directed: If
Doron successfully completes diversion, then the court shall dismiss the
charges. If Doron does not successfully complete diversion, then his
conviction and sentence shall be reinstated. In all other respects, the order is
affirmed.
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

DATO, J.

9

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.